REGIONAL ISSUES AT THE NOVEMBER MEETING: GORBACHEV'S OPTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000608060001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 6, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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DDI/SOVA/TWA/RIG:
(6 Nov 85) 25X1
SUBJECT: Regional Issues at the November Meeting:
Gorbachev's Options
Internal Distribution
1 - DC I
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SUBJECT: Reigonal Issues at the November Meeting:
Gorbachev's Option
External Distribution
White House
1 - VADM John M. Poindexter, USN
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
1 - Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs
Room 298, The White House
National Security Council
1 - Donald R. Fortier
Special Assistant and Senior Director
Political-Military Affairs
The White House
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Deputy Director
Policy Development and Political-Military Affairs
Old Executive Office Building
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European and Soviet Affairs
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Near East and South Asian Affairs
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Latin American Affairs
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Senior Director
Asian Affairs
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SUBJECT: Regional Issues at the November Meeting:
Gorbachev's Option
National Security Council (Continued)
1 - Philip Ringdahl
Senior Director
African Affairs
Rm 375, EOB
1 - Col Tyrus Cobb
Staff Member
Rm 373, EOB
Department of State
1 - Bill Courtney
Special Assistant
Office of Under Secretary of State
Room 7240, New State
1 - Mark Parris
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Room 4217, State
1 - Lyn Pascoe
Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Room 4217, State
1 - Mark Palmer
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Bureau of European Affairs
Room 6219, State
1 - Robert Dean
Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs
Room 7327, State
1 - Morton I. Abramowitz
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 6531, State
1 - Robert H. Baraz
Director, Office of Analysis for the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, INR
Room 4758, State
1 - Paul Wolfowitz
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 6205, State
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SUBJECT: Regional Issues at the November Meeting:
Gorbachev's Option
State Department (Continued)
1 - Arnold Raphel
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs
Room 6242, State
1 - Peter Rodman, Director
Policy Planning Staff
Room 7311, State
Defense Intelligence Agency
1 - Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet Political/Military Affairs
Room 2C238, Pentagon
National Security Agency
1 - LTGEN William Odom
Director, National Security Agency
T532/CDB
Fort George G. Meade, Md
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C 20505
DIRECTORATE.OF INTELLIGENCE
6 November 1985
Regional Issues at the November Meeting: Gorbachev's Options
Summary
Moscow expects President Reagan to raise the issue of Soviet
bloc military activity in Third World Marxist-Leninist states at
his November meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, and is
preparing for this. Soviet authorities see the President's
three-stage proposal for resolving conflict in these countries,
which he presented in his address to the UN General Assembly, as
a design to shift the focus of world attention away from SDI,
undercut the Soviet global propaganda campaign keyed to "star
wars" and nuclear holocaust, and justify armed aid to
"counterrevolutionaries." The Soviet leadership throughout the
1980s has demonstrated a steady resolve to defend its gains in
the states mentioned by the President--Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua--and has viewed consolidation of
client regimes in these countries as an essential element in
expanding Soviet influence in the Third World. Gorbachev is not
deviating from this line. While the Soviets probably believe
that time is working in favor of consolidation of these regimes,
they are aware of their present weaknesses and will try to ignite
political backfires aimed at deflecting or reducing further
outside support of anti-Marxist insurgencies.
This memorandum was prepared byl 25X1
Regional Issues Group, Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments 25X1
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Regional Issues Group, SOVA 25X1
SOV M 85-10196
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At the November meeting Gorbachev will have no interest in
settling the armed conflicts in these "socialist-oriented"
countries on the terms proposed by the President. For tactical
reasons it is conceivable, although unlikely, that Gorbachev
might suggest talks--premised on entirely different terms--about
insurgencies in Afghanistan, Angola or Nicaragua. He will not--
either to promote arms control objectives or to contain the
"costs of empire'--make significant concessions to the United
States on Third World issues, although such considerations could
affect his decision on whether to take a low-key approach to the
regional conflict problem or look to score propaganda points at
this meeting. Conceivably he might seek to constrain the supply
of mobile surface-to-air missiles and other weapon systems to
insurgents fighting against Soviet clients. It is possible that
he will present "tension reduction" proposals designed to
spotlight areas of US vulnerability and capitalize on potential
longer-term opportunities the Soviets see to advance their
fortunes in the Third World.
1. President Reagan's address to the United Nations General
Assembly put Moscow firmly on notice that the United States
intends at the November meeting to pursue vigorously the question
of Soviet bloc military activity in Afghanistan, Cambodia, 25X1
Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua. This message could hardly have
come as a surprise to Soviet policymakers
Nevertheless, the Soviet press response demonstrates that the US
move was an unwelcomed development. Soviet authorities see this
step as an initiative designed to shift the focus of attention
away from SDI, undercut their global propaganda campaign keyed to
"star wars," and pave the way for further US support of anti-
Marxist insurgencies. They themselves have no interest whatever
in settling the armed conflicts in these five "Socialist-
oriented" states on the terms proposed by the President, which
they must read as an invitation to dismantle Soviet influence,
abandon clients and repudiate support for Third World radicalism
in return for more economic aid from the West.
Marxist-Leninist Clients and Soviet Third World Policy
2. Consolidation of pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist regimes in
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola and Nicaragua
is an essential element of Moscow's continuing broad-gauged
strategy for increasing its influence in the Third World and
acquiring new political and military bases from which to expand
Soviet influence further. Levels of Soviet military and economic
assistance to these regimes have fluctuated considerably over the
past five years, with economic aid clearly being squeezed by
declining growth of Soviet GNP. The constant factor has been a
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basic Soviet determination to make Marxist revolutions
irreversible in these countries. The tactical changes made in
each case--in levels of assistance and Soviet bloc military
participation--have been based principally on the client's degree
of peril and on the Kremlin's judgment of what risks the traffic
would bear.
3. Soviet military assistance in recent years to client
"Socialist-oriented" Marxist-Leninist regimes has been
substantial:
-- In Afghanistan, the USSR increased the number of its
troops by 7,500 men in 1984-85 (now about 118,000) and
has taken more forceful measures to suppress the
insurrection's growing capabilities. This has involved
improved operational planning and reconnaissance, more
direct use of Soviet ground and airpower, more aggressive
tactics, and the dispatch during 1985 of three additional
Spetznaz (Special Purposes Force) battalions (bringing
the total to seven battalions--about 4,000 men).
-- In Cambodia, the USSR has played a key role in supporting
Vietnamese occupation of the country. Soviet military
aid to Vietnam has levelled off in the past three years
to about $600 million annually. Without Moscow's
extensive economic aid (an estimated $1 billion
annually), Hanoi would have been hard pressed to maintain
the level and intensity of its pressure in Cambodia.
Despite the existence of certain frictions between the
Vietnamese and the Soviets concerning Cambodia (and
Laos), Soviet military advisors are active 25X1
in Cambodia. 25X1
Soviet artillery has been made available to Vietnamese
forces in Cambodia
The Soviets have also begun providing medium
tanks, older MIG aircraft, and small naval vessels to the
Cambodian armed forces, and have trained Cambodian Air
Force personnel.
-- In Ethiopia, of the $3 billion worth of arms provided by
the USSR since 1977, Moscow sent about $1.3 billion in
1977-1978 and another $1.3 billion in 1983-1985--
including modern MI-24/25 helicopters and jet fighters.
This aid enabled the Ethiopians to mount, for the first
time, a successful counterattack against Eritrean
insurgents and to rapidly recapture lost territory.
-- In Mozambique, the USSR since 1981 has supplied some
$70-0-800 million in military assistance. Soviet military
assistance rose considerably in 1983, including
unprecedented deliveries of military equipment by air.
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Deliveries fell off in 1984 (probably due to Moscow's
displeasure with Mozambique President Machel's signing of
the Nkomati Agreement with South Africa), but they have
increased in 1985. This year's aid has included MI-24/25
helicopters, tanks and APCs, patrol boats, artillery, and
three batteries of SA-3 surface-to-air missiles. Soviet
economic assistance has also increased in 1985.
-- In Angola, the Soviets have clearly beefed up their
military support, raising their 1983 deliveries of arms
($582 million) to $850 million in 1984
Among the more
sophisticated weapons Moscow has supplied Luanda since
1983 have been over 100 fighter aircraft, including MIG-
23s and SU-22s; more than 20 MI-24/25 helicopters;
antiaircraft systems for the creation of an integrated
air defense over a large portion of the country; and
large quantities of armor, transport, and ammunition.
-- In Nicaragua, Soviet bloc military aid deliveries in 1984
doubled over those of 1983. Also, the nature of Soviet
bloc military aid has expanded to include such equipment
as MI-24/25 assault helicopters, minesweepers, and radar-
controlled air defense guns. There was a lull during the
first three quarters of 1985 in the delivery of Soviet
weapons to Nicaragua, although deliveries of Soviet
military-associated cargoes (trucks, jeeps, and so forth)
rose sharply over that of corresponding months in 1984.
In October, however, a major Soviet weapons delivery to
Nicaragua appeared to be under way, the first
since last November. F_ I
The new weaponry probably includes more tanks,
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artillery, and air defense weapons, although it has not
yet been precisely identified.
4. Soviet actions over the past months have affirmed
Gorbachev's apparent intention to protect these client regimes.
Like his three predecessors, Gorbachev seems willing to furnish
such military support as appears necessary--at least in the
absence of great risk or significantly increased costs--to ensure
their survival. The USSR does face serious operational and
logistical problems in conducting counterinsurgency wars at great
distances and in unfamiliar situations, but these ventures are
not that costly. Soviet military assistance, while large in
absolute terms is--except for Afghanistan--at the margin of
existing Soviet force structure, stockpiles, and military
production.
5. Despite Moscow's concern over the possibility of more
forceful US initiatives in the Third World, the Soviet leadership
seems to believe that the United States and others who seek to
frustrate Soviet efforts there are hemmed in by a variety of
constraints which, over the long run, will work against sustained
effective opposition to Soviet aims. At the same time, the
Soviets probably think they will be able to profit from certain
major trends now visible in the international environment:
-- The fundamental shift in the regional "correlation of
forces" in Southeast Asia that could arise with the loss
of US bases in the Philippines--with or without a
successful communist revolution in that country.
-- The accelerating potential for serious revolutionary
activity in South Africa.
-- Growing frustration over the US role in the Middle East
peace process and a possibly growing inclination of
moderates in the region to accept more of a Soviet role.
-- North/South tensions resulting from the debt problem and
possible revolutionar upheavals, especially in Latin
America. 25X1
6. The Soviets are well aware, however, of the short run
problems of their client states: economic crisis, incomplete
systemic and leadership institutionalization, and military
vulnerability to insurgent attack. They know Washington has
provided steadily increased support for some resistance groups
and can see Washington is in the midst of a policy debate over
escalation of that assistance to other insurgent groups. The
clear reference in the President's address to support for
democratic resistance forces is probably read by the Kremlin as
an accurate indication of the administration's intent to up the
military ante in anti-Marxist insurgencies if this is politically
feasible. 25X1
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7. Under these circumstances, the Soviets almost certainly
-- Attempt to continue to provide client regimes with levels
of military assistance deemed adequate to prevent serious
insurgent challenge to client governments.
-- Seek to generate political pressures that will deflect
further outside support for insurgencies in client
states.
-- Play for time in which to strengthen political, social
and economic controls in these regimes.
Soviet opportunity.
-- Try to distract world attention from the anti-Marxist
insurgencies by focusing on areas of US vulnerability and
Runup to the November Meeting
8. Between now and 19 November Moscow will publicly attack
President Reagan's proposal, strive to impose its own terms of
reference on discussion of regional issues at the meeting, and
lay the groundwork for subsequent exploitation of whatever
positions Gorbachev advances in his talks with President
Reagan.
9. Theoretically, Moscow could consider strengthening
Gorbachev's hand in the talks by attempting to inflict a major
military or political defeat beforehand on freedom fighters in
one or more of its client states. Practically, however, time is
running out and opportunities to score such a psychological
victory are not evident--even if Moscow did decide to risk more
publicity for its involvement in counter-insurgency efforts and
to expose the steel beneath its current efforts to appear
10. The main arenas of Soviet activity, thus, are likely to
be propaganda and more finely tuned political influence
operations ("active measures"). The most authoritative reaction
to date to the President's comments on regional conflict in his
UN address has been Gorbachev's speech of 1 November at a dinner
for Ethiopian chief Mengistu. Gorbachev did not address the
President's proposals directly, but
-- Asserted that the charge of Soviet machinations in
Ethiopia and elsewhere in the Third World was an attempt
to cover up US interference in these countries, obstruct
their ties with the Soviet bloc (i.e., "hinder their free
and independent development"), distract world attention
from US encouragement of Israel and South Africa, and
avoid addressing the nuclear arms control issue.
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-- Declared that the Soviet Union would continue to support
Ethiopia.
-- Repeated the conventional Soviet propaganda appeal for
channeling funds saved from arms spending to Third World
development needs.
-- Approved the resolution of the Organization of African
Unity on turning Africa into a nuclear free zone and
announced that the USSR would be prepared to observe
Africa'a nuclear free status and serve as a guarantor of
such a zone.
Lesser Soviet spokesmen have stated that the USSR will be willing
to discuss regional conflicts at the November meeting, but have
suggested that Moscow's agenda might include US "state terrorism
and imperialist interference in the internal affairs of other
people," settlement of the Middle East conflict, and
establishment of various "zones of peace" and nuclear free
zones.
11. Moscow probably will wait to see how much positive
response the President gets before deciding whether more is
needed before the November meeting to put the United States on
the propaganda defensive. Thus far, the Soviets appear
encouraged by statements from some Western leaders and Prime
Minister Gandhi that the primary focus of the November meeting
should be arms control, not regional conflicts. If the
President's proposal does not achieve much international
resonance, the Soviets could very well decide to play it down in
their own propaganda--hoping others will ignore it or write it
off as simply a rhetorical maneuver.
Soviet Behavior at the November Meeting: Gorbachev's Options
12. During Secretary Shultz's recent trip to Moscow, the
Soviets reportedly dismissed US efforts to discuss regional
issues in order to get the talks back to arms control. Moscow
realizes that, whatever it might wish, it cannot prevent the
United States from raising the issue of regional conflict for
discussion at the November meeting. Gorbachev's choices revolve
around (a) acceptance or not of any "linkage" between Soviet
behavior in the Third World and achievement of Soviet objectives
in the bilateral US/USSR relationship, including arms control
agreements; (b) whether there is anything at all to be gained
from even discussing the possibility of negotiations over
insurgencies in one or more of the five Soviet client states
mentioned in the President's address; (c) how actively to engage
the President in talking about regional conflict; and (d)--
looking beyond the meeting--what the best way is to turn the
regional conflict theme against the United States.
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Linkage with the US/USSR Bilateral Relationship and Arms
Talks
13. There are no compelling reasons from Moscow's
standpoint to give up gains already achieved in the "socialist-
oriented" countries or elsewhere in the Third World out of hopes
of enticing Washington to agree to more favorable terms in arms
negotiations. Soviet America watchers would hardly feel
confident enough to offer their leadership assurances about what
such concessions might gain from Washington, and Gorbachev would
probably not be able politically to "give away the farm"--even if
he wanted to, which he does not. The Soviet leadership does
recognize as a practical matter, however, that there is a
connection between flagrant Soviet support of "national
liberation" activities in the Third World and Congressional
treatment of arms control issues. For this reason it may well
continue to exercise tactical caution in its support of, or
conduct of, counterinsurgency efforts in its client states; and
it may choose at the November meeting to argue that it has been
acting prudently with respect, for example, to "provocations"
along the Pakistan border or to military supply of Nicaragua. If
reminded of linkage at the November meeting by the United States
and pressed for a commitment to future responsible behavior, the
Soviets will probably restate their general principle of support
for revolutionary movements. But conceivably they might decide
that calculated ambiguity or assertions that "revolution cannot
be exported" could be perceived in this context by the United
States as tacit consent to restrain specific possible future
actions--for example, military supply of guerrillas in South
Africa or the New Peoples' Army in the Philippines.
Deflecting the Issue?
14. In previous exchanges with Western leaders Gorbachev
has dealt with their attempts to raise Third World issues by
merely listening and quietly reiterating Soviet positions. He
might do the same with the President at the November meeting.
Alternatively, he could reaffirm agreement that the two
countries' foreign ministers continue and institutionalize the
dialogue begun this year on regional issues. The objective would
be to terminate the discussion as quickly as possible and get
back to arms control. Such a strategy would help muffle the
regional conflict theme, display Soviet "statesmanship," and
minimize potential tensions that might arise between the USSR and
client regimes if serious talks were initiated with the United
States. However, the strategy would not provide much of a
platform for post-meeting propaganda and active measures campaigns,
and would leave the initiative with Washington. 25X1
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15. Taking a more activist stance, Moscow might use the
discussion of regional issues at the meeting to score propaganda
points against the United States while attempting to manipulate
American unease with appearing to act hypocritically or not
"even-handedly." Picking up themes already in Soviet propaganda,
Gorbachev could try to put the President off balance by directly
accusing him of instigating "state terrorism" against regimes
friendly to the USSR, of preparing to crank up aid to the South
African "puppet" Savimbi, of supporting South African racism and
aggression against its neighbors, of working with Israel against
Arab interests, of backing military dictatorships in Chile and
elsewhere in Latin America, or of exacerbating Third World
tensions by deploying nuclear-armed vessels throughout the
world. Such an approach might win kudos for Gorbachev among
conservative elements in the Soviet elite, but would risk
generating unwanted controversy over Soviet bloc military
activities in the Third World and might be seen by Soviet
strategists as likely to spoil an atmosphere at the meeting
otherwise more conducive to American concessions on arms control
questions.
Recasting the Entire Debate
16. An obvious option open to Gorbachev is to try to put
the US in a "no win" position by presenting "constructive"
"tension-reduction" proposals that are not transparently self-
serving, but acceptance of which would constrain US military
power projection capabilities, weaken US political influence, and
enhance the Soviet presence in the Third World. If Washington
decided to accept the proposed negotiating agenda, so much the
better from the Kremlin's standpoint. But Moscow's main aim
would be to position itself to (a) link US rejection of the
proposals with US "bellicosity" in "star wars" and use this
indictment to fan anti-Americanism in Western Europe and the
Third World, and (b) to advance political initiatives in the
Third World calculated to exploit US vulnerabilities.
17. The statement issued by a meeting of leaders of the
Warsaw Pact in late October, together with Gorbachev's response
to a letter from the Club of Rome on the international arms trade
and his 1 November speech, probably provide some clues about the
items that would be included in such a set of "tension-reduction"
proposals. We might see calls for:
-- A "code of conduct" for the Third World based on "respect
for national independence and sovereignty, nonuse of
force or the threat of force, inviolability of borders,
territorial integrity, peaceful solution of disputes,"
etc.
-- Resumption of the conventional arms transfer talks.
9
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-- An international effort to effect dismantlement of
foreign military bases and a withdrawal of forces from
foreign territories.
-- The convening under UN auspices of an international
conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute.
-- An invitation to the US to join with the USSR in
promoting an Asian Collective Security pact.
-- Recognition of "zones of peace" and nuclear free zones in
the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Africa, Indian Ocean and
South Pacific.
-- Approval of principles of North/South trade that paid lip
service to the Third World's "New International Economic
Order" initiative.
-- Negotiations under UN auspices dealing with the Third
World debt problem.
-- Approval of a global program for sharing high
technology.
We rate the chances of the Soviets presenting some set of
"tension-reduction" proposals at the November meeting about
fifty-fifty. Whatever the particular mix of proposals may be,
the package would be designed not only to deflect attention from
President Reagan's regional conflict agenda, but actively to
advance longer-term strategems of capitalizing on the perceived
opportunities noted just above.
Negotiating One or More Conflicts Mentioned by the
President
18. From Moscow's perspective, the President's proposal
implies actions which are either in fundamental opposition to
Soviet interests, or are unlikely to succeed:
-- Promotion of negotiations between client Marxist regimes
and insurgents. The Soviets have tried but apparently
failed to achieve negotiations in Ethiopia; they are
probably uninterested in either having such talks or
pressuring Cuba to engineer them in Angola and Nicaragua;
and they are probably skeptical about the prospects of
achieving serious talks with the Mujahedeen in
Afghanistan, or between the two opposed Cambodian
factions even if they wanted to pursue such a tack.
-- Democratization of these five states. This path would
involve a complete reversal of efforts by the Soviets and
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their bloc partners to build single-party Marxist-
Leninist systems of rule.
-- Withdrawal of bloc military support of clients, with
verification. Pursuit of such a move would lead to
co apse of client regimes in at least Afghanistan and
Angola, serious loss of influence with Vietnam, probably
loss of presence in Ethiopia, and major conflict with
Cuba.
-- Expanded trade and aid relations between client regimes
and Western partners. While the Soviets accept a certain
amount of such intercourse as unavoidable and even
desirable, their long-term objective is precisely to
reduce the structural economic dependence of their
clients on the West and strengthen integration of those
countries in the Soviet bloc.
19. Perhaps the only positive aspects of the President's
proposal from Moscow's standpoint are its implicit acceptance of
the USSR's role in the Third World as a superpower and potential
co-guarantor with the United States of agreements, and acceptance
by Washington of non-intervention principles that might constrain
future US actions. Conceivably those pluses, supplementing more
concrete cost/benefit calculations (including the benefits to be
gained from simply being seen to be engaged in a negotiating
process with Washington), might lead Gorbachev to explore talks
about some of the insurgencies mentioned by the President. It is
difficult to imagine why Moscow would broach the subject of
Ethiopia or Cambodia, but scenarios involving the three other
countries are not totally implausible:
-- Afghanistan. The objective here would be to draw or
create the illusion of drawing the United States into
discussion of "guarantees" before the initiation of talks
between the Karmal regime and the Mujahedeen, with the
aim of eroding Pakistan's confidence in US staying power
and Pakistani resistance to direct talks with the
Afghans, and creating doubts among the Mujahedeen about
the continuation of external support.
Angola. The Soviets might restate their theoretical
acceptance of at least partial Cuban evacuation from
Angola in return for withdrawal of South African support
for UNITA, combined with implementation of UN 435
guaranteeing free elections in Namibia supervised by the
UN. The gain would be a probable SWAPO victory in
Namibia; but the Soviets probably would doubt that the US
could deliver the South Africans, and they would feel
that the MPLA could not handle UNITA one-on-one even
though they might be more heartened by FAPLA's
performance in this year's offensive.
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-- Nicaragua/El Salvador. Any Soviet counter-proposal here
would be conditioned by the need for gaining Cuban and
Sandinista collaboration, which could well prove an
insuperable obstacle. No doubt the Soviets would be
prepared to trade withdrawal of Western support for the
Afghan freedom fighters for Soviet withdrawal of support
from the insurgency in El Salvador; but it is difficult
to conceive how they would visualize such a deal being
consummated. The Soviets might see hints of it, however,
as a useful active measures tactic aimed at undercutting
Pakistani resolve. Similarly, while they would see
consolidation of Sandinista power in Nicaragua as far
more important than legitimation of limited participation
of the FMLN in electoral politics in El Salvador, they
might see hints of talks between Moscow and Washington
about reciprocal incorporation of insurgents into the
political process of both countries as a means of sowing
doubt in Central America about the US commitment to El
Salvador, and encouraging Congressional opposition to
further US support for the contras.
20. The level of sophistication and destructiveness of
weapon systems introduced into Third World conflicts is a
question which Soviet policymakers inevitably must address. As
we suggest below, it is conceivable they might see some utility
in broaching this issue on a global level in the context of a
proposal to renew the conventional arms transfer talks. But they
also might see an advantage in raising the question on a regional
basis. As a backer of counterinsurgency warfare in the five
countries mentioned by the President, the Soviets now have an
obvious interest in reducing the flow to insurgents of anti-armor
weaponry and--especially--mobile surface-to-air missiles and
heavy machineguns capable of downing helicopters and fixed-wing
aircraft. The problem from the Soviet standpoint would be to
find something to trade--openly or tacitly--for restraint on the
part of their opponents. It is conceivable that Soviet policy
planners might entertain the possibility of offering to trade
continued restraint in the bloc's supply of such weapons to
guerrillas in El Salvador for future restraint in weapons
available to the contras in Nicaragua. Less plausible would be a
Soviet attempt to gain US agreement to seek restraint in the
types of weapons that might get to insurgents in Afghanistan or
perhaps even in Angola by means of an offer of Bloc restraint,
for example, in overall military delivers to Nicaragua or of
Soviet restraint in "active pursuit" along the Pakistan border.
It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would initiate discussion
of US restraint anywhere in return for an understanding, however
vague, about possible future Soviet non-supply of arms to South
African dissidents or Communist insurgents in the Philippines.
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