MOROCCO-ALGERIA: TENSIONS COULD AFFECT US INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000507160001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 12, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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A
State Dept. review
completed
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Central intelligence Agency
T' Z
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
12, December 1985
Morocco-Algeria: Tensions Could Affect US Interests
Summary
Moroccan-Algerian differences continue to
fester and could intensify, catching Washington in
between. Competition for regional preeminence,
compounded by the stalemate in the Western Sahara
dispute, has led the two sides to form new
alliances--Morocco with Libya and Algeria with
Tunisia. At the same time, Rabat and Algiers are
disappointed with the US, especially over military
aid. Neither country wants to jeopardize its ties
with the US. Nevertheless, an escalation of the
conflict could cause each to reassess its
relationship with the US in an effort to force
Washington to take sides. Both capitals believe
they can bring pressure on the US--Morocco through
its military access agreements with the US and
Algeria regarding its willingness to continue to
act as an intermediary between the US and radical
elements in the Middle East. Their continued
frustration also could lead them to threaten even
closer relationships with Libya and the USSR.
Morocco and Algeria have been at odds over the future of the
Western Sahara since King Hassan unilaterally declared the area
part of Morocco. Ten years of conflict have produced a
stalemate. Morocco has improved its military position with the
This memorandum was prepared by
the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Anaylsis. Information as
of 11 December 1985 was used in its preparation. Questions and
comments should be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, at
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completion this year of the fifth defensive berm, which has
enabled Rabat to consolidate its control over most of the Western
Sahara. At the same time, Algeria--the principal backer of the
Polisario guerrillas--continues to make gains in the diplomatic
arena. India and Liberia decided this fall to recognize the
Polisario's Saharan Democratic Arab Republic. Algeria's
resolution calling for direct negotiations between the Polisario
and Morocco and a popular referendum in the Western Sahara got
strong support this year at the UN, and Morocco found itself
Rabat's search for a way to bring the expensive fighting to
an end prompted it to enter into the union with Libya. Algeria
responded by strengthening its relations with Tunisia. Both
moves threaten the stability of the Maghreb by sharpening the
isolated on the topic in Third World circles.
lines of competition and maneuvering.
The US Connection
Hostility between the two countries, primarily over the
Western Sahara dispute, has led to problems in their relations
with the US. Each--but particularly Morocco--is disappointed at
the level of US military assistance
Both countries believe their interests are being
sacrificed to the other's. Algeria has turned to the US for the
purchase and maintenance of C-130 transport aircraft, and is
pursuing a host of other weapons--including F-16 aircraft--and
military construction and maintenance projects. Morocco so far
has purchased a wider range of its weapons inventory from the US,
and relies heavily on US training
Moroccan King Hassan wants to maintain close ties with
Washington, and we believe that he miscalculated the US reaction
to his union with Libya. He almost certainly anticipated that
Washington would judge that the benefits of the union--splitting
Libya from Algeria over support to the Polisario--would outweigh
the political embarrassment of a key US friend cozying up to
Qadhafi. In spite of the union, Hassan and senior Moroccan
officials complain to US diplomats that US military and economic
aid is not commensurate with the military and strategic
advantages Washington enjoys from the relationship. Bilateral
agreements allow US military forces transit rights in Morocco and
the use of some Moroccan military facilities.- In return, Hassan
expects preferential treatment for the purchase of sophisticated
military weapons and materiel, concessional terms for economic
aid, and instant access to the highest levels of the US
government.
Algerian President Bendjedid's expectations about his
country's relationship with the US are more modest. Even so, he
has been eager to expand both military and commercial ties, and
almost certainly anticipated that the bureaucratic machinary
would speed up after his visit to Washington last April. The
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Algerians, like the Moroccans, want advanced fighter aircraft and
US help in upgrading military facilities and maintaining or
replacing Soviet equipment. In addition, Algiers wants to expand
economic cooperation, including a US political decision to renew
purchases of Algerian liquid natural gas.
Algiers already has given signs of dissatisfaction with the
pace of US responsiveness.
Dealing with Washington
We do not believe that Morocco or Algeria wants to or
believes it can force the US to make a choice between either
country. Even so, the financial and political costs of the
Western Saharan conflict and domestic economic and social
pressures over time could lead King Hassan or President Bendjedid
to raise the stakes with his adversary. For example, Algeria
could encourage the Polisario to begin a campaign of urban
terrorism in Morocco or to increase the frequency of Polisario
assaults on the berms. Morocco, for its part, could contruct
additional defensive berms or enter Mauritanian or Algerian
territory while engaging in hot pursuit of Polisario
guerrillas. Such additions, in our judgment, would impel Rabat
or Algiers to encourage Washington to abandon its official
neutrality toward the Western Saharan conflict. Alternatively,
if either capital perceived that Washington was tilting toward
the other, it would attempt to redress the balance.
If Hassan decides to demonstrate overtly and forcefully his
displeasure with the US, he has several alternatives. He could
cancel joint military and economic commissions. He could also
restrict operations of the new Voice of America station or back
away from his publicly moderate stance on Middle East issues. If
Washington sold advanced fighter aircraft or other sophisticated
military equipment to Algeria without offering Morocco the same
deal, economically hard-pressed Hassan would feel compelled to
take drastic action. He might abrogate bilateral access and
transit agreements and turn to Libya and the USSR for military
US unwillingness to provide Algeria with arms or a
significant increase in US military cooperation with Morocco,
probably would prompt Algiers to reassess its developing
relationship with Washington. At a minimum, Bendjedid could
reduce contacts and turn to West European countries for military
and economic support. Bendjedid's levers to influence the United
States are more limited than those available to Hassan,
however. He could refuse to continue acting as an intermediary
between the US and radical Arab states and possibly abandon
moderate positions on some issues in the region, even though such
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a role enhances Bendjedid's efforts to cast himself as an
influential Arab statesman. More directly, he could cancel the
newly-formed joint economic commission or curtail US commercial
access to potentially lucrative Algerian markets. Under these
circumstances, Bendjedid would be less willing to cooperate with
the US on Libyan issues. He might also lift restrictions on
Soviet access to Algerian ports and airfields.
On balance, we believe the two countries realize that any of
these moves carry a cost in terms of ties with Washington.
Morocco, in particular, would have the most to lose, because of
its long-term relationship with the US and its traditional
dependency on US military and economic support. Algeria has more
room to maneuver with Washington, due to its greater economic
resources and established political ties with the Soviet bloc.
Nevertheless, Algiers wants to shift its foreign policy toward
the West and establish market-oriented economic reforms, and it
looks to the US to help achieve this goal.
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EXTERNAL:
1 - Howard Teicher, NSC
1 - Elaine Morton, NSC
1 - Vincent Cannistraro, NSC
1 - Lieutenant General James A. Williams, Pentagon
1 - R. Rand Beers, State Department
1 - Patrick N. Theros, State Department
1 - Lieutenant General Dale A. Vesser, Pentagon
1 - David E. Zweifel, State Department
1 - James L. Woods, Pentagon
1 - Sandra Charles, Pentagon
1 - Peter Rodman, State Department
1 - Morton I. Abramowitz, State Department
1 - Roger Merrick, State Department
INTERNAL:
1 - DDI
1 - NI0/NESA
1 - NI0/AFR
1 - C/PES
1 - CPAS/ILS
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 -' D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/NESA/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI
1 - NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AI/M
SECRET
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