EGYPT'S AIR DEFENSE PROGRAM ENDING IN SUDAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000405890001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 19, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
19 February 1985
Egypt's Air Defense Program Ending in Sudan
Summary
Egypt's decision to terminate air defense
assistance to Sudan and to withdraw its men and
equipment from Khartoum in late February will not
significantly alter Egyptian-Sudanese bilateral
relations. Shared security concerns will continue to
drive the Cairo-Khartoum relationship, overriding even
the misperceptions and lack of understanding that
caused the air defense effort to founder. Egypt,
however, is unlikely to attempt again a
ambitious program with Sudan. We belie
seek instead to convince both Washingto
that a strengthened Egyptian military i
protection against Libyan aggression.
similarly
ve Cairo will
n and Khartoum
s Sudan's best
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe Egypt-Sudan Branch,
25X1
Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis.
Information as of 18 February 1985 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, ~rrab-
Israeli Division,
25X1
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The Egyptian Effort
Egyptian Defense Minister Abu Ghazala arrived in Khartoum the
day after the Libyan bombing of Omdurman on 16 March 1984. He
made an apparently unsolicited offer of an air defense system to
protect the Sudanese capital. Within a week, two Egyptian SA-7
platoons of about 50 men arrived to protect Khartoum
International Airport and the Wadi Seidna airbase, and Abu
Ghazala had requested US assistance to airlift an entire SA-2
brigade to Khartoum by 24 March. He confidently predicted that
the Egyptian brigade would be operational within a month of
arrival and that its equipment could be turned over to the
Sudanese after about eight months of training.
The first Egyptian radar arrived in Khartoum in early April,
along with support personnel and a site selection team. In May,
a complete engineer battalion (500 men) with its equipment
arrived in Khartoum to prepare quarters for the SA-2 brigade.
Construction of this support facility proceeded slowly, and it,
was less than a quarter complete when Egypt withdrew the first
SA-7 platoon in August. No further progress was evident at
either the support site or the SA-2 site by the time the second
SA-7 platoon was withdrawn in December. Last...month Khartoum was
notified that all Egyptian personnel and equipment (including the
radars) would be removed from Sudan by the end of February.
We doubt the Sudanese were surprised by either the delays in
,,the Egyptian program or its cancellation. We believe Egypt's
unwillingness to actively support Sudan's anti-insurgent campaign
in the south and its usual cash-only policy for arms transactions
with Khartoum probably led Sudanese military officials to
question Egypt's motives and depth of commitment from the start.
The Sudanese Acting Director of Military Intelligence, for
example, complained shortly after Abu Ghazala's visit that
Egypt's assistance was simply an effort to foist old equipment on
Sudan. The Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) later told
that he had always doubted the 25X1
Egyptians would supply the equipment for the SA-2 brigade,
particularly since they had failed to provide other promised
training, equipment, or weapons. In response to Egyptian
complaints about inadequate Sudanese support and lax military
discipline, the DMI commented that "Egyptians simply do not get
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along well with Sudanese." According to the Egyptians, in
December the Sudanese even accused them of'repairing Egyptian
radars with parts they had removed from Sudanese radars.
Reasons for Failure
Defense
Minister Abu Ghazala and Egyptian Armed Forces Chief of Staff
El-Orabi offered the following reasons for withdrawing the units
sent to Sudan:
The Sudanese had made no effort to deploy any of
their own air defense equipment from Port Sudan to
Khartoum.
Sudan did not receive the $150 million it expected
from Saudi Arabia to purchase Egyptian equipment
and to maintain Egyptian personnel in Khartoum.
The Egyptian radars in Sudan were of little use
without the SA-2 missiles.
Sudanese vacillation and indecision delayed
Egyptian planning and assistance.
Sudan's depressed economy forced Egypt to expend
its resources on supporting Egyptian troops in
Khartoum rather than on constructing missile sites.
.,We believe the following also probably affected Egypt's decision:
-- Concern that this program would require constantly
increasing resources with little likelihood it ever
would provide an effective air defense for
Khartoum.
Doubt that the Sudanese ever would be capable of
assuming control of this air defense system, thus
requiring a near-permanent Egyptian military
presence in Sudan.
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Concern that Nimeiri would view a continuing
Egyptian presence as tacit approval of his
policies, including those regarding the southern
insurgency.
location and its relations with its neighbors.
but to continue to rely on Egypt, given Sudan's geographic
Sudanese disappointment over the withdrawal of Egyptian
forces is likely to be tempered by Khartoum's initially low
expectations of the program's success and the realization that
the program at least resulted in tangible--albeit mostly
symbolic--evidence of Egypt's willingness to defend Sudan. In
any event, the Sudanese recognize they have little alternative
.,aggression against Sudan.
We believe Egypt's strategic interests in Sudan--the
unhampered flow of the Nile River and the presence of a friendly
regime in Khartoum--will continue to ensure Egyptian concern over
security threats to Sudan. We believe, however, the Egyptian
military now recognizes that any program as ambitious as the air
defense effort would be impractical due to the amount of logistic
and materiel support required to compensate-..for Sudan's lack of
economic infrastructure. Egyptian military assistance to Sudan,
therefore, is likely to remain at the levels that traditionally
have permitted Cairo to minimally assist the Sudanese military
while avoiding entanglement in Sudanese internal problems. In
the meantime, we believe Egypt will continue to seek US
assistance to strengthen its defenses, believing that a strong
Egyptian military is the most effective way to deter Libyan
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SUBJECT: Egypt's Air Defense Program Ending in Sudan
NESA M# 85-10042
DISTRIBUTION:
External
Morton I. Abramowitz, INR, State
Robert Boggs, NEA/EGY, State
Richard Bogosian, State
RADM John L. Butts, Naval Intell. Pentagon
Commodore Robert J. Steele, Naval Oper., Pentagon
RADM Theodore Almstedt, Naval Oper., Pentagon
Patrick N. Theros, PM/RSA/NESA, State
Raymond Firehock, ACDA/VI/DI, 21st St. Wash.
Maj Gen William E. Odum, DAMI-FII, Pentagon.
Brig Gen L. A. Cooley, Jr., DAMO-SSA, Pentagon
Brig Gen L. W. Smith, HQMC/INTP, Hqs US Marine Corps
Maj. Gen James C. Pfautz, AF/INER, Pentagon
Brig Gen Thomas A. Baker, AF/PRIB, Pentagon
DIA, ATTN: DB-8C3 DIAAC Bolling, AFB
DIA, ATTN: DE-4 DIAAC, Bolling, AFB.
DIA, ATTN: JSI-5, Pentagon.
George R. Crossman, OPS-C, Pentgon
Lt. Col Glenn A. Lazarus, ISA, Pentagon.
Col. Kenneth McKim, DOD/ISA
1 - Philip Ringdahl, NSC
1 - Jock Covey, NSC
,, Internal
1 - DDO/Africa
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/Africa
1 - NIC Analytic Group
1 - DDO/AF
1 - PDB Staff
1 - DDI
1 - DDO/NE
1 - DDO/NE
1 -- DDO/NE
DDI/NESA/AI/E
1 - C/PES
1 - CPAS/ILS
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/ALA
1 - ALA/AF
1 - ALA/AF/H
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI
1 - NESA/AI/M
3 - NESA/AI/E
(19 Feb 85)
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85T01058R000405890001-0