SOVIET STATISTICAL FALSIFICATION AT THE ENTERPRISE LEVEL THE IMPACT ON CIA MEASURES OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000507850001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 9, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL
Central Intelligence Agency
9 September 1985
Soviet Statistical Falsification at the Enterprise Level
The Impact on CIA Measures of the Soviet Economy
Summary
The CIA's evaluation of Soviet economic performance depends heavily on
published Soviet statistics of physical output. Most Western experts believe
that Soviet central authorities do not deliberately publish false statistics
but choose, instead, to withhold publication of data they consider
embarrassing or sensitive on national security grounds. If field-level
statistical falsification exists, however, then Soviet central authorities
unwittingly could publish false statistics. Soviet central authorities seek
to minimize falsification and the level of oversight seems sufficient to keep
most enterprises from reporting non-existent output. The survey of Soviet
press accounts indicates that most report padding involves misrepresenting the
mix and quantity of materials actually needed to produce a good, thus the
impact of distortion in Soviet statistical reporting from the field is mainly
on measures of efficiency--not the amount--of production. Thus, because the
CIA uses primarily physical output series to measure aggregate output of the
Soviet economy, we believe the effect of enterprise report padding on the
CIA's measurement of Soviet growth is minimal. Furthermore, because of the
high level of aggregation involved in their calculation, CIA indexes of Soviet
factor productivity do not appear to be seriously impaired by the lesser
degree of reliability of cost and input statistics.
This memorandum was prepared byl the Economic Performance
Division, National Issues Group of the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments
and queries may be addressed to Chief Economic Performance Division
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Introduction
CIA's measurement of Soviet economic performance depends
heavily on published Soviet statistics.1 Most Western experts,
in turn, believe that the Soviet central authorities do not
deliberately publish false statistics.2 Instead--the experts
agree--the regime withholds publication of statistics that are
security-related or show Soviet economic performance in a poor
light.3 However, the Central Statistical Administration (CSA)
itself could be the victim of falsification of statistics
reported by enterprises to their superior organizations and
ultimately transmitted to CSA. 25X1
1 CIA measurement of aggregate economic activity in the USSR includes, in
addition to indexes for GNP, indexes for industrial production, agricultural
output, consumption, and factor productivity. The discussion below is
applicable to all of these, but the focus is on GNP.
2 Soviet economic statistics are based on different accounting concepts and
are compiled and released by Soviet authorities in support of their own
goals. Soviet statistics are often flawed not by lack of accuracy but by lack
of relevance. In Soviet Economic Statistics, Treml and Hardt, eds., twenty
Western experts on Soviet statistics discuss the differences of definition and
coverage between Soviet and Western statistical factors for a wide range of
Soviet economic statistics. As Stanley Cohn expressed it, in his contribution
to the volume, "the Western specialist does not completely reject official
estimates, but takes them as a base upon which to build a more valid
structure."
3
An exception to the assumption that Soviet statistics are not deliberately
distorted is the official Soviet figure for defense spending. In light of
what is independently known of the Soviet defense effort, that figure has been
consistently much lower than is credible by any acceptable Western definition
of defense spending. However, since the Soviets have never disclosed the
contents of their defense spending total, the published figure can be
considered as undefined rather than false.
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Sources and Methodology
This paper relies on Soviet press accounts and emigree
interviews to assess the impact of enterprise level statistical
distortion. The largely anecdotal press reports give neither a
complete nor an unbiased picture of statistical distortion by
enterprises. Soviet press accounts of known instances of
distortion--in the interests of discouraging dishonest
statistical reporting--will be highly selective, emphasizing
unsuccessful attempts and the penalties imposed on the
perpetrators. The press usually gives few details on the
techniques of distortion and offers biased and limited
explanations of the motivation of those who engage in
distortion. Emigre reporting is a useful supplement to press
accounts. Though generally more detailed than press reporting,
.only a limited volume of such reporting is available because of
the small number of emigres with knowledge of enterprise-level
statistical falsification.4
Nevertheless, both press and emigre reports together enable
us to draw inferences about likely statistical reporting behavior
by enterprise managers in light of prospects for rewards and
punishments in the Soviet system. On the basis of these
inferences, we categorize the various types of economic
statistics that enterprises pass on to the central authorities as
either likely or unlikely to be misreported. We also estimate
whether misrepresentation of each type of statistic is likely to
4 Only nine emigre debriefs were relevant to this subject.
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be major or minor, in order to gauge the effect on CIA measures
of Soviet economic aggregates.
Reasons for Soviet Concern
Soviet leaders are concerned about report distortion for
several reasons.5 First, it can clearly lead to an incorrect
assessment of economic performance and capabilities and thus
undermine effective economic planning and administration.
Second, it can be financially expensive to the state, since
report distortion is often committed to acquire or increase
bonuses. Third, it is seen as damaging to the work ethic of
Soviet employees, who see their colleagues getting rich "at the
stroke of a pen" instead of through hard work. Soviet. officials
also are disturbed by falsification because it can be a sign that
other serious crime--such as theft or misappropriation of state
property--has been committed. 25X1
Motivation for Statistical Distortion
Although Soviet press accounts have emphasized the role of
greed in over-reporting, avarice is not the only explanation.
Some managers will pad reports to facilitate the functioning of
their factories or to preserve and protect their own careers.
For example, if delivered inputs did not arrive in the correct
assortment to produce planned outputs, an otherwise honest
manager might distort a few reports to generate cash to acquire
5 The high level of official concern was quite evident this
April when Izvestiya and Sotsialistischekaya Industriya carried
accounts of the USSR Prosecutor's Collegium. 25X1
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those supplies necessary to fulfill his output plan-6 Because
multiple--often contradictory--commands or plan goals are not
uncommon, managers may falsify statistics relating to some of
them to give the appearance of meeting all of these targets .
The pervasive shortages of quality inputs and the criteria used
to evaluate economic performance increases the likelihood that
some statistical manipulation will occur so that the overall
output plan will be fulfilled.
Soviet press accounts imply that report padding often is
also prompted by the shortage of skilled and/or competent workers
in Soviet industry. Managers often will distribute bonuses--
acquired illegally by report padding--to workers who are in
demand by other enterprises.
Because local government and party officials are evaluated
on the economic performance of enterprises in their regions, they
often have compelling incentives to aid and abet some statistical
manipulation. To this end local party officials have some
opportunity to pressure local prosecutors and statistical
administration offices to ignore statistical misrepresentation.
Ministries are also evaluated on the performance of their
subordinate enterprises and they often will turn a blind eye to
statistical manipulation motivated by an attempt to fulfill the
output plan.
6 Gregory Grossman mentions the "dead souls" techniques--payroll padding--in
this context. See Soviet Economy in a Time of Change "Notes on the Illegal
Private Economy and Corruption." Footnote, p. . Joint Economic Committee,
10 October 1979.
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The Types of Statistical Falsification
Even though managers have incentives to distort statistics,
they must be selective. Ministerial and local support for
statistical manipulation will vary with the types of statistics
falsified and the motivations behind the falsification.
Falsifying Outputs
The first type of falsification involves the enterprise
manager reporting to his ministry or an oversight body that
planned output targets were met when in fact they were not. The
manager's objectives would be either to safeguard his own job
and/or qualify for plan fulfillment bonuses. Violations of this
type carry a 3-year jail term plus the obligation to repay all
illegal bonuses that were paid out as a result of false
reports.
The chances of successfully lying about physical production
are often slim. Output certified as produced must be
delivered. The customer for undelivered goods can initiate a
trace action. Many types of goods, such as tons of steel, or
numbers of tractors, are easy for auditors to trace. One
enterprise wage-economist reported that no-one at her factory
ever lied about finished output since the penalties were too
severe and audits of output could easily detect falsification.
Even if an enterprise successfully lies about its output in
a given year, the next year central authorities could call for it
to produce the falsely reported amount plus some additional
increment. This "ratchet effect" could force an enterprise
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manager to perpetually lie to fulfill his output plan, with ever
mounting likelihood of being found out.
Several emigre accounts from the late 1970's indicate that a
milder, but still risky form of falsification sometimes has been
used. Enterprise managers would certify the output plan for a
month or quarter as fulfilled if their products were partially
assembled and there was a reasonable chance of finishing the
production in the first day or two of the next month. One source
thought these changes were minor, but another source had heard
that padding might overstate output by ten percentage points in a
year.
Misreporting by so large an amount as 10 percentage points
would greatly increase the chance of eventual detection and cause
distress the next year when the plan went up due to the ratchet
effect. A safer way for a manager to protect job and bonuses is
to renegotiate the plan. A Soviet newspaper reported one
enterprise renegotiated the plan 22 times over a two year
period. A Soviet survey conducted in the mid-1970s revealed that
for 200 Ukrainian enterprises the value of output plan was scaled
down an average of approximately 1.6 times per year.
Given the above, we conclude that actual falsification of
physical output statistics at the enterprise level is probably
rare. There are apparently two sectors, however--transportation
and agriculture--where distortion of output statistics reported
by the field could be more common; the important output
indicators in these sectors are harder to verify.
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A railroad auditor can only prove that weight (and thus ton
kilometers) is overstated during a shipment and the auditing
effort cannot be concealed by the central authorities. However,
central authorities are trying to crack down on transportation
over-reporting with more audits and stiffer penalities.
Previously, the railroad ministry handed over statistics to the
CSA at the national level. The press accounts of "truth
varnishing" at 65 to 75 railroad stations investigated by
"control organs" last year could indicate a change in the
railroad ministry statistical reporting system. If this is the
case, then we expect both CSA and CIA statistics on
transportation to be more accurate in the future. Additionally,
if the control organs successfully lower the share of over-
reporting in transportation, measured growth of output will be
lower than it would have been, had there been no increase in
enforcement activities.
Agricultural enterprises present similar audit
difficulties. Yield per acre is an important indicator for
bonuses, but sovkhozes and kolkhozes are generally isolated,
large, and crops are scattered. These conditions make it
difficult for outside auditors to verify actual acreage
planted.
The press accounts do note that "numerous" falsifiers in
transportation and agriculture have been brought to justice
(generally by extra departmental investigators) so falsification
in these sectors still carries risks. Additionally, the rachet
effect applies to transportation and agriculture as well. Thus
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even in transportation and agriculture falsifying output probably
is not the norm.
Given the opportunity, managers are more likely to cheat on
quality than quantity. If an industrial enterprise can water the
milk or cut the potency of medicine, for example, it can still
meet its planned quantity goal with little risk of detection. On
the other hand, if it cannot make quality/quantity tradeoffs, and
must certify specific quantities produced and delivered, an
enterprise probably will certify the actual amount.
Of interest was the omission of any mention of machine
building enterprises from criticism in Soviet press reports.
Machine building enterprises often have heterogeneous outputs
valued in rubles. These enterprises typically have some
flexibility to change their product mix, to manufacture "new"
higher-priced products after minor cosmetic changes, or to
prepare higher priced special orders. These advantages could
mean they do not have to resort to the riskier types of report
padding to gain additional inputs or boost bonuses.
In cases where a machine building enterprise does not have
sufficient inputs to meet its assortment plan, it still might be
able to use the above techniques to fulfill the gross value of
output plan, and would deliver higher priced but less useful
7 For a fuller discussion of the inaccuracies of Soviet agriculture
statistics, see Barbara Severin and Margaret Hughes "An Index of Agricultural
Production in the USSR" in USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development
Joint Economic Committee, December 1982, pp 261-63.
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goods to its customers.8
Falsifying Efficiency Indicators
A second category of report distortion includes falsifying
the expenses and materials necessary to meet planned production
or falsifying non-physical plan fulfillment indices to generate
bonuses. Soviet enterprises are often given plans for production
which do not correspond to available resources. Managers seek
either to generate cash to buy extra inputs, or to generate
excess inputs for one good that can be traded for deficit inputs
for another good. The manager's goal is to produce the actual
plan amount, but he is willing to fiddle with input numbers.
National authorities would like to eliminate these types of
report padding so that they can plan the economy more effectively
and accurately. Press articles condemn this type of report
padding but rarely give explicit details, probably to keep from
handing other potential violators a roadmap. Some methods of
distortion have been explicitly cited, however. For example, to
increase bonuses, managers can overstate output-capital ratios--a
measure of productivity and efficiency--by early writeoffs of
capital equipment that in fact remains in use. One coal mine
8 This is the problem of hidden inflation in the Soviet machine-building
branch of industry. Because machine-building enterprises have some
flexibility to vary their output mix or introduce "new" products, output--
measured as gross value of output--goes up. This is not an example of
enterprise level falsification, however. The distortion occurs because the
CSA "deflates" nominal machine-building GVO to "real" GVO using an
unrepresentative deflator. The CIA index of machinery output combines
numerous physical volume output series with some GVO series. The physical and
GVO series have offsetting biases so the CIA index should be relatively
unbiased. See Ray Converse, "An Index of Industrial Production in the USSR"
in USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development, 1950-80, Joint Economic
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director used the same ploy with labor. By transferring (on
paper only) some coal miners to ancillary services, the measured
labor productivity per remaining miner shot up. Coal production
stayed flat but bonuses increased.
This type of data manipulation carries only moderate risk.
Since real output has been produced (and presumably delivered)
there will be no irate customers who will initiate an
investigation. Additionally, once an enterprise manager has
fulfilled the output plan, regional officials and ministerial
superiors will all too often show a "localist" or "narrow-
departmental" tendency to protect a successful manager from
outside auditors.
Falsification to Conceal Theft
A final category of enterprise report padding attempts to
conceal theft, corruption, and illegal production. (Soviet press
accounts stress that the slightest step on the road of report
padding leads inevitably to these high crimes.) In the previous
two categories of falsification, managers padded reports either
1) to hide plan non-fulfillment, 2) to achieve the plan output in
an unplanned way, or 3) to earn bonuses for themselves and/or
their critical workers. In this category, report padding is used
to conceal crimes already committed. Soviet legality makes this
distinction as well. Managers who under-report output so that
they can sell the rest--or overstate input requirements so they
can manufacture other goods--for personal profit often receive
extremely harsh penalties. For example, in Georgia a manager of
an experimental light industry association, who sold 1.8 million
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rubles of goods for personal profit, was shot. On the other hand
a collective farm chairman who was involved in "non-standard"
financial arrangements while contracting for much needed roads in
his district served only a year of a longer sentence before his
successful appeal.
How Report Padding Affects CIA Measures of the Soviet Economy
The CIA measures the size and growth of the Soviet economy
using synthetic value-added series.9 Very few of these over-
reporting devices will change our measures of the size or growth
of the Soviet economy, especially if physical output series are
essentially unaltered. Additionally, our measures of growth will
be in error only if the share of statistical falsification of
output increases or decreases over time.
o The first type of report padding--certifying
production of non-existent goods--potentially has the
most impact on both Soviet National Income and our
GNP accounts--but is the least likely to occur.
o Although output falsification in transportation and
agriculture can cause problems for our transportation
and agricultural indexes, it is only a problem in
measuring growth if the amount of falsification
changes substantially over time.
Two activities were mentioned in press accounts which could
9
Our synthetic Soviet GNP accounts are based on estimates of ruble value-
added by sector in 1970. For each sector these values (weights) are then
moved by indexes of output which are based mostly on physical units.
Aggregating the individual sectors provides annual estimates of Soviet GNP in
1970 prices. 25X1
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bias both CSA and CIA measures of Soviet capital stock and
capital productivity.10 Buildings are sometimes commissioned
before they are actually finished--because builders cannot
legally collect bonuses before construction is completed, thus
artificially increasing the measures of capital stock and
decreasing capital productivity. In one case, capital equipment
was reported as being retired, but was kept in use, making the
remaining capital appear more productive. These two activities
have offsetting effects on measuring capital productivity. Early
commissioning probably is not widespread because irate users of
the uncompleted building are likely to seek justice--possibly
'through letters to national level press or investigative
organs. Even so, early commissioning could be more common than
early retirement because the overall rate of Soviet capital
retirement is so low that it is difficult to imagine the early
retirement gambit was more than. an isolated incident.
o The second type of report padding--manipulating
efficiency indicators--seems common, but has little
impact on our measure of the Soviet economy, which is
largely derived from physical output series.
10 The CIA uses unmodified Soviet gross fixed capital stock data in lieu of
any data better. These data value capital at installed "comparable prices"
and do not include depreciation. Defining capital this way overstates the
real stock of capital and understates capital productivity. However, the
measured growth rates of capital and changes in capital productivity will
differ much less from their unmeasured "real" counterparts, as long as both
investment and depreciation rates remain fairly stable. The measurement
problems caused by the definition of Soviet capital greatly overshadow any
errors in measurement caused by enterprises trying to report false capital
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o Many types of enterprise labor data manipulation tend
to wash out because our GNP accounts operate at a
high level of aggregation. However, for a smaller
sector, such as construction, which employs
significant amounts of seasonal workers, both we and
the Soviets may mismeasure year-to-year changes in
productivity.
o Cases where a manager trades scarce material inputs
with another factory so that both can fulfill the
plan will not affect our measure of Soviet
production, since we will measure the output of both
.plants. The fact that specific inputs were not as
reported will seldom distort our calculations.
o We are interested in the relationship of the cost and
quantities of material inputs to outputs only when we
are examining the input-output structure of the
Soviet economy. Cutbacks in published Soviet data
permit us to work with only 13-16 sector input-output
tables at this time and it is unlikely that
enterprise level input misreporting will distort
seriously this level of aggregation.
o Cases of theft and massive fraud disturb Soviet
central authorities, but have a lesser and possible
minor significance on GNP estimates. Take the case
where a local party official convinces a construction
trust to build a lakeside dacha instead of a workers'
dormitory of equal cost. Either one would be
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considered investment in housing, so our total
estimate for investment would be unchanged.
o Some distortion of inputs can affect our measures of
GNP, however. For example, a processed food
enterprise may use some of its state-supplied inputs
to produce goods for the black market and at the same
time manage to meet its quantitative output plan by
diluting the product. Our estimate of Soviet GNP
will not include that output destined for the black
market and will over value the reported legal
production (because we assume constant quality).
These errors have possibly completely offsetting
effects and will distort our estimates only if the
share of the net distortion changes overtime.
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Appendix: The Ericson Hypothesis
Professor Richard Ericson of Columbia University proposed
the following hypothesis, that because the number of transactions
required to support growth grows approximately as the square of
economic activity, if there is an upward bias in reporting of
micro level economic activity, the upward bias of macro level
economic activity will grow at least as the square of economic
growth. This causes measured growth to be systematically
exaggerated and makes central planning more complex. The net
result of these two effects is to slow real growth but to
increase reported growth.
Historically, both the CIA and the official Soviet measures
of economic growth have shown a general twenty-five-year long
pattern of decreasing rates of growth--confirming only one of
Ericson's predictions. This, however, is what one would expect
if there is a tendency to over-report indicators of efficiency
but to report actual output. The bias in indicators of
efficiency would increase the problems of the central planners--
expected rates of growth would slow. The lack of output bias
would, though, permit both the CIA and the CSA to measure the
slowdown accurately.
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SUBJECT: Soviet Statistical Falsification in the Field:
The Impact on CIA Measures of the Soviet Economy
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SUBJECT: Soviet Statistical Falsification in the Field:
The Impact on CIA Measures of the Soviet Economy
Distribution: (cont.)
Mr. John Danylyk
Chief, Communist Economic Relations Division
Office of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State (Room 8722)
Ms. Martha C. Mautner
Deputy Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State (Room 4758)
Mr. Donald B. Kursch
Deputy Director for Economics, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Department of State (Room 4223)
Mr. Jack Brougher
Acting Chief, Soviet Affairs Division
Office of East Europe and Soviet Affairs
Department of Commerce (3415 Main Commerce)
Mr. Barry Kostinsky
Chief, USSR Input-Output Branch
Center for International Research, Bureau of Census
Department of Commerce (Room 707, Scuderi Bldg.)
Mr. Robert Obers
Economic Counselor
US Embassy
Moscow
Mr. Kenneth Yalowitz
Economic Counselor
US Mission
NATO
COL Lloyd Moore, Director, Soviet Affairs AFIS/INC
Bolling AFB D.C. 20332-5000
USDA
Keith Severin, Foreign Agricultural Service
Room 6042, South Building
Katherine Zeimetz, Economic Research Service
1301 New York Avenue N.W.
Room 832
Department of Agricultural
Washington, D.C. 20005
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