NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 8 JANUARY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010204-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 204
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Top Secret
Top Secret
281
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
8 January 1983
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Top Secret
El Salvador: Military Commander Revolts . . . . . . . . . 2
UK-US: Liberal Party Leader's Visit . . . . . . . . . . . 4
South Africa: More Pressure on Neighbors
Warsaw Pact: Defense Ministers' Meeting . . . . . . . . . 8
Guatemala: Rios Montt's Prospects Improving . . . . . . . 9
8 January 1983
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EL SALVADOR: Military Commander Revolts
The rebellion of an important field commander has caased die:-
sions in the armed forces and has increased tensions between hetens~
!'1inistcr Garcia and Assembly President D'Aubuisson.
Lt. Col. Sigifredo Ochoa, who commands more than
1,000 troops in Cabanas Department in northern El Salvador,
has declared himself in rebellion against Garcia.
Comment: Ochoa is widely respected for his tactical
ability and decisive leadership, and his revolt is the
most serious challenge to Garcia's power in three years.
Discontent with the Defense Minister's handling of the
counterinsurgency has grown in recent months, particularly
among junior officers, and he faces increased military and
political pressure to step down. Nonetheless, his posi-
tion of relative strength may enable him to weather this
challenge peacefully.
Ochoa's surrender would enhance Garcia's position
with D'Aubuisson and the ultraright. The Defense
Minister probably will be forced, however, to accept a
compromise solution.
8 January 1983
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UK-US: Liberal Party Leader's Visit
Liberal Party leader David Steel, who arrives in Washincjtorn
on Sunday, is trying to recapture attention for the faltering
Social Democratic -,Liberal Alliance and to strengthen his own
~~olitical standing.
Comment: Steel probably considers the visit as
helping to pave the way for the planned public relations
drive to revitalize the Alliance later this month. Steel
is a supporter of close alignment with the Social Demo-
crats and would probably accept their leader, Roy Jenkins,
as the Alliance's prime minister - designate. The polls,
however, show him to be the more popular politician and
show Liberal strength holding up better than that of the
Social Democrats.
Despite the Alliance's recent drop in the polls, it
still might capture enough support to hold the balance
in Parliament after the next election. With this in mind,
Steel probably hopes to help Jenkins appear to be the
leader of the Alliance while putting himself in a position
to determine the outcome of any postelection bargaining.
Steel, like his Social Democratic colleagues, supports
INF and is sympathetic to a British national nuclear pro-
gram, although he opposes Trident. For the past two years,
however, the Liberal Party's annual conference has voted
to reject INF and to phase out existing submarine-launched
ballistic missiles. Steel is not bound by the conference
decisions, but he is concerned about growing unilateralist
sentiment.
In an effort to stake out a distinct political posi-
tion for the Alliance, Steel is likely to support movement
away from the zero option on INF and may endorse including
British systems in arms control negotiations. He also may
support a nuclear freeze, although some Social Democrats
would find this unpalatable.
Steel is likely to urge a "dual key" arrangement that
puts US nuclear weapons based in the UK under the control
of both London and Washington. He appears to believe that
Prime Minister Thatcher's government is vulnerable on this
increasingly prominent issue and that emphasis on the
question could help fend off opponents of INF.
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8 January 1983
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Z a m bl / i a
LUSAKA(
`*HARARE
LILONGWE
lawi
Mozambique
z
babwe
Beira
Makgadikgadi
;Pans)
Botswana
South Africa
PRETORIA!
Swaiiland-
1 (*\MBABA*
Magude Macia
ti Moamba
*MAPUTO
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SOUTH AFRICA: More Pressure on Neighbors
:~outh Africa is attempting to extract political concessions
:'corn Zimbabwe in return for alleviating its fuel crisis, and .~ouGh
African - backed Mozambican insurgents are expanding their opera-
tzons near Maputo.
The pipeline, which was about to reopen, was damaged
again this week in an attack by the South African - backed
National Resistance Movement in Mozambique. Meanwhile,
the insurgents have recently stepped up their operations
in the southernmost part of Mozambique near Maputo. They
have mined roads and attacked several towns--including
one that is only 40 kilometers from the capital--and there
is evidence that at least some of these attacks are being
staged directly from South Africa.
Comment: Mugabe will find it difficult to restrain
hardliners from provocative statements that could further
stiffen South African resistance to direct fuel sales.
One minister violated the directive early this week by
voicing widely held suspicions of South African involve-
ment in dissident activity in southwestern Zimbabwe.
While refusing to sell fuel, Pretoria and the Mozambican
insurgents thus far have not obstructed shipments that
pass through South Africa on a rail line from Maputo.
Some of the increased insurgent activity near Maputo
and the attack on the pipeline have occurred since mid-
December, when the Mozambicans met with the South Africans
in an effort to reduce bilateral tensions. This activity
suggests that Pretoria is unable or unwilling to rein in
the rebels. Although Maputo is not immediately threatened,
further rebel advances toward the capital would put addi-
tional pressure on President Machel to seek Cuban combat
assistance.
8 January 1983
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WARSAW PACT: Defense Ministers' Meeting
TASS has announced that the annual Warsaw Pact De-
fense ministers' meeting will be held in Prague within
the next few days, apparently between Tuesday and Thurs-
day.
Comment: As in the past, the conferees probably
will be preoccupied with increasing defense budgets to
overcome sluggish military modernization in Warsaw Pact
countries other than the USSR, as well as with other
contentious issues. East European representatives,
particularly the Romanians, Hungarians, and Poles, prob-
ably would resist substantial increases. The meeting
is likely to issue a communique reiterating much of the
language on disarmament that emerged from the Political
Consultative Committee meeting this week. It may also
issue a warning of the Pact's determination to defend
itself and condemn Western arms buildups, including the
proposed fielding of the Pershing II in Europe later
this year.
8 January 1983
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Special Analysis
GUATEMALA: Rios Montt's Prospects Improving
President Rios Montt has stemmed the erosion of his support
within the military and the business community, and recent counteer-
insurgency successes have strengthened his prospects for survivinoa
at least over the short term. His improved situation has enabled
him to announce some new political reforms. Rios Montt's future,
however, is still jeopardized by the continuing deterioration of thy,
The armed forces are becoming increasingly persuaded
that Rios Montt's successful counterinsurgency campaign,
his new civic action programs, and his anticorruption
drive are winning popular support for the government.
most officers now
support the President, although some of this may depend
on the Army's ability to sustain its success against
possible renewed guerrilla attacks later this year.
A new test may come, however, when Rios Montt attempts
to retire 136 colonels to make more headroom for promotion
in the officer corps. The move will clear away some who
were closely associated with the prior government, but
it may revive coup plotting in the military.
Rios Montt appears to have enough support in the
military to preclude a successful coup any time soon.
Although recent success against the insurgents is the
major reason for this support, the doubling of the share
of the budget allotted to defense has further strengthened
the President's position. The ongoing program of the
military to produce munitions in Guatemala and the suc-
cessful testing of a domestically produced armored
personnel carrier have also improved morale.
With his position more secure, Rios Montt has under-
taken to broaden political participation and eventually
return Guatemala to constitutional rule. He has announced
his intention to hold constituent assembly elections in
early 1984 and to convene the assembly two months later.
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To prepare for the elections, Rios Montt reportedly
plans to announce new electoral laws on 23 March--the
first anniversary of the coup that brought him to power.
The laws will set new--and probably easier--guidelines
for organizing political parties and restoring an elected
government. They are likely to make voting procedures
Rios Montt may use the same occasion to end the
state of siege imposed last July and permit political
activity by parties, unions, and other arouos_
Rios Montt is personally reluctant to call for
presidential elections within two years. He complains
that the existing parties do not represent Guatemalan
society, and he wants to delay elections until new groups
can effectively contest them. He probably hopes the new
election law will result in an abundance of parties that
will drain support from the major existing ones.
The President dare not move too rapidly on political
initiatives, because there is little enthusiasm in the
armed forces for electing a civilian government while
serious insurgent activity and economic problems persist.
A recent opinion poll echoed the military's view by show-
ing that jobs and security, not elections, are the major
concerns of the population.
Economic Problems Deepening
The economy remains Rios Montt's biggest problem.
Economic activity is likely to decline further by at
least 3 percent this year.
The insurgency and world recession have resulted in
substantial losses of commercial credit, tourist busi-
ness, and private investment. Foreign exchange reserves
are virtually exhausted, and the government was forced
to impose import quotas last month.
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Rios Montt reportedly wants to move quickly to re-
quest an IMF standby agreement, which would help ease
balance-of-payments problems and could encourage lending
from other governments and organizations. The replacement
last month of the President of the Central Bank, who had
opposed an IMF agreement, will facilitate this move.
The business community still shows some concern
about Rios Montt's evangelical religious fervor, his
lack of success in dealing with the economy, and his
occasional criticisms of the private sector. His sup-
port from business and the working class will be in
serious trouble if he does not establish a coherent eco-
nomic policy soon and make some progress toward recovery.
Substantial foreign economic assistance would help
sustain Rios Montt's civic action programs. The Presi-
dent will need to uphold his promise of development
assistance to the impoverished Indians or forfeit their
growing support. Foreign economic or military assistance
also would boost his stature with the military, but grow-
ing nationalism and a "go it alone" attitude in the ranks
indicate that he would not risk his tenure immediately
if he failed to obtain such aid.
8 January 1983
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