A GLANCE AT CHINA'S PARTY CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000202050001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
28 October 1985
A Glance at China's Party Conference
Summary
The following is a summary of the major conclusions of our
forthcoming study on China's September Party Conference, "China's Party
Conference: The Waning of the Ancien Regime."
Deng's Achievements
From 12 to 24 September, the Communist Party of China held an unprecedented
series of meetings that together constitute a major milestone in Deng Xiaoping's
decade-long struggle to restructure the party leadership. In two plenary sessions of the
Central Committee and an extraordinary conference of party delegates, Deng managed
to weaken significantly the conservative party old guard, promote his allies to the top
party organizations, reduce the influence of China's senior military officers, and win a
new party endorsement of economic reform. Specifically:
This memorandum was prepared byl Office of East Asian Analysis.
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Information available as of 28 October 1985 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Domestic Policy Branch, China
Division, OEA, on
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? One-quarter of the 210-member Central Committee, including 10 of the 27
members of the Politburo, resigned.
? 91 younger leaders were named full or alternate members of the Central
Committee.
? Six new members joined the Politburo--five for the first time and one promoted
from alternate--and five were added to the Secretariat.
? The Central Committee approved guidelines for the 1986-90 Five-Year Plan that
strongly reaffirm the reformist course of economic policy.
We believe Deng accomplished most of his short-term objectives at the meetings:
? The balance of forces in the Politburo and the Central Committee has shifted to
the reformers.
? The influence on decisionmaking of the party's old guard, and especially its
military contingent, has been significantly reduced.
? The leading reformers placed proteges on both the Politburo and Secretariat. Hu
Yaobang put three on each body and Zhao Ziyang one.
? Serious economic performance problems, and growing conservative criticisms of
reform policies, were not allowed to derail the economic development program
approved in 1984.
What Deng Did Not Get
Despite these important gains, the meetings did not resolve all of Deng's
short-term political problems. His most forceful conservative critics, namely Chen Yun
and Peng Zhen, remain on the Politburo and will try to restrain political and economic
reform plans. Party conservatives maintain a strong foothold in the propaganda
apparatus, and will continue to insist on justifying economic policies on strict ideological
grounds. Moreover,,it appears that the reformers did not get all the top appointments
we believe they had sought. In particular, there has been no confirmation that the
September sessions endorsed Deng's succession plan, which calls for Hu Yaobang to
replace Deng as Chairman of the party's Military Commission and Hu Qili to succeed Hu
as General Secretary.
The New Agenda
Over the long term, the leadership changes Deng put in place at the September
meetings will assume greater significance. In our view, the meetings mark a major
turning point in the generational transfer of power. Although the old guard remains
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influential, little now bars the way to consolidation by the successors on the Politburo
and Secretariat. We also believe the restructured party leadership will be more
energetic and flexible than its predecessor, and better able to carry out its
decisionmaking functions.
Deng is changing the social and ideological base of the party. The reconstituted
Central Committee heralds the ascendancy of the polytechnic institute graduates over
the peasant activists, soldiers, and intellectuals of the older generation. The new leaders
are more sympathetic to Deng's brand of "socialism with Chinese characteristics": free
of 19th century dogma and able to absorb the technologies and ideas of capitalist
countries, while maintaining the party's dominance in all political matters.
The resounding vote of confidence in economic reform policies'contained in the
five-year-plan guidelines means that Beijing will continue its trial-and-error approach to
economic development-- reducing the role of central planning, refining its use of
macroeconomic levers to control the economy, yet permitting greater individual initiative
and free market activity. The debate over the optimum development strategy will
persist, and reform policies must continue to show gains to stave off conservative
critics, but we believe the reformers have an extended mandate to make bold changes in
China's economy. The conservative tone of major leadership speeches at the party
conference indicates that more attention will be paid to the ideological dimension of the
reforms, perhaps at the cost of some confusion within the economic bureaucracy and
among foreign investors.
The.reduction in military influence achieved at the meetings puts control of the
armed forces more securely in civilian hands than has been the case in decades. We
believe Deng will seek to follow up these gains by making more changes in the military
hierarchy, bringing forward a younger, more politically pliant high command better able
to carry out effective military modernization.
Finally, the September meetings set the stage for what will probably be Deng's
last effort to resolve the succession issue. We expect Deng to press for his
second-stage succession arrangements and make further preparations for his own
retirement. We believe he will try to carry the remaining members of the old guard into
retirement with him, probably before the scheduled 13th Party Congress in 1987.
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SUBJECT: A Glance at China's Party Conference
1 - Mr. James R. Lilley, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Room 6205, Department of State
1
- DDI (7E-44, Hqs.)
1
- D/OEA (4F-18, Hqs.)
1
- C/OEA/CH (4G-32, Hqs.)
1
- C/OEA/CH/FOR
(4G-32, Hqs.)
1
- C/OEA/CH/DEV
(4G-32, Hqs.)
1
- C/OEA/CH/DEF
(4G-32, Hqs.)
1
- C/OEA/CH/DOM
(4G-32, Hqs.)
1
- OEA/Research Director (4G-48, Hqs.)
1
- Senior Review Panel (5G-00, Hqs.)
1
- PDB Staff (7F-30, Hqs.)
1
- NIO/EA (7E-62, Hqs.)
1
- C/PES (7F-24, Hqs.)
1
- C/DO/PPS (313-01, Hqs.)
1
- FBIS/NEAAD/China Branch (306, Key)
1
- C/EAE-18, Hqs.)
1
- CPAS/ILS (7G-50, Hqs.)
5
- CPAS/IMC/CB (7G-07, Hqs.)
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