NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 5 APRIL 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010065-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 65
• Publication Date: April 5, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
Central
Ill ~^) Intelligence
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Contents
Special Analysis
Zimbabwe: More Instability Ahead ........................................ 7
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Special Analysis
ZIMBABWE: More Instability Ahead
Government military actions against the local civilian population in
Matabeleland, coupled with the ruling Zimbabwe African National
Union's campaign to destroy the opposition Zimbabwe African
People's Union, have set the stage for conflict between the Shona-
speaking majority and the Ndebele minority. Prime Minister Mugabe's
tough tactics toward his tribal and political rivals could portend
generally more radical domestic and foreign policies.
The military repression in Matabeleland, which may have resulted
in as many as 2,000 deaths, and ZAPU leader Nkomo's flight from the
country on 8 March have left his party in disarray. Mugabe has vetoed
efforts by ZAPU officials and some moderates in his own ZANU party
to arran f r k rn or to renew unity talks between the two
parties.
Mugabe has charged ZAPU leaders are responsible for the
country's unrest. He recently warned that, if they did not restrain the
dissidents, "we will disarm them as a party"-his most direct threat
to date that he may ban ZAPU.
Censorship has reduced reporting on developments in
Matabeleland, but the government may have reined in the North
Korean-trained 5th Brigade, the all-Shona unit responsible for most
of the depredations against civilians. Recent dissident attacks on
white farmers, however, could provoke more brutalities. The
conviction of Nkomo's military aides, who are being tried for treason
and possession of arms, also could set off another cycle of dissident
incidents and military repression.
Continued occupation of Matabeleland by the 5th Brigade and
other Army units probably will prevent alarge-scale tribal insurrection
in the near future. The government's repressive tactics, however,
have strengthened resentment among the Ndebeles, who comprise
about 16 percent of the population. Many of the 10,000 to 13,000
former ZAPU guerrillas still in the national Army may IPave and join
the dissidents, now estimated to number about 1,000.
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Prospects for Insurgency
Nkomo probably would find it difficult to line up sponsors for a
movement in exile. Neither Zambia nor Botswana-Nkomo's
traditional allies-wanted anything to do with him after he fled. Both
countries are already concerned about strains in their relations with
Zimbabwe over the influx of Ndebele refugees in recent months, and
they want to avoid provoking Harare into cross-border operations.
The Soviets, who were Nkomo's primary backers during the civil
war, are unlikely to jeopardize the possibility of more friendly bilateral
relations by embracing a secessionist movement that has no backing
from independent black Africa. Since Mugabe came to power,
Moscow has courted him assiduously.
The South Africans probably will provide only enough support to
Ndebele dissidents to ensure that tribal conflict continues to simmer.
Unlike South African-backed movements in Angola or Mozambique,
ZAPU's tribal base is too small and geo ra hicall localized to
support a successful tribal insurrection.
Outlook
Mugabe's abandonment of a moderate course toward the
Ndebele may encourage ZANU hardliners to push for more radical
approaches toward the whites or the economy. Such moves could
destroy Zimbabwe's reasonably successful economic and political
relations with the West.
The Prime Minister is inclined toward Marxist social and
economic organization. His pragmatism, which had discouraged more
radical impulses in ,ZANU during the first two years of independence,
may now give way.
Increased instability would create more opportunities for the
USSR. As Harare's anxieties about security become greater,
government officials may tend to ignore urgent economic problems.
Instead, they may emphasize the need for military equipment and
training, an area in which the USSR and East European states are
likely to be more forthcoming than Western countries.
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Zimbabwe's relations with the West already have become
distinctly cooler. Mugabe resents Western criticism of his handling of
the Ndebele dissidents. He has accused the West of having double
standards, condemning Zimbabwe while condoning much worse
offenses in South Africa.
If the cycle of dissident terrorism and government repression
continues, relations probably will deteriorate further. As a result,
Western governments will find it harder to justify their aid programs
for Zimbabwe. 25X1
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