RECENT SOVIET WRITINGS ON INTERDICTING NATO'S SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000507690002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Wishilgton.D C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
1 July 1985
Recent Soviet Writings on Interdicting
NATO's Sea Lines of Communication
Summary
Soviet naval doctrine has long held that interdicting enemy
sea lines of communication (SLOCs) is a secondary mission. The
appearance of several articles on SLOC interdiction in open
source Soviet journals during the past three years, however,
suggests a revival of a long-running internal debate over whether
this naval mission should be upgraded. Increased discussion of
the interdiction mission at this time probably reflects current
Soviet interest both in the implications for the USSR of a
protracted war in Europe and in NATO's attention to this
subject. Soviet writings have often stated that SLOC
Interdiction could become more important in a protracted
conflict.
On the other hand, the articles in question have appeared in
a major naval journal, but they were not written by especially
prominent officers. As in the past, no authoritative Soviet
spokesman on naval theory known to us has advocated--even
obliquely--upgrading SLOC interdiction to be a primary mission.
On the contrary, recent articles by authoritative theoreticians
such as Admirals K. Stalbo and A. Pushkin continue to describe
SLOC interdiction as a secondary mission. Soviet naval exercises
also continue to show little if any evidence of activity that can
be related to open ocean interdiction. Moreover, the future
submarine force the Soviets appear to be building, while a highly
This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the author or to Chief, Strategic Forces
Division,
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capable, more technologically-advanced force, will contain far
fewer of the diesel attack submarines particularly suited to
anti-SLOC warfare. The debate over the importance of SLOC
Interdiction, therefore, does not appear to have had any impact
thus far on Soviet naval doctrine.
2. This judgment was based primarily on evidence provided
by Soviet military writings . Soviet writings
through 1981 generally assigned SLOC interdiction a lower
priority than protecting Soviet SSBNs and destroying NATO SSBNs
and aircraft carrier battle groups.,
The lower priority
for SLOC interdiction probably reflected a Soviet belief that
either a Pact victory over NATO forces in Central Europe or
escalation to the use of theater nuclear weapons would occur
before the interruption of NATO's sea-based reinforcement and
resupply became a critical task.
3. Over the last three years, several articles dealing with
SLOC interdiction have appeared in Soviet open source journals.
This paper examines these articles for evidence of continuit and
change in Soviet thinking.
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Nature of Open Source Writings
4. Use of Soviet literature to identify changes in Soviet
military thinking is complicated by the apparent reluctance of
Soviet authors to discuss openly their own views on current
Soviet military operations and intentions. Soviet open source
articles on SLOC interdiction usually either describe World War
II interdiction campaigns by the German or Soviet navies or
address NATO's wartime dependence on and plans to protect the
Atlantic sea lanes. Moreover, most Soviet statements on SLOC
interdiction discuss Western views on the subject. Almost every
Soviet statement on SLOC interdiction includes a phrase such as
"in the Pentagon's view" or "as foreign specialists think."
5. Some Soviet articles ascribing a particular position to
Western authorities or observers are genuinely designed to inform
a Soviet audience about Western opinion. For example, Soviet
military journals regularly contain fairly straightforward
reporting on Western naval exercises and developments such as US
"oceanic strategy." Sometimes, however, Soviet authors use this
device to obliquely state the accepted Soviet viewpoint. Some
articles, for example, have referred to an opinion among Western
naval experts that SSBNs are vulnerable and must be protected by
other forces--a well known Soviet belief but one held by few in
the West with respect to NATO navies. At other times the authors
seem to be obliquely expressing an opinion that challenges
accepted Soviet views. A high-level debate about whether the
Soviet Navy should build western-style aircraft carriers appeared
in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik in 1978 and 1979. Both Stalbo
and Pushkin, who took opposing sides in the debate, used aircraft
operations in World War II to obliquely argue about the utility
of such ships under current conditions. It is necessary,
therefore, to examine each Soviet article separately, taking into
account the author's position and background and comparing what
is said
Longstanding, Authoritative View
6. Articles published by Soviet naval officers during the
1970s in Morskoy Sbornik, the official journal of the Soviet
Navy, and in Voyennaya Mysll, the restricted-circulation journal
of the Soviet General Staff, provide a fairly clear picture of
Soviet thinking at that time on the relative importance of
wartime SLOC interdiction. Among the more authoritative
statements are articles by Vice Admiral Stalbo and Rear Admiral
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N. P. V'yunenko, two prominent theoreticians with close ties to
the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral of the Fleet
of the Soviet Union Sergey Gorshkov. Stalbo and V'yunenko, who
between them probably authored much of Gorshkov's major 1976
book, The Sea Power of the State, wrote that acquisition by the
Soviet and NATO navies of nuclear weaponry--particularly
submarine-launched ballistic and cruise missiles--had
fundamentally changed the nature of naval warfare by greatly
Increasing a navy's ability to strike strategically important
targets deep within the enemy's territory. As a result, more
traditional missions such as destroying the enemy's fleet and
severing SLOCs had become secondary to the main wartime task of
striking land targets--often called "the battle against the
shore" in Soviet writings. In the March 1971 edition of
Voyennaya Mysl', for example, Stalbo said:
Thus it is believed that naval forces, which
have sharply increased their combat
capabilities, have become a major strategic
factor capable of directly .engaging vitally
important objectives located in the enemy's
heartland, capable of exerting swift, direct,
and sometimes decisive influence on the course
of the war.
In connection with this, the oceans and seas
have lost their past traditional
significance--as solely the arena for the
clash of naval forces of belligerent nations
in battle along sea communications or in
amphibious operations. They have become vast
areas for the launching of naval ballistic
missiles fired from submarines and aircraft
taking off from the decks of attack carriers.
V'yunenko echoed this thought in an article that appeared in
Voyennaya Mysl' in January 1977:
Foreign experts believe that in
connection with development of strategic
cruise missiles, the past significance of
cutting the enemy's sea lines of communication
and protecting friendly sea routes has
changed. In the recent past such activities
constituted the navy's principal business,
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while today they have become only one
component, and far from the most important
one, of the mission of damaging the military-
economic potential of a number of naval
powers.
Both authors attributed these views to foreign experts. We know
however, that these views reflect Soviet military thinking, and we
therefore regard them as authoritative expressions of Soviet
military doctrine.
7. Many of the open source articles appearing in the last
three years demonstrate continuity in the Soviet view of wartime
SLOC interdiction. In a November 1982 Morskoy Sbornik article
about German anti-SLOC efforts in 1942, for example, Rear Admiral
Pushkin--the editor-in-chief of that journal--asserts that
American and British efforts against German U-boats did not have a
decisive impact upon the war. He criticizes "bourgeois falsifiers
of history" who wrongly assigned "enormous importance to the
'battle of the Atlantic,' considering it one of the main factors
that determined the outcome of World War II." In a commonplace
formulation for Soviet naval authors denigrating the importance of
SLOC interdiction, he goes on to say that it was the Soviet Army's
effort on the Eastern Front, not American and British ASW efforts,
that decided the outcome of the war in the Atlantic. He concludes
his article by saying that although nuclear-powered submarines
have greatly increased the potential to disrupt wartime shipping
and although NATO practices convoy protection measures in numerous
exercises, warfare on the sea lanes is not a top priority mission
for Western navies:
The growth in the striking force of modern
weapons and the expanded capabilities of all
the branches of the armed forces led to
reevaluation of the priority of missions in
naval warfare. In a number of Western
countries, the principal missions are now
naval actions against targets on the shore,
while destroying enemy strike groupings has
become secondary, and frting on sea lanes
plays a tertiary part.
8. Pushkin's article provides a good example of the practice
of casting Soviet naval theory as Western opinion. Western naval
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officers consistently describe controlling the North Atlantic sea
lanes as critical to NATO's success in a war in Europe. Authors
like Pushkin probably read and understand Western naval literature
and know that NATO does not regard protecting the SLOCs as a
"tertiary" mission. It is Soviet, not Western naval authorities,
who usually downplay the importance of warfare on the SLOCs.
Pushkin's low priority for the SLOC mission, combined with his
emphasis on the strategic strike mission (which is a high priority
for both the Soviet and NATO navies), strongly suggests that he is
obliquely stating his own views about Soviet naval priorities.
Moreover, the consistency between these views and earlier writings
by authoritative authors such as Gorshkov, Stalbo, and V'yunenko,
all of whom assign primacy to the Soviet Navy's strategic strike
mission, suggests that Pushkin's oblique statements reflect
accepted, unchanged Soviet thinking.
9. An October 1983 Morskoy Sbornik article by Vice Admiral
Stalbo also reflects substantial continuity with his earlier
writings, particularly on wartime naval mission priorities.
Stalbo writes that the primary purpose of naval forces, in "the
Pentagon's view," is to deliver nuclear strikes against enemy land
targets. As in the Pushkin article, this statement reasonably
expresses the importance the US and NATO assign to SSBNs. Stalbo
goes on to say, however, that "the basic problems of
organizational development and employment of the US Navy stem from
missions of employing the strategic submarine nuclear system and
its support forces." Here Stalbo seems to be describing the
important Soviet naval mission of supporting and protecting SSBNs,
a mission foreign to the US Navy, whose SSBNs operate
independently and without air and naval protection. According to
Stalbo, ASW against enemy SSBNs and power projection are the next
most important missions for the US Navy. Stalbo concludes his
list with a discussion of the need to protect the transoceanic
SLOCs, "an important factor in the integrity of the military
organism of NATO." Stalbo thus places combat on the SLOCs fourth
on his list. Although much of what he says about US naval
missions can be taken at face value, his allusion to the SSBN
protection mission and the low priority he assigns to SLOCs
suggest that he is describing his own--and probably the Soviet
naval hierarchy's--opinion rather than Western views.
10. A March 1984 article by Admiral N. Amelko provides
insight into the thinking of the most senior naval officer on the
Soviet General Staff. Although the article appeared in the Moscow
News, a propaganda vehicle published in the English language, it
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Is interesting because Amelko, who is a deputy chief of the
General Staff, openly discusses the Soviet Navy's wartime
missions, rather than relying on oblique statements. He admits
that the Soviet Navy has a SLOC interdiction mission, but argues
that it is forced on the USSR and that any Soviet efforts to
Interdict shipping will be purely defensive. Although Amelko does
not explicitly assign relative weights to the missions he
describes, he discusses SLOC interdiction only after first
describing the threat from aircraft carriers and SSBNs. Moreover,
he implies that most of the Soviet Navy's forces, particularly
submarines, are marked for anticarrier and antisubmarine tasks
rather than SLOC interdiction.
11. Two April 1985 articles by Admiral Gorshkov in Morskoy
Sbornik and Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, an official journal
published by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, contain considerable
discussion of Soviet efforts to defend their own SLOCs and to
attack German SLOCs in the Baltic and Black Seas during World War
II. The Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal article is an historic
piece that extols--and exaggerates--the importance of the Soviet
Navy's contributions to the defeat of Nazi Germany but says
nothing about the relevance of World War II experience to current
naval strategy. Like much of the recent Soviet literature on SLOC
interdiction, this article seems to be part of the celebration of
the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. The
Morskoy Sbornik article applies the experiences and the lessons
learned from World War II to current naval plans and strategy, but
Its discussion of SLOC interdiction is purely historical.
Conspicuous by its absence is any mention of SLOC interdiction
within the article's discussion of the Soviet Navy's current
missions and capabilities. Defense and interdiction of the Baltic
and Black Sea's SLOCs were key roles for the Soviet Navy in World
War II, and Gorshkov's focus on them in these two articles
probably reflects this fact. The lack of any mention of SLOC
interdiction in the Morskoy Sbornik article's discussion of
current missions suggests that Gorshkov continues to regard it as
a secondary mission.
Dissident Voices
12. Some open source articles in the past three years have
deviated from the standard practice in Soviet literature of
downgrading the potential impact of SLOC-related combat. The most
notable of these is an article by Vice Admiral A. Gontayev
entitled "Combat Operations of Submarines on Sea Lanes of
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Communication," which appeared in the January 1983 issue of
Morskoy Sbornik. Much of the article is dedicated to SLOC
Interdiction during World War II, making the standard Soviet
assessment that combat on the sea lanes was not decisive.
Gontayev says, however, that SLOC interdiction would have
Increased importance in a future NATO-Warsaw Pact war because it
would not be a strictly continental war. The USSR is now faced by
a coalition of seapowers, he writes, and combat in ocean theaters
will have a great impact upon the outcome of war in Europe:
Transoceanic communications, nowadays, in the
opinion of foreign specialists, have become
the most important factor that determines the
course and the outcome of war in continental
theaters of military operations.
Gontayev backs up this point by stating that protecting the North
Atlantic SLOCs "comprises the content of the overwhelming majority
of naval maneuvers and exercises of the navies of the NATO
bloc."
13. In a similar vein, a June 1984 Morskoy Sbornik article
by Captain Second Rank N. Kabalin states that US leaders believe
SLOCs "are now becoming the most important factor determining the
course and outcome of war in continental theaters of military
operations." He quotes NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic,
US Navy Admiral Wesley McDonald, as saying "stoppage or
substantial disruption of shipments is fraught with defeat for
NATO in Europe." The bulk of Kabalin's article is dedicated to
describing the Western concepts of defending SLOCs through
"protected zones" and "protected sea lanes" and two large-scale
NATO naval exercises--United Effort '83 and Ocean Safari '83--that
focused on defending North Atlantic sea lanes.
14. It is unclear whether Gontayev and Kabalin are simply
reporting on Western naval events and opinion or are obliquely
stating their own viewpoints. Their pieces accurately describe
the great importance Western naval leaders assign to controlling
SLOCs during a war in Europe. Gontayev and Kabalin also are
correct in saying protection of Atlantic shipping plays an
important role in NATO naval exercises. If the authors intended
their articles to be mechanisms for obliquely stating their
recommendations, however, their assertion that combat on the sea
lanes can "determine the course and outcome" of the war would
amount to an argument that SLOC interdiction should be afforded
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equal precedence with the strategic strike mission. Admiral
Gorshkov, for example, used the "course and outcome" formulation
in Sea Power of the State to assert that the acquisition of SSBNs
allowed navies, for the first time in history, to play a decisive
role in the outcome of a major war.
Doctrinal Debate?
15. The relatively heavy attention Gontayev and Kabalin
devote to the issue of SLOC interdiction and the practice of
oblique expression of views in articles like theirs suggest their
articles are in fact part of a long-running internal debate on the
relative importance of SLOC interdiction for the Soviet Navy.
They fall in line with a series of articles that have appeared
periodically since the early 1960s that seemed to imply criticism
of the level of attention the Soviet naval high command devoted to
the interdiction mission. Articles by Vice Admiral V. Solov'yev
and Captain First Rank Makeyev in the June 1978 and July 1979
issues of Morskoy Sbornik, for example, also refer to the Western
view that SLOC interdiction would have a decisive impact upon the
outcome of a NATO-Pact War.
16. The increased Soviet interest in SLOC interdiction
evident in the publication of several articles on the subject
during the past three years is probably a by-product of recent
interest in protracted conventional warfare in both NATO and the
Warsaw Pact. The Soviets' military literature indicates they are
concerned about NATO's current emphasis on being prepared for a
long conventional war against the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets have
for some time held that SLOC interdiction could become a more
important mission if a NATO-Warsaw Pact war became protracted.
For example, an article in the October 1971 issue of Voyennaya
Mysl' by Captain First Rank B. Balev states that a war against
NATO could develop into a long, drawn-out struggle in which SLOC
interdiction would play an important role. G. M. Sturua, writing
in the November 1982 issue of the Soviet journal USA: Economics,
Politics and Ideology, states that the development of a US
capability for protracted conventional warfare presupposes "the
ability to guarantee the uninterrupted functioning of ocean
communications and the disruption of enemy communications."
Soviet proponents of a higher priority for SLOC interdiction--such
as Gontayev and Kabalin--probably believe that NATO's attention to
protracted war has provided an opening to renew their argument.
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Impact on Naval Doctrine
17. So far, the debate does not appear to have had any
impact on Soviet naval doctrine. As in the past, no authoritative
spokesman on Soviet naval theory known to us has advocated--even
obliquely--upgrading SLOC interdiction to be a primary mission.
On the contrary, all available evidence suggests that
authoritative naval theoreticians such as Admirals Gorshkov,
Stalbo, and Pushkin continue to adhere to the Soviet conventional
wisdom that SLOC interdiction is a secondary task.
18. Moreover, the most recent Soviet naval exercises provide
little, if any, evidence of activity that can be equated to open
ocean interdiction of NATO's sea lanes. They continue to stress
an echeloned defense co" thp sea aporoaches to the USSR and to
Soviet SSBN bastions.
20. The Soviets also do not seem to be building the kind of
future submarine force that would facilitate a large-scale anti-
SLOC effort. An increased emphasis on SLOC interdiction would
require the commitment of a considerable number of attack
submarines.L
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22. There is also no sign/
that the Soviets have downgraded their anticarrier, anti-
SSBN, or SSBN protection missions in order to increase the number
of submarines available for SLOC interdiction efforts. We believe
these missions will tie down more than three-quarters of the
general purpose submarines in the Northern and Pacific Fleets.
The increased capability of the Sierra- and Akula-class SSNs may
allow the Soviets to pursue these missions with fewer forces, but
some of these forces probably will be used primarily as cruise
missile SLCM launchers. It is therefore doubtful that the greater
capabilities of the new Soviet SSNs will increase significantl
the number of platforms available for SLOC interdiction.
The Future
23. If an upgrade of the importance of SLOC interdiction
were under serious consideration, we would expect to start seeing
articles in military journals by authoritative spokesmen
assigning--probably obliquely--more weight to the interdiction
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mission. Such articles probably would be similar in structure to
the 1983 Stalbo article and would discuss the upgraded anti-SLOC
mission as part of a comprehensive review of naval missions rather
than focus on the SLOC mission alone.
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Newport, R.I.
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000507690002-8
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25X1