LIBYA: WHAT IF QADHAFI IS OUSTED?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000506940001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 25, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

IOL 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000506940001-2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000506940001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000506940001-2
I I
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 September 1985
LIBYA: What if Oadhafi is ousted?
Summary
Oadhafi's removal would result in an intense--and
possibly bloody--power struggle among several competing
factions. The most likely outcome would be a regime
that curtailed Libya's worldwide support for
revolutionary causes but remained opposed to many US
policies in the Middle East and Africa. Its
receptivity to developing a more constructive
relationship with Washington would be tempered at least
initially by the need to dispel the inevitable
suspicions at home and abroad that the US put it in
power. A less likely scenario involves an extremist-
dominated government that could become an even greater
threat to US interests than the Qadhafi regime. Such
extremists would be more willing than padhafi to target
US personnel and facilities directly in terrorist
operations. Although the extremists are opposed to
Soviet ideology, they might feel compelled to try to
obtain Moscow's protection if they perceived themselves
under strong US pressure. In return, Moscow might
demand increased access to Libyan air and naval
facilities and push Tripoli to adopt policies in
support of Soviet objectives in the Middle East and
elsewhere.
We judge that Oadhafi's prospects for survival are poorer
now than at any time since he came to power 16 years ago. 25X1
mismanaged socialist
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe Maghreb Branch, Arab-
Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution from the Near East/North Africa Branch of the Office of Central
Reference. Information as of 25 September 1985 was used in its preparation.
Questions and comments should he directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000506940001-2
Central Intelligence Agency
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506940001-2
25X1
economic policies, economic constraints imposed by the soft oil
market, and wasteful spending in support of radical causes
worldwide are seriously eroding the relatively high standard of
living that once was regarded by most Libyans as among the
principal fruits of Oadhafi's revolution. These developments, in
our view, combined with widely resented abuses of power by
Oadhafi's extremist supporters, are creating the political
climate that encourages plotting by Qadhafi's many opponents and
increases their chances of penetrating his elaborate security
The Key Players
In our judgment, four key groups have the capability of
deposing Qadhafi. These groups include:
--oadhafi's relatives and fellow tribesmen, assigned to
Libya's most important military and security posts, who are
concerned that his declining political fortunes threaten
their predominant position in Libya.
--Libyan nationalists in the armed forces, who would he
motivated by their loss of political influence to the
revolutionary committees and their resentment at Qadhafi's
establishment of a Peoples Militia as a counterweight.
--Exiled Libyan dissidents, who oppose Qadhafi because his
revolution has deprived them of their wealth, status, and 25X1
political influence in Libya.
--Fanatics in the revolutionary committees, who might depose
Qadhafi in opposition to one of his periodic tactical shifts
toward moderation or to prevent him from curbing their 25X1
Instability Ahead
None of these groups appears to us to have the strength to
quickly consolidate its position on its own, even in the event of
a pre-emptive move by one of them. The Qadhaafa tribe is
relatively small and would need to coopt its rivals or to expand
-2-
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506940001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506940001-2
25X1
its base of support to maintain control. There are also
indications of personal rivalries over assuming Qadhafi's mantle,
which would seriously weaken the Oadhaafa's ability to carry the
day. Oadhafi's extensive security precautions militate against a
coup by nationalist military officers that would immediately
eliminate Qadhafi's tribesmen or the revolutionary committees as
political actors. Libyan exiles have been unable to build an
extensive reliable support network inside the country because of
long absence from Libya. The revolutionary committees would
likely encounter deep-rooted popular resentment over their role
in orchestrating Qadhafi's brutal efforts over the past 10 years
to suppress dissent. 25X1
In our view, these weaknesses portend instability in the
immediate post-Oadhafi period. Available evidence does not
indicate anyone of Qadhafi's stature able and in a position
25X1
25X1
collegial rule vo involving elements from all four factions would
only serve as a facade for intense behind the scenes
maneuvering.
The radicals and the exiles would be in the worst position
to survive such infighting, in our view. Available evidence
indicates that the revolutionary committees have insufficient
arms, equipment, and training to maintain power by oppression.
Even lining up behind their titular chief, Oadhafi's deputy Abd
al-Salam Jallud, is unlikely to generate much popular support
because his longstanding reputation for corruption and debaucher
would make him a political liability.
we believe that only a successful attack on Oadhafi would
provide the exiles the lever age
in a post Qadhafi regime.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
significant role
Implications for the US
The most dangerous outcome from the standpoint of US
interests would be the emergence of a regime dominated by
revolutionary committee extremists. Such a government probably
would be an even greater threat to US interests than Oadhafi.
(They almost certainly would exploit
trieir positions in the government to support terrorism and
subversion as foreign policy instruments. This would heighten
the threat of direct Libyan involvement in terrorist operations
against US personnel and facilities, particularly in the Middle
East. Any US attempt to counter Libyan aggression, however,
could push the regime into Soviet hands. This might open up
additional opportunities for Moscow to obtain increased access to
Libyan air and naval facilities and to promote a Libyan foreign
-3-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506940001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506940001-2
25X1
policy that uses moderate tactics to undermine US interests.
In our judgment, any other regime--even one dominated by the
Qadhafi clan--probably would want a more constructive
relationship with Washington. We believe that such a new
regime's focus on building popular support would require bringing
order to Oadhafi's chaotic system of government, curtailing
costly foreign adventures, and redressing popular socio-economic
grievances. The need to promote and revise economic priorities
would require the new government to improve its international
image--particularly by reducing Libyan involvement in
revolutionary causes worldwide--to facilitate access to Western
consumer goods, technology, and managerial expertise. This
almost certainly would involve approaches to the US.
At the same time such a regime probably would proceed
cautiously to allay inevitable suspicions at home and abroad that
the US "installed" it in power. gadhaf_i's vitriolic 1(;-year
attack on Western values and frequent references to the brutal
Italian occupation of Libya during the early 1900s, ensures that
no new leadership could survive without demonstrating its
independence from Western influence. In addition, existing
Islamic currents in Libya probably would reinforce the regime's
determination to pursue a nonaligned foreign policy, particularly
during a time of domestic political turmoil. Any emphasis by the
regime or. traditional Islamic values would be intended to build
support among Libyans who inevitably would look to Islam to
provide a sense of personal security in their daily lives.
In our view, the nonaligned and Islamic affinities of the
new regime would result in continuing opposition to US-sponsored
peace initiatives. Such a regime also probably would remain
involved in areas where traditional Libyan political and economic
interests are engaged, such as in Tunisia, Niger, Sudan, and 25X1
Chad.
We doubt that Moscow could install a Marxist-oriented pro-
Soviet regime without a greatly expanded Soviet military
presence. Soviet advisers are too few and scattered to take
control of the Libyan military and swing it into action.
Moreover, widespread dissatisfaction in Libyan military circles
with the quality of Soviet assistance is accompanied by general
cultural alienation and ill-will resulting from a condescending
attitude by Soviet advisers toward their Libyan students,
-4-
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506940001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000506940001-2
25X1
Moscow's capability to influence a Libyan succession would
depend on which groups came to the fore. In any case, judgments
about Moscow's influence are perforce speculative given the
limited information on Soviet assets and inroads among the
various Libyan groupings. Moscow's extensive and longstanding
training of Libyan military personnel and their 1,500-2,000 man
military advisory contingent in Libya point to greater Soviet
influence with nationalist officers and Qadhaafa tribesmen in the
armed forces and security services than with ideologues or 25X1
The Soviets at a minimum probably have used their extensive
contacts in military circles to identify Libyan officers most
likely to assume key political positions in a post-Oadhafi
regime. Moscow thereby probably also has acquired potentially
valuable information on these officers' views, leadership skills,
and lifestyles to use in its efforts to develop a pro-Soviet 25X1
Such information,
could help them
exploit political uncertainties resulting from Qadhafi's
removal. Moscow could use its access to Libyan military
personnel and facilities to warn the Libyan regime of a coup if
the Soviets deemed a change in government against their
interests.
25X1
25X1
Moscow's willingness to use whatever assets it has in Libya
to influence the succession is another key unknown. The Soviets
might adopt a wait-and-see approach, believing their interests
would be preserved in any case by continued Libyan dependence on
Soviet military assistance. To strengthen Moscow's hold on this
dependency, the Soviets initially might offer additional weaponry
to the new regime at concessional rates. The payoff of such an
approach could be lessened, however, if, as we expect, West
European governments--particularly the French--were willing to
help reduce Libyan dependence on Moscow by supplying advanced 25X1
on balance, we regard Soviet leverage as insufficient to
deter any regime not comprising revolutionary committee fanatics
from seeking improved relations with Washington. Instead, the
new regime probably would try to play off Moscow and Washington
in an attempt to maximize the military and economic benefits it
needs to survive in power.
-5-
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000506940001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000506940001-2
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000506940001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85TO1058ROO0506940001-2
25X1
SUBJECT: LIBYA: What if Qadhafi is Ousted?
NESA M#85-10193
DISTRIBUTION
EXTERNAL:
1 - Howard Teicher, NSC
1 - Vincent Cannistraro, NSC
1 - Arnold Raphael, State Department
1 - Morton Abramowitz, State Department
1 - Lt. Gen. John T. Chain, Jr., State Department
1 - Peter Rodman, State Department
1 - Sandra Charles, Pentagon
1 - Lt. Gen. Dale A. Vesser, Pentagon
1 - Lt. Gen. James A. Williams, Pentagon
INTERNAL:
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - CPAS/ILS
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB ve
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI
1 - NESA AI M
DDI/NESA/AI/M
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85TO1058ROO0506940001-2