NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 22 APRIL 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010110-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 110
• Publication Date: April 22, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
OCUASJC1G
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
22 April 1983
~op-S~eeret-
2 April 1983
Copy 2 R 1
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Tory Se?iret
Contents
El Salvador: Guerrilla Leadership in Disarray ........................ 2
USSR-CUBA: Increase in Economic Aid ................................ 4
West Germany-East Germany: Strained Relations .............. 5
USSR-Lebanon-US: Soviet Comments on Bombing .............. 6
Guatemala: Assassination Plot ................................................ 8
Australia-China: Premier Zhao's Visit .................................... 9
Special Analyses
Iran: Tehran's Terrorist Campaign .......................................... 10
USSR-ASEAN: Bid for Better Relations .................................. 13
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EL SALVADOR: Guerrilla Leadership in Disarray
The recent deaths in Managua of top Salvadoran guerrilla leaders
are a major political setback for the insurgent alliance and may prompt
an internal power struggle.
The Nicaraguan Interior Ministry on Wednesday announced the
suicide of Cayetano Carpio, the ranking leader of the insurgency. He
reportedly killed himself last week after learning that the Sandinistas
had arrested members of his general staff for the recent murder of
Melida Anaya, his second in command.
Comment: Carpio was the founder and driving force of the
largest and most doctrinaire of the five guerrilla factions in
El Salvador. His death and the apparent breakup of the faction's
command structure in Managua probably will encourage rival
organizations to expand their own bases of political and military
support. It is possible that Carpio was murdered as part of a plot by
rivals to seize control of the insurgent alliance.
The current disarray in the guerrilla leadership is a blow to the
insurgents' efforts to promote an image of unity. It also weakens their
credibility as they seek to disrupt the government's election plans and
force negotiations on their terms. In addition, their military initiatives
will be difficult to sustain if rivalries in Managua interrupt coordination
and planning among the factional guerrilla groups in the field.
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by 20 percent last year and will increase it further this year
First Deputy Premier Arkhipov, who is responsible for economic
matters, attended the annual bilateral economic commission meeting
in Havana last week. The USSR supplied an estimated $3.9 billion in
economic aid in 1981 and $4.7 billion last year. Most of the aid was
provided in the form of subsidized prices both for sugar purchases
and for Soviet petroleum sales
The reported increase in Soviet aid is evidence that Moscow will
continue to help Cuba, as President Castro tries to deal with the most
difficult economic situation Cuba has experienced since he came to
power. The USSR presumably considers the economic aid-and the
estimated $590 million in military aid last year-to be worthwhile in'
view of Cuba's role in Central America, the Caribbean, and Africa.F_
The Soviets will continue to urge Cuba to manage its economy
better to limit the amount of aid they have to provide. In dollar terms,
Soviet economic and military aid appears to have tripled over the past
eight years as a result of falling world sugar prices, increased oil
prices, and the modernization of the Cuban armed forces.
There is no direct evidence that the Soviet regime under General
Secretary Andropov is taking a tougher line with Cuba. Moscow's
attempts to cut back its foreign aid is part of its current effort to help
solve domestic economic difficulties.
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WEST GERMANY-EAST GERMANY: Strained Relations
West German conservatives are trying to exploit the recent
suspicious death of a West German citizen in East Germany to force
a tougher posture by the Kohl government toward East Germany.
The West German's death, which occurred during an
interrogation on 10 April, was publicized a week later just before East
German economics chief Mittag arrived in West Germany to discuss
economic cooperation and a possible summit. Kohl canceled his
meeting with Mittag in protest and telephoned East German leader
Honecker to demand an investigation.
Elements of the conservative press attacked the government for
allegedly trying to play. down the matter. Christian Social Union leader
Strauss proclaimed the incident a "murder" and compared East
Germans to Nazi war criminals. Economics Minister Lambsdorff-a.
Free Democrat-criticized Strauss's outburst. In turn, Lambsdorff
was criticized by Strauss's party for "flourishes of appeasement."
Comment: The government has not yet established an official
position on intra-German relations, largely because of differing views
within and among the coalition parties.
Moreover, Kohl probably saw advantages in pursuing an intra-
German summit meeting tentatively planned for later this year. The
incident, however, makes a summit at that time less likely.
The public attention focused on the incident will reduce Kohl's
latitude to make concessions that do not clearly benefit both sides
equally, as conservative leaders have been demanding. This could
make intra-German agreements more difficult to attain, thereby
prolonging the current stagnation in relations.
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USS -ILEBANO -U& Sovieil Comm Gnm a on Combing
T?i Se?FeR
Soviet media-after a period of brief, factual reporting-have
begun to use the bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut to criticize
US policy in Lebanon and the Middle East. A TASS commentary on
Wednesday, pointing to the US announcement of a CIA official's
death in the explosion, castigated the CIA's "subversive" role
throughout the Middle East. Radio Moscow in an Arabic broadcast
yesterday linked the bombing directly to the unresolved Lebanese
and Middle East crisis and to US support for Israeli "expansionism."
An earlier broadcast implied that the Israelis were responsible for the
explosion.
Comment: The Soviets are likely to portray the incident to Arab
audiences as "proof" of Lebanese popular opposition to the US
presence in Lebanon. The recent expulsions of Soviet intelligence
officers from Western Europe and the publicity given to the defection
last year of a KGB official stationed in Iran are added incentives for
Moscow to squeeze maximum propaganda from the US statement
concerning the CIA official.
I seoreQ
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The government has announced that it has foiled a plot to kill
President Rios Montt and possibly other government ministers. Three
gunmen, who are still free despite their identification by the
government, reportedly were hired in Honduras by an unnamed
political faction.
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AUSTRALIA-CHINA: Premier Zhao's Visit
Discussions in Canberra this week between Prime Minister Hawke
and Chinese Premier Zhao focused on China's opposition to any
resumption of Australian economic aid to Vietnam, and not on
bilateral trade issues as originally expected. Zhao stressed that aid
would not reduce Vietnam's dependence on the USSR but would
serve to legitimize its occupation of Kampuchea. Hawke emphasized
that no action on aid would be taken without consulting with the
ASEAN members and the US. The Prime Minister, who would like to
develop Australia's role as a mediating middle power in Southeast
Asia, also expressed concern about the shelling on the Sino-
Vietnamese border and offered to help in settling the Kampuchea
problem.
Comment: Foreign Minister Hayden almost certainly will
encounter more objections to the aid proposal during his visits next
week to ASEAN countries. The proposal, which was part of the Labor
Party's election platform, is largely designed to placate the party's left
wing.
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Special Analysis
IRAN: Tehran's Terrorist Campaign
The bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut is only part of Iran's
campaign to promote political instability throughout the Middle East.
Iran's ruling clerics believe it is their religious duty to foster Islamic
governments along Iranian lines. The US, Israel, and moderate Arab
states are viewed as threats to the achievement of this goal. Although
there is a wide variation in views among Iranian leaders on how
aggressively to pursue their goals, the success of Iran's attacks will
strengthen the position of those in the regime who advocate the use of
terrorism and subversion.
Deputy Foreign Minister Sheikholeslam, who played a leading role
in the taking of the hostages at the US Embassy, and Deputy Foreign
Minister Mansuri, a former Revolutionary Guard leader, are active in
promoting subversive activities. Ayatollah Montazeri, Ayatollah
Khomeini's apparent heir, and his supporters in the Revolutionary
Guard also are advocates of subversion.
President Khamenei, Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, and other
conservative senior officials often go along with aggressive policies.
They use the subversive activities of independent clerics outside the
government to intimidate other regimes in the Persian Gulf region.
Foreign Minister Valeyati and former Prime Minister Ayatollah
Mahdavi-Kani, however, generally favor nonviolent methods of
exporting the Iranian revolution.
Tehran's subversive actions are most likely to be used to protect
Iran's own revolution and to foster the emergence of. Islamic
fundamentalist regimes sympathetic to Iranian interests. They also
are designed to reduce superpower influence in the Middle East.
Iranian Presence in Lebanon
Iranian subversive activities in Lebanon are aided by sectarian
violence and the presence of pro-Iranian Shia groups. The Iranians
also can pick from a variety of targets, including US, Israeli, and West
European troops and installations.
Iran maintains several hundred Revolutionary Guards in the
Syrian-controlled sector of Lebanon. They are involved in
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propaganda activity and the recruitment of Lebanese Shias for
training in Iran.
The Guard is closely allied with two breakaway factions of Amal,
Lebanon's mainline Shia organization. The larger group, which has a
few hundred men, is under the command of Husayn Musawi. It also
has ties with Syria.
Actions Against Iraq
The Iranians also have carried out numerous acts of terrorism
against Iraqi targets. Iranian-backed Shia dissidents, for example,
have claimed responsibility for five car bombings over the last year
against Iraqi installations:
- Last August a car carrying explosives blew up in front of
the Iraqi Embassy in Paris.
- In the same month a car filled with explosives was driven
by a Shia terrorist team into the Ministry of Planning in
Baghdad, killing at least 50 people.
- In December a car bomb outside the Iraqi News Agency
building in Baghdad killed several bystanders.
- Yesterday two car bombings in Baghdad inflicted hem
damage to a hotel and the Air Force headquarters.
Iran also is working with Syria against the Iraqi Government.
Activity Against Other Countries
Elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region, Iran is working hard to
undermine the government of Bahrain.
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In Pakistan, Iranian students organized and encouraged by the
Iranian Consul General and members of his staff reportedly were
involved in the bombing of French facilities in Karachi this year.
Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia dissidents also claimed credit for these
attacks.
The Iranian diplomats also played a prominent role in
encouraging the Shia sit-in that has led to sectarian fighting in
Karachi. The Iranian Consul General subsequently was expelled.
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Special Analysis
USSR-ASEAN: Bid for Better Relations
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa's recent visits to the
ASEAN states-Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the
Philippines-were aimed largely at improving relations and at
containing China's influence in the region. The USSR's support for
Vietnam, however, remains a major obstacle to any change in the
Soviets' overall position in Southeast Asia.
Last December Kapitsa was assigned responsibility for China and
for East and Southeast Asia. He is a China specialist, and he
reportedly believes that his predecessor's failure to pay enough
attention to ASEAN enabled Beijing to increase its influence with the
member states.
In addition to undercutting China's prestige, the USSR's other
objectives in the region include trying to reduce ASEAN military
cooperation with the US and obstructing defense coordination within
the organization. Moscow also wants to allay ASEAN's worries about
Soviet naval activity in the area. The sea routes through the region are
vital to the USSR's access to the Indian Ocean.
Soviet trade last year with ASEAN was five to one in ASEAN's
favor, and Moscow wants to achieve a better balance-while
obtaining needed raw materials. Moreover, the Soviets are seeking
ASEAN's support in opposing an expanded Japanese military role,
and they hope to reduce hostility on the Afghanistan issue.
The Vietnam Obstacle
The achievement of these objectives is hindered primarily by
Moscow's support for Hanoi. Nonetheless, the Soviets regard their
relationship with the Vietnamese as a major barrier to the expansion
of Chinese influence.
ASEAN countries view Soviet backing for Vietnam as essential to
Vietnamese policies that they fear, particularly Hanoi's efforts to
consolidate military and political control of Kampuchea. They also are
disturbed by the USSR's use of military facilities in Vietnam.
The USSR is trying to assuage the concerns of the ASEAN states
by urging them to reconcile their differences with Vietnam and by
seeking to heighten their suspicions of China. Kapitsa attempted to
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convince his hosts of Hanoi's desire for a cooperative relationship
with ASEAN and its interest in resolving the Kampuchea problem. He
urged the members to reverse their stand against a joint conference
with Vietnam to discuss the problem.
Kapitsa tried to back up this approach by warning in Singapore
that continued ASEAN support for the Kampuchean coalition might
lead Vietnam to arm Communist insurgents in ASEAN countries. His
threat produced hostile responses in several countries, and the
Soviets later insisted that the USSR itself has no intention of arming
insurgents.
Most insurgents in the ASEAN area are pro-Chinese rather than
pro-Vietnamese, and the Soviets have not made a significant effort
recently to support local Communists and dissident groups. The
growing Communist insurgency in the Philippines could attract Soviet
support, however, if it shows the potential to topple President
Marcos.
Other Issues
Soviet intelligence operations against ASEAN governments and
against overseas Chinese communities in the member states have
been a major irritant. Suspicions of the USSR have increased in
recent years as a result of revelations about Soviet spies in Malaysia,
Singapore, and Indonesia. Moscow currently is trying to reduce
ASEAN suspicions and obtain the removal of visa restrictions
imposed on Soviet officials.
The USSR has few economic incentives to offer the ASEAN
nations, which in trade matters are oriented toward Japan, the US,
and Western Europe. Moreover, Moscow even reduced its imports
last year as part of its effort to limit hard currency purchases.
Several countries have rejected Soviet overtures to establish ship
repair facilities, largely for fear that this would facilitate KGB
operations. The Philippines, however, has been seeking Soviet
financing for a cement plant. This would be Moscow's only aid project
in the region, but talks are at a stalemate.
Need for New Tactics
Kapitsa probably recognizes that he disappointed his ASEAN
hosts by simply restating standard Soviet policies. He may believe it is
necessary for Moscow to devise some new-but essentially
cosmetic-approaches. A possible sign of this was Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko's recent meeting in Moscow with the three
Indochinese Ambassadors to call for a solution to the Kampuchean
problem.
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Vietnam's recent attacks on Kampuchean resistance camps
along the Thai border, however, have further soured ASEAN attitudes
toward any repackaged proposals for negotiations. In any event,
Moscow's continued support for Hanoi is likely to preclude any
substantial increase in the USSR's influence or standing in the region.
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