A CONTINGENCY STUDY ON A GREEK-TURKISH MILITARY CONFRONTATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000202330002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 9, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
STAT
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
9 June 1983
A Contingency Study on a 'Greek-Turkish Military Confrontation
Summary
A war between Greece and Turkey is improbable given
present circumstances. However, the volatility of relations
between the two countries -- they clashed on Cyprus in 1974
and nearly came to blows twice later in the decade over
Aegean oil exploration rights -- and the negative
implications for the US and NATO of fighting between them
suggest that the possibility of such a development must be
taken seriously. This paper is an attempt to lay out the
current disputes that could provide impulse for a Greek-
Turkish clash, to describe. how the fighting might unfold,
and to calculate the impact of such an event on US
interests.
The Greek-Turkish quarrel continues to center on
conflicting claims about resource rights and territorial
limits in the Aegean. These disputes spill over into other
areas, hindering agreement between Athens and Ankara on NATO
command and control responsibilities in the Aegean and
heightening bilateral tensions..over Cyprus and other
issues. Although both sides presently appear intent on
avoiding military conflict, the chances of war would
increase over the longer term if either side gained a clear
military advantage or if the domestic situation in either
country became unstable
EUR M83-10173-- 25X1
This memorandum was prepared byl lof the
Office of European Analysis at the request of the National intelligence
Officer for Western Europe.
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We believe the most likely spark for conflict would be
an accident -- probably an inadvertent air clash -- that
could lead to extended air-to-air combat or even escalate
into combined air, naval, and ground operations in the
Aegean. A calculated attack -- a Turkish assault on a Greek
island, for example, or a Greek strike at Turkish airfields
-- is far less likely but might come about if either side
grew frustrated with the negotiation process or suspected
that the other was about to launch a preemptive attack.
There is rough strategic parity between the two sides, but
we think that superior equipment and training would give the
Greeks an edge in air and naval combat in the Aegean, while
superior numbers would give the Turks a clear-cut'advantage
on Cyprus. The two would be about evenly matched in the
border area of Thrace, and fighting there would probably end
in a stalemate. Whatever form the fighting took, a war
would almost certainly be short and very costly for both
sides.
Although hostilities between Greece and Turkey would
have unwelcome repercussions for the USSR, whose access to
the Mediterranean would be hindered by conflict involving
the Turkish Straits or the Aegean, Moscow would be the net
beneficiary of fighting between the two NATO allies. Any
such conflict. would seriously impair Allied ability to
monitor and respond to Soviet activity within and adjacent
to the Eastern Mediterranean. And if either Greece or
Turkey perceived a US tilt toward the other, the offended
country almost certainly would shut down US facilities,
possibly withdraw from NATO, or do both.
The Issues
Tensions in Greek-Turkish relations since the early 1970s stem largely,
although not entirely, from a tangled web of conflicting claims in the Aegean
that touch on-Greek and Turkish national security interests. Greeks across
the political spectrum see Turkey as a growing regional power with designs on
Greek territory, particularly in the Aegean. For their part, the Turks
believe that Greece is seeking to preempt legitimate Turkish,rights in the
area -- a perception intensified by the election of Andreas Papandreou as
Greek Prime Minister in 1981. Concerned that the semi-enclosed Aegean will
gradually become a "Greek lake," Turkey has argued for the principle of equity
in the Aegean.
o Continental shelf rights: Greece maintains that its inhabited
islands have their own continental shelves--a view bolstered by
international conventions. Turkey argues that many of the Greek
islands lie on the Anatolian shelf, and it demands an equal share in
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the economic exploitation and distribution of the Aegean's seabed
resources -- an issue made more urgent in Ankara's eyes by the
discovery of oil there in the early 1970s.
o Territorial waters: Greece's territorial waters currently are set at
six nautical miles, but Athens reserves the right to extend its
boundaries to twelve nautical miles. Ankara argues that this would
cut off Turkey's direct access to international waters and has made
known that such an extension would constitute a casus belli.
o Airspace and air traffic control: Since the early 1930s, Greece has
claimed an airspace of ten nautical miles around its islands, and it
has international sanction to supervise all civilian flights in the
Aegean. Athens has insisted that all Turkish aircraft entering its
Flight Information Region file flight plans. Turkey recognizes an
airspace of only six nautical miles around the islands and, like the
United States, refuses to file plans for military flights, claiming
that such flights do not affect safety in the area and therefore do
not come under the provisions governing commercial air traffic.
o NATO command and control: Until Greece's withdrawal from the
military wing of NATO in 1974, Alliance command and control
responsibility in the Aegean fell to Athens. Under the NATO plan
that provided for Greece's return to the military wing in 1980,
command and control responsibility in the Aegean was assigned to the
Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, pending the
resolution of the disputes between Greece and Turkey. Greece is
seeking to regain its pre-1974 responsibilities, while Turkey is
pressing for some formula that would allow for joint control. The
lack of progress on the issue reflects each side's concern that an
agreement might prejudice its other claims in the Aegean.
o The militarization of the Aegean islands: Greece claims that the
right of national self-defense overrides any treaty provisions --
which, in any case, the Greeks regard as equivocal on the issue --
providing for the demilitarization of its Aegean islands. It
justifies the upgrading of its defenses on the islands by pointing to
the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the creation after 1974 of the
Turkish Aegean Army based in Izmir. Turkey argues that the treaties
under which the islands were ceded to Greece dictate that they remain
demilitarized.
o "Minorities: Greece and Turkey periodically accuse each other of
discriminating against the ethnic communities living under their
respective jurisdictions. Greece's Muslim minority resides primarily
in Thrace--close to the. Turkish border--and on the island of
Rhodes. The ethnic Greeks in Turkey live primarily in Istanbul and
Izmir and on the islands of Imbros and Tenedos.. Each side accuses
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the other of failing to respect the safeguards for minority
communities outlined by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.
o Cyprus: Although not strictly a bilateral issue, the unresolved
Cyprus problem has exacerbated the disputes in the Aegean. Greece
points to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 as proof of what it
views as Ankara's aggressive intentions and has called for the
withdrawal of Turkish troops as a precondition for meaningful
negotiations between the two Cypriot communities. Turkey claims that
it was the Athens-inspired coup against then President and Archbishop
Makarios that prompted its intervention and that, as one of the
original treaty guarantors of Cypriot independence, it had the right
to intervene in order to protect the constitutional order. Ankara
also argues that it must maintain a military presence in order to
protect the Turkish Cypriot minority pending an acceptable resolution
of intercommunal differences.
t3r-UtK-1Ui"K15 01 UId1UyUC U11 UULJLdliUIII ncycaii ~auc~1 .25X1
The chances of armed conflict would increase if either side gained a
clear military advantage or if the domestic situation in either country became
unstable. For example, a Greek government suffering from declining popularity
and'facing chaotic economic and social conditions might be tempted to
overreact to a Turkish move or -- in the extreme -- even undertake a military
operation against Turkey in order to distract public attention from pressing
internal problems. The return to political factionalism in Turkey and a'
resurgence of social and economic turmoil could encourage Ankara to do
likewise. Both sides recognize that the stakes of a generalized conflict are
high. But, while this argues against a premeditated and large-scale military
strike by either side, it does not rule out the possiblity of a minor incident
rapidly escalating to the level of a general conflict 25X1
o The Armenian question: The assassination by Armenian terrorists of
more than twenty Turkish diplomats over the past several years has
heightened Ankara's sensitivity to the Armenian question. The Turks
have accused the Cypriot government during the past year of harboring
Armenian terrorists and have threatened to take action against such
groups. The Greek Cypriots deny these charges and fear that Ankara
might use Armenian terrorism as a pretext for launching a small-scale
commando operation in Cyprus. Both Athens and Nicosia have said they
would respond in kind . 25X1
On occasion since 1974, the Greek and Turkish governments have each
raised the level of tensions. Papandreou'-s rhetorical flourishes have tended
to reinforce Turkish perceptions of an intransigent Greece. Similarly,
Ankara's periodic penetrations of Greek-claimed airspace have tended to
confirm Greek perceptions of an aggressive Turkey. At present,. both parties
appear intent on preventing minor incidents from mushrooming into open
conflict, and in recent months they have taken tentative steps to renew the
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Conflict Scenarios
Conflict in the Aegean could evolve in several ways and escalate to
varying levels of intensity. It could be the result of an accident--such as
an inadvertent air clash--or an outright act of aggression. Even in the event
of an accident, fighting could quickly expand from involving just air forces,
for example, to include naval and ground forces. In either case, we cannot
rule out the possi i.ghting might spill over into Thrace or expand
to include Cyprus.~ t~ 25X1
There is rough strategic parity between the two sides, and we do not
expect this to change drastically in the near future. The Greeks appear to
have the upper hand in the Aegean, while the Turks have a clear-cut advantage
on Cyprus. The two sides probably recognize their own strengths and
weaknesses, and neither has any misconceptions about its inability to defeat
the other in a protracted war. While the tactical military objectives for the
Greeks and the Turks would differ under the various scenarios, we believe the
underlying goal probably would be to winsterritor early in the conflict to
use as a bargaining chip in peace negotiations
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Whatever form the fighting took, a war involving more than small-scale
skirmishes almost certainly would be short and costly for both sides. The
duration of the conflict would depend largely on fuel and'ammuni.tion stocks on
hand at the beginning of hostilities. We believe that, without external
resupply, both Greece and Turkey would have difficulty sustaining intensive
combat longer than one to two weeks. Both sides probably would have enough
fuel at the outset to last at least that long, but both would quickly
experience shortages of air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles. Hostilities
could last substantially longer than two weeks if the two sides limited the
scope of fighting to an air war of attrition, hit and run raids, or possibly
border skirmishes in Thrace.
We believe the most likely cause of an unpremeditated war would be an
inadvertent air clash in the Aegean. If fighting escalated, the two most
probable scenarios would be: --
o Extended air-to-air combat.
o Aerial combat that escalates into combined air, naval and ground
operations in the Aegean.
In the event combat resulted from a calculated act of aggression, the
following would be most likely:
o A Turkish attempt to take Greek territory.
o Greek air strikes on Turkish airfields.
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Scenarios resulting from. an unintentional outbreak of conflict
These scenarios would probably result from an aerial confrontation in the
disputed six-to-ten mile airspace around the Greek islands. Political
tensions probably would be on the rise, and posturing on both sides would
bring about a situation in which one or more aircraft were shot down through
miscalculation, accident, or an erroneous perception of military threat.
o Unpremeditated air clash -- Each side's military objective following
the initial incident would be to establish air superiority by seeking
out and engaging the other country's fighters and possibly attacking.
its airfields with the intention of destroying aircraft. If the.
Greeks were to establish air superiority over the Aegean islands, they
would then be able to interdict and disrupt any naval task force that
the Turks might try to organize. Air superiority for the Turks, on
the other hand, could enable them to patrol the Aegean almost at will
and disrupt any attempt by the Greeks to reinforce their islands.
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o Aerial combat that escalates into naval and ground operations -- Under
this scenario,, the military objectives for the Greeks--following or
concurrent with attempts to achieve air superiority--would be to
reinforce their island garrisons, protect the islands from a Turkish
assault, and keep open their sea lines of communication. The Greeks
might also begin posturing along the border in Thrace to prevent the
Turks from moving additional troops south from the First Army to
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marshal an amphibious assault force. The Turkish objectives would be
to use air and possibly naval forces to disrupt the Greek supply lines
from the mainland in order to prevent the Greeks from reinforcing
their islands. If the Turks were dominant in the air, they might even
be tempted to try an assault on one of the Greek islands in order to
reinforce Ankara's position in any negotiations following the
fighting. .
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We believe that in a naval confrontation in the Aegean the Greeks
would at least be able.to hold their own. At a minimum, the Greeks
could probably. maintain their sea lines of communication, although the
Turks might be able to disrupt them for short periods of time. If the
Greeks could achieve local air superiority, as seems likely, Turkish
naval prospects would be even further diminished.
Scenarios resulting from an outright act of aggression
Calculated aggression by one side or the other would probably stem from
frustration with the negotiation process or from one side's suspicions that
the other was preparing to launch a premeditated attack.
o A Turkish attempt to take Greek territory -- The primary Turkish
military objective in a premeditated attack almost certainly would be
to-take and hold Greek territory to use as a bargaining chip in
negotiations. This could take the form of an attack in Thrace, an
assault on a Greek island in the Aegean, or an attack in Cyprus. If
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the Turks attacked in Thrace, their objectives -- in addition to
seizing territory--would be to tie down Greek forces and prevent
Athens from reinforcing the Aegean islands or launching its own
counteroffensive to seize the only river crossing point in Turkish
Thrace.
The primary Greek objective in Thrace would be to stop a Turkish
offensive, while extracting a high toll. It is also possible that the
Greeks, in anticipation of a Turkish thrust, would initiate a limited
offensive of their own to destroy bridges and to take the Turkish
crossing point at the Evros River in an attempt to seal off the main
Turkish forces. The Greeks would hope that any military activity on
their part, including spoiling raids or minor border skirmishes, would
also disrupt Turkish attempts to mass for an attack, as well as tie
down Turkish forces that Ankara could otherwise shift southward for
use in the Aegean.
Recognizing the high costs of an operation in Thrace, even if
they could succeed in taking some Greek territory, the Turks could opt
instead to invade a Greek island. The proximity of some Greek islands
to the Turkish mainland could make such an operation appear attractive
to Ankara, and if the Turks moved against one of the smaller, lightly
defended islands, they would probably be successful. If the Turks
tried to invade one of the six well-defended major islands, however,
we believe they would have difficulty for several reasons:
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Under this scenario we believe the Greeks could probably foil a
Turkish invasion attempt against one of the major islands. If the
Turks were successful, we believe the Greeks would probably be able
to marshal the force necessary to retake an island, although the
ensuing combat almost certainly would be costly to both sides.
The Turks would be more likely to succeed in launching
operations against the Greeks in Cyprus. The Turks have superior
manpower there, and even with their obsolete equipment they almost
certainly could make major territorial gains against the Cypriot
National'Guard (CNG). The Cypriot force has upgraded its equipment
since the Turkish invasion in 1974 and is now a more credible
fighting force, but it still has little capability to initiate
offensive operations on its own. While the CNG could not stop the
Turks from taking additional territory, the Cypriots could make the
operations costly in terms of lives and equipment.
o Greek strikes on Turkish airfields -- In this situation the Greeks
probably would try to take the Turkish Air Force out of the war
either at the outset of fighting -- before the Turks could take
advantage of their greater number of aircraft -- or following an
umpremeditated air clash-resulting in Greek losses.
C.
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25X1 Implications of a Conflict
Any conflict between Greece and Turkey, whatever the outcome, is likely
to damage vital Western interests. Together, Greece and Turkey form a
critical part of Western defenses on the southeastern flank of NATO, in terms
of both the forces they provide and the bases and intelligence monitoring
facilities used by the United States and other Allies. In addition, RDF
contingency planning for Southwest Asia, the protection of oil supply lines 25X6
from the Middle East all hinge on an effective and
committed Allied effort in the eastern Mediterranean. In short, the loss of
either Greece or Turkey--or both--would seriously impair the ability of the
United States and NATO to monitor and respond to Soviet activity within and
outside the region.
the pro-West government of Constantine Karamanlis--withdrew from NATO to
protest the Alliance's failure to prevent the Turkish invasion of the
island. Turkey--under the pro-West leadership of Suleyman Demirel--took-
The potential costs to the West of a conflict between Greece and Turkey
were brought into vivid relief during the 1974 Cyprus crisis. Greece--under
control of the US military facilities in Turkey 25X6
the Western response to the crisis. Some nine years later, Greek and Turkish
relations with the United States and NATO still reflect that legacy,0 25X1
The perception by either Greece or Turkey in any future crisis of a NATO
or US tilt toward the other almost certainly would prompt either or both to
withdraw from NATO, shut down US facilities, or do both. Even if both
countries remained in NATO, the heavy casualties and the loss of equipment
likely to result from a conflict would degrade Western military capabilities
in the eastern Mediterranean. A full assessment of the loss would depend, of
course, on the conflict scenario and the outcome of the fighting 25X1
The Soviets clearly would be the net beneficiary--militarily and
the renegotiation of their respective base agreements with Washington. Both
countries had considered themselves model allies, and both felt betrayed by
on military equipment and sales. Moreover, both Athens and Ankara demanded
in response to an embargo by Washington
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politically--of any future conflict between Greece and Turkey. Like Western
governments, the Soviets generally have avoided taking sides in the disputes
between Greece and Turkey, and it is unlikely that they would become directly
involved in localized fighting between the two. But open hostilities would
also have unwelcome repercussions for Moscow. A Greek declaration of a 12-
mile territorial sea, for example, would affect Soviet shipping and the Red
Navy's floating supply and repair facility off the island of Kithira. In
addition, open hostilities would almost certainly lead to the temporary
closure of the Tur traits, thus cutting Moscow off from the
Mediterranean.
As long as the numerous disputes between Greece and Turkey remain
unresolved, the tension between the two will continue to affect each country's
relations with the US and detract from each party's ability to focus on NATO's
primary mission. Although present circumstances make a war between Greece and
Turkey improbable, the potential for hosti_li s could grow if solutions to
the bilateral dispute remain elusive.
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