PAPANDREOU, KARAMANLIS, AND THE GREEK ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 18, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5
Memorandum for:
This memorandum was written by
the Iberian-Aegean Branch of Western Europe.
E lJ R A
Office of European Analysis
25X1
25X1 ,
,~vR~18s-/ooh
State Dept. review completed
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5
~~X1
Central Intelligence A~encv
SUBJECT Papandreou, Karamanlis, and the Greek Elections
1. Why did Prime Minister Papandreou decide not to support President
Karamanlis for reelection?
Papandreou's about-face was an improvised maneuver 25X1
designed to shore-up his party's leftwing and if possible to draw support away
from the pro-Moscow Communist Party. Papandreou must have felt more
vulnerable than indicated by opinion polls, which have generally given him the
edge over his conservative opponent. We thus see the move as a sign of
weakness rather than strength.
endorsing Karamanlis would jeopar Sze a wing grass-roo s support
-- While trying to cover his left flank, Papandreou may have gambled that
he could reassure centrist voters by proposing a candidate who is
relatively well respected, despite being a political unknown.
(Christos Sartzetakis, Papandreou's choice for President, is considered
a liberal centrist and is not a member of the Socialist Party.)
-- He probably also calculated that this strategy would lay the groundwork
for either a formal or informal post-election alliance with the
Communists should he win only a plurality in the next Parliamentary
election.
This memorandum was prepared by (Office of European Analysis.
Questions and comments may be directed to Chief, Western Europe Division,
EUR M85-10048
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5
' ' 25X1
-- Alternatively, Papandreou may have figured that his election prospects
were becoming increasingly poor and that if he were to lose the next
election, his "principled stand" would at least ensure the survival of
the Socialist Party and the support of the hard-core left. In short,
he may have been convinced that failure to take such a stand -- coupled
with a defeat at the polls -- could lead to fragmentation in his
party.
-- Finally, Papandreou almost certainly derived some satisf action in
dumping his old nemesis, Karamanlis. He may also have been concerned
that Karamanlis' influence and authority would grow and his own
diminish if the Socialists fail_to secure a majority in the next
election.
While it is conceivable that Papandreou's decision was part of a long-
term "game-plan" (the constitutional reforms, for example, almost
certainly had been bandied about by the party leadership for some
time), Papandreou is essentially an "improviser." Thus, we believe his
decision was taken on the spur of the moment within the last week or
We also agree with Embassy Athens that suc
a game-plan would require a degree of secrecy Greek politicians are
incapable of.
2. What effect will Papandreou's decision have on parliamentary elections?
If the Socialists can get Sartzetakis elected as President, Papandreou
may postpone parliamentary elections until October -- to give the electorate
time to absorb the shock. If Sartzetakis loses, parliamentary elections would
be mandatory for May. The sooner the parliamentary elections are held, in our
view, the greater the Conservatives' chances of beating Papandreou. In short,
we think Papandreou's decision could turn out to be a tactical blunder that
will cost him the parliamentary election.
-- Parliamentary voting for President began this Sunday, and Sartzetakis
-- with 178 votes -- fell far short of the 200 needed for election in
the first and second rounds. The contest is almost certain to remain
undecided until the third ballot on 29 March, when the Socialists will
need only 180 votes to elect their candidate.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5
~ ~ 25X1
-- While odds favor Sartzetakis by the third ballot -- assuming the
combined support of the Socialists (165 votes), the Communists (12
votes), and a f ew independents -- the outcome is by no means certain.
Balloting is secret, and the Conservatives, who control 112 votes, need
only nine more to deadlock Parliament and force new parliamentary
elections. some Socialist 25X1
parliamentarians -- who genera y are more moderate than the party
stalwarts -- were well-disposed toward Karamanlis. A few may be
tempted to "cross-over" and support the Conservatives, especially if
Mitsotakis liberally promises post-election favors.
-- Whether Papandreou is reelected Prime Minister will depend largely on
his ability to keep the middle-of-the road voters he won in the last
election -- roughly 10 percent of the electorate according to our
calculations. These voters have generally viewed Karamanlis as a
necessary counterweight to Papandreou. We think Karamanlis' departure,
Socialist proposals to trim presidential powers (see below), and the
possibility that Papandreou is aiming at an electoral coalition with
the Communists will be enough to nudge many centrists back toward the
Conservatives in the next election.
-- According to conservative sources of Embassy Athens, Papandreou's
treatment of Karamanlis will cost the Socialists from 5 to 8 percent of
the center vote. Based on opinion polls and our reading of the various
parties' fortunes, we think this percentage swing could give the
Conservatives more than the 40-42 percent of the vote they would need
in the next election to form a majority government under Greece's
current electoral law.
-- Papandreou's best hope is to delay general elections until October,
trying in the interim to reassure his centrist voters that the
departure of Karamanlis does not foreshadow radical changes. In our
judgment, he faces a tough uphill battle even if he is able to pursue
this option.
3. What will Karamanlis do now and what impact will his actions have on
parliamentary elections?
There is little doubt that Papandreou's harsh treatment of Karamanlis
will be a key issue in the next election. We doubt, however, that Karamanlis
will play as active a role in the campaign as some political pundits in Greece
have suggested.
-- Papandreou has undoubtedly wounded Karamanlis' pride, but we think
Karamanlis -- a central figure in Greek politics for over ZO years --
will consider it beneath his dignity to become too openly involved in
campaigning.
-- At the same time, Karamanlis is likely to oppose Papandreou behind-the-
scenes, maintaining his statesmanlike posture but issuing occasional
statements that signal his concern about recent political
developments.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5
25X1
4. How significant are Papandreou's proposals to amend the constitution?
The constitutional reforms Papandreou submitted to Parliament this week
would significantly limit presidential powers and make the office of President
a ceremonial one. Specifically, the President could no longer at his own
discretion dissolve Parliament and call national elections, veto legislation,
or hold a referendum.
-- In our view, Papandreou's prospects for amending the constitution are
not good. In order to pass these amendments, the Socialists would need
180 votes in Parliament on two separate ballots held at least one month
apart. (This assumes they are able to elect Sartzetakis as President
and remain in power in the interim.) Even then, under present rules,
it takes the approval of two successive Parliaments to amend the
constitution.
-- The Socialists have already withdrawn the most f ar-reaching and
potentially dangerous proposal they had made. This would have greatly
simplified the process of amending the constitution and opened the way
to partisan abuse of the amendment process.
5. What has domestic reaction been to Papandreou's maneuvers and what further
reactions can we expect?
Reaction ranged initially from euphoria on the left to a conviction on
the right that Greece is facing one of its most serious crises. While Embassy
Athens reported a few signs of "panic" (bank withdrawals and a jump in the
black market drachma rate), the political atmosphere has remained relatively
calm. At the moment, we do not expect widespread violence or disturbances,
and we believe most Greeks are willing to signal their approval or disapproval
of Papandreou's recent actions through the ballot box rather than on the
streets of Athens.
-- The military officer corps, which as a whole remains conservative
despite personnel changes by the Soc"ialist government over the past
four years, almost certainly is disturbed by the departure of
Karamanlis. Perhaps more than any other group, the military saw
Karamanlis as insurance that Greece would remain oriented to the West
and that there would be no radical shifts in domestic or foreign
policy. Our Consul General in Thessaloniki reports that even normally
pro-PASOK officers are unhappy with the way Karamanlis was treated.
-- Papandreou himself is undoubtedly concerned about unrest in the
military. The four Army Corps commanders, who were in Athens last
weekend consulting on personnel-matters, were ordered on Sunday to
return immediately to their individual headquarters -- probably as a
precaution a4ainst a military backlash to Papandreou's decisions.
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5 25X1
-- However, former Minister of Defense and conservative party leader
Averof -- who remains well-connected in military circles -- told US
Embassy officials that he had no indication of significant unrest in
the officer corps.
the Conservatives are 25X1
generally pleased with developments inso ar as they have provided the
party with an election issue par excellence. So far, opposition leader
Mitsotakis has acted in a statesmanlike manner. According to Embassy
Athens, Mitsotakis has asked his supporters not to mobilize or
demonstrate in reaction to recent events and while balloting for
President is taking place.
-- Nonetheless, the Communists have announced their support of
Sartzetakis' nomination. They also are likely to support Papandreou's
proposals for constitutional reform. While their leverage on
Papandreou may be limited at present -- as some in the Socialist Party
have suggested to US officials -- their potential for influence could
grow during the coming parliamentary election campaign. Having
effectively ditched the center, Papandreou may find it necessary to
curry at least tacit Communist support after the election.
-- While we think it unlikely, it is not inconceivable that the radical
right could attempt a move against the government within the next
several months. Extreme rightists almost certainly view recent events
as an opportunity to gain the support of those in the military and
security services who may believe Papandreou is working to establish a
one-party state. On balance, though, we think that any attempt to take
extra-legal action would fail, and that a failed attempt would redound
to Papandreou's benefit by earning him a large sympathy vote.
6. What are the implications of Papandreou's recent announcements for the US?
Papandreou almost certainly is nervous about US reactions. Government
officials are using a number of channels -- the press, direct talks with US
officials, and official pronouncements -- to convince Washington that changes
in Greece will not affect foreign policy. At the same time, Papandreou will
be looking desperately for ways to rally public support behind him --
particularly on issues such as Turkey and Cyprus where national passions run
high -- and the US could easily become a scapegoat. There are a number of
events occurring over the next several months that Papandreou could attempt to
use to rally support.
-- The Turks have launched a diplomatic campaign in Western capitals to
limit Greece's participation in NATO. Papandreou will use any
publicity about this to play upon public perceptions that NATO or the
US is siding with Turkey and against Greece.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5 ~X1
i i
-- Proposed US aid figures to Greece and Turkey have been submitted to
Congress and may come up for discussion in the appropriate committees
this summer. Papandreou will look closely at official statements and
the juggling of aid figures as the bill progresses for signs that the
US is tilting toward Turkey.
-- The government has already reacted negatively to references about US
contingency planning for the dismantling of military bases in Greece.
Speculation in the Turkish press that Turkey might be willing to accept
the bases almost certainly would be twisted by Papandreou to serve his
purposes.
-- A deterioration of the situation in Cyprus could play into Papandreou's
hands. Turkish Cypriots are set to vote on a new constitution at the
end of this month and are likely to hold presidential elections in
April and parliamentary elections in June. The popular Greek
perception of Cyprus is such that Papandreou could easily portray these
state-building measures as efforts tolerated by the US and thus part of
a general tilt toward Turkey.
-- Finally, Prime Minister Ozal is due for a visit to Washington in
April. Turkish papers claim he will raise Greek-Turkish issues during
his visit. Athens will be closely following official coverage of the
visit and is likely to seize on any negative press commentary about
Greece.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5
J
Distribution:
Original - PDB Staff
1 -
Richard Haass- State
1 -
David Jones - State
1 -
William Rope - State
1 -
Barry Lowen
kron -
State
1 -
Peter Somme
r - NSC
1 -
Ty Cobb - N
SC
2 -
Ron Lauder
-. ISP
1 -
DDI
1 -
ADDI
1 -
NIO/WE
1 -
DDO/EUR~
25X1
1 -
OD/EURA
2 -
Production
Staff
4 -
IMC/CB
1 -
WE Div.File
1 -
C/WE
,
1 -
Branch File
1
EURA/WE/IA/
15M
ar85
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85T01058R000202520001-5