THE POLITICS OF CANADIAN DEFENSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000202840001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 9, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
The Politics of Canadian Defense
9 May 1985
Summary
Canada's military capabilities declined as a result of
16 years of neglect by the government of Liberal Prime
Minister Pierre Trudeau. Prime Minister Mulroney's
Conservatives have begun to rectify these deficiencies but
in doing so have caused a storm of controversy.
The relatively small po itica oppose ion as taken
advantage of this vagueness and has succeeeded in confusing
the defense issue -- by connecting SDI with the new US-
Canada North Warning System, for example -- and in creating
a public perception that the Tories are focusing on defence
in order to curry favor with Washington. Nevertheless, we
believe that Mulroney will continue trying to improve
Canada's defense effort -- particularly its NATO component
-- and will do so within the limitations imposed by a budget
deficit that, as a percentage of GNP, is larger than that of
th
U
i
e
n
ted States. We also believe that Ottawa is eager to
reshape and curtail the country's NATO tasks to more nearly
match C
d
'
ana
a
s desires and available resources.
ffnRD COPY
This memorandum was requested by Major Frank McHugh, USAF, J-5, JCS and was
prepared by EURA WE/BBC. Please refer any McLaughlin, C/EURA/W~ questions to John
EUR M 85-10090.1
CL BY J
DRV FROM MULTIPLE
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Trudeau and Defense: A Case of Neglect
During Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's tenure -- 1968-1984 -
Ottawa devoted little attention and minimal resources to defense. Between
1968 and 1977, for example, Trudeau showed, according to a noted Canadian
historian, an almost malevolent attitude toward the Canadian Forces ('CF) and,
in effect, starved them with parsimonious budgets. During this period,
Trudeau established home defense, or "sovereignty protection," as the CF's
primary task and consistently played down Canada's military contribution to
NATO; in the early 1970s, for example, Ottawa withdrew half of its forces from
West Germany. In the late 1970s, however, the Liberal government began -- in
the face of strong pressure from its NATO allies -- to appropriate more funds
for defense, particularly for the replacement of aging equipment. The current
Canadian Frigate Program (CFP) and the on-going purchase of CF-18 fighters are
the major
l
rep
acement programs.
In our view, Trudeau's deliberate neglect of the armed forces was
facilitated by negative or ambivalent Canadian attitudes toward defense.
First, Trudeau himself was profoundly anti-military and saw little merit in
defense spending when the funds could be used to address social problems.
Second, and more importantly, Canadian society is to a great extent ambivalent
toward the military, and generally considers only the the enforcement of
sovereignty regulations and international peacekeeping duties as the proper
tasks of the CF. Since 1945, for example, with the near-universal approval of
the Canadian public, Ottawa has aided UN peacekeeping activities in Cyprus,
the Suez Canal Zone, and the Golan Heights. Likewise, once Trudeau formally
established sovereignty protection as the CF's major task in a White Paper in
1971 -- even though he introduced few measures to assist the Forces in
performing such a task -- the public quickly approved and supported this
role. Both these tasks detracted from the importance the public attached to
Canada's NATO role, and thereby allowed Trudeau's neglect of the capabilities
of the armed forces to pass virtually unnoticed -- except for some Tories,
military anal
st
d th
y
s, an
e NATO allies.
Also contributing to Trudeau's ability to run down the Canadian military
was--the,,Canadian public's general lack of a perception that the country is
threatened militarily. US commentators often contend that Canadians
historically have been content to take a "free ride" on defense, first
allowing Great Britian to carry the burden and, since 1945, allowing the
United States to carry it. We believe that this sort of analysis gives
Canadians too much credit for, consciously thinking about their country's
defense needs. In our opinion, Canadians generally think little about defense
and when they do, reject outright the idea of giving defense priority over
maintaining the social welfare system. These attitudes made it easy for
Trudeau to ignore defense, and will make it very difficult for Mulroney to
implement a more expensive and efficient defense program. We believe that an
aggressive government-sponsored "education" program for the public -- that
emphasizes the existence of an external threat and the possible economic
benefits of improving the CF's capabilities -- would have to be undertaken
before Ottawa could push major increments in Canadian spending, no matter
which party is in power.
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Tory Defense Policy: Reality Replaces Rhetoric
The Conservative Party's policy pronouncements in 1983 and 1984 often
focused on the Liberals' defense record, criticizing the sorry state of the
Canadian Forces and promising to provide sufficient "first-class equipment" to
allow them to perform their varied missions. In passionate speeches, Mulroney
damned Trudeau's neglect of the military, evasion of Canada's NATO
responsibilities, and failure to protect Canada's territorial integrity. The
Tories promised 6-percent real growth in defense spending, significant
increases in both regular and reserve manpower, and the acquisition of an
ability to protect Canad' n interests off each of the country's three oceanic
coasts.
After winning a massive victory in September, 1984, however, Mulroney and
his colleagues quickly discovered that they had inherited an economic mess
from the Liberals -- including a deficit ($27 billion) larger as a percentage
of GNP than that of the United States -- that precluded them from fulfilling
their defense pledges. Indeed, one of the Tories first acts was to cut $154
million from the defense budget -- supposedly an adjustment for lower than
expected inflation. More recently, Ottawa permitted to expire an option to
buy 20 additional CF-18 fighters at the same cost as an earlier group, and has
failed to place the follow-on order for more ships under the Canadian Frigate
Pro
ram
In o
i
i
g
.
ur op
n
on, these actions are evidence neither of Tory
insincerity nor duplicitity on defense -- indeed, we believe the Tories are
intent on modernizing and moderately expanding Canada's defense capabilities
-- b
t
u
are rather the result of severe budgetary constraints.
Mulroney also faces a lack of Cabinet and party consensus on the
direction Canadian defense spending should take. Many Tory MPs see little
point in increasing defense spending if it does not bring the party tangible
political benefits. This group -- which probably is dominant among
backbenchers and which is looked on with sympathy, if not fully supported, by
Mulroney and Defense Minister Erik Nielsen -- favors spending to maintain or
expand the defense establishment in Canada, and with it those communities
located near military bases. Sovereignty protection and/or continental
defense, therefore, appeals most to this faction. Another group, led by
External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and Disarmament Ambassador Douglas Roche,
appears to favor spending that stresses the improvement of Canada's
contribution to NATO. According to their public speeches, both men see the
upgrading of the West's conventional forces as a means of raising the nuclear
threshhold, and, more importantly, believe that a bigger Canadian contribution
would expand Ottawa's political clout in the Alliance. Finally, Mulroney
inherited a number of defense hardliners in his parliamentary caucus --
including former Defense Minister Robert Coates and several longtime MPs from
the western provinces -- who favor increasing defense spending to a degree
sufficient to permit the CF to execute all existing tasks. This group is
highly vocal and will press the Cabinet for action. Moreover, it may serve
Mulroney as a tool with which to prod his less defense-minded colleagues to
agree to military improvements simply to quiet the rightwing and thereby
forestall public sniping from the group that flight damage the government and
party_
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The Defense Debate: Key Players and Pressure Groups
The key Tory defense players are Mulroney, Clark, and Nielsen. Following
are their basic positions:
-- Mulroney - Mulroney appears to view the world almost exclusively
through an East-West prism that places priority on Canada's
commitments to NATO and NORAD. If he could have his own way, we
believe that Mulroney would expand each contribution qualitatively
and quantitatively That said, however, Mulroney is first and
foremost a shrewd politician determined to make the Tories into
Canada's "natural" governing party -- as the Liberals were for most
of this century. To this end, we believe he will pursue a defense
policy that most of his party can support, and that will serve the
party's political interests by bringing economic benefit to the
country. In the overall defense debate, we believe that Mulroney
will insist on at least minimal improvements in Canada's NATO and
NORAD contributions -- he clearly believes this is necessary to keep
his number-one foreign policy goal of better Canada-US relations on
track. Beyond that, he will seek a cabinet, party, and public
defense consensus. The disadvantage to Mulroney's step-by-step
approach is that it is time consuming and therefore makes rapid
substantive improvement or new departures unlikely. The advantage is
that it may enable Mulroney to install a durable defense policy that
more nearly matches current resources and desires to the country's
NATO, NORAD, and home defense commitments.
-- Clark - Clark is an almost prototypical representative of the
internationalism that permeates postwar Canadian attitudes toward
foreign and defense policy; he is, in fact, much closer
philosophically to traditional Liberal party policy than is either
Mulroney or Nielsen. Nonetheless, Clark,accord-ing to his public
speeches, believes that Trudeau went too far -in backing away from
close-relations with Washington and NATO, and in ignoring the needs
of Canada's military forces. It now appears-that Clark will try to
enhance Canada's political influence in NATO -- he probably places
slightly more importance on Canada's multilateral commitments than
does Mulroney or Nielsen -- and regards an_ improved Canadian
contribution to the Alliance as a key means to that end. In our
opinion, Clark is likely to try to push the Cabinet toward an
increase in Canada's commitment to NATO, and probably would welcome
encouragement from the other allies to buttress his position. We
also believe that Clark will attempt to use the Canadian public's
traditional affinity for NATO to stymie the party's hardliners and
home defense advocates by arguing that*Tory support for NATO may be
the most politically palatable way to increase Canadian defense
spending at a time of budgetary restraint.
-- Nielsen - Nielsen is a veteran Tory parliamentarian and a much-
decorated World War II'pilot. He reportedly was delighted to have
the defense portfolio added to the one he holds as Deputy Prime
Minister. During the Tories' opposition years, Nielsen was the
party's most outspoken critic of Liberal defense policy; he now finds
himself, however, with the power but not the funding to improve
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Canada's defense effort significantly. Although vociferously pro-
NATO, Nielsen has hinted that he is also concerned with addressing
home and continental defense issues. He was, for example, the
leading proponent of an early conclusion of the Canada-US North
Warning System (NWS) Agreement. Like Mulroney, however, Nielsen's
main concern is keeping the Tories in power, and he therefore
probably will agree to make Canada's NATO commitments his
Department's top priority on the grounds that it is the most
politically expedient defense option. Moreover, Nielsen currently is
charged with reviewing well over 1,000 federal spending programs with
an eye toward reducing the deficit through program elimination.
Nielsen has said that his preliminary report will not be ready before
the end of November. Because Nielsen's review is the Tories' major
deficit cutting effort, it seems likely that the Defense Minister
will have little time for his defense portfolio until well into
1986. For that reason, we expect that the Canadian military's NATO
orientation probably will remain undisturbed.
The oppostion parties -- the Liberals and the New Democrats (NDP) -- and
the media are making the development of Tory defense policy a frustrating,
acrimonious, and time-consuming affair. Because the Tories' parliamentary
opposition consists of little more than a tattered rump -- 40 Liberals and 30
New Democrats in a 282-member Parliament -- it must necessarily focus on
issues that will win it media attention and will strike most deeply at public
sensitivities and paranoias. Since Parliament convened last September, the
opposition has fixed its attacks largely on defense-related issues, and has
demonstrated an ability to unnerve and enfeeble the government, arouse the
media, and worry the public. The opposition portrayed, for example, the
modernization of the Distant Early Warning radar system -- now the North
Warning System -- as part of the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The
result of this tactic has been an on-going, sulphurous parliamentary debate
that apparently has convinced much of the public and media that such a
connection exists and that the Tories are bending to US wishes. Likewise, the
government's decision to dispatch 1,200 additional troops to West Germany-is
being characterized widely by the press and opposition as a move aimed more at'
pleasing Washington than improving Canada's NATO contribution. In large
measure, Mulroney caused much of the latter problem by announcing the decision
just before meeting President Reagan at Quebec City in March.
The opposition's attacks are aided and made more effective by most of the
Canadian media. The media tend to treat the United States and the Soviet
Union as equals in regard to military matters, and describe various actions by
Washington and Moscow in similar unflattering terms. The media also exude
pride in the fact that Canada has no nuclear weapons on its soil or in the
CF's control, and manifest particular delight in lecturing the superpowers on
the issues of disarmament and arms control. Thus when the opposition is able
to link, even tangentially, a government defense or foreign policy to nuclear
weapons -- the NDP's attacks against the Liberals' decision to allow the
testing of US cruise missiles in Canada, and the current attacks on the
supposed link between the NWS and SDI are two prime examples -- the'media hop
aboard and sound a clarion call for the protection of Canada's supposed
nuclear virginity. In our view, the consistent success of the opposition and
media in gaining the public's attention via tenuous claims and allegations is
evidence both of the unsophisticated nature of the defense debate in Canada,
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and the almost universal failure of the general populace, most of the media,
and many politicians to perceive the existence of an external threat.
According to senior officials in both the Department of External Affairs
(DEA) and the Department of National Defense (DND), government opinion
sampling in 1984 showed that the Tories' campaign for a thorough reexamination
of defense policy caught the public's interest. The poll results showed that
the public favored the development of a defense policy designed to match
Canadian tasks with the available resources. In our opinion, however, the
Tories wasted this opportunity -- -- and now 25X6
have little room to maneuver. Mulroney moved so quickly to establish better
ties with the United States that he has left the Tories open to charges of
toadyism whenever they strike an attitude or adopt a policy even roughly
similar to Washington's. Mulroney's haste to dispatch new troops to Europe
and to complete the NWS Agreement for signing at the Quebec Summit contributed
to the public's growing perception of him as a US pawn. Most seriously, the
government's early and strong support for SDI played directly into the
opposition's hands, and may prove in the end to have preempted the chance for
a comprehensive, nonpartisan, and effective national defense debate.
Given the divisions among the Tories, public attitudes, and Mulroney's, 25X1
apparent abhorrence of any controversy that might hurt Conservative political
fortunes, we believe Ottawa is likely to decide to place a clear emphasis on
Canada's NATO contribution -- largely because it appears to be the safest
course politically. The Canadian public supports NATO almost unanimously --
when polls showed a majority of Canadians opposed to the testing of US cruise
missiles in 1983, for example, they also showed more than 85-percent supported
Canada's membership in the Alliance -- and the Liberal Party and most of the
media are staunchly pro-NATO; only the NDP advocates Canadian withdrawal from
NATO and this position consistently limits its popularity. Moreover, if the
Tories propose maintaining 3-percent real growth in defense spending at a time
of overall budget cutting -- indeed a period of reductions in social programs
-- a pro-NATO policy probably would minimize public and media criticism and
li
i
'
m
t the opposition
s ability to score points against the government.
The Bureaucracy: A Decidedly Pro-NATO Influence on the Tories
The Department of External Affairs (DEA) has long regarded the Canadian
Forces's role in NATO -- particularly its assignment in West Germany -- as an
essential condition for Ottawa to have political weight in the Alliance. The
hoary chestnut that a military contribution "keeps Canada's seat at the NATO
table" is not an inaccurate synopsis of this attitude. Throughout Trudeau's
years, therefore, it tried to insure that the largest portion of the sparse
resources allocated to defense went for NATO commitments, even though such a
course meant that the defense tasks which the Prime Minister designated as
higher priorities -- e.g., sovereignty protection and continental defense --
were underfunded or not funded. We believe this attitude continues to hold
the field in the Department under the Tories. At a recent conference on
Canada-US security, for example, several senior External Affairs officials
indicated that they favored Canada seeking release from its commitment to
NATO's northern flank -- that is, the Canadian Air and Sea Transportable
(CAST) Brigade's duties in Norway -- and boosting Canadian ground forces in
West Germany to their pre-1971 strength. Moreover, External Affairs Minister
Clark is committed to improving Canada's political influence in the Alliance,
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and we believe that he supports his Department's position favoring a greater
military contribution to NATO. This does not, however','insure that Clark
would favor a greater ground force commitment in Europe since it would provide
f
ew of the domestic economic and political benefits that he and other Tories,
with an eye toward the election due in 1988, are seeking. In our opinion,
Clark and the DEA bureaucrats will produce nearly irresistable pressure within
Tory councils for a defense policy emphasizing the NATO commitment.
The Department of National Defense (DND) was in political eclipse
throughout the Trudeau era, and was usually headed by rather nondescript
ministers. In the Cabinet, the Defense Department wielded virtually no
influence, and the Defense Minister seldom sat on the Priorities and Planning
Committee.(PPC), the most important Cabinet committee. Although Defense
ostensibly has been refurbished under the Tories and Nielsen now sits on the
PPC, we believe that the DND will have minimal influence on the formulation of
the Conservatives' defense policy. The Green Paper/White Paper process the
Tories had promised for defense appears now to have been folded into and
replaced by the Green Paper being prepared by Clark and External Affairs.
Because Mulroney and Clark are primarily concerned with the foreign policy
implications of defense policy -- and because Nielsen has a full plate of
domestic issues to focus on for the immediate future -- the Defense Department
will have little to say regarding what tasks are assigned to it. Moreover,
because it is enjoying a degree of political prominence and media attention --
if not influence -- which it has not had in more than 20 years, we believe
that the senior Defense bureaucracy would be loathe to risk that prominence by
pushing for policies conflicting with the wishes of Mulroney and Clark. In
our opinion, although Defense probably would be much more willing to
accommodate a redefinition of defense tasks than External Affairs, it probably
will not actively pursue them in the near or medium terms, and will be content
with the political necessity of stressing the NATO role.
The influence of Finance Minister--Michael Wilson's budget on 23 May may
render conflicting intra-government views on defense policy academic. Wilson
currently is battling within the Cabinet fora budget that would begin
reducing Canada's deficit. If he wins -- as now seems likely'--- the defense
estimates probably will meet but not exceed Canada's commitment to 3-percent
real growth in defense spending. (Although Ottawa consistently has met the 3-
percent goal in recent years, we do not believe, given the CF's overall
deterioration during Trudeau's tenure, that this rate of increase will arrest
the erosion of the CF's capabilities.) In such a case, the already existing
NATO-centric orientation of Canadian defense spending probably will continue,
with Ottawa maintaining such large-scale capital expenditures as the Canadian
Frigate Program and the North Warning System. We believe that if Wilson has
his way with the budget, Canada's defense debate will come to an abrupt end
and the focus of defense spending will remain on NATO. In our opinion,
however, this does not foreclose the possibility of Ottawa being receptive to
suggestions for some redefinition and curtailment of its current slate of NATO
a__i._
Future Canadian Defense Policy:? Some Prelirrr4nary Conclusions and Estimates
The present state of the debate on Canadian defense policy is, to say the
least, confused and contradictory. Despite this unsettled situation, we offer
the following preliminary conclusions:
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-- Mulroney, his party, and his government are sincerely committed to
revitalizing Canada's defense effort', and particuarly its NATO
component. Two decades of Liberal neglect and an acute budgetary
:crisis,. however, will limit their -ability to make rapid substantive
improvements. In our opinion, Tory defense policy at least for the
next several years will be long on rhetoric and short on substance.
-- Mulroney's government to date is decidedly timid about measures that
might disturb its current lofty standing in the polls. Part of this
timidity is due to the Tories' lack of the governing experience. We
believe, however, that the greater part is rooted in Mulroney's
overriding ambition to make the Tories into a political machine
capable of duplicating the Liberals' political longevity -- the
Liberals have ruled Canada.for 64 years in. this century -- and his
belief that opinion polls will guide him toward that goal along the
.path of least resistance. Because polls show that Canadian
.participation in NATO is almost universally popular, we believe that
Mulroney will eventually steer Canadian defense policy toward an
enhanced Alliance commitment.
-- Within the NATO context, Ottawa probably will be willing --.perhaps.
eager -- to consider any suggestions by the Alliance that the list of
Canada's tasks be reconfigured and shortened to match more closely
its desires and available resources. We believe that the Tories
would find particularly appealing any changes that might serve the
threefold purpose of increasing Canada's credibility in NATO,
bringing the country domestic economic benefits, and allowing; the
Conservatives to fulfill a campaign promise. A few examples of the
type of adjustments that Ottawa might favor include the following.
1. An increased maritime commitment requiring the construction of
additional frigates, which would, in turn, give business to
shipyards in Quebec and the Atlantic provinces where the
Conservatives need to strengthen their political base.
2. An increased ground force commitment in West Germany, with a
simultaneous redeployment of Canadian fighter squadrons to Canada.
Such a plan would:
-- Allow the Tories to benefit politically from the public and
media approval that probably would greet such a decision.
-- The redeployment of CF-18s would provide a much-needed
economic boost to the communities surrounding several now-
withering or dormant air bases in Canada.
The restationed squadrons would allow the government to ease
some of the opposition's pressure by claiming that it was
providing for the defense of Canada by Canadians, and thereby
lessening the country's` reliance on the US military.
Such moves probably would satisfy all levels of the
bureaucracy in Ottawa: External Affairs would be satisified
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with the continued NATO commitment; Defense would take
pleasure in its improved military capabilities in Europe, in
North America, and in the public's eye; and the Finance
Ministry would perhaps be pleased with a more rational
expenditure of defense resources.
3. Ottawa might be receptive to an increased "northern" commitment
-- perhaps in conjunction with Norway, Iceland, and the United
Kingdom. Although we believe the DEA would initially oppose the
adoption of a greater CAST-type commitment, it probably could not
block a greater northern orientation for Canadian defense policy
if it was clearly recognized as part of Ottawa's contribution to
NATO.
-- A northern commitment probably would require increased
maritime forces for Canada and would thereby bring some
domestic economic benefits with it. It might also involve
greater airborne surveillance responsibilities which would be
a boon for the communities surrounding air bases in the
coastal provinces and Arctic territories.
-- A northern commitment would be a politically marketable
commodity in that the media, a number of MPs from all three
major political parties, and the Senate Committee on External
Affairs and National Defense are expressing increasing concern
with Canada's inability to defend its Arctic region. In
addition, a pride in being a "northern country" has long been
part of Canada's national ethos, and plans for improving the
country's Artic defense and/or surveillance capabilities
almost certainly would strike a responsive chord with most
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