NORTH KOREA: NEW WEAPONS IN THE MILITARY FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000201940001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 15, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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NGA Review Complete
10
North Korea: New Weapons in the Military Forces
Summary
North Korea continues to add new and improved
weapons and equipment as force modernization
progresses. An improved relationship with Moscow
has allowed P'yongyang to begin receiving weapons
systems of a technological level heretofore
unavailable from China or domestic production.
This
year
the Soviets are providing MIG-23 fighters
and
SA-3
surface-to-air missiles. Although we have
not
yet
confirmed the source of a limited number of
Scud
surface-to-surface missiles now in North Korea,
the
Soviets designed and produced this weapon. Moscow
certainly approved the shipment of over 100 Soviet-
designed, Polish-built MI-2 helicopters between 1980
and 1984.
Beijing continues to provide at least technical
assistance to P'yongyang. We believe that the
Chinese are aiding the North in establishing
domestic jet fighter production, and that an
aircraft soon to enter prototype assembly or
production will be a copy of the Chinese F-7, an
improved variant of the early model Soviet MIG-21.
China also appears to be aiding North Korean efforts
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to develop an air-launched antiship missile and a
mobile missile for coastal defense.
Domestic weapons development continues as the
North Koreans use rather ingenious methods to design
and produce systems using highly modified mixes of
Soviet and Chinese weapons and equipment. A self-
propelled, radar-controlled, antiaircraft gun
system, and an infantry fighting vehicle are the
latest to be readied for deployment as part of North
Korea's growing ground forces mechanization program.
yongyang is intent on tie ing a new ank or
improved version of the T-55 or T-62 tanks that have
been produced in North Korea.
All of the new weapons are rather dated
technology, but they represent an improvement over
equipment currently in use and help correct
weaknesses, particularly those in the air and
mechanized forces. Major improvements in weapons
quality shall depend on outside supplies, but the
trend toward closer relations with Moscow suggests
that the Soviets may offer a wider variety of
weapons in the future. We do not know, however,
just how far Moscow might go in providing weapons,
nor what the Soviets might demand in return.
Soviet Weapons Supply
This year the USSR began providing North Korea with MIG-23
fighters and SA-3 surface-to-air missiles. These deliveries
represent the first supply of major weapons by the Soviets in
over 10 years. The MIG-23 and particularly the SA-3 are dated in
design, but they provide P'yongyang with weapons with qualities
heretofore unavailable that will significantly upgrade the
capabilities in the North's air and air defense forces.
The MIG-23s'are the first combat aircraft delivered by the
Soviets since 1974, and the first relatively modern fighters
introduced into North Korea in over 20 years.* We believe that
the Flogger-G variant now in the North has the same avionics and
weapons packages that are standard on Flogger-Gs in the Soviet
forces and include the AA-7 Apex missile.
*All photos are attached at the end of this memorandum.
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The'MIG-23 - Apex combination would give the North its
first, true-all-weather fighter-interceptor, and the only
aircraft equipped with. all-aspect missiles. Both the infrared
and. radar guided versions of the Apex can be used in nearly all
angles of attack at medium altitudes against opposing aircraft.
,Other North Korean fighters with older infrared Atolls are
limited to missile'attacks from the rear quadrant. The radar-
homing-Apex gives the MIG-23 an all-weather capability unmatched
by 'othe.r North Korean f-ighters, most of which are clear-weather,
daylight-only fighter-interceptors.
There are 26 MIG-23s in North Korea now, and we believe that
-Moscow will provide at least enough aircraft to-fill out a
fighter regiment of 35-40 aircraft. If.curr.ent delivery rates
are maintained, we expect a full regiment by the end of this year
or early 1986. It probably would take-six months to a year
before the ful-l regiment was operational and fully integrated
into the North's air defense system.
Missiles. Although of -1950s design, the SA-3 is still deployed
in- the USSR and widely,used elsewhere. It will significantly
upgrade the North's low-altitude air defenses, which up to now
depended on large numbers of antiaircraft guns and hand-held
missile-s. The SA-3 will augment the widely deployed SA-2, which
provides medium-to-high altitude protection.
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The SA-3 is not yet operationally deployed, and we do not.
know how- widely it will be based. Initially, the system probably
will be used for defense around the capital. Deployment at other
important point targets and perhaps in a barrier defense along
the coasts and the Demilitarized Zone could follow, but this
depends on the number the Soviets are willing to supply.
Another weapon of Soviet design-now found in limited
quantity in North Korea is the Scud surface-to-surface missile.
-We_are n ot sure who provided the first Scuds, and North Korea may
now be producing it in small numbers through reverse
.e.ng.ineering. The 300-kilometer range of the Scud would give the
North-the capability to strike large, fixed targets deep in South
Korea. -
Helicopters. The Soviets apparently approved Poland's delivery
MI-2 Hoplite~
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Warsaw also supplied over 100 of the Soviet-designe
'MI-'Zs " etween 1980 and 1984. Another major upgrade took place
when'P'yongyang illegally acquired 86 US Hughes.500 helicopters
in 1983 and 1984.
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Chinese Technical Assistance
China probably is assisting the North in establishing a jet
fighter industry.
Production or
assembly could be in the early stages by late this year or early
in 1986. We believe that the aircraft produced will be a copy of
the Chinese F-7, 40 of which were supplied to North Korea in
1982:
We do not believe that P'yongyang would invest so much
time, effort and money to construct facilities for the
production of a fighter any less sophisticated than the
F-7.
Production of the F-7 appears to be within North Korean
technical capabilities, particularly with Chinese
assistance.
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Projecting production rates for a fighter not yet seen even
in prototype in a country never before engaged in jet aircraft
manufacture is difficult at best.
series production for 40 fighters per year, it would be doing
well compared to other small countries engaged in aircraft
manufacture or assembly.
We believe that limited assembly will precede manufacture,
which will start slowly and perhaps reach 20 aircraft per year by
about 1989. If Chinese assistance is sufficient to allow the
North to overcome early production problems, the rate might reach
40 aircraft a year as early as 1988.
Missile Programs. China also appears to be aiding in the
development of two other weapons systems--air-to-surface and
surface-to-surface missiles. Both are designed for use against
ships.
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If the North Koreans succeed in mating Styx with the IL-28,
P'yongyang will add a more flexible antishipping weapon that
still will be of limited effectiveness. The IL-28 could launch
missiles outside the effective range of ship-borne antiaircraft
weapons, but the surface-search capabilities of the aircraft
would be extremely limited, and both Styx and the IL-28 are
susceptible to electronics countermeasures.
The Chinese appear to have at least influenced North Korean
development of a mobile coastal defense missile system.
P'yongyang has fielded a tracked launch vehicle equipped with the
Chinese-designed Silkworm antiship missile. The system is nearly
identical to that deployed in China, except that the Koreans use
a different vehicle--the much used chassis developed for the
North Korean M-1973 armored personnel carrier. The mobility
provided by a tracked launcher improves the North's flexibility
in employing coastal defense missiles.
Domestic Weapons Development
For over 10 years, North Korea has relied exclusively on
domestic production to supply the armored vehicles used in its
continuing mechanization program. With the exception of tanks,
all of the armored vehicles--ranging from APCs through a variety
of self-propelled weapons--are highly modified derivations or
indigenously fabricated mixes of vehicles and weapons originally
designed by the Chinese or the Soviets.
Definitive data on the characteristics of many of the
North's armored vehicles have been difficult to obtain.
Pyongyang does not parade the vehicles, and did not export any
until recently. In 1984, the North exported its domestically
produced armored personnel carrier to Zimbabwe, and this year
publicity about the deal provided information on APC armament
that we were unable to confirm in the previous 12 years of
production. Newspaper photos show that the basic APC is equipped
with two turret-mounted guns--probably 14.5-mm ZPU-2 heavy
machine guns. With its high rate of.fire--600 rounds per minute
per gun--and.a tactical antiaircraft range of 1,400 meters, the
APC can provide some protection for mechanized forces against
light helicopters.
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Somewhat better protection against aircraft should be
available soon when the new self-propelled antiaircraft machine
gun system (M-1983) is fielded. This system uses a T-62 medium
tank chassis, a modified Drum Tilt fire control radar, and
probably the four-barrel version (ZPU-4) of the 14.5-mm machine
gun. This weapon system appears to be in the final stages of
testing prior to operational deployment.
Both the chassis and radar on the M-1983 have capabilities
beyond what we consider necessary for use with a machine-gun
system. The tank chassis is extremely heavy, and the radar has
acquisition potential well beyond the range of the guns.
Pyongyang may later attempt to mate larger and more effective
guns with the Drum Tilt radar--T-62 chassis combination. The
four-barrel 23-mm guns used on the Soviet ZSU-23-4 self-propelled
antiaircraft system and seen in North Korea in twin-barrel, towed
versions, or the twin-30-mm guns used with Drum Tilt on North
Korean naval craft appear to be likely candidates for future use.
An infantry fighting vehicle--a highly modified variant of
the basic M-1973 APC--entered series production in 1984. This
vehicle is 0.6 meters longer than the standard APC, uses a larger
turret similar to that on the PT-76 light tank, and mounts what
appears to be a light cannon with a caliber of 30-to-37-mm. The
IFV probably will join the North's mechanized forces soon, and
eventaully could replace the APC. A cannon-armed IFV would have
much greater destructive power than the APC with its machine guns
and could be highly effective in combat against lightly armored
vehicles.
Implications
All of the new weapons are of rather dated technology, but
each represents an improvement over equipment currently in use in
North Korea, particularly by the North's air and mechanized
forces. P'yongyang's long-standing need for modern fighters is
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being at least in part remedied by a reversal in the Soviet
attitude toward supplying weapons. Significant change, however,
will remain dependent on Soviet willingness to continue to supply
air and air defense weapons. We do not know how many MIG-23s
Moscow will supply, nor if the USSR will provide a more modern
fighter in the future.
Soviet supplied weapons could have much broader
implications--particularly for the future of the North's ground
forces. Rumors persist that the USSR will supply such weapons as
the T-72 tank, modern antitank missiles, and mobile surface-to-
air missiles. These weapons would increase the capabilities of
North Korea's already large and potent ground forces far beyond
improvements we expect from the North's domestic research,
development, and production efforts.
We do not know, however, just how far the Soviets are
willing to go in providing weapons to Pyongyang, nor what they
would demand in return. Moscow may believe that such deliveries
eventually could lead to air and naval access to bases in North
Korea. For its part, however, P'yongyang likely would resist
giving up territorial concessions that would look like ceding
sovereignty to the USSR. The North might, however, be willing to
increase its support for Soviet policies at the expense of
P'yongyang's relationship with Beijing.
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SUBJECT: North Korea: New Weapons in the Military Forces
Original - OEA/NA/Korea
1 - DO/OEA
1 - Ch/Research/OEA
1 - OEA/NA
5 - CPAS/IMG/CG (7G- 07)
1 - CPAS/ILS (7F-50)
DDI/OEA/NA/Korea
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North Korean-Produced Armored Personnel Carriers
'Harare, Zim babwe
April 1985.
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