NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 11 APRIL 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010080-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 80
• Publication Date: April 11, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of TO Secret
Central
Monday
11 A pri ~~83
National Intelligence Daily
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,_.
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Contents
Jordan-Palestinians: Hussein Ends Talks With PLO .............. 1
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Mexico: Cutback in Imports ...................................................
Iran: Policy on Oil ....................................................................
Ghana: Radical Influence Increasing ....................................
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11 April 1983
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JORDAN-PALESTINIANS: Hussein Ends Talks With PLO
Jordan's statement yesterday relinquishing responsibility for
future peace negotiations to the Palestinians stems from King
Hussein's frustration with PLO chief Arafat's refusal or inability to
make a commitment.
The statement reviews the most recent meeting between Hussein
and Arafat, which ended last Tuesday, and reports on the agreement
they reached for Jordan to represent the Palestinians in expanded
Middle East talks. Arafat reportedly decided against implementing the
agreement, however, after encountering strong opposition from
Fatah's Central Committee Burin three days of talks in Kuwait and
from PLO leftist leaders.
Comment: Fatah's rejection of Hussein's proposal has left little
room for compromise. Arafat might be able to get his colleagues to
make some concessions, but he cannot give Hussein the degree of
authority the King considers necessary for Jordan to participate in
The PLO chief apparently had hoped Hussein would continue the
dialogue until an Arab summit convenes, but the King-believing that
he finally had an agreement-probably saw Arafat's backtracking as
another attempt to stall. Hussein thus decided to stop pushing for a
decision and to abide by the Arab consensus on negotiations, even
though he may still eventually hope to obtain PLO and Arab support
negotiations.
for his entry into talks under the US initiative.
Arafat will try to deflect blame for Jordan's decision by continuing
to call for an Arab summit to decide the next move. The PLO chief
would expect any resulting resolution largely to endorse his
organization's position.
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Mexico: Import Plunge
-8U Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb-
1982 1983 ``lugs
aProjected for Feb-Aug 1983.
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25X1
11 April 1983
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MEXICO: Cutback in Imports
A steady reduction in imports has slashed industrial production,
causing bankruptcies to increase, unemployment to grow, supplies of
goods to dwindle, and inflation to remain high.
Imports in January dropped 73 percent from the same time last
year. The moratorium announced last August on repayment of
principal disrupted credit and forced Mexico to import only what it
could pay for in cash or by barter.
Mexican business and government officials do not expect a quick
rebound in imports, despite the $5 billion commercial credit signed
last month. Most of the initial installment of $1.7 billion is being used
to repay a $434 million loan, to catch up on government and private
interest obligations, and to help rebuild reserves.
Shortages of imported raw materials have caused manufacturers
to shut down numerous factories, and many industries report that
production is off as much as 65 percent. As a result, the private sector
estimates there is 20-percent unemployment.
The pharmaceutical and automotive industries are especially hard
hit. One large plastics maker reports that his product line has shrunk
from more than 200 items to just 20, despite high demand and
vanishing inventories.
Commenf: With no quick end in sight for the debt moratorium or
capital flight, imports will remain drastically reduced for at least the
next five months. Some relief will come, however, from $2 billion in
officially arranged supplier credits, such as US agricultural credits.
President de la Madrid probably will seek additional commercial
borrowing-not now permitted under Mexico's IMF stabilization
program-or a reduction in interest payments to offset domestic
criticism and reduce the likelihood of demonstrations. If bankers and
the IMF do not show some leeway, pressure could grow for Mexico to
extend its debt moratorium to include interest payments.
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IRAN: Policy on Oil
Iran currently is abiding by its OPEC production quota of
2.4 million barrels per day, but sales may decline durin._q the next few
months unless Tehran offers discounts.
Tehran recently cut
its official crude price to $28 per barrel for Iranian Light-only
$1 below the Arab Light benchmark, in contrast to the 3- er-barrel
discount offered before the OPEC agreement.
Comment: At the new price and production level, Tehran's oil
revenue will total $1.6 billion per month. Although this is about
$500 million per month less than Iran was receiving before the
agreement, it is still sli htl more than needed to maintain current
import levels.
Iran is likely to abide by OPEC production guidelines during the
next few months and maintain a tough line on prices. It probably will
grant small discounts, however, to compensate for high freight and
insurance rates in the war zone. The Iranians recognize the risks of a
downward price spiral if members fail to adhere to the agreement.
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GHANA: Radical Influence Increasing
Radical leaders in the government are continuing to increase their
power at the expense of Head of State Rawlings.
Leftist leader Tsikata has been denouncing alleged US
subversion, while Rawlings has been makin some overtures toward
moderate Ghanaians and the West.
Leftists made further gains in the cabinet reorganization
announced last week, including the reinstatement of the radical
Secretary of Trade who had been dismissed for incompetence. In
addition, the radical faction continues to control government media
outlets despite public condemnation by Rawlings last month of radical
excesses in the press.
Ghana has obtained $350 million in new credits from Libya in a
deal arranged by Tsikata. The credits are to be used to finance oil
imports for the year beginning 1 May.
The strength of radical influence is likely to blunt any future
moves by Rawlings to follow a more moderate course. A further
consolidation of power by the radicals-with or without Rawlings-
probably will aggravate Ghana's already desperate economic
situation. The Libyans presumably hope the recent oil agreement and
past arms deliveries will strengthen the leftist faction sufficiently to
prevent further moves to develop better relations with the West.
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The radical Black June organization led by Abu Nidal claimed
responsibility in Damascus for the shooting yesterday of Issam
Sartawi, a PLO official attending the Socialist International Congress
in Portugal. Sartawi was a moderate committed to maintaining a
dialogue between Palestinians and Israel.
Comment: Abu Nidal's group, which rejects any negotiated
Palestinian settlement, to date has claimed responsibility for killing at
least six moderate PLO representatives. Past operations have
coincided with the interests of Iraq or Syria, where the group
maintains offices, and have been both warnings to the PLO and
attempts to undermine PLO leader Arafat's diplomatic initiatives.
death may be an indirect warning to Arafat to keep any Middle East
negotiations in line with Syrian interests.
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