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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000507590001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 9, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central IntdlVnce Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
9 May 1985
GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY
Summary
In less than two months, General Secretary Gorbachev has elevated
several key supporters to the Politburo, asserted party dominance
over the military, and adopted the role of principal foreign policy
spokesman for the USSR. Without changing the Kremlin's basic
policies and positions, Gorbachev has positioned himself to exploit
international interest in a new Soviet leadership and thereby improve
bilateral relations with both China and Iran. In statements
calculated to affect international opinion, he has portrayed himself
as taking the lead in pursuing summitry with the US and has
encouraged Europeans to seek a wider debate about the need for US
compromises at the Geneva talks. Having gained a propaganda windfall
from the accession to power of a younger more vigorous leader, Moscow
has signaled an end to the relative immobility of Soviet foreign
policy over the past five years, and the authority and durability of
Gorbachev's leadershi could en the r more substantive shifts
in Soviet policies.
This memorandum was prepared by Melvin Goodman of the Office of Soviet
Analysis. It was coordinated with the Offices of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis and East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are welcomp and mA 11-~ e
addressed to Melvin Goodman, Office of Soviet Analysis, 25X1
SOVA-M-85-10091C 25X1
r.,nu /i .,c I
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Introduction
There is an appearance of new activism in Soviet foreign policy. In
part, this impression derives from General Secretary Gorbachev's new
leadership in Moscow, which has been portrayed as decisive and formidable.
(Soviet propaganda is responsible in no 'Small measure for this image.) In
part,'it derives from the initiatives and perception of others who are seeking
to profit from the change of leadership in Moscow. (Certain West European and
Chinese leaders are crediting the Soviets with being more active; some Third
World leaders--particularly in Iran and Nicaragua--appear to be anticipating
more Soviet support for their interests.) Finally, the impression of activism
flows from the actions of the Soviet leadership, which are designed to open
the international cul-de-sac created by the walkout from the arms talks with
the US in 1983, the cancellation of the Arkhipov visit to Beijing in 198~.a_nd
the unwillingness to respond to Iran's overtures for improved relations.
The Soviet leadership already has signaled its intention of increasing
pressure on the US to seek accommodation with the USSR, accelerating the pace
of improved relations with China, and possibly ending the deterioration in
relations with Iran. In order to limit the damage of these initiatives on key
clients in the Third World, the Soviets have held a series of meetings with
Cuban, Nicaraguan, Vietnamese, and Iraqi leaders to underscore continued
support on sensitive regional issues and to stress that "third country"
interests would not be compromised. None of these third world states has
publicly signaled concern over possible new departures in Soviet relations.
The Soviets themselves, moreover, are maintaining an inflexible position
toward Pakistan and Japan, which suggests that new power relationships among
the too Soviet leaders will not end efforts to intimidate opponents abroad.
Gorbachev and Succession Diplomacy
During previous succession periods, Soviet leaders were willing to pursue
changes in foreign policy, occasionally adopting policies that relieved
foreign pressures until internal positions were sorted out. In the immediate
post-Stalin period, for example, the Soviets favored an early end to the
Korean War, signed a peace treaty accepting Austrian neutrality, withdrew from
Finland, reopened diplomatic relations with Israel, and moved towards summitry
with President Eisenhower. In the mid-1960s, the Soviets began both a massive
military buildup and a campaign for arms control measures that led to the
nonproliferation treaty and SALT I, an expansion of the Soviet position in the
Third World, and a policy of selective detente that was designed in part to
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exploit differences within the Western alliance.
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The Sino-Soviet-US Triangle 25X1
Recent Soviet leaders have struggled with the adverse consequences of
Moscow's inferior position in the triangular relationship. As a result of the
vulnerabilities created by Beijing's rapprochement with the United States, the
Soviets have sought to accomplish the following objectives:
secure a breakthrough toward a fundamental improvement in relations with
China.
-- prevent or at least obstruct and delay the drawing together of the US and
China.
event, signaling a desire to accelerate the pace of improved ties.
with the Chinese delegation to the Chernenko funeral last month was such
Two previous successions in the 1980s did not follow this formula, but
the current leadership's initial actions toward China and Iran suggest the
pursuit of several perceived opportunities. Moscow has diminished its
polemics against both Beijing and Tehran, and is trying to project some
movement in bilateral relations with China and Iran. Several major Sino-
Soviet meetings will take place between now and September, including Vice
Premier Yao Yilin's trip to Moscow in June to sign a long-term trade
agreement, a Supreme Soviet delegation to Beijing in August, and a meeting at
the UN in September between Foreign Ministers Gromyko and Wu. Soviet-Iranian
political and economic contacts are scheduled for May and June.
There is no indication that the broad lines of Soviet national security
and foreign policy are facing internal challenge, or that Gorbachev is 25X1
considering any fundamental changes in policies pursued by the Uld Guard in
the recent past. Moscow is trying to preserve the strategic gains of the
1970s and to extend them where possible. The new leadership appears to
realize that the extension of Soviet influence internationally depends in
great measure on improvements in the economy at home; Gorbachev's most recent
statements seem to emphasize this point, stressing that the "main issue"
before the party was economic development. The younger members of the
Politburo, and Gorbachev's key allies moreover, are more familiar with
economic and domestic issues than with foreign and military problems, and
preparations for the next party n ress and five-year plan almost certainly
will preoccupy the leadership. 25X1
But Gorbachev's decisive victory at the Plenum has breached the
generational dividing wall and presumably gives him greater opportunity to
change foreign policies as well. Even modest changes in Soviet foreign
positions could improve the environment in which difficult domestic decisions
are being made--and could have international consequences. Gorbachev's meeting
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-- improve relations with the US, in part to strengthen US incentives to
subordinate Washington's relations with Beijing to those with Moscow.
The China Angle
Since Gorbachev's accession to power, the Chinese have been more willing
to signal their interest in improving relations or, at the very least,
unwilling to appear intransigent in responding to Soviet signs of
conciliation. Over the past two months, for example, the Chinese have made
fewer references to the "three obstacles" to normalizing relations (Soviet
military buildup along the border, occupation of Afghanistan, support for
Vietnam), which is not only a signal to Moscow but is potentially worrisome to
Japan, Thailand, and the United States. The Chernenko funeral in March became
the backdrop for the exchange of political and ideological gestures on the
part of both sides, reflecting a mutual interest in lowering the level of
confrontation.
-- On the eve of the funeral, Gorbachev's speech to the Central Committee
stressed the importance of improving -relations with China, the only
significant foreign policy aspect of a speech devoted to domestic
affairs.
-- Following the funeral services. Gorbachev met with the Chinese
delegation, marking the first meeting between a Soviet general secretary
and a Chinese official in more than 2U years.
-- The Chinese delegation, in turn, referred to the USSR as a "socialist"
country for the first time in nearly 20 years and referred to Gorbachev
as "comrade," which has happened rarely for any Soviet official since the
formal break in party ties in 1967. Gorbachev returned the gesture at
the Central Committee plenum last month.
Beijing's gestures are far more significant than Moscow's, particularly since
they appear to respond to an authoritative Soviet article of late 1984 that
chided the Chinese for refusing to identify the USSR as "socialist." China's
use of such party terms as "comrade" suggests that it is dangling in front of
the Kremlin the possible restoration of party-to-party ties and Chinese
attendance at next year's 27th Soviet party conaress. which would be a
considerable feather in Gorbachev's cap.
The Soviets, of course, would have to pay a price for any restoration of
party ties. There are steps that the Soviets could take which would not have
a significant impact on the balance of forces in the region or even alleviate
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Chinese security concerns, but which would have a favorable impact on
international perceptions and might start a negotiating process that produced
Chinese concessions. Such steps might include:
-- The transfer of low-readiness divisions near the Sino-Soviet border or
the token redeployment of high-readiness regimental units.
-- The announcement of a moratorium on SS-20 deployments in Asia or a freeze
on the number of troops on the border.
-- The return of one or two divisions in Mongolia to the Trans-Baykal
Military District.
The latter move would be particularly significant since it would involve
a "third country." Moscow has been consistent in stating its refusal to
compromise third country interests. The Soviets also could renew such token
gestures as confidence-building-measures analogous to the CBMs arranged in the
European theater by the Helsinki agreement or such declaratory measures as
nonaggression pacts and nonuse of force pledges. althou h the Chinese have
ignored such gestures in the past.
Until now, the Soviets have been unwilling to discuss Chinese demands for
a unilateral Soviet pullback from the "disputed" areas on the border or from
Mongolia. Moreover, the sixth round of Sino-Soviet consultations ended last
month without any progress on fundamental issues, although Sino-Soviet
relations continue to acquire more substance. The two sides for the first
time added "politics" to the list of fields for broadening relations and
contacts, and China recently offered to establish links between trade
unions. The fact that China has been willing to improve state-to-state ties
over the past several years without any Soviet concessions on the territorial
or geopolitical issues presumably has led Moscow to believe that--even without
a significant change in policy--economic, technical and cultural exchanges
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can continue to increase, albeit gradually.
The US Angle
Gorbachev's intentions toward the US appear no different than those he
inherited from his three immediate predecessors--to seek advantage against the
US in the military and political spheres while building up a relationship with
the United States against a hostile China. The goals that Moscow set in the
late 1970s still have not been achieved: a strategic arms agreement that
limits US modernization; participation in regional diplomacy, particularly in
the Middle East; an expanding Soviet presence in the Third World without undue
superpower repercussions; ending trade discrimination; avoiding entanglements
on human rights issues. Recently, the US has gained policy flexibility
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against the USSR as a result of Moscow's lack of success in Afghanistan, more
active US diplomacy in southern Africa, some signs of stabilization in El
As a result, the Soviets have adopted a series of measures designed to
create a favorable image of Gorbachev and to put the Reagan administration on
the defensive:
-- Soviet references to summit diplomacy and a European missile moratorium
are designed to manipulate public opinion in the US and to exploit West
European unease over a perceived lack of US commitment to arms control.
-- Private Soviet references to long-term economic deals and improved
business conditions for US businessmen in Moscow are designed to
tantalize prominent US businessmen. Renewed Soviet interest in US
petroleum equipment presumably is intended to improve both political and
commercial dealings before the US-USSR Joint Commercial Commission meets
in May.
-- The recent Soviet willingness to allow IAEA inspection of a greater
variety of Soviet nuclear facilities and Ambassador Dobrynin s private
hints that the USSR might accept on-site inspection of the Krasnoyarsk
radar installation by a US team are designed to convey a sense of
possible "new openess" in the USSR.
-- An increase in issuance of visas to Jewish refuseniks and the release of
a well-known dissident couple have been played as a gesture to the
West. Any improvement in conditions for Andrey Sakharov or his wife
would have a favorable impact throughout West Europe and the United
States.
Salvador, and the "strategic dialogue" with China.
also create wedge-driving opportunities between the US and its allies. 25X1
In addition to trying to influence US congressional debate on arms
control and military spending, the Soviets will pursue policies that exploit
congressional differences with regard to covert action programs on behalf of
the contras in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas already have in motion a broad
active measures campaign in the US, and the Soviets are pitching in by
publicizing President Ortega's willingness to cut the number of Cuban
advisers, postpone any acquisition of interceptor aircraft, and cooperate with
the Contadora process. All of these steps were announced after an Ortega trip
Following the Soviet announcement of a seven-month moratorium on missile
deployments in Europe--timed to coincide with European peace demonstrations on
Easter Sunday, the arrival of a US Congressional delegation in Moscow, and
talks with the Dutch foreign minister--the Soviets probably will link any
ostensible conciliation on INF to the need to restrict SDI. A somewhat more
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to Havana. During President Ortega's talks in Moscow, TASS reiterated the
importance of the Contadora process and announced the first withdrawal of
Cuban military advisers.
At the same time, the Soviets are signaling that they remain confident
with regard to the overal global power position of the USSR relative to the
United States and will not be intimidated by US rhetoric.
-- Soviet unilateral airspace reservations in the Berlin air corridor are
aimed directly at US and Allied interests, and undercut the principle
of four-power management in Berlin.
-- Soviet statements in the aftermath of the Nicholson shooting hold the
US entirely responsible and challenge the handling of four-power
concerns in the two Germanies.
-- Soviet intransigence on the substance of the Geneva arms control talks
included a veiled threat to repeat the 1983 walkout from START and
INF.
All of these steps maintain Moscow's image of strength but, at the same time,
contradict and even undercut the efforts of Soviet public diplomacy on arms
control and East-West issues that are designed to exploit European doubts
about US policies and to create problems for the Reagan administration with
the US Congress and public opinion. These inconsistencies may reflect a
continuing tension i Moscow between the need to appear firm and any desire to
appear forthcoming.
The USSR-Iran-Iraq Triangle
Since the Iranian revolution, Moscow has been unable to exploit Iran's
anti-US posture and military vulnerability in order to strengthen its own
position. Soviet policy tilted toward Iraq in 1982, but the only political
benefit that Moscow has received from the war thus far is a closer
relationship with Iraq; even that, has failed to deter the reestablishment of
US-Iraqi diplomatic ties, Iraq's move toward the moderate Arab states, and
Baghdad's interest in diversifying arms purchases, particularly from West
European manufacturers.
Before Gorbachev's accession to power, Soviet-Iranian relations remained
severely strained, and Syrian-Libyan efforts to broker improved Soviet-Iranian
relations had failed. Last year, the Iranians--facing serious military and
economic problems--undertook several initiatives to acquire military and
economic support, but Moscow's harsh anti-Iranian line never wavered.
Gorbachev's immediate predecessors took the long view toward Iran--i.e.,
recognizing the lack of leverage and strong assets in Iran, they reacted
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skeptically to Tehran's initiatives for improved relations, holding out for
specific policy concessions and waiting for Khomeini to disappear from the
scene. The Soviets rejected a meeting dt the UN between Foreign Ministers
Velayati and Gromyko, and turned down an Iranian request to discuss the return
of Soviet economic experts.
The new leadership's initial response, however, appears to be more
sharply focused on the near term--i.e., recognizing that Iran's deteriorating
economy, the stalemated war with Iraq, and diplomatic isolation could work to
Moscow's short term benefit. The Gorbachev leadership probably believes that
Iraq's dependence on Soviet arms gives Moscow some room to maneuver in
improving relations with Iran. Moreover, Iran's current situation presents an
opportune moment to explore possibilities with Tehran, and Iran s ate is
location and resources make it a Soviet target of high priority.
Instead of merely positioning themselves for the post-Khomeini period,
the Soviets now appear ready to lower the level of confrontation and create an
environment for a wider dialogue. For the first time in five years, for
example, the Soviets sent greetings to Iran on the anniversary of the founding
of the Islamic Republic of Iran; an unusual TASS refutation of a VOA report on
Soviet-Iraqi relations also 'nted to Moscow's interest in improving
relations with Iran.
Gorbachev appears to be responding to Iran's gestures and holding out the
prospect of improved relations. Since Chernenko's death in March the Soviets
have been more responsive to a series of events initiated by Tehran:
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As in relations with China, we do not expect the Soviets to make
concessions on larger geopolitical issues. Instead, while dissociating
themselves from Iraq's bombing tactics against Iranian cities, they are merely
holding out the promise of Soviet evenhandedness in relations with Iran and
Iraq. There are a number of actions that the Soviets could undertake along
this line without overly antagonizing Iraq. They could:
-- Facilitate the movement of goods across the Soviet-Iranian border.
Return Soviet economic experts to such Iranian economic projects as the
power plant at Ahvaz.
Negotiate an increase in trade and economic assistance.
Increase sales of military equipment (small arms, spare parts,
ammunition) to Tehran.
Return to restraint with respect to cross-border forays from Afghanistan.
Any of these steps would improve Soviet-Iranian relations, and the Soviets
could accomplish this without unduly antagonizing Persian Gulf moderates who
are sensitive to any sign of change in Tehran's political isolation in the
region. In doing so, the Soviets would be trying to encourage continued
antipathy toward the US, Iran's contacts with such radicals as Cuba, Libya,
and Syria, and opposition to Israel. Iran is thus far taking the lead in the
relationship with the USSR, but the Soviets appear to want to test the waters
in order to gauge the level of Tehran's desire for better relations, develop
contacts with the Revolutionary Guards, and possibly signal dissatisfaction
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with Iraq's insistence on a comprehensive settlement of the war. 25X1
Third World Link
The use of diplomacy and political gestures to suggest the possibility of
improved relations with the US, China, and Iran has been accompanied by a
series of meetings with those key regional clients that would feel threatened
by any favorable change in Soviet relations with traditional rivals. 25X1
At the same time, the Soviets are now 7oing out of their way to
intimidate familiar antagonists. Gorbachev s meeting with General Zia in
March was a rough one for the Pakistani leader and, in the first major
propaganda blast since then, Pravda charged that Islamabad was coming closer
to "direct military provocation" against Afghanistan. It was particularly
noteworthy that the article mentioned no other third country (e.g. US, China,
Iran) now aiding the Mujahedin except for Pakistan. Before Chernenko's
funeral, the Soviets were orchestrating a major effort against all the states
providing assistance to the Afghan insurgents.
Gorbachev's recent meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone--the first
between a Japanese prime minister and a Soviet general secretary since 1973--
provided no evidence that Moscow intended to be more flexible regarding
longstanding differences between Moscow and Tokyo. Moscow reportedly agreed
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Tikhonov (as the Soviets proposed) and threatened to leave Moscow without
meeting any Soviet leader unless Gorbachev received him. The TASS account of
the brief session was the sternest of all the descriptions of Gorbachev's
meetings with foreign visitors following the Chernenko funeral. At the same
time, TASS accounts of Gorbachev's meetings with the leaders of the Japanese
communist party were particularly warm in view of the troubled relations that
have existed in the past between the CPSU and the JCP. (On the other hand,
the Soviets appear to be dangling the possibility of a Gromyko trip to Tokyo
later this year in return for greater Japanese flexibility toward the USSR.)
Prospects
The Soviets, having already gained a propaganda windfall from the
accession to power of a younger more vigorous leader, are now undertaking a
modest but more activist policy designed to improve relations with China and
Iran, and steal a march on the United States. In some instances, the Soviets
have signaled their interest in creating more moderate public positions.
Polemics against China and Iran have diminished somewhat; criticism of support
for the Afghan insurgents concentrates on Pakistan, for example, and has been
less critical of the efforts of the US, Iran and China. Contacts with
Washington, Beijing, and Tehran are increasing or being sought with Soviets
baiting the discussion with hints of increased trade opportunities, including
long-term arrangements with the US and China, and more high-level
discussion.*
Gorbachev's public remarks seem intended to assure the party that Soviet
interests will be protected and to intensify Western pressure on US policies.
-- Gorbachev was critical of the US in his plenum address on 23 April and
the V-E Day speech but his statement to a West German peace group in
March, Pravda interview in April, and Elbe anniversary reaffirmed
Moscow's commitment to East-West relations. His plenum address defended
the Soviet rationale for a continued dialogue with Washington, and his
statement to the Warsaw Pact leadership last week was a moderate one
pitched to a West European audience. His V-E speech also called for a
revival of detente.
Gorbachev used his meetings with West European leaders last month to
stress improved relations with the most notable change being reduced
* The Soviets were particularly careful in their talks with Vice Premier Li
Peng, who is reportedly being groomed to become Premier Zhao Ziyang's
executive officer and may be promoted to both the secretariat and the
politburo in the fall. Li studied in the USSR in the late 194Os and early
1950s, and has a good command of Russian.
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stress improved relations with the most notable change being reduced
criticism of West Germany.
As a result of these efforts, Gorbachev has created an impression he is taking
the lead on summitry with the US and has encouraged Europeans to seek a wider
debate about the need for US compromises at the Geneva arms control talks,
particularly on SDI. Recent Chinese actions suggest that Beijing is prepared
to move ahead with state-to-state relations and to probe for signs of Soviet
flexibility.
There are ripple effects associated with Soviet gestures that also could
redound to Moscow's advantage. Soviet contacts with Iran could provide Moscow
with more leverage over both Iran and Iraq. The Soviets presumably realize
that even the appearance of better relations with the US could lead to
improved Soviet economic relations with Japan and greater anxiety in
Pakistan. Continued normalization with China opens up opportunities with
ASEAN states and allows the Soviets to maneuver diplomatically in Southeast
Asia vis-a-vis the US. Progress on either of these fronts could lead to
greater tolerance for Soviet activity in the Third World.
Moscow eventually will have to consider changes in more than style and
atmospherics, however, in order to obtain genuine improvement in relations
with the US, West Europe, China, and Iran. One way to strengthen leverage
with Washington would be to improve relations with China, perhaps by taking a
symbolic unilateral reduction of Soviet forces along the border or in
Mongolia. Similarly, the missile moratorium in Europe could be followed by an
announcement of unilateral reductions in Soviet medium-range missiles or a
freeze on the forces of all participants in the MBFR talks until a final
agreement is reached. Such steps would require a Soviet leadership capable of
imposing unpalatable policies on the military leadership.
Thus far, Gorbachev has had great success in elevating his supporters to
positions of authority and asserting party dominance over the military. And
he has adopted a more assertive and self-confident stance in foreign policy.
The struggle over resource allocations and foreign and defense policies are
continuing, however, and it will remain difficult to alter the substance of
Moscow's key bilateral relationships. Nevertheless, the relative immobilism
of the last five years of Soviet foreign policy appears to have ended, and the
authority and durability of Gorbachev's leade hi could open the way for more
substantive shifts in Soviet foreign policy. 7
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SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Foreign Policy
Internal Distribution
Copy
1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3- SA/DCI
4 - ED/DCI
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Executive
DDI
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Senior Review
OCPAS/IMD/CB
Vice Chairman,
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SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Foreign Policy
External Distribution
White House
Copy 27 - Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
White House
28 - Admiral John M. Poindexter
Military Assistant, National Security Affairs
White House
29 - Ambassador Jack Matlock
Senior Staff Member, USSR-Eastern Europe
Room 368, Old EOB
State Department
30 - Darryl Johnson
Special Assistant to the Undersecretary
for Political Affairs
Room 7240
31 - Stephen Bosworth
Chairman, Policy Planning Council
Room 7311
32 - Lt. Gen John T. Chain
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Room 7327
33 - Robie M. Palmer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs
Room 6219
34 - Thomas W. Simons, Jr.
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 4217
35 - Alexander Vershbow
Multilateral Relations
Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 4225
25X1
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SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Foreign Policy
External Distribution
State
36 - Morton Abramowitz
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 6531
37 - William D. Howells
Director, Office of Politico-Military Analysis, INR
Room 6638
38 - Robert H. Baraz
Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, INR
Room 4758
39 - Frank Crump
Chief, INR/SEE/FP
Room 4843
40 - Jay Kalner
c/o Mr. Firehock
ACDA, Room 6510A
Department of Defense
41 - Andrew W. Marshall
Director, Office of Net Assessment
Room 3A930, Pentagon
42 - Director, DIA
3E258, Pentagon
44 - Wynfred Joshua, DIA
DIO, European and Soviet Political Affairs
Room 2C238, Pentagon
45 - Colonel Al Prados, DIA
DIO for NESA
Room 2C238, Pentagon
46 - Major General William E. Odom
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(DAMI-ZA), Room 2E466, Pentagon
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SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Foreign Policy
External Distribution
Department of Defense
47 - Ms. Linda Wetzel
Policy Assistant for USSR-EE Affairs
OASD/ISP/EUR-NATO Regional Policy
Room 1-D469, Pentagon
48- Director, National Security Agency
Fort Meade, Maryland 20755
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T01058R000507590001-0