KOREA: PROSPECTS FOR A SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000201950001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 18, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85T01058R000201950001-9
STAT
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Q
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
18 October 1985
Korea: Prospects for a Summit
Summary .
The two Koreas have agreed in principle to a
meeting between South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan
and North Korean leader Kim I1-song--a potentially
historic meeting that could lead both to new
opportunities and dangers for dialogue and stability
on the peninsula. Several major procedural and
substantive obstacles remain, and the chances for a
summit, in*our view, are still less than 50-50. But
we believe that the broader North-South dialogue and
other policy goals in Seoul and P'yon make
summit more likely than ever before.
This memorandum was prepared b~ IOffice of East Asian
Analysis. Information available as of 18 October 1985 was used
in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Korea Branch, Northeast Asia Division,
HAS
EA M 85-10182L
COPY-49 of it
2.5X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
North Korea, in our judgment, has taken the
initiative in pressing for a summit, catching Seoul
off-guard by responding to President Chun's three-
year old proposal to meet Kim Il-song. We are unsure
of the North Koreans' primary motivation for
pressing their diplomatic offensive, but we are
reasonably confident they hope to:
-- Overcome US objections to direct talks
with P'yongyang.
- Gain a substantial share of the 1988
Olympic Games.
-- Attract Western credits and joint ventures
for their badly strapped economy.
A breakdown of summit preparations would not
necessarily bring the broader dialogue to a halt.
But if it was accompanied by mutual recriminations,
the progress so far could quickly be undone and
tensions on the peninsula begin to rise. We might,
for instance, expect the North to renew efforts to
demonstrate that South Korea is too unstable and
security too uncertain for the Olympic Games to be
held there.
Should the numerous procedural obstacles be
overcome and a summit occur, the equation on the
peninsula will have been changed. With the two
sides talking, cross-contacts between the Koreas and
their respective allies could be a logical next
step. Tokyo and Beijing already have contacts with
P'yongyang and Seoul respectively, and we would
expect those contacts to broaden. Washington, and
to a lesser extent Moscow, would also feel increased
pressure to alter policies towa~ the divided
peninsula.
It is difficult to see any real progress toward
reunification coming out of a summit, but the fact
of its having taken place would have significant
ramifications. The regimes in Seoul and P'yongyang
might see short term gains--Chun could claim
increased prestige and the North would be better
positioned to engage Japan and the West in political
and economic exchanges. Ironically, however--by
leading to reduced public perceptions of threat from
the "other" Korea, a summit could have unsettling
effects on both sides of the DMZ. In both Koreas
entrenched elites--including the military
establishments--probably would fear that a
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
continuing dialogue could reduce public vigilance
and threaten their shares of the economic pie.
South Korea's military could have particular cause
for concern, as a reduced perception of the North
Korean threat could lead to greater domestic
pressure for reform.
Agreement in Principle
The presummit talks represent the most serious possihilitv
ever of a meeting between leaders of the North and South.
P'yongyang's Political Motives
President Chun first proposed a summit in 1982 and repeated
the offer last spring. P'yongyang's positive response, however,
surprised Chun and has enabled North Korea to keep the
initiative. We believe the North regards the summit as an
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
integral part of its attempt ultimately to engage the United
States in direct talks. US statements on the need to reduce
tensions and to make progress in North-South relations are
clearly understood in P'yongyang. In fact, recent North Korean
behavior in Military Armistice Commission meetings (MAC),
including positive responses to a longstanding US proposal for
steps to reduce tension in the Demilitarized Zone, suggests that
P'yongyang is attempting to package a set of actions that will
appear to respond directly to US requirements.
The timing of both North Korea's public diplomatic offensive
and its private pursuit of a summit suggests, however, that it
may have been the award of the 1988 Olympic Games to Seoul that
spurred the North to seek to improve its international image in
hopes of cohosting the Games. South Korea's success in winning
the competition for the site of the 1988 games has dramatized the
problems faced by P'yongyang during the last two decades in its
usually losing competition with Seoul. In our view, the North is
deeply concerned that the international attention focused on
Seoul in 1988 will further highlight the South's economic
success, technological achievement. ' ternational
support relative to the North. ~ :7 25X1
As was the case during previous diplomatic thaws, the
North's current approach is aimed partly at the South Korean
public, particularly Chun's critics. North Korea knows that Chun
is widely unpopular and that he is moving to clamp down on his
critics. P'yongyang almost certainly hopes that by diminishing
the South's perception of a threat from the North, it can
undermine public tolerance of Chun's tough domestic stance. We
do not believe this objective is high on Kim I1-song's list at
present, despite the concerns evident among Chun's advisers about
a weakening in popular resolve to confront the North. But we do
believe that playing to the gallery in South Korea will grow more
important as the dialogue continues, especially if dissension in
the South increases , student causes, or
economic problems. 25X1
Seeking Economic Advantage
Kim's diplomatic initiative also appears designed to
convince foreigners to help North Korea's economy. For more than
a year, North Korea has attempted to expand imports of petroleum,
industrial equipment, and technology from both Communist and non-
Communist trading partners. P'yongyang is seeking to entice
Western and Japanese firms to engage in joint ventures and to
grant new credits to North Korea by pointing to the change in the
North-South atmosphere. Nevertheless, given North Korea's
current economic difficulties and its poor track record as an
international debtor, most potential investors and trading
partners so far have kept the P'yongyang at arm's length.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
P'yongyang's Internal Politics
We believe succession politics almost certainly influence
P'yongyang's approach to a summit, although our evidence is
circumstantial. Recent press commentary in the North has
extolled the roles of both father and son in.the dialogue. Kim,
seeking to make his son's succession easier,.may sense the need
to engineer actions that Kim Chong-il would find more difficult,
if not impossible, to initiate. If this is true, Kim Il-song
could intend to make his son the beneficiary of a landmark step-- 25X1
for example, success in winning new outside aid for economic
modernization or a North-South agreement on contacts aimed at
reunification--that would help to legitimize his succession.
Seoul on the Defensive
President Chun, in our view, also wants a summit. At a
minimum, the event would boost his image at home as well as
enable him to claim he has gained something his predecessors
could not--de facto recognition from Kim as a coequal Korean
leader. Chun's effort to push cross-recognition also suggests 25X1
that he could see a summit as a step to make China and perhaps
the Soviet Union more willing to, enaaae in direct economic and
political contacts with Seoul.
Major Obstacles Remain
The two sides' objectives are contradictory for the most
part, and Seoul and P'yongyang can select from an array of monkey
wrenches if they decide to halt the summit process. Such issues
as whether to publicize a summit, wide differences on procedures
and political steps toward eventual reunification, or even
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
incidents along the DMZ could be used to justify stopping the
process.
North Korea might eventually lose hope of extracting
concessions on the Olympics or of achieving a breakthrough in
contacts with Washington and trade with the West. Nevertheless,
for now at least, we believe Seoul is more likely than P'yongyang
to break off the negotiations entirely:
-- South Korean officials worry that the dialogue may
already be leading the United States to consi-d-7
contacts with North Korea.
- With little obvious to be gained beyond improving
Chun's personal political fortunes, lower-level
officials in SeouVmay believe it is in their country's
best interest to try to torpedo the talks.
Who Gains From a Summit?
We believe summit preparations can succeed only if the two
sides agree to a largely symbolic public relations event. The
meeting could include reaffirmation of previously acceptable
agreements, such as the 4 July 1972 bilateral accord enshrining
the p r i n c i p l e Of Deaceful ' ation without foreign
interference.
The major immediate outcome of such a meeting would be
raised public expectations of reduced tensions on the
peninsula. Speculation would likely spread that South Korea
would invite Kim Il-song to make a return visit to Seoul. Public
attention, in the meantime, would focus on the other forums of
the North-South dialogue in hone of practical steps toward better
intra-Korean relations.
We believe the good feelings raised by a summit could cause
President Chun to overestimate its political benefits. Chun
would gain personal prestige from a meeting with Kim Il-song, and
might use his "personal" role to buttress the case--if only in
his mind and in the minds of his_ close advisers--for deferring
further preparations for his succession in 1988. But we doubt
that Chun's opponents would be long distracted from their demands
for constitutional revision. A respected South Korean academic
expressed to US Embassy officers in Seoul his opinion that a
summit would help Chun's domestic position in the short run,h,it
would not for long override demands for political reforms.
In addition, we would expect South Korean security officials
to worry that a summit would reduce South Korean fears of the 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
Northern threat and thereby fuel opposition demands for political
reform. Students and opposition politicians might clamor for
more contacts with the North than the regime is prepared to
undertake.
P'yongyang's repressive regime has less reason to fear
public demands following a summit, and both.Kims would certainly
claim credit for the diplomatic breakthrough. Nevertheless--
should North Korean economic conditions continue to deteriorate--
bureaucratic opposition to the government's demand for constant
sacrifice for the sake of military preparations could grow. F
On the other hand, military leaders themselves might worry 25X1
that reduced threat perceptions could threaten their huge share
of North Korea's economic pie. If the younger Kim attempts to
take credit for summit diplomacy, these concerns could reduce
military support for his succession to power. 25X1
Implications: Tripartite Talks vs. Cross-Recognition
Each Korea is likely to follow a successful summit with a
major push to achieve its preferred framework for relations with
the superpowers, China, and Japan. We expect intensified
competition as North Korea seeks to achieve direct talks with the
United States and greater trade with Japan, while South Korea
presses for Chinese and Soviet recognition. China and Japan
already have demonstrated their inclination to trade with both
Koreas, and a successful summit could lead to expanded commercial
and political contacts. One likely result of such movement would
be increased pressure on the United States from China and perhaps-
Japan to reconsider the option of Tripartite talks.
If Summit Diplomacy Fails
25X1
As we have noted mutual suspicion remains high and summit
preparations could run afoul of any number of problems. Whether
a breakdown would hurt other aspects of the dialogue or have
other negative repercussions would depend on how and when it
?occured: .
- Red Cross, economic, and parliamentary talks would not
necessarily be affected if either side unilaterally
backed out of summit preparations before the two
leaders announced their intention to meet. By the same
token--as long as'the talks remain (at least nominally)
secret--the overall North-South dialogue should survive
if the preparations stall over the summit agenda or
procedures. There is, of course, a possibility that
differences arising from economic, interparliamentary,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
or sports talks might spill over into summit
discussions and be the cause rather than the victim of
a summit breakdown.
More serious consequences might result if a summit took
place but resulted in recrimination rather than
agreement. It is conceivable that a face-to-face
meeting between Kim and Chun would degenerate into an
argument leading to public restatement of traditional
positions spiced with visceral rhetoric. In that
event, other talks almost certainly would be
interrupted. We believe an even more negative outcome
would result if the two sides scrapped a summit after
it had been widely publicized. In our judgment,
vituperation likely would be even more evident than in
the case of a hostile meeting, as the two sides would
not even have the fact of a summit to nurture hopes for
improved relations. A breakdown of other talks would
be likely and a charge-and-countercharge escalation
could raise the tension level on the peninsula.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9
I I
SUBJECT: Korea: Prospects for a Summit
Distribution:
Copy 1 - Michael Armacost, Department of State
Copy 2 - Paul Wolfowitz, Department of State
Copy 3 - Morton Abramowitz, Department of State
Copy 4 - Richard Armitage, Department of Defense
Copy 5 - Gaston Sigur, National Security Council
Copies 6-9 - Office of Legislative Liaison
Copy 10 - DCI
Copy 11 - DDCI
Copy 12 - DDI
Copy 13 - NIO/East Asia
Copy 14 - Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Copy 15 - Senior Review Panel, Office of the DCI
Copy 16 - C/PES/OMPS/DDI ILLEGIB
Copy 17 - D/OEA
18 - D/CPAS
Co
py
Copies 19-23 - C/CPAS/IMC jj~~~-bC2~ l ~- - f~c' S~VK'~c`
I __.. ne nr^
Copy 25 - C/OEA/Northeast Asia Division
Copy 26 - C/OEA Korea Branch
Copy 27 - C/EA 25X1
Copy 28 - C/EA
Copy 29 - C/EA
Copy 30 - Author
Copy 31 - Special Assistant for Dissemination Analysis/CPAS
DDI/OEA/NA/Korea (18 October 1985) 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201950001-9