SUDAN-LIBYA: PROSPECTS FOR A RECONCILIATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000405760001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 23, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
23 January 1985
SUDAN-LIBYA: Prospects for a Reconciliation
Summary
We believe there is at least an even chance that
President Nimeiri will make a tactical reconciliation
with Libyan leader Qadhafi before mid-year. Nimeiri is
facing a deteriorating economy, eroding security in
southern Sudan, and dim prospects for additional support
from his allies. For over a year, Qadhafi has actively
sought an accommodation as part of a broader effort to
limit support to his opponents and end his diplomatic
isolation. A reconciliation would do little to solve
Nimeiri's domestic problems, but it would offer him the
considerable advantages of at least temporarily
suspending Lib an subversion and support for Sudanese
dissidents.
Nimeiri would view any such agreement with Libya as
a temporary measure and not a replacement for his ties
with the United States. Nonetheless, a Sudanese-Libyan
reconciliation would inevitably alter the tone of
Nimeiri's relationship with Washington. Khartoum
(would be less inclined to
participate in military excercises with the United
States and less supportive of US positions in
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This memorandum was prepared by f the Egypt-Sudan 25X1
Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office ear has ern an South Asian Analysis,
at the request of the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. It was
coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia
and within the Directorate of Intelligence. Information as of 22 January 1985
was used in preparation of this paper. Comments and queries are welcome and
should be addressed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, 25X1
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President Nimeiri's recent conciliatory gestures toward the
rebellious south have been turned aside, and there is little
prospect in the near term for a political settlement of the
conflict. Moderate southern politicians are divided over the
region's administrative structure, and major insurgent leaders
continue to rebuff Nimeiri's overtures. The Libyan- and
Ethiopian-backed southern rebels stepped up their activity last
month in what may be the start of an offensive. Government
forces are hardpressed to contain rebel attacks, and vital
development projects remain shut down. Nimeiri has appealed to
his benefactors, primarily Egypt and the United States, for
additional military assistance to combat the insurgents,
especially helicopter gunships and transport aircraft, but has
not received a'response satisfactory to him or his armed forces.
Since last fall, Nimeiri has tried to placate foreign and
domestic critics by slowing Islamization and releasing key
northern opponents from detention, in addition to seeking
reconciliation with the south. These tactics have not yet
generated the increased foreign economic and military support
Nimeiri deems necessary to ward off civil unrest this spring or
to underwrite a solution to the southern problem. Khartoum,
which is in arrears to the IMF, has been reluctant to impose
stringent austerity measures, fearing they would heighten the
prospect of civil disorders. Chronic mismanagement of the
economy has caused foreign donors to hesitate to provide further
aid. In late December, the US Government officially notified
Nimeiri it might cut off all ?stance if he failed to comply
with IMF measures.
Last October, Nimeiri publicly expressed his frustration over
the slowdown of foreign aid and suggested a provocative solution
to his problems in the south. In an interview with an Arab
language paper published in London, Nimeiri said the Western
press and financial institutions--who, he claimed oppose his
country's Islamic line--had persuaded their governments to slow
aid to Sudan. He. specifically noted that "media pressure had led
to a tangible delay in the delivery of US military and economic
aid to Sudan at a time when the United States is aware of the
threat to our country's national unity...." In an interview with
Le Monde, Nimeiri said that if he'found himself without means to
defeat the rebels in the south, he would "have no hesitation in
bringing about a reconciliation with Libya, the Soviet Union and
Ethiopia."
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Libyan Diplomatic Overtures and Sudanese Responses
Qadhafi has made at least five separate diplomatic overtures
to the Nimeiri regime since last spring. These initiatives are
part of a broader strategy of reconciliation and accommodation
with neighboring Arab regimes intended to limit Arab support to
Libya's opponents, lessen US influence in the region, and end
Tripoli's diplomatic isolation. Qadhafi's efforts already have
produced the political "union" with Morocco, the expansion of
commercial and arms supply relationships with Italy, Greece, and
Malta, meetings with Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez and French
President Mitterrand, and a fragile accommodation with France
over Chad.
Saudi Arabia appears to have brokered the first significant
Libyan-Sudanese contact, which took place last April in mecca
between Sudanese Vice President Tayyib and Libyan adviser Qadhaf
The meeting
produced no agreement, and it appeared badly timed, in that it
was preceded by the Libyan bombing of Omdurman in mid-March and
followed by an attack by Sudanese backed Libyan dissidents in
Tripoli in early May.
Nonetheless, Tayyib kept channels to Libya open.
Qadhafi has continued to increa
his aid to the southern rebels, apparently calculating that
Nimeiri might become more responsive if insurgent successes
threatened Khartoum's control of the south.
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Benefits and Costs to Nimeiri of a Reconciliation
A reconciliation with Libya could cost Nimeiri much of the
political and economic support he gets from his,current allies.
Nimeiri may believe that he is already losing it, however, and
that reconciliation with Libya--or the threat of it--would give
him new leverage with his allies. He probably would anticipate
being as successful as Morocco in presenting reconciliation as a
fait accompli. He would try to portray his accommodation with
the Libyans as merely a tactical ploy designed to confound his
"Communist" opponents. Nimeiri probably expects the most
positive response from Riyadh, because of past Saudi efforts to
mediate between Libya and Sudan. Cairo and Washington would be
greater challenges, but he may believe that their concern for
maintaining their own strategic and economic interests in
Sudan--and the absence of an obvious alternative to himself as
President--would temper their reaction.
We believe the most likely Libyan-Sudanese agreement would
entail restoration of diplomatic relations and a suspension of
support for each other's dissidents, rather than a political
"union" with Libya similar to that of Morocco. No agreement with
Qadhafi wouldsolve problems with the economy or the south, but it
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would at least temporarily remove the extra burden of Libyan
subversion and support for Nimeiri's opponents in southern Sudan.
Qadhafi might offer some economic aid as an inducement to reach
an agreement. He could be expected to honor most of the
agreement in the short-run, because the suspension of
anti-Qadhafi radiobroadcasts from Sudanese territory and of other
types of Sudanese support to Libyan dissidents would be a major
gain for him. Over the longer term, Qadhafi would still try to
undermine any government in Khartoum that did not condemn US
policy in the Middle East, particularly by using northern Muslim
dissidents, but this is of less concern to Nimeiri than solving
his immediate problems.
A side-benefit for the Nimeiri regime of a rapprochement with
Libya would be a more nonaligned image and the prospect of
improved ties with the USSR. Sudan's relations with Moscow--
paralleling those of Egypt--might improve enough to attract
Soviet military and economic aid. Khartoum has in past years
resisted Moscow's efforts to improve relations, but recently
Khartoum has carried on a series of low-level cultural exchanges
with Moscow. The speaker of the Sudanese parliament will soon
make an official visit to the USSR. Although the Soviets would
be skeptical that any Libyan-Sudanese reconciliation could
endure, they almost certainly would welcome the rapprochement in
the hope that it would provide an entree for.,.themselves in
Khartoum or at.least reduce US influence there. Moscow might
also calculate that closer Libyan-Sudanese relations would lead
Khartoum to reduce its support for opponents of Ethiopia's
Marxist regime.
We believe Nimeiri may be personally vulnerable to Libyan
blandishments at this time.'--Although his antipathy toward
Qadhafi is profound, because of Qadhafi's efforts to topple his
regime since the mid-1970s, Nimeiri is increasingly driven by
personal and political desperation. Concern with his own
deteriorating health has, in our opinion, led to his personal
turn to Islam and his efforts to impose his religious views on
his nation. Nimeiri is thus susceptible if Qadhafi pitches his
argument on the theme of common Islamic goals. Indeed, Nimeiri's
recent rhetoric suggests he believes Western allies are shunning
him because of his Islamization program.
Implications for the Southern Problem
If Libya suspended or diminished its aid to the southern
Sudanese rebels, Nimeiri probably would lean even more toward a
military solution, reasoning--we believe incorrectly--that
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government forces would finally gain the upper hand. He would
still have to ask for additional military support from allies,
however, and to send northern troops south to fight the
insurgents. The decline in morale among government forces would
be*checked only temporarily, if at all. The regime would remain
vulnerable to a military coup triggered by the southern problem.
The southern insurgents probably would respond in the short
term to a Nimeiri-Qadhafi reconciliation by stepping up their
attacks and placing maximum pressure on the regime, hoping the
Sudanese military would move to replace Nimeiri. If this
strategy failed, they would still have enough captured military
equipment and supplies to operate at a lower level. They could
also maintain pressure on the regime by keeping important oil and
water projects shut down through terrorism and kidnapping of
foreign nationals.
Regional Implications
Egypt--whose own relations with Qadhafi have recently been
strained to the verge of military confrontation--would initially
be highly upset by a Sudanese-Libyan accord. Cairo, however,
might eventually see some benefits for itself in the longer run.
An improvement of security in southern Sudan,.mi.ght raise hopes
for the resumption of work on the Jonglei Canal, a water
diversion project important to Egypt. It might also lessen
Khartoum's pressure on Egypt for major military assistance for
the south.
Saudi Arabia would give a Nimeiri-Qadhafi rapprochement
guarded support, and Riyadh might even offer Khartoum more
economic assistance. As in the case of the Moroccan-Libyan
Union, Riyadh would see the reconciliation as placing constraints
on Qadhafi and reducing his subversive activities in the region.
A Sudanese-Libyan accommodation would mean further political
'polarization in North Africa. Algeria would be displeased by the
accord and probably would improve its relations with Egypt to try
to offset Qadhafi's latest gain. Morocco probably would point to
the agreement as another sign of Qadhafi's moderation in regional
politics. Weak states that are potential targets of Libyan
troublemaking, such as Tunisia and Niger, probably would be more
likely to conclude that they need to strike their own deals with
Qadhafi.
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The reconciliation probably would ease tensions in the Horn
of Africa, at least on the surface. Somali President Siad Barre,
who reportedly agreed recently to establish consular relations
with the Libyans, might be prompted by Nimeiri's lead to further
upgrade relations, especially if Tripoli promises to suspend aid
to Somali dissidents and offers economic assistance. Ethiopia
might make its own reconciliation overture to Sudan. Khartoum
has reached several similar agreements with Addis Ababa in the
past; they rarely have lasted long. But each country, facing
overwhelming famine and refugee problems, probably would consider
a breathing space in their long quarrel advantageous.
Conclusion
Nimeiri's foreign policy has been characterized by pragmatism
and responsiveness to the domestic political demands of the
moment. He is a master of sudden moves that throw his opponents
off balance, and he has repeatedly demonstrated his capacity to
change policy dramatically. In the three years following the
Libyan-backed coup attempt of 1976, he made two rapprochements
with Qadhafi. The principal factor. in Nimeiri's decision this
time will be his perception of whether his allies plan cutbacks
of political, economic, and military support.
Implications for the United States
Nimeiri would view an accommodation with Libya as a temporary
measure that would not replace his ties with the United
States--and this is the line he would almost certainly take with
US officials. He seems to value his relations with the United
States and probably has no desire to turn completely to Libya or
the USSR. He may wait to see if his trip to Washington next
month produces more economic and military support before moving
ahead with Libya.
A Sudanese-Libyan reconciliation, however, would inevitably
alter the tone of Nimeiri's relationship with the United States.
Khartoum probably would be neutralized as the most effective base
of operations for Libyan dissidents. In addition, Khartoum would
be less likely to cooperate with Washington on projects such as
the movement of Ethiopian Jews (Falasha) to Israel. Nimeiri is
likely to resist Qadhafi's pressure to condemn Camp David, but he
probably would support the US position in regional and
international forums less frequently than he does now.
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To avoid Libyan criticism, however, Nimeiri would
become less inclined to approve other forms of security
cooperation with the United States, including participation in
joint military exercises.
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SUBJECT: SUDAN-LIBYA: Prospects for a Reconciliation
DISTRIBUTION
External
Copy 1 - Richard L. Armitage, DOD
2 - Richard Murphy, State
3 - Thomas Nassif, State
4 - Arnald Raphel, State
5 - David Zweifel, State
6 - Director INR, State
7 - James K. Bishop, State
8 - Frank G. Wisner, State
9 - Chester A. Crocker, State
10 - Noel C. Koch, DOD
11 - Robert Cabelly, State
12 - Richard Bogosian, State
13 - Col. Kenneth McKim, DOD/ISA
14 - DIO/NESA
15 - George S. Harris, State
16 & 17 - Harlan Robinson, State
18 & 19 - Lillian Harris, State
20 - Jock Covey, NSC
21 - Philip Ringdahl, NSC
22 - DIO/Africa
Internal
23 - DCI
24 - DCI
25 - Exec Director
26 - SA/DCI/IA
27 - DDI
28 - DDO/Africa
29 - NIO/NESA
30 & 31 - NIO/Africa
41 - C/PES
42 - DDO/NE
43 - DDO/NE
44 - DDO/NE
45 - D/ALA
46 - ALA/AF
47 - ALA/AF/H
48 - D/NESA
32 - NIC Analytic Group 49 - 50 - NESA/PPS
33 & 34 - DDO/AF~
35 - PDB Staff
36 - CPAS/ILS
37 - 40 - CPAS/IMD/CB
DDI/NESA/AI/Ea
51 - NESA/AI
52 - 53 - NESA/AI/M
54 - 58 - NESA/AI/E
(23 Nov 85)
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