THE LEVANT AND NORTH AFRICA - 1985
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T01058R000405850001-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 9, 2009
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 15, 1985
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP85T01058R000405850001-4.pdf | 190.79 KB |
Body:
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/09: CIA-RDP85T01058R000405850001-4
SECRET 905
Central Intelligence Agency
15 February 1985
The Levant and North Africa - 1985
Summary
The areas of the Levant, Egypt/Sudan, and the Maghreb
will continue to confront the United States with a variety
of frustrating problems but likely will offer only a few
opportunities to influence the course of events and the
resolution of the issues in the region. The issues will cut
across the entire region and will be framed by forces
coalescing around four central themes:
-- Internal stability and the need for economic reform
in several countries of importance to the US.
-- Implications of the policies and actions of key
countries and Palestinian groups for Mideast peace
prospects.
-- Threats to US interests from political or military
action and terrorism.
-- Trends in political-military cooperation with the
United States on the part of our traditional
fri ends.
This memorandum was prepared by the Arab-.Israeli Division, Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/09: CIA-RDP85T01058R000405850001-4
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/09: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000405850001-4
SECRET
Israel-Lebanon-Syria-Palestinians
Israel's decision to withdraw its military forces from southern Lebanon
will have important consequences for Lebanon and the region. The Lebanese
Government probably wi I I not be able to fill the vacuum when the Israelis
depart. The,resu'lt could be a free-for-all among the Lebanese Armed forces,
the Lebanese:Forces militia, the Druze, and the Shia for control of the
coastal road from Beirut to Sidon. Bloodletting among pro- and anti-Arafat
Palestinian groups in refugee camps near Sidon and elsewhere in southern
Lebanon is also 'likely and could spark further fighting among Palestinian and
Lebanese factions in and around Beirut. The United States probably would
again be blamed by a Lebanese Government unwilling to take responsibility for
its own problems, and the US presence in Beirut could be further threatened.
Syrian forces in their current positions could not control such fighting.
The Syrian succession question domestic stability, Vice President
Rifat's maneuvers, and the 'likelihood of an open power struggle--will come
even more to !the fore if President Assad dies or becomes incapacitated. Tel
Aviv would test a new Syrian regime to ensure that Damascus would continue to
abide by existing tacit agreements on "red 'lines."
Israel faces serious political and economic challenges. The fragile
stability of the National Unity Government could be upset by internal
dissension within the Likud leadership as well as by differences between Likud
and Labor over domestic policies, problems in Lebanon, and overtures to the
Arabs. Progress in resolving Israel's economic crisis will demand the
imposition of painful measures. The most pressing issue is what reforms
Israel will design to supplement the recently announced eight month wage-price
package deal to run from February through September. To be effective, reforms
must deal with substantial deficits, both external and internal, and prevent
prices from exploding once the new package deal ends.
At least three important issues affecting the Palestinians will impact
significantly on the search for peace in the Near East.
-- PLO Chairman Arafat is trying to ,econcile with the Democratic
Alliance, which includes the Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. His
success in that effort will largely determine the prospects of
eventual involment of Palestinian representatives in any future Arab-
Israeli negotiations.
-- Even the emergence of a tentative moderate PLO bloc supportive of
Arafat's policies may not be enough to move Jordan to assume a role
for itself and for the Palestinians in future peace negotiations. If
Jordan did move in that direction, however, such a development could
confront Israel with an unwelcone*dilemma and probably a domestic
crisis.
-- Developments in Palestinian :terrorism. An expanding PLO presence in
Jordan would generate increasing Israeli concern over the possibility
of cross-border terrorist attacks. The type and frequency of such
attacks will determine the magnitude of Israel's response and to a
large extent determine the future of Jordan's relationship with
Israel.
-2-
SECRET
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/09: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000405850001-4
SECRET
Egypt-Sudan
Political and economic pressures on Egypt differ from those on Israel but
may have an important impact on US interests. Internal political pressures
may lead the Egyptian Government to reduce military cooperation with the US.
Cairo's role-in the search for peace in the Middle East is another major
aspect of its foreign policy. It's disappointment over US inactivity in the
region might lead it to promote more energetically alternatives to a US-
directed diplomatic effort. The Egyptians, like the Israelis, will need to
implement economic reform if they are to address effectively long-term
problems. So far Cairo has been only slightly responsive to urging in this
area from foreign lenders and donors. Accelerated reform would place Egyptian
political and social stability at risk.
The issues of Sudanese political stability, the southern Sudanese
insurgency, and Khartoum's relations with Libya and Ethiopia will be of
concern. The likelihood that Nimeiri will reach a rapproachement with Libya
to lessen pressure from Libyan-backed rebels and dissidents is higher now than
it has been for several years.
Maghreb
Of considerable importance to the US and to the Near East region will be
Libyan leader Qadhafi's domestic political position, the threat that Qadhafi's
opposition may pose to him, and how Qadhafi's views of his personal security
affect Libyan foreign policy initiatives. Libya's principal foreign policy
goal wi l l be to continue trying to counter US efforts to isolate Libya through
diplomatic and economic sanctions. Toward that end, Libyan military and
terrorist activities will continue to threaten US interests.
The Maghreb is an area with high potential for political instability.
Developments such as the domestic and regional implications of Bourguiba'.s
departure from Tunisian politics, continui,ng or increased tensions between
Morocco and Algeria over the Western. Sahara, and popular unrest resulting from
King Hassan's'inability to solve Morocco's economic problems could adversely
affect US interests and alter the fragile equilibrium of the region.
-3-
SECRET
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/09: CIA-RDP85T01058R000405850001-4
SECRET
SUBJECT: Three 'Ipescripts
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
Distribution:
1 - Ambassador Richard Murphy (State/NEA)
1 - DAS Arnold Raphel (State/N A)
1 - DAS James A. Placke (State/NEA)
1 - DAS Robert Pelletreau (State/NEA)
I - DAS Robert Peck (State/NEA)
1 DAS Thomas Nassif (State/NEA)
1 - Deputy for Middle East Negotiations William A. Kirby (State/NBA)
1 - MajGen:Kenneth D. Burns (DoD/ISA)
1 - Jock Covey (NSC)
1 - LtGen John T. Chain Jr. (State/PM)
1 - DDI Rep'@ Commerce
1 - SA to Secretary of Treasury for National Security (Douglas Mulholland)
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - Appropriate Division
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/09: CIA-RDP85T01058 R000405850001-4