NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 19 APRIL 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010101-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 101
• Publication Date: April 19, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
19 April 1983
19 April 1983 25X1
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Contents
Lebanon-Iran: Attack on US Embassy .................................... 1
China-Vietnam: Military and Political Pressure ...................... 2
USSR-El Salvador: Soviet Views ............................................ 3
Nigeria-US: Possible Demonstrations .................................... 4
France: Communist Party Meeting .......................................... 5
USSR: Speech by Andropov .................................................... 8
Ell Salvador: New Defense Minister ........................................ 9
Netherlands: Difficulties Over INF .......................................... 9
Guatemala: Controversy Over Economic Policy .................... 10
Special Analysis
Jordan: The King's Next Moves .............................................. 11
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LEBANON-IRAN: Attack on US Embassy
The Islamic Struggle Organization, which claimed responsibility
for the bombing yesterday of the US Embassy in Beirut, is probably an
Iranian-supported Lebanese Shia group.
The Struggle Organization has claimed responsibility for the
attack last month on the US Marines assigned to the multinational
peacekeeping force. It also says it carried out at least one other
attack against the French contingent of the multinational force this
Disrupting the situation in Lebanon by bombing the Embassy
would further Iran's foreign policy objective of exporting the Islamic
Revolution but would undercut its attempts to improve its
international image. Radical elements within the regime may have
sponsored the act without official sanction.
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CHINA-VIETNAM: Military and Political Pressure
The Chinese artillery fire that began last weekend and naval
actions against Vietnam are intended to warn Hanoi to stop its attacks
against Kampuchean resistance groups and to cease its incursions
into Thailand.
Comment: China his
responding to Vietnam's current offensive against ampuc can
resistance forces along the Thai-Kampuchean border. Beijing also is
using the occasion to criticize the Soviets for supporting Vietnam,
underscoring an important obstacle to the improvement of Sino-
Soviet relations.
The Chinese have enough forces near the border to send patrols
into Vietnam, but there is little likelihood of another invasion of
Vietnam similar to the one in 1979. There are no signs of a Chinese
military buildup or of other preparations for a more ambitious
operation.
Hanoi's military deployments in the north over the past four years
give Vietnam a nearly two-to-one advantage over China in troops
near the border. China also is likely to be restrained by its interest in
improving relations with the USSR.
The Soviets apparently are concerned that the surge in fighting
along the Thai-Kampuchean border and the growing tension between
China and Vietnam could obstruct their developing dialogue with the
Chinese. Beijing cites Soviet support for Vietnam's policy on
Kampuchea as a major obstacle to improved bilateral ties.
Foreign Minister Gromyko called an unusual meeting in Moscow
on Saturday with Ambassadors of the three Indochinese countries to
call for a settlement on Kampuchea between Hanoi and ASEAN. The
move clearly is calculated to portray Moscow as a peacemaker in the
area.
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The USSR apparently is not optimistic about the insurgents'
immediate prospects in El Salvador but believes they could succeed
over the long term.
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Comment: Since 1981, Moscow has appeared less sanguine
about the insurgents' short-term military prospects. Nevertheless, the
Soviets may calculate the lengthy military stalemate will further
complicate the US administration's efforts to win Congressional and
public support for its Central American policy. If the US decides
eventually to put pressure on San Salvador to negotiate with the
insurgents, the Soviets probably hope the party will be able to exploit
any government overtures
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The US Embassy has taken security precautions in anticipation
that the leading opposition party may incite anti-US demonstrations in
Lagos this week.
The Nigerian press continues to play up anti-US stories that
appeared last week in two newspapers controlled by the southern,
Yoruba-based Unity Party. The stories allege the discovery of a CIA
plot to assassinate party leader Awolowo. They are based on a
purported US Embassy document that the Ambassador believes may
have been forged with Soviet or East European assistance.
Several opposition leaders and the student union of the
predominantly Yoruba University of Ibadan have called for the
expulsion of the Ambassador and the reduction of the Embassy staff.
The government has increased police protection around the Embassy
and announced an investigation.
Comment: Many Nigerians are taking the allegations seriously.
The attacks coincide with signs that Unity Party prospects for
presidential elections this August appear increasingly dim.
Radicals in the party, who believe Washington is in league with
President Shagari's conservative, northern-oriented ruling party,
evidently are responsible for the anti-US campaign. They may be
seeking to blame the US for any election violence initiated by the
Unity Party.
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FRANCE: Communist Party Meeting
The Central Committee of the French Communist Party meets
today and tomorrow to assess results of municipal elections last month
and to debate the government's new austerity measures.
Comment: The Central Committee probably will criticize
important aspects of the government's austerity measures but
endorse continued participation in the government as necessary to
limit the measures' impact on workers. The government's refusal last
week to grant any significant concessions to the Communists
regarding the austerity program indicates the Communists' leverage
will continue to be seriously limited.
Nonetheless, opposition in the party to remaining in the
government appears to be growing. Communist discontent over the
austerity measures probably is the principal cause for this
development. President Mitterrand's firm stand on East-West political
and security issues also is likely to have contributed to resentment
over Socialist policies among both senior Communist officials and
rank-and-file activists.
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USSR: Speech by Andropov
Soviet media yesterday reported on a conference on agriculture
attended by all members of the top leadership except Party Secretary
Chernenko. Politburo member Gorbachev delivered the main report,
but media attention was focused on General Secretary Andropov's
concluding remarks. Andropov exhorted agriculture officials to
organize their work better but offered no new policies. Meanwhile,
Soviet and East German officials have been telling US diplomats that
Chernenko did not lead the delegation to the Karl Marx celebrations
in Berlin last week because he suddenly became ill.
Comment: The conference is unusual in that virtually all of the
republic and regional party leaders attended it. In this forum,
Andropov addressed a key policy matter with the apparent backing of
the entire remainder of the Politburo and Secretariat.
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Vides Casanova
44 years old ... was director of National
Guard ... generally respected and skilled
in dealing with people ... choice of most
senior civilian and military officials to re-
place Garcia ... will probably not play as
dominant a role as Garcia ... deeply re-
ligious ... speaks some English ... first
wife died; has remarried ... four children.
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The resignation of General Garcia as Defense Minister, effective
yesterday, and his replacement by former National Guard
Commander General Vides Casanova are likely to lead to major
changes in the military high command. Vides has already indicated his
plans to replace the Vice Minister of Defense and the Army Chief of
staff, and his nomination has been submitted to the Constituent
Assembly for ratification.
Comment: The war effort has been hindered by Garcia's
retention of incompetent field commanders on the basis of their
personal loyalty. Vides may want to appoint more aggressive officers.
He especially may want to designate a strong critic of Garcia, such as
Air Force Commander Colonel Bustillo or First Brigade Commander
Blandon, as chief of staff.
An official at NATO suggested the Netherlands is considering
delaying its decision on INF until after September, when the Dutch
10-year defense study is scheduled for publication. The study is to
include discussion of all phases of future Dutch defense, both
conventional and nuclear. Some leaders in The Hague are concerned
that presentation of a nuclear section in the study might lead to a
parliamentary debate that would result in defeat for INF, but Prime
Minister Lubbers reportedly remains firm on including the section.
Lubbers's Christian Democrats are badly divided over INF, and
groups opposed to deployment plan to time their demonstrations to
coincide with the debate of the defense study in parliament.
Comment: Many Dutch politicians probably hope progress in INF
negotiations will help avoid the need for deployment in the
Netherlands. They also are likely to hope that, if this does not happen
and deployment proceeds on schedule in the UK and West Germany
in December, opposition in the Netherlands will be weakened.
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GUATEMALA: Controversy Over Economic Policy
Government officials, goaded by the private sector, have
reluctantly announced measures to ease economic difficulties, but
they still probably will not be enough to overcome the severe shortage
of foreign exchange. The Minister of Finance says that negotiations
are in progress with the IMF for a $125 million standby loan and that a
value-added tax will be imposed and larger budget cuts made.
Comment: Current foreign exchange reserves can barely cover
imports for another two weeks, and industry could be virtually
paralyzed within a few months. The new steps are unlikely to mute
mounting criticism from influential businessmen, who fault the
government for not taking these actions sooner. Leaders of the
private sector believe stronger and faster action is needed to ease the
country's financial difficulties. Businessmen also resent the
government's failure to consult with them and are likely to push
harder for direct participation by the private sector in making
economic policy.
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Special Analysis
JORDAN: The King's Next Moves
King Hussein intends to keep a dialogue with the PLO alive,
despite the Jordanian cabinet's statement last week. He reportedly will
not meet with high-level PLO officials, however, unless they have
something new to say. In the meantime, Jordan will stress the plight of
West Bank Palestinians in an effort to force the PLO to give priority to
the recovery of Arab land rather than its own survival.
The popular reaction in Jordan to a renewal of the dialogue with
the PLO probably will be mixed. Earlier, both East Bank and
Palestinian Jordanians appeared to be behind the King's efforts to
move forward in the peace process. Now, however, the two groups
disagree about what steps should be taken next.
As a result of the PLO's rejection of Hussein's proposals, East
Bankers have hardened their attitudes toward the PLO and
Palestinians in general and believe the King has done all that he can
for the PLO. They now believe he should focus on Jordan's long-term
national securit interests, which they see as linked to progress in the
peace process
The Palestinian community in Jordan is divided over the PLO's
future role. The basic split is over the goal of the Palestinian national
movement-the drive for an independent Palestinian state or the
acceptance of something less.
Many Palestinians still maintain strong support for the PLO
leadership, while others have joined East Bankers in condemning the
organization and PLO leader Arafat. The US Embassy in Amman
reports that those who are disgruntled seem increasingly receptive to
an alternative Palestinian leadership, provided it shows it can deliver
on a settlement.
Near-Term Strategy
Amman seems to believe the best way to force Arafat and PLO
moderates to come to terms with it is to focus attention on the
increasing problems faced by the Palestinians under Israeli
occupation and the ineffectiveness of PLO rhetoric in curbing Israeli
settlement activity. The Jordanians probably also hope their hints of
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closing the bridges linking Jordan and the West Bank or dismantling
the network of institutions that have maintained West Bank ties to
Jordan will put Palestinian pressure on the PLO.
In addition, Hussein may try to take advantage of fresh doubts
about Arafat's leadership by encouraging West Bank leaders to
establish an alternative leadership that could join him in peace
negotiations. The King, however, is unlikely to have any real success
with the West Bank leaders. They have never had enough political
influence to take a stand independent of the PLO.
Counting on Washington
In any event, the King will be looking to the US to provide the
support and guarantees needed to convince the PLO-or, if
necessary, the West Bankers-that he can deliver on a settlement
favorable to the Palestinians' interests. Without that, there is little he
can do. Hussein will not enter negotiations alone.
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