INDIA: CHANGING ATTITUDES ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T01058R000506700001-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 27, 2010
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 29, 1985
Content Type:
REPORT
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 July 1985
INDIA: CHANGING ATTITUDES ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 25X1
Summary
Sikh terrorism is prompting India to adopt a more
constructive attitude toward international terrorism
issues and to seek cooperation from Western countries
harboring Sikhs. Prime Minister Gandhi's recent public
call for the release of the TWA hostages in Beirut
contrasts sharply with India's traditional ambivalence
toward hijackings and similar acts of violence. With
its chief concern narrowly focused on the Sikhs, India
t
i
ns
is likely to offer only limited cooperation aga
general terrorism in the near term.
Faced with a serious, threat from Sikh extremists, India is
beginning to take international terrorism more seriously. Recent
statements by Prime Minister Gandhi suggest that India is moving
toward closer cooperation with the United States and its allies
on terrorism issues. During the past month, Gandhi publicly:
-- Called for a global agreement on measures to combat
terrorism.
-- Condemned the TWA hijacking in Beirut and appealed to the
hijackers to release their hostages on humanitarian
grounds.
This memorandum was prepared byl Lof the 25X1
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as
of 19 July 1985 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are wel come and may be addressed to the Chief, South Asi a
Division 25X1
NESA M 85-10158
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-- Announced that the Indian Government would not succumb to
terrorist pressure and that severe action would be taken
against terrorists in India.
In addition, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has publicly
urged the government to take "stro,ng and uncompromising steps
against all forms of terrorism."
These statements contrast sharply with India's traditional
passivity toward international terrorism. In the past, New
Delhi's reactions have ranged from silence to vaguely-worded
statements of disapproval, partly from a sense that terrorism
elsewhere was none of India's business, but also out of concern
for India's friendships in the Arab world--especially with the
Palestinians. India also has been reluctant to antagonize the
Islamic f undamantal i st regime in Iran, fearing that Tehran would
retali ate by attempting to radicalize Indi a' s largely quiescent
Muslim popul ati on. For example:
-- India privately condemned Iran's 1979 seizure of the US
Embassy hostages but turned aside US pressure to j of n
official statements and did nothing to help ease the
crisis.
-- New Delhi reacted to the bombing of our Embassy in Beirut
in April 1983 by suggesting that Washington's refusal to
recognize Palestinian rights of self-determination was a
key source of US troubles i n the Middle East.
-- I ndi a has commented publicly on only a handf ul of the
many hundreds of terrorist incidents that have occurred
in recent years, according to press reports.
India has even abetted terrorist acts in neighboring
countries by providing sanctuary, financing, and training for
Tamil militants seeking a separate state in Sri Lanka, and by
periodically supporting A l-Zul f i qar terrorists aiming to
overthrow Pakistan's military regime. Officially, New Delhi has
rationalized this support by defining these groups as "freedom
fi nhtarc" rather than "terrorists."
The record under R aj i v' s stewardship, however, suggests he
may be less comfortable with Indian support of such groups. New
Delhi's backing of A 1-Zul f i qar now appears dormant and Indian
security forces have reined in the Tamil guerrillas, if only as
part of India's support for the current Sri Lankan political
negoti ations.
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India as Victim
New Delhi's attitudes began to change only after India
started experiencing terrorism first hand, following the army's
bloody June 1984 attack on Sikh extremists holed up in the
Amritsar Golden Temple--the Sikh religion's holiest shrine.
Since then, India has been jolted by a number of violent
incidents, including:
-- The hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane to Dubai by
Sikh extremists in August 1984.
-- The assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by Sikh
members of her bodyguard in October 1984 and the
resulting Hindu backlash that claimed several thousand
lives from both communities.
-- A series of bombs in New Delhi and three northern states
in May 1985 that claimed over 80 lives and injured
hundreds.
in Punjab that have resulted in some deaths. 25X1
A major factor contributing to New Delhi's raised
consciousness about terrorism is the very real threat to Rajiv.
Sikh extremists who applauded his mother's murder have also
called for his death, and many Indian and US observers believe he
is certain to be the victim of an assassination attempt sooner or
later. India's internal security services are preoccupied with
protecting his life and those of his wife and children. The
severity of this concern has been underscored by the construction
of a new home for the G andhi s designed exclusively for protective
purposes, the withdrawal of his children from their schools, and
the increased precautionary planning before Rajiv travels,
-- Numerous assassination attempts on Sikh and Hindu leaders
whether in India or abroad.
India also has taken a number of broader steps to curb Sikh-
sponsored violence within the country--including a draconian
antiterrorism law, improved airport and VIP security measures,
and the Pstablishment of new counterintelligence units targeted
against Sikhs.
The International Dimension
A number of recent events indicate that Sikh extremists are
increasingly targeting Indian interests and personnel overseas,
where funds, arms, and training are more readily available and
where they can gain greater publi city for their cause. At least
two Sikh extremist groups have claimed credit for the dramatic
crash last month of an Air India 747 at sea. New Del hi strongly
suspects the disaster was caused by a bomb planted by Sikh
extremists in Canada.
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New Delhi has long maintained that it could contain the Sikh
threat but for extremists abroad.
Mounting incidents by foreign-based Sikh terrorists as well
as concern for Gandhi's safety while traveling abroad have forced
New Delhi to recognize the need for more international
cooperation against terrorism. So far, however, the focus of
I ndi a' s efforts and activities has been on seeking closer
cooperation from foreign governments-- parti cul arl y the United
Kingdom, Canada, and the United States--in thwarting the Sikh
threat to Indian interests.
Gandhi wants I ndi an security off i ci al s to cooperate
with the United States on this issue.
Limits to Cooperation
We believe New Delhi recognizes that cooperation is 'a two-
way street and that the United States will expect India to
provide assistance in return. In the near term, however, Indian
cooperation probably will focus narrowly on piecemeal and largely
tactical arrangements with the United States concerning Sikh
activities in both countries. New Delhi can also be expected to
push for more formal quadripartite cooperation between itself,
the United States, the United Kingdon, and Canada.
Nonetheless, India has appreciated and been encouraged by US
statements of support for its unity and integrity in the wake of
Sikh unrest in the Punjab, and Rajiv himself appears to be
generally more attuned to the need for democracies to act in
concert against terrorism. US assistance to India's counter-
terrorism efforts over the past year has already had some effect
in persuadi nq New Delhi that the problem is global in scope and
that India should work jointly with other countries. Indian
security officials in New Delhi have expressed keen interest in
receiving anti-terrorism training in the United States, notably
in explosives detection and disposal and in forgery detection.
At this juncture, India's contribution to Western efforts to
fashion an international response to terrorism appears to be a
matter of some debate among Gandhi and his senior advisers, with
no clear consensus yet apparent. We believe India will be
reticent to engage in anti-terrorist initiatives that its
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friends--including the USSR--would view as too close to US
positions; it will prefer multinational settings for its public
efforts. Moreover, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs'
sanctimonious response to the US-sponsored boycott of Beirut
International Airport suggests New Delhi's entrenched bureaucracy
does not yet reflect the Prime Minister's more open-minded
approach.
Challenges for the United States
Gandhi's own perceptions of the terrorist problem appear to
extend well beyond his government's narrower focus on the
Sikhs. His interest in terrorism also adds a new dimension for
strengthening Indo-US ties.
The more actively India becomes involved in international
cooperation on terrorism, the more likely counter-terrorism will
receive support from other developing countries and the less
opportunity New Delhi will have to backslide into its traditional
ambivalence toward the problem. Closer cooperation with the
United States should also help strengthen India's resolve to
continue dealing with its own terrorist menace within a
democratic framework.
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SUBJECT: India: Changing Attitudes on International
Terrorism
Internal Distribution:
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(29 Jul 85)
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SUBJECT: Indi a: Changing Attitudes on International
Terrorism 25X1
External Distribution:
Captain Edward Louis Christensen, USN, Chief, South Asian
Regional Plans and Policy Branch, Department of Defense,
Room 2E973, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Mr. Stephen P. Cohen, Policy Planning Staff,
Department of State, Room 7312, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. James P. Covey
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director,
Near East and South Asia Affairs, National Security Council
Room 351, Old Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20500
Mr. Robert Dean
Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
PM/OD, Department of State, Room 7428, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Kenneth E. DeGraffenreid
Speci al Assistant to the President and Senior Director
Intelligence Programs, National Security Council, Room 300
Old Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20500
Mr. Donald R. Fortier
Special Assistant to the President for Political-Military Affairs
National Security Council , Room 374, 01 d Executive Office
Building, Washington, DC 20500
Dr. Robert G al l ucci
Director, Office of Regional Security Affairs, Bureau of
Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, Room 7424,
Washington, DC 20520
Lt. General Phi l li p C. Gast, USAF
Director of Defense Security Assistance
Department of Defense, Room 4E841, Pentagon,
Was hi ngton, DC 20301
Mr. Donald Gregg, Assistant to the Vice President for National
Security Affairs, Room 381, Executive Office Building,
Washington, DC 20500
Mr. George S. Harris
Director, Office of Analysis for Near East-South Asia,
Department of State, Room 4524A, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Ron Lorton, Deputy Director for Intelligence and
Research Bureau, Department of State, Room 4524A,
Washington, DC 20520
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SUBJECT: India: Changing Attitudes on International
Terrorism
External Distribution (continued)
Colonel Kenneth E. McKim, Director, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, International Security Affairs, Near East and South Asia
Region, Department of Defense, Room 4D765, Pentagon,
Washington, DC 20301
Ambassador O akl ey
VIA : Dave Long, M/CTP, Room 2236, Department of State,
Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Robert A. Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA Bureau,
Department of State, Room 6244, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Peter Rodman, Chairman, Policy Planning Council
S/P, Department of State, Room 7312, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Stephen Rosen, Political-Military Staff Member
National Security Council, Old Executive Office Building,
Washington, DC 20500
Mr. Peter Tomsen, Director, INS
Department of State, Room 5251, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Darnell M. Whitt
Intelligence Adviser to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Room 4D840, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Mr. Ronald P. Zwart, Special Assistant for South Asia,
International Security Affairs/Near Eastern-South Asia Region,
ncnartmant of Defense, Room 4D765, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
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