THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T01058R000202410001-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 28, 2010
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 15, 1985
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP85T01058R000202410001-7.pdf | 247.82 KB |
Body:
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Memorandum for: Record
These Talking Points were requested by Ty Cobb, NSC,
for the President and prepared by
C~1.Branch, Western Europe Division.
EUR P985-10032
Distribution:
Original - Ty Cobb/NSC
1 - DDI
1 - OD/EURA
2 - EURA Production Staff
4 - ICB (7G07)
1 - Division
1 - Branch File
1 -
EURA/WE/CP1
State Dept. review completed
15 February 1985
EURA
Office of European Analysis
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February 15, 1985
The Italian Communist Party
So Close But Yet So Far
Thirty-eight years have passed since Italy's greatest postwar Prime
Minister, Alcide DeGasperi, expelled the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from
his coalition government. Today, the Communists have reached a crossroads in
their search to regain power. They are within a whisker of laying claim to
the title of largest party, but at the same time, the policy gap between them
and their potential allies has increased -- a difficult position for a party
aspiring to govern in a political culture that emphasizes compromise rather
than confrontation.
-- The June 1983 legislative election brought the Communists within 3
percentage points of the Christian Democrats, who have been the
frontrunners for the entire postwar period. For the first time, it
became mathematically possible for the Communists and the small
parties to form a government without the Christian Democrats.
-- Engineering such a coalition would be difficult under the best
circumstances, given the ideological differences that separate the
parties. To make matters more difficult, the numerical breakdown in
Parliament dictates that any coalition arrangement that excludes the
Christian Democrats must be based on a deal between the Communists and
This is not very likely so long as Prime Minister Craxi leads the
.Socialists. Craxi's disdain for Communism as an ideology and his distrust of
the PCI have deep roots. '
-- He still resents how the Communists used their "Unity Pact" with the
Socialists in 1948 to increase their strength at the Socialists'
expense, blaming the PCI for the failure ~of his father's candidacy in
that election.
-- Craxi was also strongly repelled by .the harsh treatment Moscow meted
out to friends who held moderate views in Hungary and Poland in the
1950s. These negative attitudes were rther by the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
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The Socialist Party under Craxi has continued its gradual abandonment of
its traditional Marxist ideology, and it strongly supports wage restraint, for
example, as well as INF and NATO modernization.
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EUR M85-10032
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-- They established their credentials as patriots by participating in the
antifascist resistance and helping to draft the constitution. Polls
indicate that, unlike the British or American Communists, they are not
generally seen as agents of an alien power.
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-- Many long-time party militants are clearly uncomfortable with Craxi's
policies, however, and would prefer to work with the Communists rather
than the Christian Democrats.
-- In fact, Craxi has been unable to translate-the party's shift toward
the center into substantial gains at the ballot box. Should the
Socialists fail to top the 15-percent mark in nation-wide local and
administrative elections this spring, his control over the party
probably would be weakened to the benefit of those such as Rino
Formica and Gianni DeMichelis, who prefer closer collaboration with
the Communists.
Failing an alliance with the Socialists, the Communists' only alternative
route to power is through working with the Christian Democrats.
The DC politicians apparently had in mind something
s o tr o actua ommunist participation in the government. They may have
viewed the so-called "National Solidarity" governments of 1976-79, in which
the Communists traded their parliamentary su port for concessions on social
and economic issues, as a possible model.
The sudden death last spring of former Communist Party Secretary
Berlinguer brought these discussions to a c-lose. Since coming to power,
Berlinguer's successor, Alessandro Natta, has concentrated his efforts on
improving relations with the Socialists.
-- Natta, who is more reticent about dealing with Catholic politicians
than Berlinguer, caused enormous consternation among leftwing
Christian Democrats in Parliament last fall by supporting allegations
of misconduct against Andreotti.
-- But after nine months of confrontation with the Christian Democrats,
the Communists have begun to soften their line.
The Communists hope to demonstrate that their 0.3-percent victory over
the Christian Democrats?in the June 1984 European Parliament election was not
simply a sympathetic outpouring over Berlinguer. Although another narrow
Communist win in the regional elections this May would not affect the
arithmetic in the Parliament, it would profoundly alter the psychological
climate and could provide .the Communists the kind of opening they have ,been
looking for. The PCI wants to be in position to strike a bargain with either
camp once the votes are counted.
?Origins of Communist Strength
The Communists owe their pivotal position on the Italian political scene
to historical and socio-economic factors.
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-- As the preeminent party of opposition, they have been able to
establish themselves as the spokesmen of the discontented and have-
nots and as strong opponents of corruption, They draw support from
all classes and regions.
The Communists have made the most of these advantages through strong
organization and good leadership., ..
-- The party is an interlocking network of groups -- youth groups,
women's groups, trade unions -- that transmit messages between the
party leadership and the base. This machinery has often enabled them
to keep in better touch with popular sentiment than their opponents
do.'
-- Despite the involvement of individual Communists here and there in
political corruption, the party has worked hard to establish an image
of responsible participation in Parliament and of opposition to
corruption -and terrorism.
-- They have enhanced their reputation as patriotic Italians by publicly
distancing themselves from the Soviets - criticizing the Soviet system
and condemning Soviet abuses of human rights., the invasion of
Czechoslovakia, and the military coup in Poland.
Internal Problems 25X1
The successes of Italian Communism have not come free of costa Some
hidebound Communist voters have not been able to accept the party's
willingness to support centrist governments and austerity measures that hit
workers ..the hardest.
-- Although the Communists held steady in the 1983 national election,
they have slipped more than 4 percentage points from the high reached
in 1976.
-- The PCPs drift toward compromise with the "bourgeois" parties has
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strengthened a trend toward factionalism within the Communist
leadership in the past decade. Today we can identify at least five
factions, ranging from old-line Stalinists. to social democrats.
the .party has also had difficulty
convincing hardline supporters to accept its criticisms of the Soviets.
-- The Soviets' most vociferous supporters within the PCI also hew to the
"democratic centralism" line.and will not let their dispute with the
leadership get out of hand.
-- Paradoxically, however, this disagreement has led to calls from.
moderate party members, according to US officials, for more open
discussion and democracy within the party.
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Although the prominence of moderates in the party leadership makes the
Communists more acceptable partners to the other Italian parties, their recent
internal divisions also reduce the organizational advantage they have enjoyed
Changes in Italian Communism
The evidence suggests than in addition to taking advantage of the s stem,
the Italian Communists, to some extent have been coopted by it. 25X1
The public record indicates that postwar
PCI leaders long ago conc u e ey wou ave to orm a coalition with other
parties in order to govern Italy effectively. Any lingering notions of
establishing a one-party state in Italy appear. to have been dispelled by the
fall of the Allende government in Chile in 1973. 25X1
there
was no hope for a Communist government to survive in a Western country unless
it was supported by an overwhelming majorit of the population -- not a
realistic possibility in Italy. 25X1
In fact, the domestic political tactics of the Communists are similar to
those of the other Italian parties. Their major goal is to win representation
in the government and control several,ke.y ministries. They would hope to use
such afoot in the door not only to pursue their program, but also to enhance
their "respectability" at the polls.
-- In short, we believe the PCI can only come to power as part of a
multi-party coalition in which they, like the other parties, would
have to compromise on one point to secure concessions on another.
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Italy in the direction of a neutralist stance.
Circumstances have forced the Italian Communists to be relatively
moderate, but this does not mean that their participation in government should
be a matter of indifference to the .United States.. Although no puppets of the
Soviet Union, few Italian Communist leaders are well disposed toward the
,United States. Once in government, they would undoubtedly attempt to nudge
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