SOVIET POLICY ON JEWISH EMIGRATION--A CHANGE IN THE OFFING?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000608110001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 15, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central IntdI nce Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 November 1985
tit
Soviet Policy on Jewish Emigration--
A Change in the Offing?
In the run-up to the US-Soviet meeting in
Geneva, the Soviet regime has been taking a two-
track approach on Jewish emigration and other human
rights issues. In public and diplomatic channels
the regime has attempted to warn the US away from
the issue altogether.
Gorbachev has sharply criticized US human
rights performance, insisting the USSR has
nothing to be ashamed about on the issue and
publicly claiming that Jews have more rights in
the USSR than anywhere. He is said to be
compiling a list of alleged US violations to be
used at Geneva.
Soviet interlocutors have passed the word that
Gorbachev does not want to discuss Jewish
emigration in Geneva, while Soviet diplomats
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Soviet
Analysis. Comments and questions may be directed to the
Chief, Domestic Policy Division
SOYA M 85-10201X
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have been instructed to indicate to their Western
contacts that a US approach on human rights is futile and
a waste of time.
On the other hand the regime has used back channel
mess n
to hint that a policy shift on migration is being
considered by Gorbachev and that he will make other gestures
on human rights to create a better atmosphere in Geneva.
The regime took the unusual step in late January to begin
a dialogue on the migration issue with officials of the
World Jewish Congress and, indirectly, the Peres
rernment in Israel.[----
Gorbachev ^ig t be
willing to allow freer Jewish emigration and possibly the
start of direct migration flights to Israel.
Yelena Bonner, a Jewish dissident and wife of Andrey
Sakharov, evidently will be allowed abroad for medical
treatment and a Soviet told the US Embassy in Moscow that
dissident refuseniks Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Ida Nudel and
'others' will be freed as a 'humanitarian gesture' by
Gorbachev.
These officially inspired hints of a forthcoming change have
achieved at least some short term gain for the Soviet regime.
The promise of concessions itself has bought gestures of
goodwill from the World Jewish Congress--toning down
criticism of the Soviets--and the Peres government is
interested in the suggestion the USSR could participate
in an international forum on the Arab-Israeli question.
Dangling the prospect of direct and higher migration and
hinting at other moves on human rights helps Moscow's
argument that human rights should be excluded from the
Geneva discussions.
Public diplomacy aside, Gorbachev probably calculates
that there are gains in allowing direct flights of greater
numbers of Soviet Jews to Israel. Given the recent low levels
of Jewish migration--about a thousand a year since 1980--he
can agree to a substantial increase without coming close to
the high migration rates of the mid-to-late 1970s.
Direct Soviet Jewish migration to Israel might even-be
seen as a way to drive a wedge between US and Israeli
perspectives on migration and other issues.
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Higher Jewish emigration holds the possibility that
Jewish support for restrictions on US-Soviet trade--e.g.,
Jackson-Vanik--will be eroded and that Jewish lobbying on
behalf of Soviet Jews will decrease.
The regime may calculate that allowing for greater
migration and some concessions on other human rights
issues will preempt international critics and make it
easier to move on dissidents in the future.
So far, there have been no concrete, overt steps
undertaken by Gorbachev to alter Soviet emigration policy.
The reason likely is tied to their uncertainty about US-Soviet
relations and the impact of such moves on Soviet-Arab
relations. Moscow aliost certainly understands that there
would be strong Arab protests--as there were in the late
1970s--against increased Jewish migration to Israel.
Gorbachev, moreover, rejects direct US efforts to pressure him
on this issue, and may believe that US interest on migration
gives him some potential leverage. He probably does not yet
know.whether playing this card will be worth the effort. He
undoubtedly assumes the issue will come up in his meeting with
the President, and is
preparing to counter attack aggressively. At the same time,
however, he is likely to use the occasion to assess what long
term gains can be realized by showing more flexibility.
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Background
The Soviet regime's decisions on emigration have typically been governed
by policy considerations of the moment--both foreign and domestic. In the
early 1970s, for example, the regime determined that freer emigration would
give impetus to a broad array of political and economic issues with the United
States--such as the SALT I agreement and the commitment to increase bilateral
trade.
Despite recognizing the linkage of emigration to these issues, however,
the Soviets were not willing to accept US efforts publicly to tie the two.
They quickly denounced the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments to the US
Trade Act, which required a .high level of Jewish emigration as a condition for
extending most-favored-nation treatment and gaining credits, as unacceptable
interference in the USSR's internal affairs. To make the point, the number of
Israeli exit visas was quickly cut; by 1975 emigration was only about one-
third of that in 1973. In the late 1970s, however, despite stepped up
harrassment, arrests, and trials of prominent Jewish dissidents such as
Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, the regime allowed the rate of Jewish emigration to
rise dramatically. By 1979 it had reached an alltime high of 50,460 visas
issued. Moscow may have thought freer emigration would help conclude a SALT
II agreement and be particularly beneficial in the ratification process. The
Soviet were also pushing for increased trade with the United States, and
? easing emigration may have been intended to forestall problems with US
policymakers who had earlier linked trade and emigration. It is also possible
that the regime saw this as a way to clear out some of its perceived trouble-
makers while getting credit for it abroad. 25X1
By 1980 Moscow's calculations had evidently changed. The Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, the US refusal to ratify SALT II, the Olympic boycott and the
suspension of cultural and scientific exchanges led to a sharp deterioration
in relations. With nothing to gain from using emigration as an inducement,
emigration plummeted for Jews, Armenians and Germans. According to US
Government and United Nations statistics, the 1980 high of 6,109 Armenians
receiving exit permission was reduced to 88 by 1984. German emigration fell
from 6,947 visas issued in 1979 to only 910 in 1984. Jewish emigration
dropped from over 50,000 in 1979 to 896 in 1984. 25X1
In 1982 Soviet emigration officials began telling applicants that "Jewish
emigration from the Soviet Union has come to an end." In 1983, apparently to
publicize this decision, the authorities established the Anti-Zionist
Committee of the Soviet Public. Soviet officials also began implying to
foreign governments that emigration had ended, even as a "gesture." In April
1983, 25X1
increase in Jewish emigration was unlike because past Soviet experience with
such gestures had been unsatisfactory. 25X1
Counterattack under Gorbachev
With the accession of Gorbachev, the regime went on the offensive.
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The
massy in Moscow also reported in September that the number of items on
Soviet television or in the press on alleged US human rights violations was on
Strident criticism of US human rights performance was accom anted b a
prickly response to cases raised by the US and its allies
Gorbachev has personally taken the offensive on the issue of Soviet human
rights and emigration policies. During a meeting with a visiting US
Congressional delegation in September 1985, he sharply criticized the US
failure to ratify various international human rights conventions, and later
that month told French television that the USSR has nothing to be ashamed of
on human rights. He even raised the issue of Shcharanskiy--which he denied
was a human rights issue--and said that he would be glad to hear of Jews
enjoying anywhere such political and other rights as they have in the USSR.
Warns US Away From Issue
Behind the bluster there have been heavy handed warnings that Gorbachev
and his lieutenants wanted to avoid the issue altogether in discussions with
the US.
In July, for example, Arbatov told that Gorbachev
does not want to discuss the matter of ewis emigration at the meeting
in November.
At the same time a Soviet diplomat in the US commented that the Soviets
hoped that then newly appointed Foreign Minister Shevardnadze would not
encounter polemics on human rights violations in discussions with the US
Secretary of State.
In September, a senior official of the party Central Committee, in the
US on a pre-Geneva fact finding mission, warned that the
issue of Soviet Jewish emigration could hamper a successful outcome to
the meeting.
In mid-October, a knowledgeable Soviet diplomat suggested Gorbachev
would be unyielding on this issue, and said that if the US insists on
raising the human rights issue at the Geneva talks or at any future
meeting, Gorbachev will use his own comprehensive file on alleged human
rights violations in the US to counter the charges.
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Hints of Flexibility
While continuin to project a public and diplomatic hardline on human
rights, the regime began in early 1985 to
signal the possibility of a change in emigration policy. It took the unusual
step in late January of inviting the head of the World Jewish Congress to
Moscow to discuss the issue. At about the same time, the State Bank chairman
told a US official that if bilateral relations improve, emigration "would not
be a great problem." It has also played on the interest of some in, the
Israeli government who are anxious to work out an arrangement that would not
only provide for freer Soviet Jewish emigration but would direct the
emigration to Israel.
Dialogue with the WJC. discussions in Moscow between Soviet
officials, and--with Israel's blessings--the World Jewish Congress seemed to
progress through mid-July 1985.
World Jewish Congress officials returned to Moscow in September to resume
the dialogue, even though the Soviets had not fulfilled the promises the WJC
had ex ected.
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Despite the assurances, the Soviets have not yet taken any concrete steps
to increase emigration. The regime has limited itself to easing restrictions
on the Sakharovs. Sakharov and Bonner were allowed to call relatives in the
United States and Bonner evidently will be allowed to go abroad for medical
treatment.
Shcharanskiy and other refuseniks may be freed soon.
Israeli Interest. The Soviets have been able to engage Israeli support
by playing on Israe s--and its intermediaries--concern about Soviet Jewish
emigration and the parallel concern that Israel be the destination of any new
emi ration.
Israel's Minister of
Immigrant Absorption, Yaacov Tsur, has also articulated to US officials the
Israeli interest in eliminating Soviet Jewish emigration to the US, pointing
out that Jews lose US refugee status and cannot later go to the US if they
Nonetheless, it is still an open question whether behind the atmospherics
there is real progress on the issue of Jewish emigration to Israel. Indeed,
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials and the public lobbies in Israel
for Soviet Jewry are skeptical that the Soviets are prepared to be flexible on
Jewish emigration. Last month, MFA officials responsible for Soviet affairs
told US officials that they see no evidence to support hopes that there might
be a significant increase in Soviet Jewish emigration. Apparently aware of
MFA views, the Soviet regime has been dealing directly with the Prime
Related Moves to Project Flexibility
In the past week or so the Soviets have been dropping even more
tantalizing hints that they are willing to resolve some of the more
contentious human rights cases--many of which involve Soviet Jews. One
example is the story that Yelena Bonner has been given permission to go abroad
for medical treatment.
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Prospects
Gorbachev probably sees some advantage in allowing direct emigration of
greater numbers of Soviet Jews. Indeed, the recent levels of Soviet Jewish
emigration are so low--about a thousand a year since 1980--that even a
substantial increase would pale in comparison to the massive emigration of the
t n7
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Direct Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel might even be seen as a way to
drive a wedge between different US and Israeli perspectives on
emigration.
Gorbachev can also defuse the issue of emigration as a bilateral
irritant by dealing with third partners.
At home, he can defuse the refusenik issue by holding out the promise of
higher emigration in return for conformity while getting rid of others
unwilling to conform. The regime has effectively used emigration in the
past to divide and decapitate the dissident movement.
The regime might also calculate that greater emigration and some
concessions on other human rights issues would disarm its international
critics and allow Moscow, if necessary, to move more freely in the
future.
So far, however, the Soviets have not yet moved ahead on anything more
than symbolic gestures. Concern about the impact of such moves on Soviet-Arab
relations is probably a factor. Moscow certainly understands that there would
be strong protests against increased Jewish emigration to Israel from its Arab
allies. Previous Soviet emigration policy suggest that, nonetheless, this is
not an overriding concern. Gorbachev's uncertainty about the future of US-
Soviet relations is probably a further reason. While he rejects direct US
efforts to pressure him on this issue, Gorbachev may believe that US interest
on emigration gives him some potential leverage. He undoubtedly assumes the
issue will come up in his meeting with the President, and
is preparing to counterattack aggressively. He will
also, however, likely use the occasion to assess what long term gains can be
realized by showing more flexibility.
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1. Ambassador,Matlock, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs
Room jfj,Sg8grity Council
2. Leo Moser
Deputy Assistant Secretary
bureau of human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
Room 7802
Department of State.
3. Mr. Mark Palmer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Bureau of European Affairs
Room 6219
Department of State
4. Mr. Robert Baraz
Director, Office of Analysis for the
Soviet Union and Western Europe
INR
Department of State
5. James Morrison
Director, OASD/ISP/EUR/NATO Regional Policy
Room 1D469, Pentagon
6. Roland Kuchel
Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs
Room 5220
Department of State
7. Mark Parris
Director, Uffice of Soviet Union Affairs
Room 4217
Department of State
8. Lynn Pascoe
Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Room 4217
Department of State
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9. Col. Tyrus Cobb
Staff Member NSC
Room 373, EOB
10. Don Graves
INR/SEE/USSR
Room 4844, Department of State
11. John Danylyk
Chief, INR/EC/USSR
Department of State
Room 8662, New State
12. Bill Courtney
Special Assistant, Office of
Under Secretary of State
Room 7240, New State
13. Robert Ashdown
Room 5923
Department of State
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