INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SITUATION REPORT #37

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000303840001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 14, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
International Financial Situation Report #37
14 February 1985
Summary
The 11-nation Cartagena Group met in Santo Domingo on 4-8 February. The ministerial-
level sessions, held on the final two days, produced a moderately-phrased document called the
Declaration of Santo Domingo. The Latin foreign and economic ministers opted, at this point in
time, to avoid a confrontation with industrial countries. The declaration simply reiterated the
Cartagena Group's desire for a dialogue between debtor and creditor countries and warns of
serious regional instability if the request for a dialogue is ignored. Other developments in recent
weeks include:
o Mexico publicly announced new austerity measures last week that we believe were
designed to gain agreement with the IMF for the 1985 economic program. An IMF team
is currently in Mexico City to try to work out final details of the agreement.
o The resurgence of inflation in December and January is testing Buenos Aires' ability to
comply with its IMF program,
o The Philippines failed to meet the yearend 1984 reserve money target of its IMF-
supported adjustment program. Most recent indications are that this will cause the IMF
to withhold disbursement of the second tranche of the standby, which is scheduled to be
released in March.
o Chilean officials have stated that they are nearing completion of a new IMF standby
arrangement, and Santiago claims it will obtain
a $500 million, three-year World Bank structural adjustment loan in April. We believe
approval of the two loans may not occur until later this year.
NOTE: THE NEXT REPORT WILL BE PUBLISHED ON 21 MARCH 1985
This situation report was prepared by analysts of the Intelligence Directorate. Comments are
welcome and may be addressed to the Situation Report Coordinator,
GI M 85 10031C
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KEY ISSUE
The Cartagena Group Avoids Confrontation
The 11-nation Cartagena Group met in Santo Domingo on 4-8 February. The
ministerial-level sessions, held on the final two days, produced a moderately-phrased
document called the Declaration of Santo Domingo. (See the annex for an outline of the
declaration.) The Latin foreign and economic ministers opted, at this point in time, to
avoid confronting industrial governments with an immediate invitation to a political
dialogue on debt. According to Embassy reporting, the final text of the declaration was
milder than the draft prepared at the 4-6 February technical level meeting. The earlier
draft called for invitation of a direct political dialogue and was more critical of
industrial country economic policies. The declaration simply reiterates the Cartagena
Grouo's desire for a dialogue between debtor and creditor countries and warns of serious
regional instability if their request for a dialogue is ignored. It also calls for the same
favorable terms received by Mexico, Ecuador, and Brazil to be extended to all other
Latin debtors.
The Declaration of Santo Domingo indicates that the Latin American nations now
intend to make a concerted diplomatic effort to get industrial countries involved in a
dialogue with them. Their plan of action includes:
o presenting a group position at the IMF/IBRD committee meetings;
o talking with principal creditor countries to formalize an invitation to a
dialogue on debt later in the year;
o sending their proposals to the countries attending the Bonn Summit in May;
and
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o attracting international public attention to their problems.
The Cartagena Group is planning to meet again following the IMF/IBRD. committee
meetings. 25X1
DEVELOPMENTS IN MAJOR COUNTRIES
Mexico
Mexico publicly announced new austerity measures last week that we believe were
designed to gain agreement with the IMF for the 1985 economic program. Plans call for
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selling 236 state companies, freezing government employment, and cutting 1985 public
spending by $465 million - about one percent of budgeted outlays - but specifics were
not announced. The administration also said it will increase use of tariffs to regulate
imports. after three months of negotiations, the IMF
rejected in January Mexico's economic plans for this year and asked Mexico City to come
up with a tougher program to cut the budget and reduce inflation. An IMF team is
currently in Mexico City to try to work out final details of the agreement.
The new steps probably will be sufficient to reach an agreement with the IMF, but
we do not expect even the modest measures announced last week to be fully
implemented.
are likely to fight closures of any large state-owned operations.
powerful unions
After a meeting of the Mexican Economic Cabinet early this month, Mexico
released the following preliminary macroeconomic data for 1984.
o GDP rose by nearly 3 percent.
o The public-sector deficit was equal to about 6.9 percent of GDP.
o The current account balance was in surplus by about $3.5 billion.
o International reserves totaled ahout $8.5 billion.
We believe that some of these statistics probably are overly optimistic. For example,
Mexico's GDP only rose about 2 percent and that the public-
sector deficit is closer to 8.5 percent of GDP. Moreover, we expect international
reserves to drop substantially as Mexico begins to draw on them to pay international
lenders once the debt rescheduling agreement is signed.
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Argentina
The resurgence of inflation in December and January is testing Buenos Aires'
ability to comply with its IMF program. Although a formal Board review of Argentine
performance is not due until late March or early April, an IMF team was in Buenos Aires
last week seeking information about compliance through end-1984, the 1985 budget, and
how the government plans to deal with inflation, according to the press. After dipping to
15 percent for the month of November, consumer inflation jumped to 19.7 percent in
December and then accelerated further to 25.1 percent in January - 776 percent on a
January 1985-to-January 1984 basis. The IMF target of cutting inflation to 300 percent
for the period September 1984 through September 1985 is almost certainly unattainable.
The loosening of price controls on maufactures and some easing of credit in January
contributed to the increases, according to Embassy reporting.
Buenos Aires gained a temporary victory when, within days of demanding a 25-
percent wage increase for February, labor accepted the government proposal of a 14-
percent increase. In return, business promised to raise prices only 12 percent this month
and, according to the press, agreed not to lay off any workers during the next 30 days.
Immediately following the agreement, however, metalworkers began a strike, and an
automotive firm laid off 90 workers, according to the press. The US Embassy has serious
doubts about the effectiveness of the agreement even over the short term.
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Our Embassy reports that Argentine monetary authorities have tried to keep
monetary indicators within IMF guidelines by increasing the daily rate of devaluation to
prevent the peso from becoming overvalued and by raising deposit and lending rates to
bring them closer to the January rate of inflation. Nevertheless, short-term real interest
rates remain strongly negative. These actions and the wage pact suggest that Buenos
Aires remains committed to its IMF program. Nonetheless, if inflation fails to slow in
February, Alfonsin will be hard pressed to hold down wage demands and keep to
REGIONAL SITUATIONS
Latin America
Among other Latin American countries, Chile is close to obtaining a new IMF
standby arrangement, Peru has presented to IMF and US government officials a package
of austerity measures in hopes of reopening credit lines and restructuring talks, Colombia
is seeking $1.2 billion in new money over two years, and reduced oil exhort revenues
threaten Ecuador's compliance with its IMF program.
Chile
Chilean officials have stated that they are nearing completion of an estimated
$500 million, three-year IMF standby arrangement,
and Santiago claims it will obtain a $500 million, three-year World Bank
structural adjustment loan in April. We believe approval of the two loans may not occur
until later this year. The US Embassy reports that commercial bank lending and debt
rescheduling negotiations will follow the conclusion of the IMF and World Bank
negotiations.
Despite ongoing progress in talks
with the IMF, World Bank, and commercial banks, we expect several months delay before
Chile receives new credits from these institutions. In the-interim, Santiago may increase
short-term borrowing to prevent an economic slump.
The IDB in early February voted to approve Santiago's request for a $130 million
economic recovery loan, according to press reports, despite a US abstention to protest
Chile's renewal of its "state of siege." We believe the US action will heighten bankers'
apprehension, making renewal of trade credits and new loan negotiations more difficult.
Santiago successfully completed its 1983-84 IMF standby program but heightened
its financial vulnerability for 1485 by drawing $800 million in short-term credit to help
cover a $1 billion current account deficit in 1984. According to Embassy reporting,
Chile's current account deficit worsened because the trade surplus slipped to $280 million
- $720 million less than anticipated. Economic growth helped boost imports while
export revenues dropped due to low copper prices. Santiago predicts that the economy
will grow by 4 percent this year, but we believe the government would require $1 billion
over current loan requests just to grow 2 percent.
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On 4 February, Finance Minister Garrido Lecca presented a package of austerity
measures to IMF and US government officials in hopes of gaining support for Lima's
efforts to reopen credit lines and refinance the 1984 foreign debt. The banks have
deferred principal on the 1984 debt until the fourth quarter of 1985.
The US Embassy
believes that Lima hopes to secure enough financial support to get the government
through the July presidential elections, and it concurs with the local IMF representative
that this package is the best that can be ex ected from the Belaunde administration
before it leaves office in July.
Lima's difficulties in reaching an agreement with the IMF and the six-month de
facto moratorium on interest payments have caused creditors to toughen their stance on
new lending, and we doubt the new measures will change bankers' attitudes. We
anticipate a clash between incumbent officials and bankers in the coming weeks that
could force presidential candidates during the upcoming campaign to take positions that
could limit the policy options of the successor government. F_ I
Colombia
During meetings on 23-25 January with its consultative committee of creditor
banks, Colombia requested $1.2 billion over two years for energy project loans and
increased trade credit lines, according to US Embassy and press reports.
Embassy reporting indicate that bankers told Bogota that they would not
provide new money without a formal IMF standby arrangement and that they would not
increase credit lines beyond current levels. The government recently increased gasoline
prices and bus fares to boost creditors' confidence, but this has not eased bankers'
concern about Colombia's low level of foreign exchange reserves, which were equivalent
to about 2.5 months of imports at yearend 1984. Moreover, the pending report of the
IMF mission probably will be negative, since the congress has delayed until a special
session in mid-March consideration of the large budget cuts necessary to reduce the
fiscal deficit. We believe President Betancur will continue to try to avoid a politically-
sensitive IMF agreement, but banks will remain firm in refusing to provide new lending
Ecuador
As Ecuador waits for its 440 creditor banks to pledge $200 million in new loans
under its financial package, falling oil prices and reduced exports threaten the country's
ability to maintain compliance with program targets.
oil exports - down 17 percent in the fourth quarter of 1984 - are dimming trade
prospects and are reducing foreign exchange earnings, 70 percent of which are accounted
for by oil exports. Ecuador's state-owned oil company is increasing sales on the spot
market and offering discounts on contracts; nonetheless, Quito may still have to resort
to devaluations to try to boost non-oil exports. Unless spending cuts are taken or oil
income is replaced, Quito will be unable to achieve the budget surplus target of 3-
percent of GDP called for this year in the new IMF agreement.
Falling
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Bolivia
Although some advisory committee banks want Bolivia declared in default, the
committee will attempt again to persuade La Paz to resume interest payments
according to Embassy
Meanwhile, Argentina plans to cut in half its cash payments to La Paz for natural
gas this year, according to the US Embassy. Argentine gas payments have supplied
nearly half of Bolivia's foreign exchange in the last two years, and in our view this sharp
drop almost assures that Bolivia will not resume its debt payments before the Siles
administration steps aside in August.
Dominican Republic
After more than a year of contentious negotiations, President Blanco recently
announced new austerity measures aimed at securing a $65-70 million IMF standby
arrangement. A new standby could be signed as early as late March or early April,
allowing Santo Domingo to reschedule its foreign debt and gain access to much-needed
new lending. The measures include unification of the exchange rate and hefty export
surcharges. The exchange rate adjustment, however, has caused price hikes for many
basic commodities. Although there has been some backlash, the popular reaction so far
has been less violent than last April when similar price increases sparked riots that left
over 60 dead. Nevertheless, to soften the impact of these new measures, the President
announced plans to increase the minimum wage by 20 percent and pledged to continue
Eastern Europe
In Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia and its commercial bank creditors are continuing
negotiations on a multi-year rescheduling, an upcoming Paris Club meeting on Poland
may be cancelled unless the Poles clear up some arrears es, and a $150 million loan is
being syndicated for East Germany.
Yugoslavia
In late January, Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Affairs Secretary Loncar met with
ambassadors of the sixteen "Friends of Yugoslavia" countries to exhort them to "take a
positive step" towards some form of multi-year rescheduling. Loncar asserted that
Yugoslavia's bank creditors are insisting on strict comparability between bank and
government rescheduling arrangements. He implied that the multi-year rescheduling
Yugoslavia hopes to conclude soon with the banks would not be possible if governments
continue to reject such an arrangement.
According to Embassy reporting, Belgrade apparently called the meeting because
it believed that some governments were wavering in their opposition to a multi-year
rescheduling. Loncar may have deliberately overstated the banks' position on
comparability of treatment between creditors in hopes of weakening the governments'
resistance to a multi-year arrangement. however,
commercial creditors are not insisting that the government rescheduling be identical to
that offered by the banks. Yugoslavia also has been keeping a watchful eye on Brazil's
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rescheduling negotiations, believing that a multi-year precedent may be established that
will help Belgrade press its case.
Despite Belgrade's efforts, key Western governments have reiterated to US
Embassies their opposition to a multi-year rescheduling for Yugoslavia in 1985. A late-
March meeting of the Paris club has been scheduled on condition that Yugoslavia first
agree to a 1985 standby arrangement with the IMF, which is currently negotiating with
Belgrade. In our judgment, the Fund is likely to take a firm stand on attainment of
positive real interest rates; this may lead to difficult talks with the Fund, which might
delay final agreement with official and commercial creditors.
Poland
Paris Club chairman Trichet has warned the Poles that the meeting scheduled for
5-6 March will be cancelled unless Warsaw makes payments on $124 million in arrearages
from the 1981 rescheduling agreement that were due in January at the initialing of the
agreement to reschedule 1982-84 debt repayments, according to Embassy reporting. The
United States, West Germany, and France so far have not received their payments, and it
is not known if Poland has repaid other creditor countries. Warsaw had agreed to repay
30 percent of its 1981 arrearages, including late charges due as of 31 December 1983 at
the time of the initialing. The Poles already paid 20 percent of these arrearages - $80
million - when Paris Club negotiations were resumed last year and have promised to
repay the remaining 50 percent - $208 million - when the 1982-84 agreement is
signed.
According to press reports, an IMF team arrived in Warsaw on 7 February to begin
talks with government officials on Poland's application to join the Fund. Polish officials
believe that IMF membership is attainable within six months, but Fund officials suggest
formal action will not take place until six months or more after detailed information on
prices, subsidies, and exchange and interest rates has been supplied to the Fund. The IMF
does not anticipate a decision on Warsaw's application before the Fund's annual meeting
next September.
East Germany
According to press reports, three major US banks - Bank of America, Citibank,
and Manufacturers Hanover - as well as the Bank of Tokyo are putting together a $150
million loan to East Germany's foreign trade bank.
US banks were excluded from last year's $400 million
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of skepticism about East Berlin's creditworthiness. We expect the East Germans to
return occasionally to the medium-term credit markets this year, mainly to refinance
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Western Europe
In Western Europe, The IMF continues to be optimistic about Turkey's economic
prospects, and Portugal has increased the amount of a new loan facility it is marketing
and has negotiated better terms.
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Turkey
The IMF remains generally optimistic about Turkey's economic prospects,
according to Embassy reporting. Fund representatives are particularly impressed by the
new attitude of Turkish officials, who they claim are attempting to meet the policy
objectives of the standby program as well as the quantitative targets. IMF officials say
that the Fund would have no problem in agreeing to a new standby arrangement for
1985. Turkish press reports indicate that Turkey will seek a new standby in 1985 for
about $250 million, although Ankara apparently has not made a final decision.
The IMF is especially upbeat about Turkey's balance-of-payments prospects.
According to Embassy reporting, Fund officials believe that improper recording of
certain transportation revenues and a portion of worker remittances overstated the
current account deficit in 1984 by as much as $400 million. Adjustments for these errors
would reduce the 1984 deficit to $1.4 billion, down from $2.1 billion in 1983. They
remain concerned, however, by inflation and the high public-sector deficit, which is
estimated to be $2 billion in 1984, or about 4 percent of GNP. The main problem,
according to the IMF, is insufficient tax revenues. Fund officials thus view the
introduction of the value-added tax this past January as a positive - albeit politically
unpopular - move.
Portugal
Lisbon has increased the amount of a loan facility it is marketing from $300
million to $500 million and has negotiated better terms, according to press reports. The
eight-year credit is divided into two parts; one half is a syndicated loan that carries an
interest rate of 0.625 percentage point above LIBOR, and the other half is a revolving
standby facility - priced at 0.375 percentage point above LIBOR if drawn - that allows
Portugal to issue Euronotes and advances. By comparison, last month's seven-year credit
for the state-owned electricity company was split into a fixed-rate tranche set at 13.35
percent and a floating-rate tranche set at 0.75 percentage point above the Oslo interbank
offered rate for the first three years and 0.875 percentage point afterwards. We believe
that loan's heavy oversubscription reflected both the attractive terms and the dramatic
improvement in Portugal's current account deficit last year. If the current account
deficit rises from $600 million to $1 billion this year as the government expects, Lisbon
probably will not seek any further jumbo deals.
Philippines
The Philippines failed to meet the yearend 1984 reserve money target of its IMF-
supported adjustment program. Philippine Central Bank figures indicate reserves of
almost 35 million pesos were held as of 31 December 1984, well above the target of 32 25X1
million pesos.
According to Embassy
reporting, the IMY is also concerned that the exchange rate is too high and is working
against the objectives of the program. The peso has appreciated dramatically over the
past few months from a low of 20.5 pesos per dollar in November to 18.2 pesos per dollar
in late January. While committed to a free float by their adjustment program, the
Central Bank intervened to halt the peso's appreciation by resuming its US dollar
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purchases.
Since Philippine businessmen borrowed when the
peso was weaker, they are disinclined to pay back now that the peso is stronger.
The final details of the rescheduling package, which includes $925 million in new
money, appear to have been worked out. According to Embassy reporting, remaining
issues to be resolved include the degree of Saudi participation and a Central Bank dispute
over the extent of its guarantees. According to press reports, Prime Minister Virata now
predicts the package will be signed on 26 February. The IMF has delayed its formal
review until the package is in place; as a result the second tranche, if released, will be
delayed until May.
In an unusual move, the Philippines' donor nations established an ad hoc committee
to monitor implementation of economic policy reforms. Organized to monitor economic
reform, this committee could become quite important if future disbursements of
assistance are tied to the Philippines' economic reform. According to Embassy reporting,
the IMF was pleased that the donors, in particular the United States, held back on their
pledges to signal their concerns.
Africa/Middle East
Among African countries, Morocco is seeking a Paris Club rescheduling of its debt
owed to official sources, Algeria obtained a $600 million syndicated loan on favorable
terms, and Senegal reached agreement with the IMF on a standby arrangement and with
the Paris Club on a rescheduling of official debt.
Morocco
According to Embassy reporting, Morocco has suspended almost all payments to
official creditors and has asked the Paris Club for a rescheduling of its official debt. The
same source indicates that Moroccan financial officials believe that this notification
relieves Morocco of its deht servicing responsibilities until a new rescheduling agreement
is signed. The Moroccans may be hoping that the Paris Club will set the consolidation
period to begin 1 January 1985, which would incorporate all of the suspended payments.
We believe the Paris Club is more likely to treat the suspended payments as arrearages,
which would be rescheduled under much harsher terms. Before the Paris Club will agree
to any rescheduling, Morocco must reach a new agreement with the IMF, and we believe
that is unlikely to occur hefore March.
Algeria
Algeria's $600 million syndicated loan was signed in Paris on 24 January. The
loan, which was coordinated by the Arab Banking Corporation, was oversubscribed and
was increased from the initial offer of $500 million. According to press reports, the
Algerians had requested an increase of $200 million, but the lead managers indicated that
the terms of the loan - 0.5 percentage point above LIBOR for the first five years and
0.375 percentage point for the last three years - were too narrow to warrant such a
large increase at the last moment. The drawdown will be over a one-year period, and
repayments will be made in seven equal semi-annual installments following the five-year
grace period. These terms are the best ever offered to Algeria on a large Eurocurrency
loan. Sixty banks make up the syndicate, including six US banks which account for
approximately $90 million of the loan. Proceeds of the credit will be used to finance
large development projects under Algeria's current five-year plan.
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Senegal
The IMF approved a new $75 million, 1.8-month standby arrangement for Senegal.
The basic objectives of the new adjustment program are to reduce Senegal's current
account deficit and to reduce the level and cost of state intervention in agriculture. In
addition, Senegal met with its official creditors in Paris on 18 January. According to
press reports, Western creditor governments agreed to reschedule about $85 million of
Senegal's debt repayments falling due over the next 18 months. According to Embassy
reporting, the agreement calls for rescheduling of 95 percent of the principal and
interest falling due between 1 January 1985 and 30 June 1986 over 9 years, including a
four-year grace period. Ninety percent of end-1984 principal and interest arrearages
were also rescheduled over eight years, including three years of grace.
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Annex
The Declaration of Santo Domingo
I.
Cartagena Group New Considerations
A.
Recent debt negotiation terms should be extended to other nations
B.
Debt negotiations must be broadened
1.
Bank debt restructurings are not enough
2.
Need co-responsibility of debtors and creditors
C.
Stringent adjustment programs result in reductions of living standards
1.
Unemployment grows and economic growth declines
2.
Social tensions have reached critical levels
D.
External factors are not helping Latin nations
1. Economic recovery has not extended to Latin America
a. OECD protectionism is growing
b. Trade and finance has been restricted
2. Transfer of resources has become negative in the region
3. Interest rates could rise again
H. Political Dialogue
A. Latins reiterated urgent need for a political framework for debt
1. Creditor countries must overcome reservations
2. A solution is not possible without a dialogue
3. Ignoring a dialogue risks regional instability
B. Cartagena Group will begin concerted diplomatic initiatives for a dialogue
1. A joint position will be presented at the April IMF/IBRD meetings
2. Group will approach creditors to discuss the invitation to dialogue
3. They will send proposals to countries attending Bonn Summit
4. They will draw the attention of international public to their
problems
5. They state that a dialogue must go beyond debt restructurings
III. Follow-up Action
A. Cartagena Group is planning to meet after April IMF/IBRD meetings
B. Uruguay is now the interim secretary of the group
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 1982
1983
Argentina
Exports
7,620
7,840
Imports
5,340
4,500
Balance
2,280
3,340
Brazil
Exports
20,170
21,900
Imports
21,070
16,840
Balance
-900
5,060
Chile
Exports
3,820
3,840
Imports
3,530
2,970
290
870
wExports
3,020
3,000
5,480
4,960
-2,460
-1,960
Exports
2,140
2,200
Imports
1,990
1,460
Balance
150
740
Indonesia
Exports
21,130
21,200
Imports
19,900
19,740
Balance
1,230
1,460
Malaysia
Exports
12,030
14,130
Imports
12,390
13,200
Balance
-360
930
Mexico
Exports
21,210
21,700
Imports
15,130
8,020
Balance
6,080
13,680
Morocco
Exports
2,060
2,010
4,310
3,590
2,250
-1,580
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Trade Trends in Key Debtor Countries
Million US Dollars at a seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
83I 83II 83111 8310 84I
1984
8411 84III Jul AJ2 Sep Comment
7,650 7,300 7,690 9,150 8,430 8,490 8,780 8,070 8,800 9,480
4,420 4,830 4,720 4,070 3,940 4,460 4,940 5,390 4,750 4,670
3,230 2,470 2,970 5,080 4,490 4,030 3,840 2,680 4,050 4,810
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Trade surplus for all of 1984 could
reach $4 billion.
20,850 22,730 22,210 21,620 25,380 27,700 27,640 29,080 27,450 26,390 Exports of industrial goods rose 37
17,760 16,400 16,210 17,010 14,840 15,310 15,400 15,180 15,940 15,070 percent in the first 10 months of
3,090 6,330 6,000 4,610 10,540 12,390 12,240 13,900 11,510 11,320 1984.
3,680 4,000 3,960 880 a . 100 _ J _ 3 710 3 , JJV
. z , 510 520
3,040 2,850 2,880 3 110 3 470
,
640 1,150 1,080 600 410 590 -190
450
J, 3,280 3,270
I ..,.
7
7
1 LM
6 0
2,900 2,820 3,120
5,310 5,180 4,660
-2,410 -2,360 -1,540
2,290 2,270 2,050
1,490 1,440 1,340
800 830 710
18,370 20,460 22,280
22,880 18,070 19,620
-4,510 2,390 2,660
12,690 13,870 14,310
13,140 12,960 13,500
-450 910 810
20,250 21,570 22,180
6,600 8,920 8,040
13,650 12,650 14,140
1,990 2,060 2,010
3,690 3,460 3,770
-1,700 -1,400 -1,760
3,180
3,370
3,540
2,880
3,130
2,760
4,760
4,480
4,700
4,780
5,370
4,520
-1,580
-1,110
-1,160
-1,900
-2,240
-1,760
2,190
2,360
2,560
2,800
2,610
2,640
3,140
GOP experts to report a trade
1,610
1,800
1,580
1,660
1,320
2,150
1,490
surplus of $1.14 billion for 1984
580
560
980
1,140
1,290
490
1,650
.
23,420
21,990
20,210
18,830
20,450
17,590
18,450
18,410
17,940
20,370
19,900
19,350
20,130
20,230
5,010
4,050
-160
-1,070
-1,100
-2,540
-1,780
15,560
15,470
16,560
17,220
17,120
17,600
16,930
13,200
13,390
14,510
14,510
14,040
15,310
14,170
2,360
2,080
2,050
2,710
3,080
2,290
2,760
22,640
8
25,030
23,030
22,840
22,660
23,000
22,850
Exports of manufactures rose 29
,440
9,580
9,090
10,800
10,260
10,480
11,660
percent in the first seven months
14,200
15,450
13,940
12,040
12,400
12,520
11,190
of 1984.
1,970
2,270
2,060
2,170
2,260
2,660
3,490
3,900
3,980
3,940
4,290
3, 790
-1,520
-1,630
-1,920
-1,770
-2,030
-1,130
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000303840001-8
Trade Trends in Key Debtor Countries - (continued)
Million US Dollars at a Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
Quarterly
198
4
iyu
1983 831
8311
83111
831V 841 84II 84111
Jul
kiq
Nigeria
Exports
Imports
Bal
16,560
19,200
11,590
12,890
8,430
14,060
12,860
11,480
13,140
11,670
11,870
14,010
16,400 13,770
9,070 8,990
12,010
9
440
12,920 11,
8
430 10
620
11,490
rts est
at
incone
0
9mll
ance
Peru
-2,640
-1,300
-5,630
1,380
1,470
-2,140
7,330 4,780
,
2,570
,
,
4,490 1,
020
600
19,860
1,630
im
expo
at $10.
.9
rts
ated at $
for all 984u billion
Exports
Imports
3,260
3
600
3,020
2
550
2,740
2
550
3,240
3,270
2,760
3,190 3,150
3,180
3,330
3,
110
3
080
Balance
,
-340
,
470
,
190
2,480
2,430
2,720
2,250 ' 2,220
2,340
2,270
2,
320
,
2
420
Philippines
E
760
840
40
940 930
840
1,060
790
,
660
xports
Imports
4,970
8,270
4,890
7,980
4,690
8,110
4,800
7
980
4,940
7
760
5,100
8
030
5,070 5,170
5,810
5,570 5,
930
5,930
OOP has established a board t
Balance
-3,300
-3,090
-3
420
,
-3
180
,
-2
820
,
6,450 5,870
6,160
6,560 5,
780
6,140
o
oversee ex
ort
r
ti
South Korea
,
,
,
-2,930
-1,380 -700
-350
-990
150
-210
p
p
omo
on.
Exports
Imports
21,850
24
250
24,440
26
190
21,370
25
180
23,850
25,050
26,920
28,270 29,030
27,850
28,660 28,1
50
26
740
Balance
,
-2
400
,
-1
750
,
-3
810
23,640
25,910
29,910
30,170 31,850
31,160
32,230 32,9
20
,
28
330
Thailand
,
,
,
210
-860
-2,990
-1,900 -2,820
-3,310
-3,570 -4,7
70
,
-1,590
Exports
Imports
6,950
8
550
6,370
10
290
5,950
9
680
6,030
6,660
6,980
6,840 7,150
7,980
7,460 8,3
50
8
150
Balance
,
-1
600
,
-3
920
,
-3
730
9,580
10,540
11,350
10,710 10,280
9,820
9,950 9,8
70
,
9
640
Venezuela
,
,
,
-3,550
-3,880
-4,370
-3,870 -3,130
-1,840
-2,490 -1,5
20
,
-1,490
Exports
Imports
17,570
580
1
15,380
360
15,120
110
16,000
100
15,900
14,660
15,010 17,540
14,950
17,240 13,5
80
14,040
GW has
d
Bala
2
9
6
,370
7,740
7,930
0
8720
140
9
0
20
8
approve
legislation
nce
,
90
8,020
6,010
9,900
9
6,920
7,0 0 9.1
6
;2ln
,
,
ai nn
,980
simplifying the export permit
Total
Exports 164,360
Im
orts 167
590
163,510
142
148,970 163,860
168,770 171,730
182,960 184,060
178,270 184
010 176
5
20
174
280
p
,
Balance -3
230
,540
20
147,020 135,370
139,420 147,860
139,920 145,110
,
,
147,090 146
400 150
6
00
,
144
170
,
,970
1,950 28,490
29,350 23,870
43,040 38,950
,
,
31
180 37
610 25
9
20
,
30
,
,
,
,110
Note: Exports f.o.b. and imports c.i.f. are on a customs basis and are derived from IMF International Financial Statistics and other sources.
Note on estimates: Numbers in bold are CIA estimates. Imports for Indonesia, Nigeria, and Venezuela are derived from trade partner data and
updated monthly. The following figures are provisional - July through September exports for Indonesia, all estimates for
Malaysia, Morocco, and Thailand.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000303840001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000303840001-8
SUBJECT: International Financial Situation Report #37
Copy No. I Sec. James Baker Treasury
2 R. G. Darman
3 Beryl Sprinkel
4 James W. Conrow
5 Robert Cornell
6 Charles Dallara
7 Charles Schotta
8 James A. Griffin
9 Doug Mulholland
10 Manuel Johnson
11 David Mulford
12 Christopher Hicks
13 Sec. George Shultz State
14 Kenneth Dam
15 Morton I. Abramowitz
16 Michael Armacost
17 Ralph Lindstrom
18 W. Allen Wallis
19 Langhorne Motley
20 Richard Burt
21 Richard McCormack
22 Chester Crocker
23 Paul Wolfowitz
24 Richard Murphy
25 J.C. Kornblum
26 Byron Jackson
27 Lionel Olmer
Roger Robinson
Douglas McMinn
David Wigg
Commerce
11
Randall Fort PFIAB
Leo Cherne PFIAB
David Tarbell OSD (ISA)
DCI
ExDir
SA/DDCI
DDI
ADDI
Ch/PES/DDI
NIO Economics
DDO
Ch/DDO/EPOS
46 Ch/DDO/AF
47 Ch/DDO/EA
48 Ch/DDO/EUR
49 Ch/DDO/LA
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65-66
67
68
69
70-77
44 February 1985
Ch/DDO/NE
Ch/DDO/SE
IAD/OCG/PEL
D/ALA
Ch/ALA/SAD/R
D/OEA
D/EURA
Ch/EURA/EE/EW
D/SOVA
D/NESA
DD/OGI, D/OGI
Ch/OGI/SRD
Ch/OGI/ISID
Ch/OGI/TNAD
Ch/OGI/ECD
Ch/OGI/ECD/FI
CPAS/ISS/SA/DA
OGI/CO 25X1
Ch/OGI/Pub
OGI/Pub
1 - Edwin Truman, Federal Reserve Board
1 - Henry Wallich, Federal Reserve Board
1 - David Roberts, Federal Reserve,
New York
1 - Leo Cherne, PFIAB, New York
1 - E. Gerland Corrigan, President,
Federal Reserve Bank, New York
1 - Alan Greenspan,
Townsend, Greenspan and Co.
2 - Doug Mulholland, Treasury
1 - Richard Combs, State
1 - Lauralee Peters, State
1 - Peter W. Rodman, State
1 - J.D.Bindenagel, State, (for pass to
Ambassador Arthur Burns)
5 - Byron Jackson, Commerce
1 - Warren E. Farb, Commerce
- Steve Farrar, OMB
1 - William Isaac, Federal Deposit
NIC/AG
1 - Ch/OGI/GD
1 - Ch/ECD
1- Ch/ECD/FI
1 - Ch/ECD/r
1 - Ch/ECD/DI
1 - Ch/ECD/CM
25X1
25X1'
_...._._.~I
L 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/28: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000303840001-8 __._?_w _