USSR-FRANCE: THE GORBACHEV-MITTERRAND MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000303390001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 26, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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completed
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26 September 1985
USSR-France: The Gorbachev-Mitterrand Meeting
Summary
Both President Mitterrand and General Secretary
Gorbachev appear to have modest expectations for their
early October meeting. Soviet probing could test
apparent French resolve to avoid statements critical of
US positions, but Gorbachev's unprecedented exposure to
a skeptical and aggressive French press invites tough
questioning that could deny him the media success he
seeks.
statesman interested in greater cooperation with Western Euro e.
Beyond that, recent Soviet media commentary
Gorbachev probably sees his 2-5 October visit to France
primarily as an opportunity to portray himself as a flexible
suggested that he is li e y o concen ra e
on gaining some rench support for Soviet views on European
security issues and ,the alleged dangers of the US Strategic
in renewing the Western dialogue with the Kremlin.
to demonstrate firmness toward Moscow without kowtowing to
Washington and to show that France has an important role to Slav
Mitterrand, too, will be concentrating on his image. He is
on the defensive at home, where his party faces the prospects of
heavy losses in legislative elections next spring, and he would
like a visible success to distract media attention from French
responsibility for bombing the Greenpeace flagship this summer.
He is almost certainly looking for a meeting that will allow him
This paper was prepared bye of the Office of European Analysis and
of the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome
the Chief, Strategic Policy Division, SOVA,
an may a directed to the Chief, West European Division, EURA, or to
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Gorbachev and the Media
The Soviets apparently calculate Gorbachev will be able to
use the media to foster an impression of Soviet commitment to
detente and arms control, possibly generating West European
pressure for US flexibility during the scheduled US-Soviet
talks. A recent Soviet radiobroadcast devoted to the upcoming
Gorbachev-Mitterrand meeting suggested that Paris could
contribute to progress at the US-Soviet arms talks in Geneva.
In his pursuit of maximum favorable impact on Western public
opinion, Gorbachev is exposing himself to the French media.
French officials have told their US counterparts that Gorbachev
has agreed to two interviews with the French news media prior to
his arrival in Paris as well as a joint news conference scheduled
for 4 October. The latter could be particularly risky because --
as US officials and others have suggested -- Gorbachev's staunch
defense of Soviet positions and penchant for political repartee
sometimes convey an impression of arrogance. If challenged by
his French hosts on such issues as human rights or SS-20
deployments, he thus might adopt a combative posture that would
undermine his presumed objective of accentuating common Franco-
Soviet perspectives.
The French media, like Mitterrand, are on guard after
Gorbachev's publicity success in Britain last December, and they
will be out to prove that they cannot be hoodwinked b,y his
vaunted talents for manipulating the press. French magazines and
newspapers already are discounting the Gorbachev style and
emphasizing the lack of real change in the Soviet Union. Indeed,
the French media's attention to Soviet human rights abuses will
almost certainly force Gorbachev to field tough questions on
Poland, Afghanistan, Sakharov. and Frenchmen detained in the
Soviet Union.
Strategic Arms
Gorbachev probably hopes to capitalize on well-publicized
French fears that an arms race in space would neutralize the
strategic utility of French nuclear forces. He may calculate
that French anxiety can be translated into open support for a US-
Soviet accord on space weapons and for the preservation of the
current US-Soviet ABM treaty. The Soviets are probably realistic
enough, however, not to expect explicit French opposition to
Mitterrand may join Gorbachev in condemning the
"militarization of space," but we believe the French President
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would carefully balance any criticism of SDI by reiterating
French condemnations of Soviet space weapons research -- which
French officials consider to be at least as far advanced as US
research. Mitterrand personally assured the US Ambassador that
Soviet efforts to exploit US-French differences over SDI would be
futile. US officials in Paris report, moreover, that the French
are wary of being drawn into unqualified opposition to SDI that
would undermine the US position at Geneva and make their own
summit appear to jeopardize prospects for detente. To date,
Paris has made a clear distinction between criticizing SDI in
Western forums -- where criticism is "in the family" -- and
making such statements during meetings with Soviet officials.
Gorbachev is likely to stress Moscow's willingness to
undertake substantial reductions in offensive strategic nuclear
forces if the US should forgo SDI development. He is likely to
avoid detailed discussion of INF issues but may say that Moscow's
unilateral moratorium on new INF deployments is contingent on
future NATO actions, hoping to influence the November Dutch
decision and other future NATO decisions on INF deployments.
Despite French skepticism, Mitterrand almost certainly would
applaud any detailed proposal for significant reductions in
strategic or intermediate-range nuclear forces as a step in the
right direction -- one well worth following up at the US-Soviet
negotiations in Geneva or in the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in
November. He would word his response carefully to avoid giving
the impression of jumping on the Soviet bandwagon, but he might
urge Washington to take such a proposal seriously in the interest
of world peace. Any Soviet proposal that could be interpreted as
embracing French nuclear forces before massive reductions had
been completed by the US and the USSR_ however, would get short
Because the French are fundamentally hostile to aspects of
the US concept of SDI, it is possible Mitterrand could be tempted
to endorse a US-Soviet tradeoff involving deep cuts in Soviet
offensive weapons for severe restrictions on SDI research. In
past dealings with Soviet officials, however, the French have
rejected Soviet efforts to establish such linkage. Paris has in
fact consistently refused to link any of the three negotiating
categories defined b,y mutual US-Soviet agreement, and French
officials have been especially firm in opposing Soviet attempts
to establish a connection between SDI and intermediate-range
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EUREKA
The Soviet leader ma.y offer qualified support for
Mitterrand's proposed EUREKA project on European technical
cooperation, but Gorbachev is likely to emphasize his support for
EUREKA's development of non-military technologies. Although
Mitterrand would welcome a Soviet endorsement of EUREKA, he would
be suspicious if Moscow reversed field on its previous criticism 25X1
of EUREKA and would reemphasize that the program is strictly a
Western initiative; if necessary Mitterrand would s hat
there is no room for East European participation.
Other Foreign Policy Issues
French officials have told their US counterparts that Soviet
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze noted Gorbachev's interest in
discussing some of the issues currently deadlocking the
Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). He is also likely to
seek French statements of concern about the volatility of the
Arab-Israeli conflict and the situation in Central America.
Given the tightrope he has to walk between Moscow and Washington,
Mitterrand probably will relegate Soviet recommendations for
breaking the CDE deadlock to working-level groups of experts.
Despite his suspicions of Soviet motives, Mitterrand may
reiterate well-known French positions on the need for all-party
negotiations to resolve the conflicts in the Middle East and
Central America.
e oviets want formal links between CEMA and
e an a may raise this issue in Paris as another sign of
his desire to expand Soviet-West European cooperation. Any
Soviet move, however, is likely to be conditioned by Moscow's
longstanding misgivings about actions that could boost West
European cohesion or coordination. Paris probably is unprepared
to offer any significant initiative to advance ne otiations
between the two communities.
Bilateral Issues
US Embassy sources in Paris report that agreements on terms
for French export credits to the USSR and on French agricultural
or industrial sales to Moscow may be signed. The Soviets will
probably also express sympathy with French concern about the
USSR's trade surplus with France. Paris almost certainly will
welcome any agreements but has learned through experience that
Soviet commercial agreements are often not what they seem to
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SUBJECT: USSR-France: The Gorbachev-Mitterrand Meeting
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SUBJECT: USSR-France: The Gorbachev-Mitterrand Meeting
Distribution:
Internal
DDI
ADDI
C/PES
D/ALA
D/CPAs
D/OCR
D/OEA
D/OGI
D/OIA
D/NESA
D/BONA
D/OSWR
D/EURA
EURA Produ tion, Staff
I M C/ C B / ~' / ~ C`~l.~~C'
SOVA/BPD
EURA/WE/CM
EURA/WE/CM
EURA/WE/CM/~
Production File
(24 September 1985)
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