NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 26 APRIL 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010119-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 119
• Publication Date: April 26, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
Central
Intelligence
National
Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
26 April 1983
I up Sew e It
CPAS NID 83-098JX
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Contents
Turkey: Political Activity Resuming ........................................ 4
Jamaica: Seaga's Declining Political Prospects .................... 6
Pakistan-Afghanistan-USSR-UN: Talks Recess .................... 8
Sweden-USSR: Submarine Commission Report .................... 8
Japan: Local Election Results ................................................... 9
Spain-US-NATO: Use of Gibraltar .......................................... 9
Saudi Arabia: Minister Dismissed .......................................... 10
North Korea-Seychelles: Military Advisers Arrive ................ 10
Portugal: Election Outcome .................................................... 11.
Special Analysis
Ell Salvador: Prospects for Guerrilla Leadership .................... 12
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Top Secret
Prime Minister Trudeau probably will emphasize bilateral
economic issues, the need for progress in US-Soviet arms control
negotiations, and US involvement in Central America when he visits
Washington this week.
Last week the Canadian Government presented the new federal
budget, which primarily was designed to strengthen the financial
position, growth prospects, and job creation capacity of the private
sector. It has been widely characterized in the press as a "Tory
budget" because it departs from the Liberal tradition of large-scale
government involvement in, and direction of, the economy.
Comment: The new budget will help Canada's incipient economic
recovery. Nonetheless, Trudeau probably will urge US government
and business leaders to take actions aimed at further reducing US
interest rates, which Ottawa considers the key to a durable recovery.
He also will delineate Canada's firm opposition to any measures that
would impede the growth of East-West trade.
Trudeau is faced with continuing public opposition to the testing
of US air-launched cruise missiles in Canada, and he recently has
linked his government's willingness to permit testing to progress in
US-Soviet arms control talks. Although Ottawa's ultimate approval
remains likely, Trudeau probably will continue to avow publicly that
Canada has not yet decided to sanction the tests.
The Prime Minister also will seek some clarification of US
intentions in the Caribbean Basin, where Canadian banks have
significant investments and Ottawa has foreign aid programs.
Trudeau has refused to eliminate aid programs to Caribbean Basin
countries simply because they are leftist, and he has condemned
interference in the region by any major power. He probably will
continue his public criticism of US involvement in the dispute between
El Salvador and Nicaragua.
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TURKEY: Political Activity Resuming
Turkey is moving closer to civilian rule as the military government
over the weekend announced the resumption of political activity.
The generals, anticipating the formation of political parties and
the start of campaigning for the parliamentary election slated for
October, have made clear they will not tolerate the rhetorical
excesses and violence that have characterized past contests. The
military council also has reviewed its ban on ideologically extreme
parties and religious parties. A proposed electoral law now under
consideration in the Consultative Assembly would limit the number of
parties to two or three.
Prime Minister Ulusu had been the leading candidate to form a
conservative, military-backed party, but he has announced he will not
do so.
Politicians of all persuasions are urging the generals to postpone
the election until next spring. There is widespread concern that the
time remaining before October will not be enough to organize parties
and conduct credible campaigns.
Comment: The generals continue to be apprehensive, but they
apparently believe their constitutional framework provides adequate
safeguards against political turmoil. Although they are aware of the
concerns about the lack of time to prepare for a campaign, they
appear determined to hold an election this fall.
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JAMAICA: Seaga's Declining Political Prospects
Prime Minister Seaga and his Labor Party apparently still trail in
the opinion polls behind the opposition led by former Prime Minister
Manley.
A well-regarded poll conducted in mid-April says the charismatic
Manley and his People's National Party continue to lead 51 to
48 percent. Seaga is being blamed by many for not improving the
economic situation, and he trails Manley in personal popularity 37 to
43 percent. Although the poll indicates Manley would win if a vote
were held now, the government is not required to call an election
before late 1985.
Manley's party is having financial difficulties. Contributions are
down, largely because party moderates and former supporters in the
business community remain skeptical of Manley's claims to have
eliminated leftwing influence from the party.
Comment: Support for the Labor Party remains fragile, although
it has not lost much ground since a poll last October. Seaga's inability
to alleviate economic hardships has damaged his reputation as an
economic expert.
Memories of Manley's own failures are fading. With adequate
funds to capitalize on economic discontent and on the organizational
disarray in the ruling party, Manley is likely at least to be able to make
inroads into Seaga's dominant position in Parliament.
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The second round of UN-sponsored indirect talks in Geneva on
Afghanistan recessed last week until 16 June. UN officials say the
Pakistani and Afghan representatives agreed the UN High
Commissioner for Refuaees should consult refuaees on terms for
Comment: The latest talks made enough progress to allow
Islamabad and Moscow to appear flexible, but neither side seems
prepared to compromise. Consulting the refugees will expose the lack
of consensus among both the refugees and the Afghan insurgents.
SWEDEN-USSR: Submarine Commission Report
The US Embassy reports that the Swedish Government will issue
its official report today claiming Soviet submarines have been
violating Swedish waters and that it will follow up with a diplomatic
protest to the USSR. The report will state the Soviets are engaged in
reconnaissance and training activity and in preparations for military
operations in wartime. Stockholm also will specify that there is no
evidence of intrusions by NATO submarines. There are indications
that the Swedes informed the Soviet Embassy of the report's findings
last week and that the Soviets were taken by surprise.
Comment: Moscow will feel compelled to rebut the public
accusation and to reject the official protest. Soviet media may draw
on recent Swedish press reports of intrusions by NATO submarines to
deflect attention from the USSR's own operations and to support the
Soviets' standard allegations about a US and NATO threat to
Sweden's neutrality. Moscow probably hopes the public controversy
will die down quickly in order to avoid serious damage to bilateral
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Candidates backed by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party won
overwhelmingly in the second round of local elections on Sunday.
Prime Minister Nakasone publicly has played down any connection
between the victories and the timing of national elections, but the
media speculate that the results probably will prompt him to call early
elections for the lower house of the Diet. Upper house elections
already are slated for 26 June.
Comment: Nakasone has to decide within a few weeks whether to
call double elections. A decision to do so could work in his favor by
allowing him to exploit media coverage of his coming trips to the
ASEAN countries and to the Williamsburg Summit. In addition,
opposition parties are short of campaign funds, and the Japanese
press continues to highlight the recent spy scandal, charging that
leading Socialist Party members acted as Soviet agents.
SPAIN-US-NATO: Use of Gibraltar
Prime Minister Gonzalez has asked that US and NATO forces not
use Gibraltar during an impending ASW exercise in the approaches to
the Mediterranean. Gonzalez says he would support Spanish-NATO
exercises and use of Spanish ports by US warships exercising in the
area. Conspicuous use of Gibraltar by other countries, however,
would further irritate the Spanish public, which is already u set b a
visit of British warships to Gibraltar in mid-A ril.
Comment: In view of Spanish sensitivity, Gonzalez's suspicions
about the US, and lingering questions among the public about the
value of military ties to the West, major operational use of Gibraltar
during the exercise probably would provoke more criticism.
Gonzalez's interest in developing good mutual understanding with the
US makes it unlikely, however, that US use of Gibraltar in the exercise
would seriously harm bilateral relations.
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Minister of Information Muhammad Abduh Yamani, who was fired
on Sunday, is the first high-level official to be dismissed since King
Fahd ascended the throne last June. The King reportedly has named
All Hassan al-Sha'ir, the current Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon, as
Yamani's replacement.
Comment: Fahd probably hopes the dismissal will reduce
criticism by members of the royal family and by senior bureaucrats of
his slowness to make needed cabinet changes. The change carries
little political risk for the King because Yamani seems to have no
strong supporters and is widely viewed as incompetent. Fahd's critics,
however, ma now push harder for other and more politically difficult
changes.
NORTH KOREA-SEYCHELLES: Military Advisers Arrive
Some 24 North Korean military advisers have arrived in
Seychelles during the past several weeks, according to the US
Embassy.
Comment: It is not clear whether additional North Koreans will
be arriving. Rene has little confidence in the approximately
200 Tanzanian troops on whom he has depended for security up to
now, and he probably believes that North Koreans will be more
reliable. The President currently is on a trip to North Korea and China
and is likely to ask P'yongyang for additional troops, particularly if he
concludes that Tanzania intends to proceed with plans to withdraw its
forces by the end of the year. The North Koreans probably are
unwilling, however, to provide a large contingent or to assume more
than an advisory role.
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PORTUGAL: Election Outcome
Top Secret
The Socialist Party won the greatest number of seats in the
parliamentary election in Portugal yesterday but fell short of a
majority that would enable it to govern alone. With 70 percent of the
returns in, the Socialists led with 36 percent of the votes, and the
Social Democrats-senior partner of the last coalition-followed with
27 percent. The Communist Party ran third with about 18 percent-
slightly less than it had in 1980-and the Center Democrats-who
governed with the Social Democrats from 1979 until this election-
held 12 percent. Socialist leader Soares announced his party would
not serve in a minority status and must hold a party "referendum" to
clear the way for a parliamentary alliance.
Comment: The next government is not likely to end the political
instability that has characterized Portugal since 1974. The country
faces severe economic problems, and the new government must
adopt unpopular austerity measures to combat a growing current
account deficit and inflation. US-Portuguese relations would remain
strong under a Socialist-led administration, but there may be some
problems in working out military agreements, particularly on US use
of Portugal's mainland facilities.
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El Salvador: Factions of the Insurgent Alliance
Popular
People's
Armed Forces
Central American
Communist
Liberation
Revolutionary
of National
Worker's
Party-Armed
Forces
Army
Resistance
Revolutionary
Forces of
Party
Liberation
FPL
ERP
FARN
PRTC
PCS-FAL
Salvador Guerra
Joaquin Villalobos
Ferman Cienfuegos
Jorge Shafik Handal
1,500-1,800
1,300-1,700
700-900a
500-800a
Note: Each factional leader serves on
General Command of FMLN.
a Estimated Strength.
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Special Analysis
EL SALVADOR: Prospects for Guerrilla Leadership
Top Secret
The turmoil in guerrilla ranks caused by the recent deaths of two
top commanders in. Managua offers the potential for a power shift in
the insurgent alliance. Although the short-term implications for the
guerrillas appear largely adverse, a political struggle resulting in the
eventual domination by one faction could over time strengthen the
insurgents' military prospects.
Cayetano Carpio and Melida Anaya were the preeminent leaders
of the Popular Liberation Forces, the largest and most doctrinaire of
the five Marxist-Leninist guerrilla organizations. Their loss not only
weakens the faction but also opens a leadership gap in the insurgent
alliance as a whole. Other factions will be likely to try to expand their
political and military influence.
Short-Term Effects
The five factions-in concert with the Cubans and Sandinistas-
are trying to reduce damage to their image of unity at home and
abroad. Recent public announcements by individual insurgent
spokesmen have emphasized cooperation among the guerrilla
organizations and have pledged increased military efforts against the
government.
The reaction of insurgents in El Salvador to the deaths is
unknown, but field units almost certainly will be anxious over the
direction of leadership in Managua and over military tactical
relationships among the factions. The Popular Liberation Forces
recently appeared to be making serious efforts to coordinate military
operations with other factions, and the deaths of Carpio and Anaya
may interrupt this process. Nevertheless, the current offensive
strategy of all factions suggests field commanders of the Popular
Liberation Forces may be instructed by their new leadership to
continue working with the other groups toward large-scale operations
against economic and military targets.
New Leaders
The positions held by Carpio and Anaya probably will be
delegated to a number of junior leaders about whom little is known.
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Long-Term Implications
The Popular Liberation Forces could strengthen itself under the
new leaders, thereby retaining its influence over the other factions. It
appears more likely, however, that the new leaders will be unable to
control the faction's chronic dissension. Moreover, the vacuum left by
the death of Carpio, who was regarded by regional leftists as the "Ho
Chi Minh of Central America," probably will inspire other factions to
challenge the Popular Liberation Forces' dominance in the alliance.
The major challenger would be the radical People's Revolutionary
Army, which reportedly rivals the Popular Liberation Forces in size.
The Army is led by the ambitious Joaquin Villalobos.
The People's Revolutionary Army aspires to control the insurgent
movement, and it has been the most active militarily over the past
year. Its actions include spectacular acts of sabotage, takeovers of
towns, and skillful ambushes of government units
Prolonged disputes among the factions would hamper the guerrilla
war effort, but the eventual supremacy of the People's Revolutionary
Army could result in a more aggressive overall guerrilla effort. The
Army's leadership probably would be more successful than the Popular
Liberation Forces in strengthening cooperation with other factions and
in dictating tactics and strategy throughout the country.
Top Secret
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