CAMBODIA: RAINY SEASON UPDATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000201660003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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IUP SECRET
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
1 July 1985
Cambodia: Rainy Season Update
Summary
As the rainy season in Cambodia moves into its
third month, Vietnamese forces are. moving
-aggressively-t-o counter efforts by the non-Communist
resistance--the Khmer People's National Liberation
Front (KPNLF) and Prince Sihanouk's National Army
(ANS)--to extend guerrilla operations in the
interior. Hanoi's heavy emphasis on "sealing" the
Thai-Cambodia border, however, has given the more
resilient Communist Democratic Kampuchean (DK)
forces under Pol Pot enough breathing room to
sustain an active campaign in the provinces. Our
preliminary analysis of resistance efforts suggests
that this pattern of performance will prevail
through the rest of the rainy season and that
Vietnam's dominant military position will remain
unchanged.
The Vietnamese: Keeping the Heat On
Vietnamese forces have given the Cambodian resistance little
respite in the border area since overrunning the last of the
This memorandum was prepared by , Southeast Asia
Division, Office of East Asian Analysis.' Information available
as of 1 July 1985 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Southeast
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major resistance bases at Ta Tum in March.* Regular sweep
operations have been conducted near and against most of the
regrouping areas established just inside Thailand by the
resistance. The KPNLF was forced to abandon one such location at
Prey Chan in late April, and patrol activity inside Thailand near
Ta Tum recently prompted a precautionary evacuation deeper inside
Thailand of the Sihanoukist civilian camp at Green Hill.
Sustained attacks since late December also forced most DK forces
in southwestern Cambodia to m their remainina border bases
into Thailand by late April.
(Despite
such misadventures and persistent morale proms however,
we believe Hanoi is making modest overall progress in
strengthening its client's military capabilities. We expect
Hanoi to continue emphasizing PRK self-reliance as a primary
tenet of its Cambodian strategy.
Vietnamese late last year instituted a major campaign to
construct barriers in many border areas. Thousands of Cambodian
civilians were conscripted for the campaign, which has been
portrayed in the PRK media as an important element in increasing
In a parallel effort to inhibit resistance infiltration, the
the regime's self-reliance in security affairs.
the barriers generally consist of dual barbed
wire fences, between which are placed large numbers of landmines
and other booby traps,
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May 1985, the Non-Communist Cambodian Resistance a a
Crossroads.
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*For an analysis of Vietnam's new strategy in Cambodia and
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The Non-Communist Resistance: Slow Off The Mark
The toughened Vietnamese strategy has strongly tested the
ability-of the KPNLF and ANS to carry guerrilla warfare to the
Cambodian interior. The KPNLF, in particular, has made little
headway in the face of Vietnam's aggressive patrol and sweep
operations. Although the KPNLF has claimed to have between 2,000
and 3,000 troops engaged in interior operations at vari times
this ye- ~dS OT r y June, Vietnamese pressure had
force a but 400 to return to their bases in Thailand.
Infiltration efforts resumed in mid-June as Vietnamese sweeps
temporarily abated, but KPNLF operations will probably not go
. .. The KP.NLF.'-s- weak. lea-dersh-ip and loose command- structure have
continued to impede development of an effective guerrilla
program. Son Sann's reluctant agreement in early May to yield
his military responsibilities as commander-in-chief to Major
General Sak Sutsakhan removed a major element of contention
within the Front, but Sak's frequent hospitalizations have
hampered his ability to exert his authority. The ill-advised
resistance by Chea Chhut's garrison at Prey Chan to sustained
Vietnamese attacks in April dramatized the continuing lack of
strong central direction within the KPNLF leadership. Many of
the Prey Chan troops subsequently deserted and the base was
abandoned by late May. Although many of these troops have
recently regrouped at a new location near Bak Ronaos, morale and
discipline problems persist there as well as in other KPNLF
unchallenged for long.
Sihanouk's forces, in contrast, have rebounded surprisingly
from the loss of their base at Ta Tum. Since March, the ANS has
mapped out a methodical plan for expanding its operations into
Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey Province as far south as the Tonle Sap.
Although we cannot verify ANS claims of having moved as many as
5,000 troops into the interior in recent months, they have
mounted several major operations designed to establish some of
the contacts with local residents required for a long-term
increased Vietnamese sweep operations and population control
measures since mid-May have forced some retrenchment in ANS
guerrilla effort.
interior operations. Vietnamese patrols against ANS positions
inside Thailand have also disrupted their operations and prompted
the evacuation of civilian dependents from Green Hill in early
June.
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The DK Interior Campaign
Vietnamese forces are also maintaining heavy pressure
against most DK bases now situated in Thailand, and guerrilla
supply links from the border remain tenuous. But Hanoi's
preoccupation with border operations has provided an opportunity
for DK forces to carry out an active guerrilla campaign
throughout much of the Cambodian interior since January. The DK
has sought to demonstrate that Vietnam's offensive, rather than
destroying the resistance, only shifted the war to the
interior. Although DK forces operating near the border were at
least temporarily disrupted by the loss of their border bases, a
The bulk of Vietnamese combat power remains committed
against resistance forces and infiltration routes near the Thai
border, indicating that the Vietnamese do not at this time regard
the DK operations in the interior as sufficiently serious to
commit additional resources to deal with them. Although the DK
activity cannot be measured precisely, we believe it is not up to
the levels of 1983, which so far stands as the best DK
performance. An indicator that the Vietnamese have revised their
assessment of the DK threat would be the deployment of additional
combat units from Vietnam; for example, elements of the two
divisions that temporarily deployed to Cambodia earlier this year
for the dry season border campaign.*
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Outlook. For The R,a.in,y Season: Tighteni'n the Lid
Hanoi appears intent on maintaining heavy military pressure
to frustrate resistance plans for increased operations in the
border area during the rainy season. The pattern of sweep
operations and crossborder intrusions in areas of resistance
activity that has emerged since February will probably continue
and will involve occasional sharp encounters with Thai units as
well.* An important political motivation for Hanoi is to deny
the resistance any identifiable territorial holdings inside
Cambodia, a point it could then exploit during debates at non-
aligned and United Nations meetings later this year. Beyond
immediate tactical and political benefits, Hanoi seems to believe
that unrelenting military pressure at this stage is a necessary
part of its overall strategy of convincing the resistance and its
We believe the non-Communist resistance will make little
progress during this . ra.i.ny_..season toward-meeting even their own
modest goals for establishing the necessary groundwork inside
Cambodia for sustained guerrilla operations. The absence of a
functioning support base in the interior and Vietnam's aggressive
strategy, in our judgment, will limit their operations to
relatively shallow zones. Lack of appreciable progress this year
is likely, in turn, to render prospects for future headway more
remote. On the other hand, Communist DK guerrillas will probably
be able to sustain their activity over the next several months
and have the potential to score occasional highly visible
successes. But their actions are not likely to alter
significantly the strategic advantages Vietnam has acquired over
*Vietnamese occupation of hilltop positions in Trat Province
during attacks on DK guerrilla forces in April, for example,
sparked periodic heavy fighting between Thailand Vietnamese P
forces over a two-week period in May.
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SUBJECT: Cambodia: Rainy Season Update
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OEA/SEA/ITM
George Shultz, Secretary of State
Richard Childress, NSC
Alan Kitchens, INR/State
Dottie Avery. INR/State
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Paula
Breckon, EAP/VLK/State
Causey. INR/State
Joseph Winer, P/IMBS/State
John Maisto, EAP/PHL/State
Frazier Meade-, EAP/TB/State
Fritsch. State Pql/Mil
Richard Rice,, Dept. of Defense
John Finney, Dept. of.Defense
William Wise, Dept. of Defense
Alice Straub, INR/State
Nicholas Mauger, State/Thai Desk
Paul Wolfowitz, State/AS/EAP
John Mon.io, State/DAS/EAP
Commodore James Cossey, 0SD/ISA/DOD
Richard Armitage. DOD/ASD/ISA
C/OGI
C/OCR
Executive Director
DDI
NIO/EA
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C/OEA/NEA
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Bill Heaton, NIC/Analytical Group
OEA/SEA/IB
C/OEA/SEAD
DC/OEA/SEAD
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