CONSENSUS AND AUTONOMY: DOMINANT THEMES IN CANADIAN HISTORY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000202360001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 7, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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. U 1
23C-
Memorandum for: Colonel T.yrus Cobb
Deputy Director for
European & Soviet Affairs
National Security Council
Attached is a memorandum addressinq the
four topics you discussed with ou lt Canadian
analyst at the organizational meeting for the
NSSD on Canada at State on 8 January 1985. The
topics did not lend themselves to a single essay
and'we have therefore addressed them
individually. If we can be of further
assistance please let us know. -I can be reached
John McLaughlin
Chief, Western Europe Division
E U R A
Office of European Analysis
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
7 February 1985
Consensus and Autonomy: Dominant Themes
in Canadian History
The Canadian Confederation was organized in 1867 by the leaders of four
British North American provinces -- Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New
Brunswick -- acting with London's guidance and support. The stimuli to
Confederation were:
-- a belief that closer political association would carry economic and
defense benefits;
-- fear of an American invasion prompted by frequent public assertions
by US politicians that Canada must inevitably be made part of the
United States;
-- a perception that London, chastened by sharp conflicts with
Washington during the American Civil War and inclined toward viewing
colonies as liabilities rather than assets, was becoming increasingly
unwillin-R to defend the provinces against American encroachments.
The population was comprised almost equally of English-speaking and
French-speaking citizens. This linguistic cleavage has been a divisive
element in Canadian politics and the balancing of these two linguistic groups
has always been a primary consideration for Ottawa. On several occasions, the
federal government's mishandling of language-related issues has threatened to
disrupt the Canadian union.
-- The imposition of conscription during both world wars, for example,
was viewed in Quebec as an example of the English-speaking majority
running roughshod over the civil rights of the French minority.
Anti-conscription rioting occurred in the province's urban areas on
both occasions.
-- The federal government's institution of a policy of official
bilingualism in the early 1970s, on the other hand, was viewed by
many English-speaking Canadians as a flagrant example of the majority
being oppressed by the minority
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Although the "Fathers of Confederation" envisioned Canada as a closely
knit federal state-directed by a powerful central government, the courts have
interpreted constitutional questions -- arising under both Canadian
constitutions, the British North America Act of 1867 and its successor the
Canada Act of 1982 -- in a manner that consistently has augmented the powers
of the provinces. Consequently, Canada has developed instead into a nation of
three distinct regions -- Western Canada, Central Canada, and Atlantic
Canada.* The central government is ill-equipped constitutionally to drag the
often recalcitrant regions and their constituent provinces into line, and
Ottawa invariably meets strong opposition whenever it tries to introduce a
"national" policy. These confrontations also tend to pit one region against
another.
In 1911, for example, Central Canada opposed Ottawa's efforts to
conclude a reciprocity treaty with the United States -- which was
favored by Western and Atlantic Canada -- and the region's votes were
largely responsible for the governments's defeat in the election of
In 1980, on the other hand, Western Canada strongly opposed the
imposition of the National Energy Program (NEP) -- a plan
enthusiastically supported by Central and Atlantic Canada -- and its
votes helped to fuel the disastrous defeat in 1984 of the Liberal
government that wrote the NEP
Because of the political necessity to balance the interests of the two 25X1
language groups and the three regions, and the consequent difficulty of
implementing plans for domestic development that are national in scope,
Canadian prime ministers have tended'to use external policy as a tool of
nation-building. They often have portrayed Canadian history as a struggle
against foreign control over the nation's destiny -- a continuing effort to
develop from "colony to nation," in the words of a prominent Canadian
historian -- and themselves as the champions of Canadian autonomy.
Historically, Canadian prime ministers have used the potent images generated
by this "struggle" to unify the population.
-- After Confederation in 1867, for example, Ottawa undertook the
building of a transcontinental railroad system and instituted a
complex series of protective tariffs. Both-actions were trumpeted by
the federal government as efforts to bind the young nation together
and protect it against the threat of absorption by the United States,
rather than simply as methods of promoting effective internal
communication, economic growth, and domestic manufacturing.
*Central Canada includes the provinces of Ontario and Quebec; Western Canada
includes Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia; Atlantic
Canada includes Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and
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Between the two world wars, Ottawa portrayed itself publicly as
waging a battle -- since judged to have been largely imaginary --
against attempts by London to lure Canada into an imperial federation
ruled from, by, and for the United Kingdom. The federal government's
defense of Canadian autonomy in this period was intended to give
Canadians a sense of identity and unity as a means of counteracting
the Depression's deepening of traditional regional and linguistic
tensions.
-- Most recently, Ottawa has tried to use its efforts to limit foreign
direct investment, to diversify trade patterns away from "excessive"
dependence on the United States,-and to involve Canada intimately in
geographical areas beyond its traditional UK-US focus to offset some
of the damage done to national, unity by contentious domestic policies
'
such as official bilingualism.
Linguistic tensions, regional animosities, and the use of foreign policy
as a nation-building tool have all combined to create a political system that
stresses the need for consensus and places a high premium on proclaiming
Canada's autonomy. The early experiences of the new Conservative (Tory)
government demonstrate the continued preeminence of these themes in
contemporary Canada and in Prime Minister Mulroney's thinking.
-- The Tories traditionally have been viewed in Quebec as the party of
English-speaking Canadians and as the opponents of official
bilingualism and minority language rights. To combat this
perception, Mulroney, a native Quebecer, has taken advantage of every
opportunity to reassure Quebecers that the Tories are committed to
insuring the survival of French culture in Canada. Early in
Mulroneyy's tenure as party leader, for example, he faced down the
opponents of bilingualism in his parliamentary caucus by telling them
publicly that their choice on the issue was between "my way and the
doorway." As prime minister, he has appointed eleven Quebecers to
his 40-member cabinet and has sought to find a compromise position
that would persuade Quebec's provincial government to sign the
Canadian Constitution, which it has refused to do since its
implementation in 1982.
The Conservative government's failure to consult adequately with
citizens groups, the opposition parties, and the provincial
governments before broaching its intention to limit social welfare
programs in December resulted in a backlash that has caused it to
drop its original plans. The Tories have now issued a "consultation"
paper on social. programs which pledges the government to refrain from
introducing changes to the social welfare system until it achieves a
domestic consensus.
Likewise, Mulroney and his Cabinet colleagues are now conducting
highly publicized consultations with all interested groups in
preparation for the presentation of the government's first budget in
April. The Tories thus are seeking to form a consensus in order to
limit the political cost of what is likely to be an austere and
unpopular budget.
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-- The subject of free trade with the United States presents any
Canadian government with an extraordinary problem. The Prime
Minister must build consensus on two points: first, that the
economic gains from an agreement with the United States will be
distributed equally without undue loss to any particular region, and
second, that free trade arrangements will not place Canada on the
"slippery slope" toward political absorption by the United States.
Mulroney is. trying to do this by engaging in wide-ranging
consultations with the provincial governments and private sector
groups, and by pursuing a foreign policy that combines closer
relations with the United States with a recognizable determination
not to be subservient to Washington.
-- Actions by Mulroney such as appointing critics of US policies to
serve in high ranking diplomatic posts, seeking "peace" advice from
former Liberal Prime Minister Trudeau, maintaining foreign investment
restrictions on "culturally sensitive" economic sectors, and pressing
Washington rhetorically to begin acid rain abatement programs are
25X1 aimed at convincing the electorate that closer relations with
Quebec in Canada
Great Britain acquired Quebec from France in 1763 as part of the peace
settlement following the Seven Years War. Both London and, after 1867, Ottawa
have been faced with the necessity of providing a social and legal environment
in which Quebec's overwhelmingly French-speaking population could feel that
its distinct culture was safe. In the Quebec Act of 1774, for example, London
established British governmental institutions in the province but retained
French civil law and allowed the Roman Catholic Church to remain paramount in
social and educational matters. Likewise, the British North America Act of
1867 -- Canada's first constitution -- assigned jurisdiction over property
rights, civil rights, and education to the several provincial governments..
These constitutional arrangements took on an increased significance as
Canada's English-speaking population began to outnumber French-speaking
anad' s by a rapidly increasing margin in the post-Confederation period.
In the period between 1867 and 1960, Quebec's basically rural and
agricultural society was dominated by strong provincial governments which
ruled with the active cooperation of the Catholic Church. As a result, the
province was isolated not only from the outside world, but from an
increasingly secular and industrial Canada as well, developing a defensive
insularity that did not begin to break down until the early 1960's. During
these years, relations between English Canada and Ouebec were often marked by
angry confrontations over actions perceived by Quebecers as attempts to deny
their minority rights and to force their assimilation into the mainstream of
English-Canadian society. Several events still stand out in the "folk memory"
of Quebecers:
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-- 1885 - Ottawa ordered the execution of the French half-breed Louis
Riel for his part in leading a rebellion of French-speaking
inhabitants in Manitoba. Quebecers viewed Riel's death not as a
retribution for treason, but rather as a vindictive act perpetrated
by English Canadians against the leader of a French-speaking minority
group.
-- 1890 - The Manitoba legislature amended the provincial constitution
so as to remove French as an official language in the province.
Ottawa could have used its constitutional powers to overrule the
provincial legislation but refused to do so. Quebecers considered
this another instance in which French rights were disregarded by the
English majority.
-- 1899, 1912, 1917, and 1942 -- respectively, the decision to send
Canadian volunteers to fight with the British Army in South Africa
during the Boer War, Ottawa's plan to contribute funds for the
construction of three battleships for the Royal Navy, and the
introduction of conscription in the two world wars -- in each of these?
cases, Quebecers believed that they were being dragooned into making
sacrifices against their will by English Canadians anxious to support
After the death in 1959 of Premier Maurice Duplessis'-- who with the
support of the Catholic Church had ruled the province as his personal
political fiefdom since 1944 -- an era known as the "Quiet Revolution" began
in Quebec. Since 1960, Quebec has industrialized rapidly and provincial
society has undergone a sweeping and pervasive modernization and
secularization. Moreover, during Prime Minister Trudeau's tenure (1968-1984)
the federal government actively promoted the interests of French-speaking
Canadians and, through such policies as official bilingualism. attempted to
their mother country in its imperial adventures.
alleviate the tensions between Quebec and the rest of Canada
rest of Canada as an equal in the federal system.
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Mulroney as Politician:
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As a result of these dramatic changes, Quebec's political system has shed
much of its former defensive conservatism and insularity, and has assumed an
aggressive, cosmopolitian, and social-democratic character. The victory of
the pro-independence Parti Quebecois (PQ) in 1976 provided clear evidence that
the proponents of French-Canadian nationalism were no longer content simply to
preserve the rights traditionally accorded Ouebec, but were instead eager to
expand French rights -- particularly in the areas of language and education --
and enhance the culture's ability not merely to survive in Canada but to
flourish. The current lack of enthusiusm among Quebecers for independence
from Canada -- 80 percent now oppose that option -- signals a new maturity and
self-confidence in the province and an apparent willingness to deal with the
Brian Mulroney is a fluently bilingual, 45-year old electrician's son
from the industrial town of Baie Comeau on the north shore of the St. Lawrence
River in Quebec. He studied political science and law at'-universities in Nova
Scotia and Quebec in the early 1960s. After graduation, Mulroney quickly
established himself as one of Montreal's leading labor lawyers. In 1974 he
co-chaired a Quebec government Royal Commission that investigated corrupt
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labor practices among the province's construction unions. In 1976 he became
president of the Iron Ore Company of Canada (IOC) -- an affiliate of the US-
based Hanna Steel Company of Cleveland. During his five-year tenure at IOC,
Mulroney eliminated the company's $400-million debt and paid dividends for the
first time in a decade. He also ended the IOC's long history of acrimonious
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As a politican, Mulroney -- much like the most successful Canadian prime
minister, the Liberal Mackenzie King -- can be best described as a "trimmer,"
ready to adjust to changing political winds and relatively unconcerned with
consistency in policies. After losing the Tory leadership race in 1976, for
example, Mulroney considered accepting a post in the Liberal cabinet offered
to him by Prime Minister Trudeau. He apparently refused the offer because he
continued to have leadership ambitions, believed that Trudeau was not ready to
retire, and suspected that the newly-elected Tory leader, Joe Clark, did not
have a firm hold on his position.
Mulroney and Quebec
Mulroney, the first Tory leader from Quebec since 1896, is the Party's
indispensable asset in the province. Without Mulroney, the Tories won 1 of
Quebec's 75 parliamentary seats and only 12 percent of the popular vote in the
1980 federal election. With Mulroney, the Tories won 58 of 75 seats and 51
percent of the vote in last year's election., Because the Conservatives have
virtually no provincial organization, their dramatic turnaround must, we
believe, be attributed in large measure to Mulroney's popularity, although the
absence of Trudeau from the ballot and weariness with the Liberals also played
a role.
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Although Mulroney's winning personality and status as a native Quebecer
have given the Tories an opportunity to build an effective political
organization in Quebec, the job will not be easy. The Tories historically
have been viewed in the province as the party that hanged Riel, forced the
adoption of conscription, and opposed official bilingualism and the protection
of minority language rights. In addition, Quebec has been almost
undeviatingly loyal to the federal Liberal Party throughout most of the 20th
century and could once again abandon the Tories. In fact, there is precedent
for just such a reversal of fortunes. In the 1958 election, for example, the
Tories won 50 Quebec seats after having won only 9 seats in 1957; in the next
general election in 1962, however, the Tories won only 14 seats
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Distribution:
EURA/WE
Orig - Ty.. Cobb, NSC
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - OD/EURA
2 - EURA Production Staff
4 - IMC/CB
1 - Branch file
1 - Division.file
1 - Author
7Feb85)
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