GORBACHEV, THE NEW BROOM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000507710001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

pn,QC2050$
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
JUNE 1985
Gorbachev, the New Broom
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Central modiVnoe
Summary
Gorbachev has demonstrated in his first 100
days that he is the most aggressive and activist
Soviet leader since Khrushchev. He is willing to
take controversial and even unpopular decisions--
like the antialcohol campaign--and to break with
recent precedent by criticizing the actions of his
colleagues on the Politburo.
He has thrown down the gauntlet on issues as
controversial as the allocation of investment,
broadgauged management reform, and purging theThe
system of incompetent and corrupt officials.
very insistence of his rhetoric allows little room
t
.
for compromise or retrea
Gorbachev is gambling that an attack on
corruption and inefficiency, not radical refor a
m#
will turn the domestic situation around.
risky course, his prospects for success should not
be underestimated. Although his approach is
controversial, his near term prospects look good.
Unlike his immediate predecessors, he has already
managed to firm up his base of support in the
Politburo and Secretariat. He can also count on
some support from middle level officials of the
bureaucracy who were frustrated by the stagnation of
the Brezhnev era. The public as well has responded
favorably to his style, judging by initial reaction
This paper was prepared by the office of Soviet Analysis.
its and questions may be directed to the Chief, Domestic Policy Division,
SOYA M 85-10119X
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filtering back through Western sources* His
the
aggressiveness has placed the opposition
defensive. His opponents are probably biding their
ste
i
p.
s
time hoping he makes a major m
Gorbachev's Style
Gorbachev has moved to draw a sharp contrast yleato his
recent predecessors, who treated the bureaucracy gingerly
approached change cautiously. Brezhnev and Chernenko voiced
concern about the deenot g etonconfront theobburlems
country y, but they y were prepared
standing in the way of solutions. Brezhnev's solicitous attitude
toward the bureaucracy limited the power of his officAnasopov
officials came to believe they had lifetime tenure.
including
moved to break this mold, rbut he esencewof Brezhnevitesby his poor
health and the lingering presence
L ruin from Andropov's
a
e
Gorbachev's populist sty
Khrushchev's frequent forays among and bare knuckles
approach to dealing with He has visited factories in Moscow and Leningrad and found
other opportunities to rub shoulders with workers in an
effort to burnish his image as a man of the people. Soviet television has highlighted his easy give-and-take
and made clear he in e
has not been seen since
l
g
Chernenko and Premier Tiknonov. e
experience, Gorbachev has consciously created an environment
t nds to confront problems.
with ordinary citizens.
Gorbachev has also moved his wife Raisa into the
spotlight. She has appeared in the Soviet press and on
television, and a protocol officer reportedly has been
The wife of Politburo
assigned to handle her activities.
member Vorotnikov, who recently visited Canada, was
overheard to say that all wives of Politburo members must
trips
n
While these traits mark Gorbachev as an unconventional
Soviet politician, it is his no-holds-barred approach to
confronting chronic domestic problems that underscores his new
style as a leader.. Gorbachev may feel that an aggressive
approach is essential if he is to avoid getting bogged down like
?
now accompany their husbands on foreig
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Andropov. A wide spectrum of Soviet officials complained of
drift and corruption under Brezhnev and became discouraged when
Andropov's ill health caused his initiatives to
for momentum.
They provide a well-spring of potential support Go's
approach:
-- He has instituted a sweeping crackdown on the deep-rooted
problem of alcoholism, reportedly even denying a request
from Foreign Minister Gromyko to exempt diplomatic
functions.
- He criticized his Politburo colleagues in public during
his visit to Leningrad, terming their recent decision on
the allocation of land for private plots inadequate and
dismissing objections apparently raised by his colleagues.
He has assailed ministers by name for lack of innovation,
laziness, and poor management and has strongly implied
that they will be removed. He has attacked the complacent
attitude toward corruption within the party bureaucracy
and called for promotion of younger and more competent
officials at all levels. While such rhetoric is not new
in itself, he has already underscored his intention to
back up his tough rhetoric with dismissals by sacking some
middle-level officials.
claims that Gorbachev has
f his
"
wave o
begun to boss around high officials with a
hand," asking for information and then issuin orders
without consultation. Gorbachev
will systematically replace old guard holdovers both in
Moscow and the provinces with young and technically
competent officials.
Gorbachev has made it clear that he believes his policies
are justified by the growing foreign and domestic problems facing
the USSR:
He has studded his speeches with language that evokes the
image of a Cris' sted that the USSR is now at a
turning point.
he has decided to raise Russian national consciousness and
to impose "super-enforcement" of order and discipline.
At the April Central Committee plenum, he was sharply
critical of the economic laxity under Brezhnev and the
failure to follow through on decisions which had been
taken by the leadership.
In his speech to the S&T conference in early June, he
warned that accelerated economic growth was an imperative
due to the need to sustain current levels of consumption
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while making the investments in defense required by
current international tensions.
Consolidating Power
Gorbachev is using time honored methods for building his
power, advancing his allies into key leadership positions, but he
is off to a faster start than any of his recent predecessors.
More changes are likely soon:
-- By advancing three allies to full Politburo membership in
April he has probably achieved a working majority on most
issues.
-- The designation of Yegor Ligachev--one of the three
promoted--as unofficial "second secretary" isolated his
major rival, Secretary Grigori Romanov, who has been
nearly invisible politically._
now eclipsed Foreign Minister Gromyko and Premier Tikhonov
in political importance.
-- KGB boss Chebrikov--who was also promoted--appears to be
another close ally, giving the General Secretary an
important advantage in exerting political pressure against
would-be Politburo opponents, most of whom are tainted by
corruption.
Gorbachev also placed a younger protege in charge of the
department that oversees personnel appointments, further
consolidating his control over personnel policy and
setting the groundwork for potentially sweeping personnel
changes preceding next February's party congress. He is
off to a fast pace in replacing his opponents in the
bureaucracy. He has retired one deputy premier and three
b
osses
ministers, and named nine new regional party
three new Central Committee department heads.
Domestic Strategy
Using his strong political position, Gorbachev's first
priority is to push his domestic economic program. While some
Soviet officials have indicated he is sympathetic to the use of
pragmatic methods, including tapping private initiative, his
statements and actions underscore his overall commitment to the
current economic system and his determination to make it work
better. Having acknowledged the gravity of the economic problem,
Gorbachev exudes an optimism that he and his team can eliminate
waste, tighten discipline, increase the quality and quantity of
production, and accelerate economic growth. While expressing
great pride in the historical acomplishments of central planning,
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he has sharply criticized its recent performance, and called for
stem works.
the s
y
"revolutionary" changes in the way
His first priority fix is to reduce waste and tighten
discipline, particularly among managers:
Gorbachev has cited cases of such waste, such as the 20
percent loss of the harvest. Figures published in the
Soviet press indicate Andropov's discipline campaign has
reduced losses in working time about 20 percent, and
Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy recently announced that
the campaign had saved several hundred million rubles.
Gorbachev probably hopes to squeeze out similar resources.
Gorbachev has
discipline campaign.
deadbeats, and
threatening to fire
such problems among
c eccs an crackdowns on drunks and
managers who-have failed to correct 25X1
their workers.
His speeches indicate he will extend earlier efforts to
it both for workers and 25X1
tie pay more closely to product iv y
managers, not only rewarding good workers but penalizin --
f oor performers.
-o
p
perhaps even docking the salares-
Building from a base of improved worker discipline and
management effectivness, Gorbachev's-hopes to further boost long-
term growth entail a modernization of the capital base by
increased investment in machine-building and retooling existing
factories. While the effects of this approach will not be felt
for some time, he has remanded the draft Five-Year Plan for 1986-
90 to redirect it toward growth based on increased productivity
rather than expanded resources. More specifically:
He has called for investment in modernizing factories to
be increased from 1/3 to 1/2 of investment,* and demanded
that investment and output in civilian machine-building be
doubled. He even called for "mothballing" some new
construction projects, as an unusually candid admission. of
a major Soviet problem rather construction of.
stress on conservation
*Soviet bureaucrats, both ministerial and party, have
traditionally called for new construction. Such projects have
been doled out to satisfy local lobbies like pork barrel
projects. In his S&T conference speech, Gorbachev condemned this
approach and insisted on focusing investment on where it was
needed most.
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materials also indicates a heightened emphasis in this
area.
traditionally have resisted such steps.
e e
a showdown with ideological purists in t
Beyond this, he has been less specific on other economic
initiatives, but his statements suggests he may intend to press
even more controversial policies touching on the powers of the
bureaucracy:
-- His public statements suggest he wants to amalgamate
ministries and redirect them and the State Planning
Committee (Gosplan) away from day-to-day management
decisions.
-- He would like to see greater autonomy for plant managers
and will probably push for reduction of centrally dictated
indicators.
-- He has criticized intermediate management bodies that
choke off initiative, hinting that they should be
streamlined or eliminated. His aim is to eliminate some
of the massive bureaucratic apparatus that, as he
complained in his speech to the S&T conference, implements
Central Committee decisions in such a manner that after
they are finished "nothing is left of these principles."
-- He may advocate legalizing some parts of the "second
economy" and allow a limited expansion of the role of
private agriculture, despite potential ideological
opposition. He hinted at this in his Leningrad speech in
May. Gorbachev may feel some limited concessions--like
tolerating private repairmen or allowing greater access to
summer gardens for urban dwellers--could help improve the
quality of life without undermining the system or forcing
lite who
h
and he may visit India later this year.
Foreign Policy
Gorbachev's impact on foreign policy has so far been mostly
stylistic. He has revealed no urgent agenda to match his
determination to accelerate economic growth at home. Some of his
gambits--like the INF moratorium--are stale leftovers from his
predecessor. His immediate goal has apparently been to
demonstrate to both allies and adversaries that there is now a
strong and active leader in the Kremlin. Despite the press of
domestic business, Gorbachev has received a steady stream of
European and Third World leaders. He has been more activist than
his immediate predecessors and will reportedly embark soon on a
vigorous shedule of personal diplomacy and foreign trips. He is
slated to travel to Paris in October for meetings with Mitterrand
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Although he has not yet made any serious new initiative
toward the US, he has already made his presence felt on Soviet
policy. He reportedly ratified the return to the bargaining
table in Geneva even before Chernenko's death in March.
softened Soviet conditions for a summit with President Reagan
soon after entering office. Since then, he has apparently
sanctioned the recent expansion of bilateral exchanges and met
with several US delegations.
ublic statements
i
n p
t e rile*y1 V intent on presenting
however,
convincing American policymakers that bilateral relations will
improve only if US policy changes. He and his colleagues
evidently do not believe an early improvement in relations is
likely:
1-LCLC-- ucuvcc.. ....~ --- -- -
of European leaders, and indicated that Moscow is now prepared to
establish political relations with the European Community:
Gorbachev has, also taken a tough line within the Warsaw
Pact, reportedly sending ripples of concern through the more
Gorbachev will concentrate
on cultivating an image of strength, not conciliation.
In talks with American visitors he has bristled at efforts
t
policy adviser believes a is not disposed to concessions,
in part because he does not believe arms control can
significantly reduce domestic economic problems.
Gorbachev's chief foreign
summit dovetails with this strategy.
to raise human rights issues, demanded that the US no
take a "carrot and stick" approach, and insisted that
Soviet leaders will be ready to deal only when the US
starts treating the USSR as an equal.
-- Moscow's more recent decision to play hard to get on a
He has already spoken publicly of a commun y
met with a series
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His public
Brezhnevite regimes, such as Czechoslovakia.
statements have stressed the need for bloc unityand closeast for E
economic integration. Despite his reported sympathy at
European economic reform, he allegedly told party leaders their summit in April that "something is rotten in Deenmark." and 25X1
regiondissatisfaction w' rption
which they laxitk this signal
economic laxity in
eaalso sisignaled strong support
Gorbachev's early actions tionsChave
for allies in Afghanistan Soviet forces in Afghanistan continue to pursue the more
aggressive military approach that we began to see last
year.
He met Nicaraguan leader Ortega only days after the US
Congress turned down the President's original request for
aid to the Contras and pledged increased oil deliveries to
Despite his strong position, Gorbachev does not have an
entirely free hand. Other Politburo members can still slow up
his initiatives. Independents or even allies might balk at some
aspects of Gorbachev's freewheeling style. There are some signs,
moreover, that Gorbachev's initiatives have already been watered
down or met resistance:
-- Judging from his remarks in Leningrad, heoPolitburoon of
rejected his more far reaching proposals
garden plots,-evidently on the grounds that this amounts
to encouraging private enterprise.
fight.
As a result, those threatened by Gorbachev at the Central
Committee level lack an effective spokesman. While they can
resist by footdragging on his policies, he can probably remove
them if they don't appear to be falling into line. Many elderly
Brezhnev-era holdovers may well find it easier to retire than
effective rallying point.
opposition to Gorbachev's Juggernaut?
Opposition to Gorbachev for now appears disorganized. The
old guard in the Politburo--such as Premier Tikhonov, Moscow
party boss Grishin or republic bosses Shcherbitskiy and Kunayev--
are-probably on the defensive due to charges of mismanagement or
corruption in their organizations. Secretary Romanov, a
potential focus for opposition, has been outflanked by
Gorbachev's personnel moves and probably is no longer an
bolster the regime.
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Some evidence suggests that the timing of a US-Soviet
s it has become entangled in ~P~ership politics.
Gorbachev's bold
domestic strategy is also con l at the lower
levels, and he will have to contend with thousands of
local party officials who are unwilling to accede to the
wishes of the central party leadership. Many rank-and-
file workers will probably also resent the increased
demands for productivity and be-fearful that they might
lose their job security.
Gorbachev's edicts
te
l
crea
on alcoholism, if carried out to tne fetter wil
ion
his campaign a ainsL. corrup
not win him any friends.
Soviet media treatment of Gorbachev's speeches suggests that
nce:
t
i
a
s
his policy agenda is meeting some high-level res
Press versions of Gorbachev's speech in Leningrad toned
down his criticism of the Politburo decison on extending
the private plots.
Published versions also eliminated references to
Gorbachev's personal sponsorship or support of economic
reform initiatives.
On some occasions, the media have published full accounts
s
l d
.
ay
of his speeches only after a delay of severa
Nonetheless, the strength of Gorbachev's position suggest
that his detractors will have to wait until he makes a major
misstep or overreaches on a controversial issue in order to give
them an opportunity to coalesce. The real test may come when
evidence begins to roll in on the success or failure of his
program.
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Can Gorbachev Succeed Where Khrushchev Failed?
Gorbachev's efforts to force greater efficiency out of the
system is still a risky gamble, despite the disorganized state of
resistance. Khrushchev, for instance, succeeded for nearly ten
years in keeping the opposition on the defensive through endless
reorganizations and campaigns, but eventually he alienated his
Khrushchev's
own supporters.
the bureaucrats
them to do.
Having witnessed Khrushchev's mistakes, Gorbachev's signals
are likely to be much clearer and more consistent.
of these clear signals are likely to produce resistance.
Gorbachev's investment strategy may cause him the most problems
with the bureaucracy. The allocation of investment is closely
tied to the power of officialdom, who can dole out "pork barrel"
projects as a kind of political payment for loyalty. By sharply
reducing investment funds in some sectors and requiring ia newnd
approach to management, moreover, Gorbachev's approach to alienate many in the bureaucracy upon whom he must depend for
policy implementation. While he can use the power of hiring and
firing to discipline this group, such an approach--as Khrushchev
discovered--potentially has its cost in terms of production and
political support.
Gorbachev's call for faster economic growth may also come
back to haunt him. Efforts to reconstruct existing factories may
lead to declining output at a time when he is proposing a return
to higher economic growth rates. While his four percent growth
prediction for the next Five Year Plan may not be entirely out of
reach, it forces managers into the position of choosing between
increasing output and reequipping their factories. Massive
shifts in investment priorities could also create bottlenecks and
disruptions in the economy. For instance, shifting resouces from
l and oil output is
h
coa
energy extraction--at a time when bot
declining--to the production of more energy efficient machinery
rt term
h
h
.
o
e s
might exacerbate the energy balance in t
Gorbachev will have to carefully calibrate his policies in
order to avoid pitfalls in a system where emphasizing specific
priorities at the top frequently translates into slackened effort
on other areas. The prospects for a radical reorientation of
Soviet managers toward quality rather than quantity are also not
good--it runs counter to the approach of the last 55 years. But,
Andropov's experience demonstrated that a concerted effort on
management discipline--backed by the threat of firing--can
F_ I
probably have beneficial effects.
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LORI
Looking Ahead
With the urgent rhetoric and ambitious agenda he has set so
far, Gorbachev ewill be lse under the gun continuingtoedvrideawnce
of momentum ? 25X1
together and work against him.
Consolidating power. Gorbachev is likely to He elehtedlso
Press ent at next week's supreme Soviet session.
advance other allies into junior slots in the leadership at a
plenum preceding the Supreme Soviet. Gorbachev will almost
certainly use the party elections campaign before the party
congress next year to replace many Brezhnev holdovers among
regional party and government leaders. Party Secretary Romanov,
once Gorbachev's major rival, is already in decline, and a recent
smear campaign linking him to Gorbachev's opponents may be 25X1
intended to pave the way for his removal.
Gorbachev will continue to oust symbols of the Brezhnev old
guard in the economic bureaucracy. The ministers he named at the
S&T conference are almost certain to go. Gorbachev's attacks on
the ministries have made Premier Tikhonov's position increasingly
untenable, and he could be gracefully eased out even before the
party congress. The retirement of Gosplan chief Baybakov, a
symbol of resistance to change since the Brezhnev era, would send 25X1
a strong message to the bureaucracy.
Domestic Agenda. If Gorbachev wants to signal a new tone,
he aou a er the traditional summer vacation and work on
getting the draft Five Year Plan and party program in shape for
the congress. The draft program might be unveiled at the next
plenum and should certainly echo his themes of increased
discipline and technological progress. When the draft of the
economic pal should
increased economic growth
He could also make additional forays outside of Moscow to
demonstrate his leadership and activism. He has just returned
nd might undertake a visit to
a
from a visit to the Ukraine
somewhere in Siberia to further increase his exposure. He could
use these trips to keep up the rhetorical pressure on the
economic bureaucrats. 25X1
Foreign Policy. We will probably begin to see a growing
Gorbachev impact on foreign policy. Gromyko's influence will
decline further from its high point in the Chernenko regime. A
meeting with President Reagan would also burnish his image as a
statesman, and an early move by Moscow to arrange asummit cannot
be ruled out. 25X1
His activism may also be reflected in bolder efforts to put
pressure on current US policy. We could, for example, see more
skillful attempts to woo Tokyo by exploiting trade frictions
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between the US and Japan, or a symbolic gesture toward Beijing
designed to disrupt Sino-US relations. New initiatives to
undermine NATO cooperation on SDI and COCOM restrictions are also
likely.
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Signals of Setback for Gorbachev
Opponents will be looking for opportunities to slow
Gorbachev's momentum. An early indicator of political
difficulties would be his failure to get the Presidency. While
there may be reasons for a General Secretary to delay assumption
of the Presidency--Andropov may have for instance--Gorbachev
would have to consider the cost of losing political momentum,
especially when he so clearly linked the offices of General
Secretary and President in nominating Chernenko as chief of state
last year.
25X1 Gromyko might be in
. 4:ghr him in this
he
line for
J--r -- -- - -
ceremonial post instead of being Foreign Minister. On
balance, however, Gorbachev would probably still benefit
more from holding both posts, and it would facilitate his
enagement in personal summitry with foreign heads of
state. 25X1
Another sign of resistance would be delays in the
publication of the draft Five Year Plan or party program or the
failure of the drafts to show new approaches to economic and
social policy. If Gorbachev fails to follow up on his tough
rhetoric by firing the ministers he has criticized, it would be
widely read in the USSR as a setback. He has made personnel
turnover a major issue, and failure to make changes in the top
that his
if
i
y
gn
echelon of the party and ministries would s
Politburo colleagues are unwilling to go along.
END BOX
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15 Linda Wetzel
Policy Assistant for USSR/Eastern Europe Affairs
OASD/ISP/EUR/NATO Regional Policy
Rm 1D469, Pentagon
16 Jay Kalner
ACDA/SP
Rm 4495
Department of State
20 Col Tyrus Cobb
Staff Member NSC
Rm 373, EOB
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/30: CIA-RDP85T01058R000507710001-6-
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/30: CIA-RDP85T01058R000507710001-6
21 Don Graves
INR/SEE/ST
Department of State
Rm 4844
22 John Danylyk
Chief INR/EC/USSR
Department of State
Rm 8662 New State
23 Bill Courtney
Special Assistant, Office of Under Secretary
of State
Rm 7240 New State
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/30: CIA-RDP85T01058R000507710001-6