NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 4 JANUARY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010220-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 220
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Contents
USSR: Propaganda on Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
West Germany - US: Visit of Opposition Leader . . . . . . 3
Yugoslavia-USSR: New Strains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Special Analysis
Angola - South Africa - Namibia: Signs of Progress
4 January 1983
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USSR: Propaganda on Arms Control
The Soviet Leadership is intensifying its efforts to influcncc
public opinion in the West before the resumption of START and INF
negotiations Later this month.
The commentary published in Pravda on Sunday criti-
cizes US "stubbornness" in rejecting the Soviet "compre-
hensive" approach linking medium-range and intercontinental
missiles in arms control negotiations. It reiterates
General Secretary Andropov's call, which was made in a
written interview last week, for an expression of US
good will in response to recent Soviet proposals at
Geneva.
The commentary alleges the US is stalling at the
talks in the hope of maintaining an impasse that would
allow "rearming" Western Europe with medium-range
missiles. It repeats earlier Soviet vows to prevent
the US from achieving unilateral military advantages.
Comment: Moscow's decision to make its disarmament
proposals public suggests it sees this as a critical
time in its campaign to influence the public debate over
arms control issues, particularly in Western Europe.
The Soviet leadership reacted strongly when the French
and British rebuffed Andropov's offer to reduce the
Soviet medium-range arsenal in Europe to 162 missiles,
implying a cutback to the force levels in France and
the UK.
The latest propaganda attack probably was also
timed to set the scene for the Warsaw Pact Political
Consultative Committee meeting that begins today in
Prague. Andropov is likely to use this occasion to
emphasize the main themes of the Pravda commentary.
Foreign Minister Gromyko probably will give them fur_
play when he visits Bonn the middle of this month.
4 January 1983
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WEST GERMANY - US: Visit of Opposition Leader
Social Democratic Party leader Vogel begins a three-days visit
to the US tomorrow to help strengthen his international credentilo
before the federal election slated for this March.
Last month the opposition party leader traveled to
East Germany and visited both Italian and Vatican of-
ficials in Rome. Later this month he will visit Moscow
and hopes to confer with government leaders in Paris.
Vogel, who enjoys support from all factions of the
Social Democratic Party, was named chancellor-candidate
after Helmut Schmidt declined to run again last October.
Both Schmidt and party chairman Brandt endorse him. He
served as Minister of Justice under Schmidt from 1974 to
January 1981, when he became leader of the troubled
party organization in West Berlin, a former party strong-
hold.
Comment: Having concentrated almost entirely on
domestic affairs, Vogel needs to appear more at home
with foreign leaders and international issues to develop
his standings as a candidate for chancellor. He presum-
ably planned his travels to the US and the USSR to demon-
strate a balanced approach toward the two superpowers.
The visit to Washington nevertheless is probably intended
to reassure West German voters the Social Democratic Party
is on good terms with US leaders.
The polls currently give Vogel little chance of
becoming chancellor in March. Although the Social Demo-
crats have fared better than expected in state elections
since the change in government last October, they are
likely to fall well short of an absolute majority.
Providing the current government fails to win an
absolute majority, Vogel conceivably could obtain the
chancellorship with support of the Greens--if they win
representation in the Bundestag--but close cooperation
with the environmentalists is unlikely. Although Vogel
cooperated with a similar group to a limited extent when
he was mayor of West Berlin, he almost certainly recog-
nizes the danger this poses to Social Democratic unity
at the national level.
4 January 199-3
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YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: New Strains
Top Secret
Deepening differences in foreign trade priorities and Yugo-
slav suspicions about General Secretary Andropov's recent overtures
to Albania have increased tensions in Soviet-Yugoslav relations.
Soviet officials in Belgrade recently described
the annual trade negotiations as "difficult" and "rough,"
and said they broke off without results on 24 December.
They say the Yugoslavs refused the Soviet proposal to
reduce bilateral trade by about 10 percent but insisted
Moscow buy $850 million worth of Yugoslav consumer goods
the Soviets do not want.
Soviet diplomats say the talks will resume this
month, and they suggested the USSR would make conces-
sions. One official recently implied, however, that
the USSR will take advantage of Yugoslavia's need for
crude oil and natural gas. Yugoslav officials blame
Moscow for the difficulties and charge it is trying to
develop leverage over their economy.
The Yugoslav press has attacked Andropov's recent
offer of better relations with Albania, prompting a
formal Soviet protest. Yugoslav Presidium member Vidic,
in a speech to a Belgrade party meeting in early Decem-
ber, warned that any Soviet meddling in Albanian-Yugoslav
relations would be seen as a threat to Yugoslavia's vital
interests.
Comment: Since last April, the Soviets have been
demanding better quality goods from Yugoslavia than
Belgrade is willing to supply because it needs to
export these goods to the West for hard currency.
Moscow, however, increasingly is insisting that its trade
with other Communist countries be mutually advantageous.
Yugoslavia ships 34 percent of its exports to the
USSR to pay for essential imports of Soviet energy and
raw materials. Nevertheless, it is presently more con-
cerned with Western financial aid. Belgrade probably
will make much of its disputes with Moscow to persuade
the West to accelerate economic assistance.
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Special Analysis
ANGOLA - SOUTH AFRICA - NAMIBIA: Signs of Progress
Developments since the meeting Zast month in Cape Verde
between senior Angolan and South African officials suggest the
deadlock in Namibia negotiations conceivably may be broken, although
a number of serious obstacles remain in the way of a settlement.
Angolan President dos Santos--who apparently is eager to reach a
settlement and begin rebuilding his country's economy--was granted
special powers by the ruling Popular Movement following the talks.
Subsequent chances in the cartu hierarchy apparently have strengthened
his position.
In his most recent move, dos Santos late last month
reportedly suspended more than 30 people from their party
posts. The Angolan press says most of those suspended
are members of a dominant leftist faction, and one of
them is the wife of the regime's leading radical Marxist,
Lucio Lara.
Angola may be more willing to discuss with South
Africa or the US the withdrawal of at least some Cuban
troops. Talks are to be held with South Africa some time
this month. Dos Santos has indicated flexibility on the
Cuban troop issue in the ast
Hardline Opposition
Dos Santos will face strong opposition from Soviet-
and Cuban-backed hardliners--who may still hold the
balance of power in Luanda--if he appears too willing to
compromise on a Cuban withdrawal. Angolan criticism of
the US and of linkage of the Namibian and Cuban issues
is harsher now than at any time in the recent past.
There is no evidence, furthermore, to suggest that
even dos Santos and his backers are prepared to meet
South African and US demands that all or almost all Cuban
combat troops leave. Luanda still needs either Cuban
4 January 1983
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protection against the insurgency of the National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola, led by Jonas
Savimbi, or a negotiated settlement with the insurgents.
While dos Santos may favor such talks, there is no con-
firmation of Savimbi's recent claim that Luanda is now
ready to negotiate.
Angola's direct talks with South Africa have put
the Frontline States on the sidelines, much to the
annoyance of the Frontline chairman, Tanzanian President
Nyerere. Most other Frontline leaders appear to support
these talks but continue publicly to denounce South
Africa and the US for wanting to include the Cuban pre-
sence in the negotiations.
The South-West Africa People's Organization, mean-
while, remains in the background. Although SWAPO is
still potentially a major political force in Namibia,
South African attacks have weakened it militarily and
the Frontline States now appear to give it little weight.
South Africa Encouraged
The South Africans have been encouraged by the Cape
Verde talks. In particular, Pretoria appears pleased
that its proposals for a cease-fire and for a mutual
troop withdrawal were received with interest and that
the Angolans showed a willingness to exercise greater
control over SWAPO.
Pretoria is still fundamentally hostile to the
Marxist regime in Luanda and probably would like to
replace it. Pretoria nevertheless might be willing to
coexist with a more pragmatic and less hostile regime,
at least for a while. If Luanda were willing to cooperate
with South Africa on a Namibia settlement that effective-
ly diminished the influence of SWAPO, the South Africans
would find an accommodation with Angola especially
appealing.
4 January 19&3-
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