SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY OUTSIDE HOME WATERS DURING 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000508030001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 30, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central b tdIVnee Agncy
WnhkVmacrosos
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
30 October 1985
Soviet Naval Activity Outside Home Waters During 1984
Summa ry
naval units and probably easing the burden placed on their auxiliary ships.
Soviet naval presence outside home waters traditionally has involved only
a fraction of the Soviet Navy and this remains true today. It has been
steadily increasin , however, and-in 1984 reached its highest level ever.
In addition, the transformation of Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam into a true
overseas base for the Soviet Navy is a major change from the transitory and
small-scale use of overseas facilities that has been characteristic of Soviet
naval operations outside home waters. The buildup of air strength at Cam Ranh
into a regimental-size composite air unit--with strike, fighter,
reconnaissance, ASW, and support aircraft--has dramatically increased the
presence of Soviet naval aviation deployed outside the USSR. An increased
number of surface combatants and general purpose submarines at Cam Ranh form
the core of a naval squadron. The Soviets also are continuing to renovate and
construct support facilities there, permitting expanded services for air and
Soviet naval presence has become more robust in several regions:
? It increased sharply in the open Pacific Ocean, with nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines, general purpose submarines, and
hydrographic and space event support ships accounting for most of the
increase.
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe Office of Soviet
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the author
or to Chief, Strategic Forces Division,
Copy - of
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o
o
V C1. navy. Its
bases, and its higher value units in more critical combat theate
rs.
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n rt of
suppo wartime omissions or the Soviet Navy is increasing. This
is particularly true of the expanded force and support present in the South
China Sea. They could divert, delay, and perhaps even destroy some US and
allied forces that could instead be engaging the bulk
f th S
i
submarines and surface combatants deployed there. wo 25X1
In the open Atlantic and along West Africa the Soviet naval presence has
remained about the saw, and only in the Mediterranean did the level of
surface and subsurface units decline somewhat. Even there, deployment of
IL-38 ASW aircraft to Libya and Syria occurred more often in 1984. 0 25X1
Peacetime missions of Soviet naval forces deployed out-of-area continue
to range from showing-the-flag in Third World ports to monitoring Western
naval forces. As the out-of-area forces become more numerous, their potential
value i
? Two naval task groups visited Cuba in 1984, including the first visit
by a Moskva-class helicopter carrier.
? A three-year decline in the size of the Indian Ocean Squadron ended in
IOOA .+3 +6 - l------- _- - - -
Soviet Naval Aviation
2. Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) aircraft deployments to airfields outside
the USSR rose dramatically in 1984--more than doubling--due to the build-up of
a composite naval air regiment at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam and the institution of
General Pattern of Soviet Naval Deployments
1. The Soviet naval presence outside home waters in 1984 increased two
percent over that of 1983, to nearly 62,000 ship-days spent out of area, the
most ever. (We use the yearly tabulation of ship-days--the presence of one
ship away from home waters for one day--to compare deployment levels with
those of preceding years and to identify changes in deployment patterns.)
Ship-days in the open Pacific registered a sharp increase--36%. Ship-days
increased slightly in the Atlantic Ocean, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean
and remained stable off West Africa while they declined in the Mediterranean
Sea. Two task groups--instead of the us 1 one--visited Cuba and operated in
the Caribbean in 1984.
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Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters, by Region,
Ifeli.- ? ?:'
IIi
111
III
1965 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
*West Afican s~ic,days to, 1974
and 19 7 5 are included in !he
Atlantic Ocean fo, -.~lose years
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111
1974 75 76 77 78 ? :1 81 : 8'
Event Support Shics
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1976 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
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Total Naval Aviation Out of Area Deployment Days
1976 - 1984
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1976 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 81
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Overseas Deployment of Soviet Naval Aviation
1I!)- ? 1984
111
Angola. TU-95 Bear D
Vietnam. TU-95 Bear D
and TU- 142 Bear IF
People's Democratic
Repubilc of Yemen, IL-38
Syria, IL-38 May and
TU-16 Badger
I Me- InIkINIk~6-b- Cuba, TU-95 Bear F
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more frequent IL-38 ASW aircraft deployments to Libya and Syria. Deployment
days for Soviet naval aircraft in the Indian Ocean dropped significantly in
1984. Aircraft days decreased slightly in Cuba, but increased in Angola.
3. In recent years, the Soviets have demonstrated a more sustained,
active, and proficient use of naval aircraft in distant areas. In 1984, the
presence of naval aircraft in Vietnam--as measured in days of aircraft
presence--surpassed the previous peak established in Egypt in the early
1970s. The Soviets continue to diversify the air order-of-battle at Cam Ranh,
adding fighters, bombers, and various support aircraft as they gradually
increase the inventory.
4. Growth of naval aviation deployments occurred on a smaller scale in
the Mediterranean region in 1984. There was an increase in the number of
IL-38 deployments to both Libya and Syria. The deployments have become more
diversified in 1985 with a combination of IL-38 deployments to Libya and TU-16
Badger reconnaissance aircraft staging to Syria. This marked the first visits
of Badgers to the region since a single previous visit to Syria in 1981 and
the routine presence of these aircraft in Egypt in the 1970s.
5. The SNA aircraft are generally more active during their out-of-area
deployments than they have been in the past. This is especially true in the
Mediterranean where IL-38s and Badgers often fly more than twice the average
number of missions seen in earlier deployments. There is frequent activity
from Cam Ranh airfield, including maritime reconnaissance, training,
intelligence collection, and local airfield flights. Overseas aircraft take
part routinely in Soviet naval exercises and occasionally in combined
exercises with Third World nations.
6. The increased presence and activity probably have contributed to a
rise in proficiency. Although losses of SNA aircraft still occasionally occur
overseas, Soviet units continue to expand gradually their operational areas in
most regions where they deploy. This evolution probably will continue as the
Soviets experiment with the use of naval aviation in a variety of missions in
Regional Presence and Activities
South China Sea
7. During 1984, the Soviets built their forces in the South China Sea
into a naval squadron while they renovated or constructed new shore facilities
in Vietnam. The level of surface combatants nearly doubled during the year,
although the total number of ship days in the region increased by only two
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Measuring Soviet Naval Presence
Ship days are the most convenient measure of Soviet naval
presence outside home waters, but they can be misleading unless
several considerations are taken into account:
? Yearly statistics include the large percentage of
noncombat ships that the Soviets maintain abroad. Many
naval auxiliaries, such as yard craft, repair ships, and
submarine tenders are included in the ship-day count. In
1984, nearly 40 percent of Soviet ship days represented
such auxiliary ships and craft. Another 14 percent are
accounted for by research vessels and missile testing and
space support ships.
? Our figures do not differentiate between days at sea and
those spent in foreign ports or sheltered anchorages.
? Ships in transit for sea trials or interfleet transfer are
counted, although they may perform only limited
operational functions or none at all.
The Soviet Navy must commit ships to maintenance before,
after, and sometimes during overseas deployments to
maintain out-of-area force levels. Thus the ship-day
count does not reflect the total time involved in
supporting distant naval operations.
? Soviet out-of-area deployments attract significant
attention, yet on a daily average they involve under 10
percent of the Soviet Navy. In 1984 the Navy deployed on
a daily average 19 surface combatants and about 31 general
purpose submarines--only about 6 percent of the combatant
inventory and about 10 percent of the general purpose
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Soviet Ship-Days in the South China Sea
(Without the Pacific Ocean), 1983 - 1984
Hydroqraphic and Space
Event Support Ships
111
111
111
111
?
FTIT"wrolff
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percent, in part because the availability of shore-based support permitted a
13 percent reduction in auxiliary ship days. In addition, the buildup
occurred late in the year and is not reflected adequately by the yearly
8. The squadron now usually includes four to six submarines. Typically,
about three or four are based at Cam Ranh and one or two are there during
transit to or from the Indian Ocean. Four small ASW ships, two
missile-equipped patrol combatants, two coastal minesweepers, and a number of
auxiliaries usually are present in the South China Sea, as well as one or two
frigates during transit to or from the Indian Ocean. The three to four
submarines, small combatants, ASW ships, and the coastal minesweepers form the
core of what appears to be a permanently deployed squadron formation.
9. The Soviets continue to renovate the port facilities at Cam Ranh,
upgrading POL storage and water pumping facilities. Inew
construction--barracks, storage and other buildings--at a number of locations
on Cam Ranh peninsula in support of both the airfield and the port.
10. The Soviets appear to have formed at Cam Ranh a composite air
regiment composed of two to four Bear F ASW aircraft, two to four Bear D
reconnaissance aircraft, 16 Badger bombers and support aircraft, and 14
Flogger fighters. Renovation and new construction at the airfield is
continuing. The Soviets have established minor maintenance facilities,
weapons storage, and more housing, and have refurbished POL pipelines and
storage tanks.
11. The Soviets have improved the overall defense of Cam Ranh with
missile-equipped naval combatants and Flogger aircraft, and more additions may
occur. The deployment of mobile surface-to-surface coastal defense missiles
would be a logical next step; coastal defense missiles defend the homewaters
of all four Soviet fleets and have been exported to a number of countries.
12. Soviet auxiliaries continued to undergo extended repair and overhaul
in Ho Chi Minh City, while minor maintenance and repair activities provided by
afloat auxiliaries continued in Cam Ranh Bay. Soviet use of Singapore for
refuelling naval-subordinated oilers supporting the South China Sea squadron
increased in 1984--four used Singapore in 1984 compared to two in 1983.
13. The naval base at Cam Ranh Bay contrasts with the traditional
impermanence of Soviet out-of-area presence since their expulsions from Egypt
and Somalia. Soviet air and naval facilities at Cam Ranh continue to grow and
take on the appearance of permanence; most air and naval units routinely
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I I
present appear to be deployed either permanently or until repair and ove
needs require rotation back to the USSR.
strength of the Pacific Fleet available to carry out the primary mission of
defending the critical sea approaches to the USSR. The forces at Cam Ranh
potentially could aid this mission in an indirect manner, however, through
operations in the South China Sea region. If units stand and fight at Cam
Ranh during war with the West--as implied by the diversification and
permanence of the facilities and forces there--they could delay, divert, or
14. The expansion of forces at Cam Ranh reduces--at least initially--the
damage US naval forces ultimately needed for higher priority missions.
Pacific Ocean
15. Soviet out-of-area ship days in the open Pacific increased 36
percent. The major increase was in submarine days. The increased submarine
days reflect more numerous patrols of SSBNs and some general purpose units off
the US West Coast, as well as increased numbers of general purpose submarines
transiting to and from the South China Sea and Indian Ocean.
16. The more frequent SSBN patrols close to the US west coast include
unprecedented and nearly-continuous forward deployments of Delta-class SSBNs
away from traditional patrol areas close to the USSR. The Soviets have also
increased the fre uency of their Y-class deployments off the US west coast.
Indian Ocean
17. A three-year decline in the size of the Indian Ocean Squadron ended
in 1984 when the force there increased slightly. Two general purpose
submarines were usually present in 1984, up one from 1983, and three surface
combatants were usually there instead of two to three. Research ships spent
about 25% more time in the region, while the presence of a mine warfare ship
and one or two amphibious ships remained stable. Auxiliary ship presence
18. The squadron's units continue to spend most of their time at anchor
at the austere Soviet naval support facility at Ethiopia's Dahlak Island in
the Red Sea or in South Yemeni waters, either in Aden harbor or at the
anchorages off Socotra Island. Port calls are made to littoral states,
declined 10 percent to 12-13 vessels on the average.
particularly to the Seychelles in support of the Rene regime.
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Soviet Ship-Days in the Pacific Ocean
(Without the South China ? 1983 - ?
D1
111
Event Support Sh'IQS
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Total Soviet Ship-Days in the Pacific Ocean
and South China Sea,1974 - 1984
111
S~jcrraires
?
III
1974 75 ? 77 ? 79 ? I ? ? i ?
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111
IIi
111
I irIMM a I at-all 19101191 a 111-61 Al Ito
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19. Two IL-38 ASW aircraft are continuously stationed at Al Anad
Airfield, South Yemen, down from four routinely present before 1984. The
Soviets have not sent IL-38s back to Asmera, Ethiopia since two aircraft
routinely deployed there were damaged or destroyed by a rebel attack on the
airfield in May 1984.
20. The aircraft based at Al Anad normally conduct several
reconnaissance flights each month against the US Navy aircraft carrier task
group usually on patrol in the northern Arabian Sea.
21. A combined Soviet-Ethiopian naval exercise was held for the first
time in May 1984, and it may have included participation by the South Yemeni
Navy. Several Soviet units, including an F-class diesel attack submarine and
IL-38s from Ethiopian airfields, participated along with four Ethiopian
ships.
22. The first deployment of a K-class diesel-powered torpedo attack
submarine to the region occurred from July to October 1984. The two
submarines present most often are one diesel--either F-class or K-class--and
one nuclear-powered guided missile unit, either a C-class or Mod-E-II-class.
More K-class patrols in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean can be
expected as more units of this class enter the Pacific Fleet.
23. During August, a Soviet task force, which included the Moskva-class
helicopter carrier Leningrad, two minesweepers, and additional combatants and
auxiliaries arrived in response to the Red Sea mining incidents. Some mine
hunting operations may have been carried out in South Yemeni waters and in the
Red Sea, but overall the task group was generally inactive. Its main units
departed through the Suez Canal in early November. The presence of the group
helped boost the ship-day count for combatants and kept the ship-days total
for mine warfare ships stable, although previously routine patrol operations
by a Soviet mine warfare unit in the Strait of Hormuz were maintained only
sporadically during the year.
24. In late February 1985, the Soviets sent a cruiser, a nuclear-powered
attack submarine, a frigate, an amphibious landing ship, a hospital ship, and
four antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft to join their Indian Ocean naval
force. These joined two cruise missile submarines, two IL-38 ASW aircraft, a
destroyer, an amphibious landing ship, and a hospital ship, bringing the
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Squadron's strength to a slightly higher level than it maintained during
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25. The deployment of two amphibious ships to the Indian Ocean was not
unusual, but the presence of a second hospital ship was unprecedented. The
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second ship may have gone to the Indian Ocean to transfer a new command
authority for the squadron.
26. In early 1985, the Soviets also conducted the first deployment of
IL-38 May ASW aircraft to Mozambique.
If deployments to Maputo
recur, their political significance would outweigh their limited military
utility in the southwest Indian Ocean.
27. No new Soviet naval use of facilities in the Seychelles has occurred
despite Soviet donations of fuel oil and assistance in refurbishing and
maintaining dilapidated fuel storage tanks. The number of Soviet port calls
to Victoria was reduced in 1984. Nonetheless, President Rene's insecurity and
ongoing Soviet efforts to play on his concerns may result in some privileges
such as occasional landing rights for Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft or
occasional use of fuel storage tanks.
28. Several port calls to Mauritius were made in 1984, mainly by
oceanographic research ships. Soviet relations with Madagascar soured in 1984
and early 1985. President Ratsiraka permitted US naval auxiliaries to make
port calls in April 1984 and in March 1985 in order to provide humanitarian
assistance after natural disasters but has since denied a Soviet request for a
ship visit. In addition, a network of Soviet-installed SIGINT sites has
apparently been dismantled, at least temporarily, in response to the US
29. The Indian Ocean Squadron provides a small but visible threat to
Western naval forces. The nuclear-powered cruise missile or torpedo attack
submarine on patrol in the Arabian Sea serves as the main threat to the US
carrier battlegroup there, short of a massive attack by long range aircraft
from bases in the southern USSR. The diesel submarine in the region also
provides a second threat to Western forces and shipping. The IL-38 aircraft
in South Yemen support the submarines with reconnaissance against the carrier
group or other targets and ASW screening missions to attempt to detect enemy
voicing its concern over their usefulness to the Soviets.
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submarines following the Soviet units. The Soviet surface combatants,
auxiliaries, and amphibious ships would be of more limited use in the area
during hostilities with the West. They could be withdrawn before hostilities
or be sacrificed in support of submarine operations. The squadron lacks
sustainability in wartime because Dahlak Island is lightly defended and
without weapons storage facilities. The squadron could be reinforced with
several submarines from Cam Ranh Bay, but this would only aggravate logistic
weaknesses and divert resources from what might be the more critical campaign
in the Pacific. The few Soviet submarines in the Indian Ocean could conduct
operations of limited duration against sea lines of communication (SLOC).
Atlantic/Caribbean
30. Two task groups transited the Atlantic Ocean to visit Cuba in 1984,
instead of the usual one. A Soviet task group arrived in the Caribbean in
March and consisted of the Moskva-class helicopter carrier Leningrad, an
Udaloy-class destroyer, an F-class diesel-attack submarine, and a naval
tanker. The Leningrad is the first helicopter carrier sent to Cuba by the
Soviets, and the task group's arrival marked the first visit to the Caribbean
by an Udaloy-class ship, the Soviet Navy's newest and most capable
antisubmarine warship .
31. The second group arrived in Cuba on 28 December 1984 for a stay of
almost two months. The group was made up of a Sovremennyy-class guided
missile destroyer, two frigates, a T-class diesel attack submarine, and an
oiler. It represented the 24th Soviet deployment of a task group to Cuba
since 1969 and marked the first deployment of a Sovremennvy-class ship to t_hP
regi on.
Other highlights of the deployment
included the transit through the Caribbean south of Jamaica--the first time
the Soviets have ventured into those waters with surface combatants. Bear D
reconnaissance and Bear F ASW aircraft continued to deploy to Cuba during the
year.
32. The Soviets also continued their increased deployment of submarines
off the US east coast. Beginning in December 1983, older E-II nuclear-powered
cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) engaged in patrols varying 30 tQ 60 days in
length off the US. These SSGNs typically patrol about 350 to 500 nm--beyond
their missile range--from the US coast. In January 1984, Delta-I and Delta-II
SSBNs began patrolling closer to the US in areas previously associated with
Yankee-I patrols. On 8 April 1984, the Soviets began more frequent patrols of
Yankee-class SSBNs closer to the US--at one point only 215 nm off Cape
Hatteras.
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? ? 77 ; 79 :1 81 82 83 :'
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111
111
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1974 75 76 77 78 79 :0 81 : :'
Hydrographic and Space
Event Support Ships
General Purpose
Submarines
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Soviet Ship-Days Caribbean 1974 - 1984
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33. The primary advantage to the Soviets of these deployments is to
reduce missile flight times. Submarines deployed in these areas, however, are
more vulnerable to US ASW forces than they would be if they were operating in
the bastions and continued deployments of this sort could cause difficulties
in SSBN scheduling and maintenance.
34. The initial deployments may have been intended mainly for political
rather than military reasons as a Soviet reaction to US missile deployments in
Europe. Nonetheless, the presence of the E-II off the US coasts probably is a
precursor of eventual routine deployment of Soviet land-attack cruise
missiles--the SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24--to waters near the US.
Mediterranean Sea
35. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron has had a recognizable wartime
mission against Western naval forces in the region since its inception. Force
levels in the Squadron have not changed dramatically in recent years. In
1984, however, the ship-days of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron fell by over
10 percent. This reduction probably is due to the cessation of unusual US
military activity in the eastern Mediterranean, especially off Lebanon. The
presence of amphibious ships--which doubled in 1983 with one Alligator or two
Polnocnys kept at anchor in the eastern Mediterranean, probably for a
contingency evacuation role--was sporadic in 1984.
36. The use of Libya and Syria for periodic deployment of ASW and
reconnaissance aircraft has given the Soviets an improved monitoring
capability in the eastern and central Mediterranean. Soviet access to these
airfields during the opening stages of war would be a particularly valuable,
although exposed, asset. Deployment of IL-38 ASW aircraft to Libya and Syria
became more routine in 1984--four deployments to Libya and four to Syria
during the year. The IL-38s also have become more active during their
deployments--usually flying some five-to-eight missions during their
two-to-four week stays. This activity usually is a mixture of ASW training
and reconnaissance flights against Western naval forces. 25X1
37. The Soviets continue to use ports in Syria, Libya, and occasionally
Algeria and Tunisia for limited repair and maintenance of combatants in the
Mediterranean. Tunisia granted access for a Soviet F-class submarine in
August after denying Soviet requests since they were last given docking
privileges in the late 1970s. Maintenance work for Soviet units in regional
ports and shipyards provides valuable support for the Mediterranean Squadron
as well as providing some alternatives to using overcrowded shipyards in the
USSR. 25X1
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1974 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
m 11 . Is
-141
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Soviet Ship-Days in the Mediterranean Sea
;f!)rL 1984
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West Africa
38. There was little change in the size of the Soviet naval patrol off
West Africa in 1984. A diesel attack submarine was present in the region for
more than half the year--up from the two-month submarine deployment there in
1983. A surface combatant and/or an amphibious ship remained present in
Luanda throughout the year, supported by auxiliaries and Soviet naval
technicians ashore. The Soviet fisheries protection patrol of one or two
minesweepers continued to operate out of Conakry, Guinea.
39. The amount of time spent by TU-95 Bear D naval reconnaissance
aircraft in Angola increased in 1984. They maintained the usual low level o
activity while deployed, however,
41. The Soviet naval presence off West Africa normally does not present
a credible threat to the West in the event of war. Bear D reconnaissance
aircraft deployed to Luanda in wartime would be unable to reach the major
cross-Atlantic sealanes to be used by US forces and shipping. If a
diesel-powered attack submarine was deployed to the region and remained during
hostilities, it could conduct limited anti-SLOC missions against merchant
shipping, although it would lack adequate logistic support and ordnance
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Soviet Ship-Days
11!)- ? 1984
1976 77 78 79 .0 81 82 83 84
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 Deployment Areas and 1984 Ship-Days of Soviet Naval Forces Outside Home Waters
1 Niger? a /(
cNeme
(i Aa r Y.A.R.
Sudan
9.ne.a
India
ugind
amts
Pacific
OW-Da"
SSBn 2,774
1,827
Swfaacombatants 201
Alapbliblow ships 48
Mina warfare ships 331
Research ships 1$7
Au~" IM
TOW 5,4
Surface Cuts 133
Research Mips '443
Auxiliaries -ft
Pacific Ocean
Caribbean Sea
West African waters
Indian Ocean
Arctic Ocean
Operating area of Soviet maritime aircraft stationed abroad
Foreign airfield to which Soviet naval aircraft deploy
Regional boundaries provided by Naval Operational Intelligence Center
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Atlantic
Ship-Days
SSBNs 2,950
General purpose
Surface combatants 804
Amphibious ships 121
Mine warfare ships 573
Research ships 3,105
Auxiliaries 3,565
Total 15,673
P.duo.' c,.,. _
World Total Ship-Days
(1984)
SSBNS
General purpose
submarines 11.204
Surface combatants 6.931
Amphibious ships 1.799
Mine warfare ships 2,658
Research ships 8,771
Auxiliaries 24,770
Total 61,861
The Snited States Government has not recognized
the nco,po,ahon of Estonia. Latna and Lahuama
tnlo the Soviet Un,on. Other boundary ep,eseetaeon
is not eecessa,dy authoritative
Mediterranean
Ship-Days
General purpose
submarines 2,398
Surface combatants 2,697
Amphibious ships 284
Mine warfare ships 489
Research ships 750
Auxiliaries 8,991
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:ij?i?.
South China Sea
M0?t Ship-Days
4enersf purpose
Amphibious ships 492
Mine warfare ships 923
Research ship 498
4.SM
Auxiliaries
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Overseas Facilities and Anchorages Used by Soviet Naval Forces
Atlantic
8 SSBNs
12-13 general purpose submarines
2 surface combatants
1-2 mine warfare ships
10 auxiliaries
8-9 research ships
Western
Sahay!
Ad Dakhla,,-,
GunerBbew
CONAKRY{
The United Stns Gomnnernt has not ruwgno.d
the oconpernion d Estonia. Lo... and Lithue a
Otto the So.iel Union. Other boundry npreeentet.oo
s not neaeewkr euthoriutiw.
West Africa
1 general purpose submarine
1 surface combatant LUANDA
1 mine warfare ship
3 auxiliaries
1-2 research ships
1 amphibious ship
Namlbe
(MocemedSI
4. Support/ repair facility
.r., Port of call
stela
Da Nang
INnarn
G JCsm Ranh
KAmpdng $a4m+
I J",
1R?'
COLOMBO* Sr' Lanka
A
...r? Chagos
Archipelago
wCTORIA,r_ ? Diego Garcia
Seychelles Coerivy I. (fortune Ronk)
Indian Ocean
,?arydos Carajos Shoals
i -PORT LOUIS Indian Ocean
Anchorage
Airfield
Note: Tabulations show average daily deployment
of Soviet naval forces in 1984.
2 general purpose submarines
3 major surface combatants
1 mine warfare ship
12-13 auxiliaries
4-5 research ships
1-2 amphibious ships
South China Sea
4 general purpose submarines
4 surface combatants
1-2 mine warfare ships
12-13 auxiliaries
1-2 research ships
:; 1-2 amphibious ships
Vladivaatbk k Pacific
7-8 SSBN5
5 general purpose submarines
I surface combatant
1 mine warfare ship or amphibious ship
3-4 auxiliaries
5 research ships
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Distribution for:
Soviet Naval Activity Outside Home Waters During 1984
Internal Distribution
DCI
EA/DCI
DDI
D/ S OVA
DD/SOVA
EXO/SOVA
C/ES/CIB
C/SOVA/SIG
DC/SOVA/SIG
C/SOVA/SFD
C/SOVA/SF/D
C/SOVA/SF/O
C/SOVA/SPD
C/SOVA/RIG
C/SOVA/NIG
C/SOVA/DEIG
C/SOVA/RIG/EAD
C/ S OVA/ R I G/ TWAD
NIO/SP
NIO/GPF
NIO/USSR
NIC/AG
D/CPAS
OCPAS/IMD/CB (5 copies) )W~J~?57CCk~~'~~~
DDI Action Staff
DDI Senior Review Panel
OSWR/NSD
I OA/ T SD
OIA/WP/AB 25X1
OGI/ISID
OGI/ISID/CA
SF/N Chrono
SF/N, 10 copies
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External Distribution
Thomas P. Christie
Deputy Director, General Purpose
Programs,
Program Analysis and Evaluation
Department of Defense
Room: 2E330, Pentagon
Military Assistant
Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy
Room: 4E830, Pentagon
Military Assistant
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International
Security Affairs
Room: 4E808, Pentagon
Ronald S. Lauder
Dept. Asst Secretary
(European and NATO Policy)
International Security Policy
Room: 4D822, Pentagon
Military Assistant
Acting Deputy Under Secretary
for Policy
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Room: 2E812 Pentagon
Military Assistant
Director of Net Assessment
Room: 3A930, Pentagon
Executive Assistant & Naval Aide
Deputy Under Secretary of
the Navy (Policy)
Room: 4E780, Pentagon
Commodore J. M. Boorda
Executive Assistant
Chief of Naval Operations
Room: 4E674, Pentagon
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LCDR Gail Harris
NOIC Det
Naval War College
Newport, RI
VAdmiral L. Baggett, Director
Office of Naval Warfare
CNO (OP-095)
Room: 4E536, Pentagon
RAdm. John L. Butts
Director of Naval Intelligence
CNO (OP-009)
Room: 5C572, Pentagon
Richard L. Haver
Deputy Director of Naval
Intelligence
CNO (OP-009Y)
Room: 5B688, Pentagon
Capt. James Eglin
Deputy Director Foreign Intelligence
Division
CNO (OP-009Y)
Capt. Richard Rager
Strategic Concepts Development
Center
Institute for National Strategic
Studies
National Defense University
Washington, DC
Mr. Ted Neely
CNO (OP-009Y3)
Room: 5B688, Pentagon
Cdr. D. L. Herrrington
Operations Officer
Navy Operational Intelligence Center
Suitland, Md.
Capt. F. R. Killelea
Head, Naval Warfare Section
NISC (OOW)
Naval Intelligence Support Center
Suitland, Md.
Capt. Moore
Director Special Projects Division
CNO (OP-009G)
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Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Plans, Policy and Operations
CNO (OP-06)
Room: 4E592, Pentagon
Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy
Division
CNO (OP-60)
Room: 4E566, Pentagon
Capt. R. W. Barnett
Strategy, Concepts Branch
CNO (OP-603)
Room: 4E486, Pentagon
Dr. D. D. Lovelace
Strategy, Concepts Branch
CNO (OP-603)
Room: 4E486, Pentagon
Director, Politico-Military
Policy & Current Plans Division
CNO (OP-61)
Room: 4E572, Pentagon
Capt. M. B. Hughes
CNO Executive Panel
2000 N. Beaureard Street
Alexandria, Va.
Director, Program Planning Office
CNO (OP-090)
Room: 4E620, Pentagon
Asst. to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room: 2E872, Pentagon
Director, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCS
Room: 2E936, Pentagon
Robert Baraz, Director
I NR/SEE
Dept. of State
Morton S. Miller
I NR/PMA
Room 6510A - Department of State
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25X1
Asst. Chief of Staff for
Intelligence
DAMI-2A
Dept. of the Army
Pentagon 2E466
Asst. Chief of Staff for
Intelligence
(AF/IN)
Dept. of the Air Force
Room: 4A932, Pentagon
Director of Intelligence
(Marine Corps)
Rm. 3233, Arlington Annex
Arthur Begelman
Center for Naval Warfare Studies
Naval War College
Newport, R.I.
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