CHINA: NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICIES AND PRACTICES SINCE 1 JANUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000405640001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 3, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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STAT
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urvn I Cv Lila I IUDU 11UIV
Central Intelligence Agency
China: Nuclear Export Policies and Practi s
Since 1 January 1984
Summary
Since joining the International Atomic Energy Agency two years
ago, Beijing has taken steps to become a more responsible nuclear
exporter, and we have no knowledge that Beijing has made unsafeguarded
transfers in 1985. China's record, however, is blemished by:
? Unsafeguarded transfers in 1984 that apparently were deliveries on
contracts signed before China joined the IAEA.
? China's failure to su
scribe to any recognized international guidelines or
b
publish its own guid lines for applying controls on exports.
This memorandum was prepared by
Office of East Asian Analysis, trace o dent can eapons
Research. Information available as of 3 December 1985 was used in its preparation.
Comments and queries are welcome and ma be directed to the Chief, Development
Issues, China Division, OEA,
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Beijing's Record
China began exporting nuclear-related materials in 1981
primarily to earn hard currency, but in our view Beijing also hoped that participating in
Seeking to limit the sharply critical reactions to its unsafeguarded nuclear
sales--and to increase its chances of gaining access to US nuclear technology--China
announced in September 1983 that it would join the IAEA on 1 January 1984.
Membership in the IAEA, however, does not commit a state to impose safeguards on all
exports. IAEA statutes require IAEA safeguards only on IAEA-sponsored nuclear
projects. In other cases, the supplier and customer negotiate whatever safeguards will
global nuclear trade would increase its access to Western nuclear technology.
apply.
Unlike the major Western and Soviet Bloc suppliers, China does not adhere to any
internationally accepted nuclear export norms, such as the London supplier guidelines or
the Zangger guidelines, when exporting to nonnuclear weapon states (see the inset).
China also has not articulated its own guidelines. Thus, we are unsure, what if any,
safeguards Beijing routinely requires on exports that do not fall under IAEA auspices.'
' China is also not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Since the
1960s, China has strenously o osed the NPT on the grounds that it "discriminates"
against developing countries.
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INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EXPORT GUIDELINES
The Zangger guidelines were voluntarily adopted in 1974 by nuclear supplier
states party to the NPT as agreed procedures for implementing treaty
obligations regarding nuclear exports. The guidelines cover only exports to
nonnuclear weapon states that are not party to the NPT. With certain minor
exceptions, they contain a blanket requirement for IAEA safeguards on exports
of source and special fissionable material. They also include a list of detailed
definitions of what constitutes material or equipment specially designed or
prepared for nuclear use. Safeguards also are required on any source or special
fissionable material produced by or used in equipment that includes reactors
and certain components, heavy water, nuclear-grade graphite, reprocessing, fuel
fabrication and heavy water plants and special equipment for them, and special
The London Suppliers Guidelines were adopted voluntarily in 1978 by
major nuclear suppliers, including non-NPT-party France, as guidelines for
exports to all nonnuclear weapon states. In addition to requiring IAEA
safeguards, the London guidelines require a no-explosive-use pledge, establish
agreed criteria for physical protection, and set controls on retransfers. The
provisions extend to facilities for reprocessing, enrichment, and heavy water
production that are constructed using exported technology. The guidelines also
require suppliers to follow special' procedures when transferring sensitive
facilities arty. ttechnology or material that can be used for weapons.
Since joining the IAEA, Beijing has affirmed on a number of occasions--both
public and private--its commitment to engage only in peaceful nuclear cooperation with
other countries and to abide by IAEA guidelines. In January and February 1985, for
instance, Chinese Vice Premier Li Peng publicly reiterated Beijing's commitment not to
assist nonnuclear weapon states in obtaining nuclear weapons, adding that Beijing would
fulfill its IAEA obligations and respect IAEA regulations.
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Our evidentiary base is such that we cannot say for certain whether additional
shipments of unsafeguarded material were made under these old, open-ended contracts.
We have no indication, though, that China has made such unsafeguarded transfers in
1985. Moreover, China's pledges to honor IAEA safeguards are backed by a series of
nuclear cooperation accords it has signed in the last 18 months. Several of these
agreements address the question of the conditions under which China will require
application of IAEA safeguards:
? China and Brazil publicly signed a nuclear cooperation accord in October 1984 in
which each country agreed to apply IAEA safeguards on nuclear materials and
equipment transferred between them.
Although China and Brazil are unlikely to become major
nuclear trading partners, this accord was Beijing's first bilateral agreement to
include unconditional IAEA safeguards.
? China and Argentina signed a nuclear cooperation accord in April 1985. It states
that the contracting parties will request that IAEA apply safeguards with respect
to the material and equipment transferred under the agreement.
? In June 1985, China and the UK signed an agreement covering nonsensitive
technologies and equipment that are not required to be safeguarded. The UK and
China have indicated any cooperation covering sensitive areas will be subject to
IAEA safeguards and covered in a separate agreement.
? China and japan signed an agreement in July 1985 that applies IAEA safeguards,
including on-site inspections for all equipment imports from Japan. This was the
first time China agreed to accept such safeguards in an agreement with a major
supplier country.
? China announced at the IAEA annual conference in September that it would
voluntarily place some of its civilian nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards.
We have no indication that China has failed to live up to any provision of these
agreements.
China has also signed more general economic agreements that include
cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For example, China and Iran publicly
announced a protocol in June to cooperate in a variety of economic and scientific fields,
including the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Iran, a party to the NPT whose nuclear
facilities are under IAEA safeguards,
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Unanswered Questions
Although Beijing seems to be abiding by international nuclear standards, our
information, as always, is fragmentary and often contradictory, making a definitive
judgment about China's nuclear activities impossible. Even though we may learn of a
proposal we do not always know its final disposition,
and we cannot be sure we know of every deal. Beijing's failure to agree to specific
international guidelines or to clearly spell out its own guidelines makes it difficult to
determine what conditions Beijing may have attached to any particular transactions. F
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Chinese Nuclear Cooperation - Chronology 1985
April
18
China and Belgium sign nuclear cooperation
agreement.
June
3
July
23
China and Argentina sign nuclear cooperation accord.
China and UK sign nuclear cooperation agreement.
Agree to negotiate a separate protocol to implement
IAEA safeguards if sensitive transactions occur.
China and Iran sign economic and scientific
cooperation accords, which include specific
reference to cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear
energy.
US and China sign nuclear accord during visit of
Chinese President Li Xiannian to Washington.
Japan and China sign agreement on nuclear power
cooperation containing provisions that China will
apply IAEA safeguards to imports from Japan.
Japan reportedly fails to gain further Chinese
assurances of return of materials and technology
in the case of misuse.
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August
22
September
24
China tentatively agrees to an IAEA request to
sell an unknown quantity of natural uranium fuel
to Iran for use in Iran's planned research
reactor.
China announces its decision to voluntarily
place some of its civilian nuclear installations
under IAEA safeguards.
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SUBJECT: China: Nuclear Export Policies and Practices Since
1 January 1984
Distribution:
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Mr. Gaston Sigur, NSC, Room 302, Old EOB
Ambassador Richard Kennedy, Ambassador at Large and
Special Advisor to the Secretary on Nonproliferation
and Nuclear Energy Affairs, Room 7531, Department of State
The Honorable Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Room 4318,
Department of State
Ambassador John Negroponte, Assistant Secretary for
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs,
Room 7831, Department of State
Copy 5 - Mr. George Bradley, Acting Assistant Secretary for
International Affairs, Department of Energy,
1000 Independence Ave., SW, Washington, DC 20585
Copy 6
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Mr. James Lilley, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Room 4318, Department of State
- Mr. Fredrick McGoldrick, Director of Nonproliferation
and Nuclear Export Policy, OES, Room 7828,
Department of State
Copy 8 - Dr. Lewis Dunn, Assistant Director for Nuclear
and Weapons Control, ACDA, Room 4936, Department of State
Copy 9
Mr. James Shea, Director, International Programs,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
NRC/SO, Willste Building,
Room 261, 7915 Eastern Avenue, Silver Spring, MD
Copy 10 - Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, Director, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Room 6531, Department of State
Copy 11 - D/OEA, Room 4F-18
Copy 12-15 - Office of Legislative Liaison, Room 7B-02
Copy 16 - Senior Review Panel, Room 5G00
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DDI, Room 7E44
MG David Einsel (Ret), NIO at Large, Room 7842
Assistant NIO at Large Room 7B42
C/EA/j Room 5D-38
C/PES, Room 7F24
PDB Staff, Room 7F30
CPAS/ILS, Room 7G50
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D/OEA, Room 4F18
Research Director, Room 4G48
C/OEA/CH, Room 4G32
C/OEA/CH/DOM, Room 4G32
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C/OEA/CH/DEF, Room 4G32
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OGI/NID/NP, Room 2G24
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C/DO/PPS, Room 3D01
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C/OSWR/NED, Room 5G48
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D/ALA, Room 3F45
D/OGI, Room 3G00
- D/NESA, Room 6G02
NESA/SO/I, Room 6G17,
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