OPTIONS FOR CONTROLLING ACCESS TO TERRORIST WEAPONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 10, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
Q
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07 :CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07: CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
I I
Central Intelligence Agency
Washin~on. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
10 ~ t~ L 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: (See Distribution List)
SUBJECT: Options for Controlling Access
to Terrorist Weapons
1. The attached memorandum, prepared by our foremost expert
on terrorist acquisition of weapons, provides a comprehensive
look at how terrorists get weapons and offers some suggestions on
impeding this access. These suggestions offer no easy solutions
and are offered in hopes of stimulating further thought on the
problem while pointing to the very real difficulties that lie in
implementing each of them.
2. Your comments and suggestions are welcome and may be
addressed to Chief International Security Issues
Division,
At tachmen t : ~ Copy ~of 57
O tions for Controllin Access to Terrorist Wea ons
GI M 85-10184CX, July 1985,
25X1
1bX1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
,, , . , Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07: CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07: CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
~ ~
sIBJEICT: Options for Controlling Access to Terrorist Weapons
OGI/ISID/NP (10 July 1985)
Distribution:
Copy
1 - VALM John Poindexter, USN
Copy
2 - Mr. Douglas Mulholland, Treasury
Copy
3 - The Honorable Michael H. Armacost, State
Copy
4 - The Honorable Robert B. Oakley, State
Copy
5 - Mr. Noel C. Koch, Pentagon
Copy
6- Mr . By r o n L. J a ek so n,
Comore r c e
Copy
7 - Mr. Francis J. McNeil, State
Copy
8 - Mr. Charles Allen, NIO/CT-Narc
Copy
9 - OLL/DDI
Copy
10 - O DCI
Copy
11 - O/DDCI
Copy
12 - SA/DDCI
Copy
13 - Ex Dir
Copy
14 - John H. Stein, Inspector General
Copy
15 - DDI
Copy
16 - DDI Registry
Copy
17 - DDI/PES
Copy
18 - CPAS/ISS
Copy
19-20 - C/IMC/CPAS
Copy
21 - Senior Review Panel, 5GOOHQ
Copy
22 - D/OGI, DD/OGI
Copy
23 - OGI/PG/Ch
Copy
24-31 - OGI/EXS/PG
Copy
32 - C/DDO/SE
Copy
33 - C/DDO/CPN
Copy
34 - C/DDO/CPN
C
opy
35 - C/FISC
Copy
36 - C/CRES
Copy
37 - D/ALA
Copy
38 - D/OEA
Copy
39 - D/BONA
Copy
40 - D/EURA
Copy
41 - D/NESA
Copy
42 - NIO/USSR
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
Copy
43 - NIO/LA
44 - NIO/NESA
4 5 - N IO /EUR
46 - NIO/Warning
47 - DDO
48 - C/DDO/CPN
49 - DDSd~T/ D/OTS
50-51 - CPAS/IMC
52-53 - OCR/DSD/DB
54-55 - C/ISID
56 - C/ISID/AT
Copy 57 -
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07: CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07: CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
I I
8 July 1985
Options for Controlling Access to Terrorist Weapons
Summary
Terrorists obtain most of their weapons through one of four
channels, each of which presents a different set of problems and
opportunities for control:
o Patron state supporters, including Libya, Iran, and Syria
are the most productive source of weapons from Bloc and
Western sources for many terrorist groups. The best
opportunity to limit the value of this channel lies in
convincing Western government and arms manufacturers not
to sell small arms and infantry weapons to identified
patron states of terrorist groups.
o The international gray arms market consists of a loose
network of dealers and brokers who provide weapons through
numerous cutouts and intermediaries. Aggressive targeting
of these private dealers--when no government is likely to
make overt moves to protect--offers some opportunity for
success.
o Other terrorist groups are major sources of weapons for
some terrorist organizations; weapons are frequently
ezchanged for logistic and operational support.
Increasing the effectiveness of foreign customs and border
control officials through training and technical support
offers the major hope of cutting into this source of
weapons.
This memorandum was prepared by (Arms Transfers
Branch, Office of Global Issues. ommen s may be directed to
ational Security Issues Division, on
Copy '~ o f 57
25X1
1X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07: CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07: CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
I I
o Theft and conmercial sales are the major sources of
weapons or terrorists in most places outside the Middle
Bast. Improving and speeding-up IIS access to information
on IIS-origin weapons discovered abroad in terrorist hands
could help identify those declared end-users that do a
poor job of ensuring reasonable security for the II3
weapons they import.
Such efforts to control terrorist access to weapons, even if
only partly successful, may nevertheless be worth considering, if
only to limit terrorist access to new weapons and ammunition now
becoming available. These include more effective, special-
purpose ammunition, and weapons composed largely of non-metallic
materials which could more easily foil conventional security
systems.
2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07: CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07: CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
Options for Controlling Access to Terrorist Weapons
Terrorists have a variety of channels through which to
acquire weapons. This memorandum reviews the four principal
sources of weapons for international terrorists and provides
estimate s, of what mi?ht be done to impede arms transfers to these
groups .
Our research indicates that terrorists have four principal
sources of weapons:
o Patron-state suppor ters.
o The international gray arms market.
o Support from other terrorist grou s.
o Theft and commercial purchase.
Patron State Support
Several governments, notably Libya, Iran, and Syria purchase
prodigious quantities of ordnance--both Bloc and Western--some of
which is passed to terrorists. Weapons made available to
terrorists by patron states range from small arms to more
sophisticated ordnance such as artillery rockets, and man-
portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons.
Absent the ability to oblige the Soviets and Bloc countries
to restrict arms sales to nations which support international
terrorism, the best opportunity to prevent terrorists from
acquiring arms via this channel is to convince Western
governments and arms manufacturers not to sell weapons suitable
for terrorist use--particularly small arms and other infantry
weapons--to identified patron states of terrorist groups. This
would require convincing not only major West European countries
such as Belgium, Austria, and Italy, but also a growing number of
Third World governments, including Brazil, Argentina, and
Singapore, which are aggressively developing their indigenous
arms industries, often under US or Western license. Most of
these countries will resist pressure to ban sales of weapons to
patron s to tes. At a minimum they should establish more effective
Copy o f ~
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07: CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07: CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
and verifiable end-user controls over exported ordnance. Their
interest in US weapons technology for their own arms industries
might offer some leverage in this area.
The International Gray Arms Market
Private arms dealers and brokers also purchase large
quantities of weapons--from both Western and Bloc sources--for
sale to a variety of clients, including terrorists. These
weapons usually are acquired via a circuitous network of cutouts,
which makes it impossible to trace complete purchase-to-delivery
cycles. For this reason, Bloc nations--particularly Bulgaria--
frequently use private arms dealers to both buy and sell weapons
which may be destined for terrorist groups.
Because gray market intermediaries are used by both Western
and Bloc suppliers to distance themselves from the ultimate
recipients of the arms they sell, we believe that aggressive
targeting of these private dealers offers the most effective way
of reducing the availability of weapons to terrorist groups. No
government--either in the West or in the Bloc--is likely to make
any overt move to protect an individual whose activities are, at
best, marginally legal. Possible operations against such
individuals should involve:
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07: CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07: CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
I I
Other Terrorist Groups
Our analysis of captured terrorist ordnance indicates that
terrorist groups frequently provide arms and explosives to each
other--probably in return for logistic and operational support.
The contents of Red Brigade (BR) arms caches discovered in 1982
and the confessions of "penitent" terrorists suggest that in 1979
the BR received weapons from the PFLP with the understanding that
the Brigade would keep most of the weapons and bury the rest for
future Palestinian use. The BR, in turn, appears to have passed
on some of these weapons to other West European terrorist
Given the increasingly compartmented nature of terrorist
groups, there appears to be little that the US Government can do
to prevent these groups from exchanging ordnance once acquired.
The best hope for limiting this procurement channel probably lies
in increasing the level of training of foreign customs and border
control officials in an effort to complicate the spread of
weapons f rom one terrorist group to ano ther.
Theft and Commercial Sales
Outside the Middle East, a large proportion of weapons found
in terrorist arms caches appear to be non-military, civilian
firearms which were either stolen or purchased from legitimate
commercial concerns. Recent analyses of three caches of i l lic it
arms discovered in Colombia revealed, for example, that over half
of the recovered weapons were commercially available
"paramilitary" weapons that had been purchased in South Florida
gun shops. Similarly, analys is of West European terrorist
weapons indicates that although the more lethal ordnance (such as
automatic weapons and anti-tank launchers) is often of Bloc
origin, most of the recovered firearms are locally ayaitabtP
commercial models of Western manufacture.
Because control of civilian firearms is largely a local
police problem, there is relatively little the US can do directly
to reduce the number of weapons stolen or bought from foreign
guns shops. Improving communications links to US officials
(especially the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms at
Treasury) so that they can learn quickly when commercial US-
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
r , ,~ ~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07: CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07: CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9
I I
origin firearms turn up in terrorist hands is one important
step. ATF could, in turn, check the declared end-user of these
weapons in order to identify foreign gun shops and countries that
do poor jobs of ensuring reasonable security for the US weapons
New Dangers
Unless effective steps are taken soon to reduce the access
of terror fists to new weapons, terrorist arsenals wi 11 not only
grow, but also gain increasingly sophisticated and lethal arms.
Recent advances in f firearms technology have resulted in:
o New types of ammunition--such as the French-made TH1/
round--which combine the previously irreconcilable
properties of causing massive tissue damage and
penetrating soft body armor or a hardened vehicle.
o Caseless ammunition--such as that developed for the new
West German G-11 assault rifle--which does not contain
metal cartr idge cases that would trip metal detectors.
o New small arms--such as the Austrian AUG assault rifle and
the Glock pistol--which are largely constructed of high
impact plastic and contain few metal parts, and are thus
easier to smuggle through airport security systems.
o Increasingly sophisticated night-vision and laser sighting
devices that enable a shooter to reliably engage his
victim in low light conditions and which faci litate rapid,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/07: CIA-RDP85T01058R000304730001-9