NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 19 MARCH 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010023-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: March 19, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
c' 4 2 i
National 'Intelligence Daily
Saturday
19 March 1983
CPAS NID 83-066JX
281
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Contents
.......................... 1
Lebanon: Attacks on the Multinational Force ........................ 2
USSR-Western Europe: Views on CSCE ................................ 3
Turkey: Parties Law To Be Enacted ........................................
Bulgaria: Internal Security Changes ........................................ 7
Special Analyses
USSR-Yugoslavia: Tikhonov's Visit ........................................ 10
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19 March 1983
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Meanwhile, the government's recently formed peace commission
has indicated to US officials that the draft amnesty law would be
ready for the Assembly's approval next week. The law would give the
guerrillas 40 days to surrender to peace commission offices, rather
than to military installations. The ff stablished in each
of the country's 14 departments
The peace commission is intended to undercut calls by the
insurgents for negotiations leading to power sharing. It apparently
hopes its offer of security guarantees will bring some of the more
moderate elements in the insurgent alliance into the electoral
process, thereby undermining the guerrillas' unity and damaging their
prestige at home and abroad.
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1 19 March 1983
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The four attacks this week on the multinational peacekeeping
force in the Beirut area could be the work of one or more groups
seeking to discredit the capabilities of the force and hasten its
departure.
All the incidents took place in predominantly Shia areas. The
principal Shia religious leaders, however, have condemned the
attacks and have expressed their support for the role of the
multinational force.
representatives of Lebanon's two
Communist parties met with other Lebanese leftists last December.
The purpose of the meeting was to plan attacks against both the
multinational force and the Lebanese Army.
Comment: The Communists and the radical Shias oppose the
central government and could view attacks on the multinational force
as a way to weaken the force's commitment to Lebanon and to
discredit the government's security forces. Iranian relations with
radical Shia elements appear strong, and Iranian
activity in Lebanon could be related to the attacks on the
multinational force.
It is also possible that Syria has sponsored the attacks. Damascus
may fear the role of the multinational force will be expanded in areas
that would limit the role of Lebanese forces supported by Syria.
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The Soviets almost certainly will support the compromise draft
final CSCE agreement submitted by the neutral and nonaligned
participants as a basis for further negotiations, but the West
Europeans are divided over how to proceed.
At a meeting of Western Ambassadors at the CSCE almost all of
the Allies welcomed the neutrals' draft as the basis for final
negotiations. The Dutch and British representatives, however, voiced
disappointment with the weakness of the proposed provision on
human rights. British officials have hinted that they may prefer to end
the meeting in Madrid early if the human rights sections are not
strengthened.
Comment: The Soviets would welcome an early agreement in
Madrid in order to put the US on the defensive. Although the revised
language imposes more strictly defined limits on a European
disarmament conference than Moscow wants, the USSR probably
would accept the noncommital references to human rights. Barring an
early agreement, the Soviets would prefer to keep the talks going out
of concern that their breakdown would reduce the chances of
blocking NATO INF deployments in the fall.
The Allies do not want the West blamed by public opinion for
failure at Madrid, because it might hurt prospects for INF deployment.
EC leaders are to discuss CSCE strategy next week, and they almost
certainly will favor continued negotiations on the neutrals' draft. If
conservative elements in Chancellor Kohl's new government prevail
on this issue, the West Germans may join the British in supporting
strengthened human rights provisions.
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3 19 March 1983
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The ruling generals will promulgate a new political parties law in a
few days, but they may postpone the parliamentary election
scheduled for this fall in order to give the new parties time to organize
and campaign.
Political circles are uncertain whether the generals will permit
resumption of political activity after the law is enacted or wait until
promulgation of the electoral law, perhaps as early as mid-April.
Political leaders are urging the generals either to allow parties to start
organizing after the parties law is in place or to postpone the
parliamentary election-now set for October-until the spring of
1984. They want to ensure that the new parties have enough time to
organize, choose leaders, nominate candidates, and conduct
campaigns.
The chairman of the Consultative Assembly's constitutional
committee, which drafted the parties bill and is now writing the
electoral law, has publicly hinted the election might be delayed.
Comment: Sticking to the current timetable would open the
generals to charges of stifling political activity. Postponing the
election, however, would tend to confirm the doubts of their West
European critics, who have been skeptical of the generals' intention
to restore civilian rule this year. The ruling council so far has met all of
its self-imposed deadlines, but the generals' determination to
reestablish democracy on a sound footing could persuade them to
delay the election until the spring of 1984.
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BULGARIA: Internal Security Changes
The US Embassy in Sofia reports party leader Zhivkov has
replaced a deputy interior minister and the director of the national
police and is forcing retirements of many other senior security
officials. Zhivkov has named party officials to the top posts and has
ordered them to crack down on corruption. Rumors indicate major
scandals may be brewing, including the alleged murder of a judge
who was investigating diversions of military equipment during the
Warsaw Pact exercise last September.
Comment: The shakeup comes at a time when Sofia is defending
itself against allegations of complicity in the attempted assassination
of the Pope and international drug smuggling. As a result, it is likely to
prompt more foreign speculation of a Bulgarian coverup. Zhivkov,
however, may believe he has to tighten his control to assure that no
further embarrassments occur.
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7 19 March 1983
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Special Analysis
Premier Tikhonov, who arrives in Belgrade on Monday, is the most
important Soviet visitor to Yugoslavia since Tito's death in May 1980.
Tikhonov and his delegation probably hope to assess the ability of
Yugoslav leaders to deal with the country's economic and political
difficulties and will seek an endorsement of the USSR's arms control
proposals. The Yugoslavs are likely to ask the Soviets to sell them
more oil and probe the attitudes of the new leadership in Moscow
toward their government. F__1
The USSR's agreement to proceed with the frequently postponed
visit affirms Moscow's general satisfaction with the current state of
bilateral relations. The Yugoslavs almost certainly will seek Soviet
reaffirmation of past agreements-particularly the Belgrade
declaration of 1955, under which the USSR recognized Yugoslavia's
independent course.
Economic Questions
The talks are likely to focus primarily on trade issues.
Yugoslavia's deteriorating economy is forcing it to expand exports to
the West and consider putting greater emphasis on market forces at
home. Nevertheless, Soviet trade in 1982 accounted for 34 percent of
Yugoslavia's exports and 20 percent of its imports.
Trade between the two countries is conducted through a bilateral
clearing account that allows the Yugoslavs to pay for Soviet oil with
goods that might not sell in convertible currency markets. Yugoslavia
lacks hard currency to increase purchases of non-Soviet oil, and it is
likely to urge the USSR to sell it more oil and natural gas at current
low world prices. The Soviets, however, are unlikely to increase their
deliveries without a substantial increase in the quality of Yugoslav
exports to the USSR.
Tikhonov may question the Yugoslavs about the West's financial
assistance package for Yugoslavia. He probably will argue that,
despite this help, Yugoslavia's long-term economic interests still
require close relations with the "socialist" countries.
The Premier is likely to warn the Yugoslavs against any political
conditions attached to Western assistance. The Yugoslavs probably
will respond by reassuring the Soviets that Western aid does not carry
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10 19 March 1983
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compromising economic or political conditions and by asking for
more aid from the USSR.
Moscow has made some effort to help Yugoslavia. Last year the
Yugoslavs persuaded the Soviets to deliver some raw materials early
but failed to obtain an increase in the overall volume of deliveries for
the year. There were hard feelings in Belgrade, however, about the
USSR's attempts to secure better quality Yugoslav goods in
exchange.
The annual trade protocol, which was signed in January, included
concessions permitting Belgrade to run a trade deficit in 1983.
Although the protocol indicates a more forthcoming Soviet policy, the
Yugoslavs will remain skeptical as Moscow sometimes has failed to
honor its promises.
The Press
Tikhonov is like
about anti-Soviet m
recent article in a Z
ly to rest
aterial in
agreb we
ate Moscow's longstanding complaint
the Yugoslav media and' cultural life. A
ekly im I ing that Stalinism still exists in
the USSR could be a sore point.
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Last week the Yugoslav party's Central Committee plenum itself
implied the need for tighter party control over "irresponsible"
journalists, a move the Soviets almost certainly approve. Few
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speakers, however, advocated punitive action, and currently there
appears to be no general crackdown on the press.
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Foreign Policy Issues
Differences over the recent Nonaligned Summit in New Delhi also
may be contentious. Tikhonov may complain about Belgrade's
opposition to the Cuban-inspired formula that the "socialist" states
are the "natural allies" of the nonaligned countries. He probably will
also object to Yugoslav President Stambolic's implicit criticism in New
Delhi of the USSR's policy toward Afghanistan and Vietnam's
occupation of Kampuchea.F_~
Yugoslavia and the USSR are closer on regional security
questions. Tikhonov may get general endorsement of the Soviet INF
initiatives announced at the Warsaw Pact summit in January.
Authoritative Yugoslav commentaries have been favorable toward
General Secretary Andropov's proposal and skeptical that the US is
sincere about INF arms control. Belgrade agrees with Moscow that
INF deployment by NATO would raise tensions.
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The Yugoslavs may seek Soviet approval of the latest draft by the
neutral and nonaligned countries of the CSCE concluding document,
formally introduced by a Yugoslav speaker at the meeting in Madrid
last week. They are likely to point out that the draft softens Western
language on human rights and calls for a post-Madrid disarmament
meeting, the USSR's primary goal in the CSCE proceedings.
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12 19 March 1983
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