INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS: SOFT-PEDALING DIFFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000506650001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 15, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
t G-~
Jib 25X1
15 July 1985
Indo-Pakistani Rel ations: Soft-Pedaling Differences
SUMMARY
Tensions have eased slightly between India and Pakistan
since Rajiv Gandhi succeeded his mother, but the differences
on regional as well as bilateral issues continue to reflect
enduring national security concerns. Indian fears center on
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, its acquisition of
sophisticated conventional arms from the United States, and
its alleged assistance to Sikh dissidents. Islamabad in
turn believes that India's quest for regional dominance
challenges its stability and even its survival. The two
countries' visceral mistrust of each other is likely to
impede significant rapprochement, at least in the near
term.
Relations between India and Pakistan have been more cordial under Rajiv
Gandhi than under his mother. Rajiv and President Zia have already met twice-
-at I ndi ra' s funeral and again at Chernenko's--and their discussions,
described by both sides as upbeat, have spurred efforts by each to ease
tensions:
-- Following Zia's decision earlier this year to try the Sikh hijackers of
two Indian airliners--welcomed by Rajiv as a first step toward reducing
This paper was prepared byl (Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
State Dept. review completed
AIM
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strains--New Delhi agreed to resume the bilateral talks that Indira
broke off last summer.
-- Rajiv's decision to shift the principal brief for Pakistani affairs
from his mother's hardline adviser, G. Parthasarthy, to Foreign
Secretary Bhandari, a former schoolmate of his Pakistani counterpart,
will remove a significant irritant from the relationship. The
replacement of India's abrasive Ambassador in Islamabad, whose tour has
come to an end, also will help.
Since February the two countries have resumed intermittent talks between
high-level as well as working level Foreign Ministry officials. Early this
month high-level meetings of the Joint Commission were held in New Delhi.
Established in 1982, the Joint Commission focuses on expanding bilateral
trade, communications, tourism, and cultural exchanges. In addition, the two
foreign secretaries have met several times at meetings of regional
organizations, the Nonaligned Movement, and the United Nations. Later this
month, senior Indian and Pakistani officials are scheduled to meet again to
Abiding Mutual Mistrust
New Delhi's doubts about Pakistani intentions remain the major obstacle
to significant rapprochement:
-- The Pakistani nuclear program and--to a lesser extent--US arms aid to
Pakistan remain stumbling blocks, and Raj i v' s statements in public and
in private suggest he is as worried about the former as Indira was.
-- For Rajiv, as for his mother, suspicion of Pakistani involvement with
Sikh extremists in Punjab is a major impediment to a breakthrough in
Foreign Secretary Bhandari' s comments to Under Secretary Ikl e in early
May probably were meant to remind Washington before Rajiv's visit that New
Del hi views Z i a' s regime and its regional policies--including its security
relationship with the United States and its stance on Afghanistan--as a threat
to Indian interests. Bhandari said that:
-- India was proceeding "step by step very cautiously" to "cool down the
atmosphere" with Pakistan because Islamabad in the past has not shown a
sustained commitment to improving relations.
-- Afghan refugees in Pakistan are causing "great panic" and adding to the
country's "volatility."
-- New Delhi believes Islamabad's role in aiding the Afghan insurgency
could provoke Soviet efforts to destabilize Pakistan--to the detriment
of India's interests.
-- Pakistan's military might must be reduced to alleviate Kabul's fear
that Islamabad would launch an attack if Soviet troops were to
withdraw.
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Even so, the shift in Rajiv's rhetoric on Pakistan while he was in Washington-
-where his complaints about US arms sales to Islamabad focused on the
diversion of India's economic resources caused by the arms race with Pakistan,
not on questions about Pakistan's right to acquire arms--could indicate new
willingness to try a more conciliatory line. 25X1
Pakistan, for its part, still fears that India's desire for regional
preeminence threatens Pakistan's survival. Islamabad fears Indo-Soviet
collaboration to weaken Pakistan--a development we consider unlikely because
of divergent Indian and Soviet equities in South Asia. Some Pakistanis know
that New Del hi wants Pakistan intact as a buffer against Soviet-occupied
Afghanistan, but many still worry that Moscow will somehow manipulate India to
attack Pakistan:
-- Pakistanis also are concerned that India might take advantage of
tensions along the Pakistani-Afghan border to intimidate Pakistan or
that India mi ht launch a preemptive strike against Pakistan's nuclear
facilities. 25X1
Slim Prospects for Improved Relations
Islamabad continues to push for a bilateral nonaggression pact--first
proposed by Zia in 1981 in response to New Delhi's arguments that Pakistan's
newly acquired US arms threatened India. New Delhi is parrying Pakistani
initiatives by pushing for progress on trade and cultural exchanges until
tensions have eased further. Many influential Indians believe the 1972 Simla
Agreement--in which Indira Gandhi and then-President Bhutto agreed to settle
their countries' differences through bilateral talks, refrain from hostile
propaganda, and avoid meddling in each other's county --is the most realistic
basis for normalizing relations. 25X1
Still, New Delhi in our view wants to maintain at least the appearance of
cooperation on a nonaggression pact in order to:
-- Bolster its image of reasonableness and statesmanship as leader of the
Non al i gned Movement.
-- Remind Moscow that India is pursuing its own foreign policy line:
-- Avoid complicating India's rel ations with the Gulf Arabs by appearing
If the current dialogue does not again grind to a halt as a result of
disagreements over the Sikhs or other contentious issues, the two sides will
eventually have to wrestle with a deadlock for which no easy solution is in
sight. In their 1982 counterproposal to Pakistan's nonaggression pact, the
Indians insisted on conditions that, in Islamabad's view, impinge on
Pakistan's sovereignty--such as asking Pakistan to forgo the right to take
disputes to the United Nations and to commit itself never to allow foreign
bases on its territory.
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SUBJECT: Indo-Pakistani Rel ations: Soft-Pedaling Differences
DDI /NESA/SO
External Distribution:
(15 July 1985) 25X1
Mr. Robert Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA Bureau, Department of
State, Room 6244, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Ron Lorton, Deputy Director, Office of Analysis for Near East and
South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Room 4636, Department of
State, Washington, DC 20520
Internal Distribution:
1 - DDI
1 - DDI Registry
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - C/DDO/NE-
1 - PDB Staff
4 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/NESA/SO
2 - NESA/SO/P
2 - NESA/SO/S
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