CHINA: THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR CHALLENGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 5, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
Q
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
Central Intelligence Ageng
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
5 July 1985
China: The Tactical Nuclear Challenge ~~ 25X1
Beijing recognizes that its arsenal of strategic missiles provides
China few nuclear options, short of an attack on a Soviet city, if Moscow 25X1
uses tactical nuclear weapons in an otherwise conventional conflict.
circumstantial evidence suggests
that China is working to develop its own tactical nuclear weapons. If
Beijing makes a sufficient commitment of resources, we believe that within
the next three years the Chinese could field new theater nuclear missile
units for use against easily targeted Soviet military facilities along the
border. 25X1
Initially, these units probably will be equipped with
medium-range solid propellant missile and within five to
ten years will receive shorter-range ba istic missi es. This new theater 25X1
nuclear force would increase China's options in responding to tactical
nuclear strikes. But we believe it will take at least a decade for Beijing to
develop the full range of advanced tactical nuclear weapons that would
allow it to respond to every level of Soviet nuclear escalation. 25X1
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asian Analysis. 25X1
Information available as of 5 July 1985 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries .are welcome and may. be directed to the Chief, Defense Issues Branch, China
Division, OEA, on 25X1
EA M 85-10129C
25X1 I I I 25X1
Copy of 75
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
A Need for a Theater Nuclear Force
We believe the Second Artillery Corps provides China with the ability to retaliate
to a Soviet strategic nuclear attack but is incapable of pertorming limited theater or
tactical missions. It consists of a few ICBMs and 60 to 120 medium- and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles that could not.. be easily shifted from their current
targets--enemy industrial and population centers--to strike relatively small military
facilities. The Chinese Air Force lacks the high-performance aircraft .needed to deliver
nuclear .weapons to a battlefield or behind enemy lines in the face of modern Soviet
airpower and ground based air defenses. And although the Chinese have
the capability to build atomic demolition munitions (ADMs), these weapons are difficult,
to emplace quickly or in combat and may not be in the right place when they are
needed. In sum, China's current nuclear-capable forces do not provide Beijing with a
flexible tactical nuclear capability.
25X1 25X1
Beijing appears cognizant of the limitations of its nuclear arsenal of strategic
missiles and is at least contemplating the development of tactical nuclear capabilities.
25X1
25X1
Chinese military thinkers over the past decade. These writers argue that China's nuclear
.forces do not deter tactical nuclear war because they cannot be used effectively for
retaliatory strikes in kind for Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons during an invasion
of China. 25X1 25X1
Beijing's interest in developing theater nuclear forces probably stems in part from
the adoption of a new, more aggressive defense strategy for northeastern China. The
new conventional strategy is aimed at engaging Soviet forces in heavy conflict before
they approach major industrial and population centers and depends on the concentration
of Chinese infantry divisions in relatively forward positions.l The Chinese probably
realize that this revision of Mao's "luring an enemy in deep" strategy could provide the
Soviets with a battlefield dilemma; if faced with a slowed or even stalled advance along
certain invasion corridors the Soviets--to maintain the offensive--might resort to
tactical nuclear strikes early in the conflict to obliterate China's dug-in defenders.
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
25X1
A less likely Chinese option is to equip new theater missile units with existing
antiship missiles modified to carry nuclear weapons.
We believe, however, that while the Chinese variant of the
25X1
STYXs has a guidance system suitable for attacking ships at sea, the Chinese would 25X1
have great difficult modif in the guidance to acquire much less easily differentiated
land targets. 25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2ox~i
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
We
expect that by 1995, a more .mobile solid-propellant RBM will be ready for use and by
then the Chinese may even have developed enhanced radiation weapons or nuclear
artillery as well. In this manner, within a decade Beijing may have developed a
full-range of advanced tactical nuclear weapons with which to attempt to deny potential
Soviet gains at every level of nuclear escalation. (S NF)
China.
Nonetheless, for the foreseeable. future Soviet tactical nuclear capabilities will
remain overwhelmingly superior to China's in numbers of weapons, flexibility,
performance, readiness, and training. New theater missile units will, if deployed,
enhance China's ability to retaliate against Soviet military targets without
catastrophically escalating the level of conflict. They will, therefore, complicate Soviet
nuclear planning and increase the risk Moscow would face in using nuclear weapons in
When the Chinese deploy theater nuclear units, we believe that Beijing
will place tactical nuclear weapons under the control of regional military
commanders instead of the Second Artiller Cor s--China's strate is ballistic
missile force.
Such a deployment scheme
is consistent with US and Soviet practices and would make the tactical nuclear
forces far more responsive. These, units would train with the ground combat
armies they would support and give regional commanders the means to
respond promptly to shifting conditions in combat. 25X1
Nonetheless, we are certain that, as is the case with US and Soviet
theater nuclear forces, all of China's nuclear weapons still will be tightly
controlled by the highest levels of authority.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
 }
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
SUBJECT: China: The Tactical Nuclear Challenge'
DISTRIBUTION:
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Copy 1 Henry Cooper, Assistant Director, Strategic Programs
National Security Council
Copy 2 Gaston Sigur, Senior Staff Member, East Asia, EOB Rm 302.
Copy 3 Don Gregg, Special Assistant to the Vice-President,
White House Rm 298.
Copy 4 David Laux, Senior Assistant for China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong
EOB Rm 302. '
Department of State
Copy 5 Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary, East Asian and
Pacific Affairs,. Rm 6205. ~
Copy 6 AMB Morton Abramowitz; Director INR, Rm 6,531.
Copy 7 Herbert Levin, Policy Planning Staff, Rm 7330.
Copy 8 David N Schwartz, Office of Policy Analysis, Rm 7430.
Copy 9 Donald M Anderson, Director, EA/CH, Rm 4318.
Copy 10 AMB Alan W. Holmes, Director, Bureau of Political and
Military Affairs, Rm 7327.
Copy 11 Charles Kartman, Bureau of Political Military ,Affairs, Rm 7430.
Copy 12 Mark Pratt, EA/RA/TC, Rm 4312.
Copy 13 Charles Martin, INR/EAP/CH, Rm 8840.
Copy 14 Mark A Sigler, INR/PMA, Rm 6524A.
Copy 15 Jack Sontag, INR/EAP/CH, Rm 8840.
Department of Defense
. ~
Copy 16 Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA,
Rm 4E808, Pentagon.
Copy 17 Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy, Rm 4E838, Pentagon.
Copy 18 James Kelly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia, ISA,
Rm 4E817, Pentagon.
Copy 19 Major General William E. Odom, Army Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Rm 2E466, Pentagon.
Copy 20 Commodore James D Cosset', Director of East Asia and Pacific
Region, International Security Affairs, Rm 4C839, Pentagon.
Copy 21 LTC Gary Weis, ISA, Rm 4C849, Pentagon
Copy 22 John J Sloan, Defense Intelligence Officer, East Asia and
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
Department of Energy
Copy 28 Douglas Faulkner, DOE/DP-421, GA-257, Forrestal Bldg.
National Photographic Interpretation Center
Copy 3 NPIC/IEG/EAFD,
Central Intelligence Agency
Copy 31 DDI (7E44)
Copy 32 C/ACTS (6F20)
Copy 33 NIO/EA (7E62)
Copy 34 NIO/SP (2E49)
Copy 35 NIO/USSR-EE (7E62)
Copy 36 NIO/S&T (5G00)
Copy 37 C/EA/RR (5D10
Copy 38 C/DDO/EA~ (5D38)
Copy 39 DDO/EA/ (5D54)
Copy 40 C/PES (7F24)
Copy 41 NIC/Analytical Group (7E47)
Copy 42 PDB Staff (7F30)
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
43 CPAS/ILS (7G50)
44-46 CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
47-48 OCR/ISG (1H19)
49 C/OCR/DSG/EA (1 H 18)
50 C/BONA/SF/0 (4E13)
51 C/BONA/RIG/EA (5E25)
52 C/SOVA/SF/0 (4E13)
53 C/BONA/PA%E (4E46)
54 . C/SOVA/TWAD/A (4E 12)
55 C/SOVA/TWAD/T (4E28)
56 D/OSWR (5F46)
57 C/OSWR/DSD (4G00)
58 C/OSWR/DSD/BMB (5F22)
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
D/OEA (4F18)
C/OEA/PROD (4G32)
C/OEA/NEA (4G43)
C/OEA/SEA (4F38)
C/OEA/CH (4G32)
25X1
25X11
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3
Copy 67 C/OEA/CH (4G32)
Copy 68 C/OEA/CH/DOM (4G32)
Copy 69 C/OEA/CH/FOR (4G32)
Copy 70 C/OEA/CH/DEV (4G32)
Copy 71-75 C/OEA/CH/DEF (4G32)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/26 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000201640001-3