SLOC INTERDICITON REVISITED: RECENT SOVIET WRITINGS ON INTERDICTING NATO'S SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000507440002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
SLOC Interdiction Revisited:
Recent Soviet Writings on
Interdicting NATO's Sea Lines
of Communication
Plenary Session Paper
Office of Soviet Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
United States of America
Secret
SOV M-85-10058
June 1985
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Summary
SLOC Interdiction Revisited:
Recent Soviet Writings on
Interdicting NATO's Sea Lines
of Communication
land from enemy strikes from the sea.
Several articles on wartime interdiction of sea lines of communication
(SLOG) have appeared in Soviet open-source journals over the last
three or four years. Although the frequency of their appearance suggests
an increased Soviet interest in this mission, the substance of the articles
does not appear to signal a change in Soviet naval mission priorities.
Morskoy Sbornik articles by Vice Admiral K. Stalbo and Rear Admiral A.
Pushkin, for example, indicate that SLOG interdiction continues to be
regarded as a secondary mission. (Pushkin says "tertiary.") According
to these authors, the main wartime business of modern navies is to
deliver nuclear strikes against enemy territory and to defend the home-
Other articles in the same journal by Vice Admiral A. Gontayev and
Captain Second Rank N. Kabalin appear to assign more importance to
SLOG. These authors, quoting Western naval leaders, say that combat
on the sea lines of communication can affect the "course and outcome"
of the land war in Europe. Although some Western naval analysts have
argued that these articles should be interpreted as oblique statements of
Soviet doctrine that upgrade the importance of SLOG interdiction, they
also readily can be taken at face value as reports on the Western
viewpoint. We do not believe, therefore, that Gontayev's and Kabalin's
articles should be viewed as authoritative statements of doctrinal change
without corroborating evidence from other sources.
Moreover, we see no evidence in
writings or exercises that the Soviets are deemphasizing other missions
in a way that would free additional submarines for SLOG interdiction.
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Page
Summary
i
Nature of Soviet Open-Source Writings
1
What the Soviets Are Saying
2
Continuity
2
Change?
4
What the Articles Do Not Say
6
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land targets.
of Communication
SLOC Interdiction Revisited:
Recent Soviet Writings on
Interdicting NATO's Sea Lines
Introduction The Soviets seem to believe that wartime interdiction of NATO's North
Atlantic sea lines of communication (SLOG) would be a secondary
mission that would have less-than-decisive impact on the outcome of a
war in Europe. This judgment is based on evidence provided by Soviet
military writings and naval exercises throughout the 1970s and early
1980s. These sources consistently demonstrate that Soviet naval plan-
ners believe they must concentrate their efforts on defending the USSR
from nuclear strikes from the sea and ensuring that Soviet ballistic missile
submarines survive long enough to deliver nuclear strikes against NATO
lanes have appeared in Soviet open-source journals. The relative fre-
quency and substance of these articles have led some Western naval
analysts to argue that the Soviets have upgraded the importance of
wartime SLOC interdiction. This paper examines some of these articles
Over the last three or four years, several articles on SLOC interdiction
during World War II and the wartime importance of the North Atlantic sea
for evidence of continuity and change in Soviet thinking.
25X1
25X1
to help identify trends in Soviet thinking on SLOG in-
Nature of Open- Use of Soviet literature to identify changes in Soviet military thinking is
Source Writings complicated by the apparent reluctance of Soviet authors to discuss
openly their own views on military subjects. Rather, Soviet open-source
articles on SLOG interdiction usually either describe World War II
interdiction efforts by the German, Soviet, and allied navies or address
NATO's wartime dependence on, and plans to protect, the Atlantic sea
lanes. Moreover, most Soviet statements on SLOG interdiction are
couched as Western views on the subject. Almost every Soviet state-
ment on SLOC interdiction includes a phrase such as "as foreign
specialists think" or "in the eyes of Western specialists."
Some students of Soviet military literature maintain that, as a rule of
thumb, when Soviet authors ascribe a particular position to Western
authorities or observers, they really are stating the Soviet viewpoint. That
obviously is true in some cases. Some Soviet articles, for example, have
referred to an opinion among Western naval experts that SSBNs are
vulnerable and must be protected by other forces-a well-known Soviet
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belief, held by few in the West. But in many instances Soviet authors
seem to reliably report Western views. In these cases it is just as
reasonable to believe that the author intended to inform a Soviet
audience about Western opinion, in much the same way as Western
military journals seek to inform their readers. Alternatively, it also is
possible that an author wished to express an opinion that differs from the
accepted Soviet view by ascribing it to Western opinions. It is safer,
therefore, to treat each Soviet article separately, considering the author's
position and background and comparing what is said with information
from other intelligence sources.
What the Soviets Continuity
Are Saying Articles by Soviet naval officers in Morskoy Sbornik and the General
Staff's journal Voyennaya Mysl' during the 1970s provide a fairly clear
picture of Soviet thinking on the relative importance of wartime SLOC
interdiction. Among the more authoritative statements are articles by
Vice Admiral K. A. Stalbo and Rear Admiral N. P. V'yunenko, two
prominent naval theoreticians with close ties to the commander in chief
of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergey Gorshkov. Stalbo and V'yunenko,
who between them probably authored much of Gorshkov's book The
Sea Power of the State, wrote that the advent of nuclear weaponry in
both the Soviet and NATO navies, particularly submarine-launched
ballistic and cruise missiles, had fundamentally changed the nature of
naval warfare by greatly increasing a navy's ability to strike strategically
important targets deep within the enemy's territory. As a result, more
traditional missions such as destroying the enemy's fleet and severing
sea lines of communication had become secondary to the main wartime
task of striking land targets-often called the "battle against the shore"
in Soviet writings. In the March 1971 edition of Voyennaya Mysl', for
example, Stalbo said:
Thus it is believed that naval forces, which have sharply increased their
combat capabilities, have become a major strategic factor capable of
directly engaging vitally important objectives located in the enemy's
heartland, capable of exerting swift, direct, and sometimes decisive
influence on the course of the war. In connection with this, the oceans and
seas have lost their past traditional significance-as solely the arena for
the clash of naval forces of belligerent nations in battle along sea
communications or in amphibious operations. They have become vast
areas for the launching of naval ballistic missiles fired from submarines
and aircraft taking off from the decks of attack carriers.
Although this statement was cast as the opinion of foreign experts, it
clearly reflects information on Soviet military thinking
We regard it, therefore, as authoritative.
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Many of the open-source articles appearing in the last three years
demonstrate continuity in the Soviet view of wartime SLOC interdiction.
In a November 1982 article in Morskoy Sbornik about German anti-
SLOC efforts in 1942, for example, Rear Admiral A. Pushkin asserts that
American and British efforts against German U-boats did not have a
decisive impact upon the war. He criticizes "bourgeois falsifiers of
history" who wrongly assign "enormous importance to the 'battle of the
Atlantic,' considering it one of the main factors that determined the
outcome of World War II." In a commonplace formulation for Soviet
naval authors denigrating the importance of SLOC, he goes on to say
that it was the Russian army's effort on the Eastern Front, not American
and British ASW efforts, that decided the outcome of the war in the
Atlantic. He concludes his article by saying that, although nuclear-
powered submarines have greatly increased the potential to disrupt
wartime shipping, and NATO practices convoy protection measures in
numerous exercises, warfare on the sea lanes is not a top-priority mission
for Western navies:
fighting on sea lanes plays a tertiary part.
The growth in the striking force of modern weapons and the expanded
capabilities of all the branches of the armed forces led to reevaluation of
the priority of missions in naval warfare. In a number of Western countries,
the principal missions are now naval actions against targets on the shore,
while destroying enemy strike groupings has become secondary, and
Pushkin's article provides a good example of the practice of casting
Soviet naval theory as Western opinion. Western naval officers consis-
tently describe controlling the North Atlantic sea lanes as vital to NATO's
chance of success in a war in Europe. It is the Soviets, not Western naval
authorities, that usually downplay the importance of SLOC. Pushkin's
assertion that naval actions directed against the enemy's territory
constitute the primary naval mission, on the other hand, is a direct lift
from previous writings by authoritative Soviet authors such as Gorshkov,
Stalbo, and V'yunenko. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that
Pushkin is obliquely stating Soviet views.
An October 1983 article by Vice Admiral Stalbo also reflects consider-
able continuity with his earlier writings, particularly the Soviet view of
wartime naval mission priorities. Stalbo writes that the primary purpose
of naval forces, in "the Pentagon's view," is to deliver nuclear strikes
against enemy land targets. Although this sounds like the Soviets'
"battle against the shore," it also reasonably states the importance the
US and NATO assign to SSBNs. Stalbo goes on to say, however, that
"the basic problems of organizational development and employment of
the US Navy stem from missions of employing the strategic submarine
nuclear system and its support forces." Here Stalbo seems to be
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describing the important Soviet naval mission of supporting and protect-
ing SSBNs-a mission foreign to the US and other NATO navies. 25X1
According to Stalbo, ASW against enemy SSBNs and power projection,
in turn, are the next most important missions for the US Navy. Stalbo
concludes his list of American naval missions with a discussion of the
need to protect the transoceanic sea lines of communication, "an
important factor in the integrity of the military organism of NATO." F_~ 25X1
Although much of what he says about American naval missions can be
taken at face value, the apparent allusions to the "battle against the
shore" and SSBN protection missions suggest that Stalbo is describing
his own-and probably the Soviet naval hierarchy's-opinion rather
than merely reporting Western views. In any case, Stalbo places combat
on the SLOG fourth on his list. Virtually all students of Soviet behavior
believe that the Soviets list things in priority order. This seems to be the
case with Stalbo, who clearly continues to treat warfare on the sea lines
of communication as secondary to the strategic nuclear strike, SSBN
protection, and ASW against enemy SSBN missions.
Change?
Some recent open-source articles appear to deviate somewhat from the
standard Soviet formulation that combat on the sea lines of communica-
tion would not have a decisive impact on a war in Europe. The most no-
table of these is an article by Vice Admiral A. Gontayev entitled "Combat
Operations of Submarines on Sea Lanes of Communication," that
appeared in the January 1983 issue of Morskoy Sbornik. Much of the ar-
ticle is dedicated to SLOC interdiction during World War II, making the
standard Soviet assessment that combat on the sea lanes was not
decisive. Gontayev says, however, that a future NATO-Warsaw Pact war
would not be a strictly continental war like World War II. The USSR is
now faced with a coalition of seapowers, and combat in ocean theaters
will have a greater impact upon the outcome of the war, according to
Gontayev. This means that:
Transoceanic communications, nowadays, in the opinion of foreign spe-
cialists, have become the most important factor that determines the course
and the outcome of war in continental theaters of military operations.
Gontayev backs up this point by stating that protecting the North
Atlantic SLOC "comprises the content of the overwhelming majority of
naval maneuvers and exercises of the navies of the NATO bloc." F__1 25X1
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In a similar vein to Gontayev, a June 1984 Morskoy Sbornik article by
Captain Second Rank Kabalin states that US leaders believe that SLOC
"are now becoming the most important factor determining the course
and outcome of war in continental theaters of military operations." He
quotes NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), US
Navy Admiral W. McDonald as saying "stoppage or substantial disrup-
tion of shipments are fraught with defeat for NATO in Europe." The bulk
of Kabalin's article is dedicated to describing the Western concepts of
defending SLOC through "protected zones" and "protected sea lanes"
and two large-scale NATO naval exercises-United Effort '83 and Ocean
Safari '83-that focused on defending North Atlantic sea lanes. 0 25X1
Some Western naval analysts believe that articles like Gontayev's and
Kabalin's should be considered authoritative statements of a change in
the Soviet military's view of wartime SLOC interdiction. They argue that
Gontayev and Kabalin are using allegedly Western opinions to obliquely
state official Soviet views. In particular, these analysts point to both
authors' assertion that combat on the sea lines of communication can
"determine the course and outcome" of the war in the land theaters as a
significant upgrading of the Soviet SLOG interdiction mission. If Gon-
tayev and Kabalin are obliquely stating the official viewpoint, then their
use of the "course and outcome" formulation suggests that the Soviets
now view SLOG interdiction as a decisive task. In Soviet writings, a
decisive military action is one that affects the "course and outcome" of
the conflict. Admiral Gorshkov used this formulation in his book The Sea
Power of the State to assert that modern navies armed with submarine-
launched ballistic missiles now could play a decisive role in a global war.
Interpreting the Gontayev and Kabalin articles as expressions of a
change in Soviet doctrine presents two problems. First, they contain
nothing new. The Western view that combat on the sea lanes could
determine the course and outcome of the war was used previously in
articles by Vice Admiral V. Solov'yev and Captain First Rank B. Makeyev
in the June 1978 and July 1979 issues of Morskoy Sbornik. These earlier
articles were not interpreted as oblique statements on Soviet thinking,
probably because they appeared at roughly the same time as Gorsh-
kov's The Sea Power of the State, which treated open-ocean interdic-
tion of the sea lines of communication as a secondary mission.
The other problem is that both the Gontayev and Kabalin articles can be
interpreted readily as factual reports on Western naval opinion. Western
naval leaders do assign great importance to controlling the sea lines of
communication during a war in Europe and have often stated that
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interruption of the flow of Western shipping spells defeat for NATO.
Gontayev and Kabalin also are correct in saying that protection of
Atlantic shipping plays an important role in NATO naval exercises. Unlike
some writings which clearly seem to use Western opinion to state Soviet
views, we cannot say with any degree of confidence that the Gontayev
and Kabalin articles represent an authoritative statement of a shift in
Soviet views.
What the Articles On balance, we do not believe that the recent open-source writings
Do Not Say signal an upgrade in the priority of the Soviet anti-SLOC mission. As
demonstrated by the Stalbo and Pushkin articles, the Soviets still seem
to believe that the main business of navies during a NATO-Warsaw Pact
war will be to deliver, and defend their homelands against, nuclear strikes
from the sea. Both of these articles acknowledge a need for wartime
attacks on NATO's sea lines but place it in perspective to more critical
tasks. The Gontayev and Kabalin articles, on the other hand, lack such
perspective, merely reporting on the criticality to NATO of the North
Atlantic sea lanes. Given the contrast with Stalbo and Pushkin, we do
not believe the Gontayev and Kabalin articles should be interpreted as
official pronouncements of Soviet doctrine without corroborating evi-
dence from other sources.
If the Soviets had upgraded the priority of their anti-SLOG mission, we
would expect to see them deploying a number of submarines along the
probable routes of NATO wartime convoys as part of major Northern
Fleet exercises. These exercises, however, continue to stress an eche-
loned defense of the sea approaches to the USSR and Soviet SSBN
bastions. They contain little, if any, activity that can be equated to open-
ocean interdiction of NATO's sea lanes.
An increased emphasis on SLOG interdiction would require the commit-
ment of a considerable number of attack submarines. Our estimates of
Soviet production trends, however, show the number of general purpose
submarines declining by as much as 10 percent over the next 10 vears
The Soviets also could increase the number of submarines available for
anti-SLOC missions by deemphasizing other wartime missions. But there
is no evidence that the Soviets have 25X1
downgraded their anticarrrier, anti-SSBN, or SSBN-protection missions
which, we estimate, will tie down some three-quarters of the Soviet
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Northern and Pacific Fleets' general purpose submarines. The Soviets, in
other words, do not seem to be building or structuring the kind of future
submarine force that would facilitate a large-scale anti-SLOC effort at
the same time as they pursued their other important missions.
A New Debate? It also is possible that there is an ongoing debate among Soviet naval
theoreticians about the SLOG interdiction mission. Renewed Soviet
interest in SLOC interdiction at this time may be a byproduct of
American interest in protracted conventional warfare. As evidenced by
their open-source literature, the Soviets are concerned about the empha-
sis that current US leaders place on being prepared for a protracted war
against the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets have long held that SLOG
interdiction could become a more important mission if a NATO-Warsaw
Pact war became protracted. G. M. Sturua, for example, in the Novem-
ber 1982 issue of the Soviet journal USA: Economics, Politics and
Ideology, wrote that the development of a US capability for protracted
conventional warfare "presupposed the ability to guarantee the uninter-
rupted functioning of ocean communications and the disruption of
enemy communications." Authors such as Gontayev and Kabalin could
be using Western opinion to obliquely question the conventional Soviet
wisdom. They may believe that Soviet naval theory now places too much
emphasis on conducting missions in a short, inevitably nuclear campaign
to the detriment of preparation for interdicting enemy SLOG as part of a
protracted conventional war.
It is difficult to say, based on these articles alone, that a debate on SLOG
interdiction is under way. We know that the Soviets use their military
journals to discuss differing viewpoints on military subjects. Such a
debate appeared in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik in 1982 and 1983
concerning Stalbo's views on "the theory of the Navy." Several authors
subsequently attacked Stalbo openly. Unlike the Gontayev and Kabalin
articles, however, these articles clearly took issue with another Soviet
author. If a similar debate on SLOG interdiction is unfolding, we should
start to see more pointed articles-probably cast as Western views-
about the role of navies in protracted war. An article extolling the
importance of SLOG interdiction by an authoritative spokesman such as
Admiral Gorshkov-who produced an article in 1983 ending the Stalbo
debate-would give us a clue as to who was winning the debate.
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