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Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 10, 2008
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Publication Date: 
April 5, 1983
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PDF icon CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3.pdf995.52 KB
Director of Central Ill ~^) Intelligence Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 Top Secret Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 Top Secret Contents Special Analysis Zimbabwe: More Instability Ahead ........................................ 7 Top Secret 5 April 1983 25X6 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 _ Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 Next 9 Page(s) In Document Denied Q Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 Top Secret Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 Top Secret 5 April 1983 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 Top Secret Special Analysis ZIMBABWE: More Instability Ahead Government military actions against the local civilian population in Matabeleland, coupled with the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union's campaign to destroy the opposition Zimbabwe African People's Union, have set the stage for conflict between the Shona- speaking majority and the Ndebele minority. Prime Minister Mugabe's tough tactics toward his tribal and political rivals could portend generally more radical domestic and foreign policies. The military repression in Matabeleland, which may have resulted in as many as 2,000 deaths, and ZAPU leader Nkomo's flight from the country on 8 March have left his party in disarray. Mugabe has vetoed efforts by ZAPU officials and some moderates in his own ZANU party to arran f r k rn or to renew unity talks between the two parties. Mugabe has charged ZAPU leaders are responsible for the country's unrest. He recently warned that, if they did not restrain the dissidents, "we will disarm them as a party"-his most direct threat to date that he may ban ZAPU. Censorship has reduced reporting on developments in Matabeleland, but the government may have reined in the North Korean-trained 5th Brigade, the all-Shona unit responsible for most of the depredations against civilians. Recent dissident attacks on white farmers, however, could provoke more brutalities. The conviction of Nkomo's military aides, who are being tried for treason and possession of arms, also could set off another cycle of dissident incidents and military repression. Continued occupation of Matabeleland by the 5th Brigade and other Army units probably will prevent alarge-scale tribal insurrection in the near future. The government's repressive tactics, however, have strengthened resentment among the Ndebeles, who comprise about 16 percent of the population. Many of the 10,000 to 13,000 former ZAPU guerrillas still in the national Army may IPave and join the dissidents, now estimated to number about 1,000. Top Secret 7 5 April 1983 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 Top Secret Prospects for Insurgency Nkomo probably would find it difficult to line up sponsors for a movement in exile. Neither Zambia nor Botswana-Nkomo's traditional allies-wanted anything to do with him after he fled. Both countries are already concerned about strains in their relations with Zimbabwe over the influx of Ndebele refugees in recent months, and they want to avoid provoking Harare into cross-border operations. The Soviets, who were Nkomo's primary backers during the civil war, are unlikely to jeopardize the possibility of more friendly bilateral relations by embracing a secessionist movement that has no backing from independent black Africa. Since Mugabe came to power, Moscow has courted him assiduously. The South Africans probably will provide only enough support to Ndebele dissidents to ensure that tribal conflict continues to simmer. Unlike South African-backed movements in Angola or Mozambique, ZAPU's tribal base is too small and geo ra hicall localized to support a successful tribal insurrection. Outlook Mugabe's abandonment of a moderate course toward the Ndebele may encourage ZANU hardliners to push for more radical approaches toward the whites or the economy. Such moves could destroy Zimbabwe's reasonably successful economic and political relations with the West. The Prime Minister is inclined toward Marxist social and economic organization. His pragmatism, which had discouraged more radical impulses in ,ZANU during the first two years of independence, may now give way. Increased instability would create more opportunities for the USSR. As Harare's anxieties about security become greater, government officials may tend to ignore urgent economic problems. Instead, they may emphasize the need for military equipment and training, an area in which the USSR and East European states are likely to be more forthcoming than Western countries. Toa Secret 8 5 April 1983 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 Top Secret Zimbabwe's relations with the West already have become distinctly cooler. Mugabe resents Western criticism of his handling of the Ndebele dissidents. He has accused the West of having double standards, condemning Zimbabwe while condoning much worse offenses in South Africa. If the cycle of dissident terrorism and government repression continues, relations probably will deteriorate further. As a result, Western governments will find it harder to justify their aid programs for Zimbabwe. 25X1 Top Secret 9 5 April 1983 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3 Top Secret 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/10 :CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3