NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 30 APRIL 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010131-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 131
• Publication Date: April 30, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
OCPAS/CTG
yepsecret
National Intelligence Daily
wi. e
CPAS NID 83-102JX
~OAPr1 }$8g
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Contents
Suriname: Friction in the Regime ............................................ 1
USSR-Syria: Soviet Military Presence .................................... 2
Canada-US: Opposition to Cruise-Missile Testing ................ 3
France: Limited Domestic Unrest ............................................ 4
UN: Disarmament Committee Adjourns .................................. 5
Ethiopia: Military Developments ..............................................
Lebanon: Sectarian Fighting Resumes ....................................
Italy: Pertini Agrees to Election Date ...................................... 9
East Germany-West Germany: Summit Canceled ................ 9
USSR-Mongolia-China: Harder Line on Troop Withdrawals .. 10
USSR: Sakharov May Leave .................................................... 10
USSR: Fast Start for Spring Grains ........................................ 11
Switzerland-USSR: Soviet Press Office Closed .................... 11
Bahrain-Saudi Arabia: Threat From Oil Spill ........................ 12
Algeria-Italy: Gas Accord Signed ............................................ 12
Special Analysis
Western Europe-Lebanon: Status of the MNF ...................... 13
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SURINAME: Friction in the Regime
The increased political infighting between the two leftist parties
supporting the fragile regime of Army Commander Bouterse may
provoke a government crisis.
The party that includes People's Mobilization Minister Sital
reportedly opposes the plans of pro-Bouterse Prime Minister Alibux's
party to reconcile with the Dutch and to limit Cuba's involvement in
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Comment: Sital, who is a Marxist, is widely considered to be
Havana's choice as Suriname's eventual ruler. The Cubans have
sponsored him since 1980. Sital's control of the militia gives him an
armed power base and offers him an opportunity to cultivate political
Sital and his supporters may intend to make a grab for power, but
Bouterse's military backers are aware of their ambitions and could
move to thwart them. In August 1980 Bouterse imprisoned Sital on
charges of plotting a coup with Cuba's complicity.
The Cubans evidently are becoming alarmed about the situation.
If Alibux's party prevails, the regime probably would follow a more
cautious policy toward Havana-especially in view of Brazil's recent
concerns. If Sital's influence prevails, however, increased
radicalization of Suriname is likely.
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USSR-SYRIA: Soviet Military Presence
The more prominent Soviet military presence in Syria is prompting
defensive claims from Damascus about the limits of the USSR's role.
An English-language Syrian newspaper on Wednesday ran a
Pakistani article on the Soviet military presence in Syria. It noted the
Pakistani claim that the USSR's involvement was justified and stated
Syria shared this view. The article also noted, however, that this
presence should not be prolonged and that the Syrian military should
eventually replace the Soviets and allow them to return home.
The newspaper account of the USSR's role underscores Syrian
sensitivity to charges of having become a Soviet outpost in the Middle
East. At the same time, however, the heightened tension between
Syria and Israel reinforce the continuing importance to Damascus of
its military ties to Moscow.
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CANADA-US: Opposition to Cruise-Missile Testing
Opponents of cruise-missile testing in Canada probably will
exploit an inaccurate Canadian press report that the US no longer
considers the program necessary.
The story was carried on Thursday in the influential Montreal daily
Le Devoir, which attributed it to sources "close to the US Geneva
negotiating team." US officials are said to have told a correspondent
who had accompanied Prime Minister Trudeau to Washington that
the testing program is nearly complete and that "testing in Canada
will not change anything.
Comment: Despite the official US caution that the article is
entirely inaccurate, the story is likely to cause more trouble for the
Canadian Government. Public opposition to testing has become
increasingly strident-over 100,000 demonstrated against it in
Toronto and Vancouver last weekend-and many of these opponents
are unlikely to believe the US denial.
Nevertheless, the government-which this week reaffirmed its
support for US initiatives in both Parliament and during discussions in
Washington-probably will stand by its earlier commitment to
weapons testing. It is likely to defend it as a part of Canada's
contribution to NATO.
Until now, most of the Canadian press has reluctantly endorsed
Ottawa's claim that the test program is necessary because of the
intransigence of Soviet disarmament negotiators at Geneva. Editorial
support also has been encouraged by official US insistence on the
need for testing. The article in Le Devoir may undercut support in the
media for testing and become a rall in point for the growing number
of antitesting groups in Canada.
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Recent nationwide demonstrations and a surge in Corsican
terrorist activity pose serious problems for the government but do not
threaten its stability.
Disparate groups of students and medical personnel are
protesting against new test requirements, a reorganization of the
state-run hospital system, and other reforms. The protestors,
however, are not challenging the authority of the state or demanding
a wholesale reversal of the government's domestic policy.
The US Embassy reports farmers' demonstrations are aimed at
stiffening the government's position in negotiations within the EC.
They are demanding a revision of the Community's price system for
agricultural products, which they say makes French products less
competitive.
Corsican nationalists are claiming credit for some 15 bombings
yesterday in major French cities. The attacks are the first by
Corsicans on the French mainland since President Mitterrand's
election in 1981. They follow a crackdown on terrorist activities in
Corsica.
Comment: The current unrest is not comparable to the student
strikes of May 1968, which nearly toppled the government of
President de Gaulle. Only the Corsican terrorists-whose goal of
independence for Corsica does not have widespread support-are
challenging the authority of the state, and Mitterrand is likely to
respond by strengthening antiterrorist measures.
The disillusionment of many citizens over aspects of Socialist
economic policies probably will not cause Mitterrand to consider
abandoning the austerity program. The legitimacy of the government
is not being seriously questioned.
Sporadic social and labor unrest is likely to grow, however, in part
because of the government's austerity measures. Students with bleak
prospects for employment may remain a particularly volatile group.
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UN: Disarmament Committee Adjourns
The 40-member Committee on Disarmament yesterday ended a
three-month session in Geneva, which was largely obstructed by the
The Soviets and their allies stalled the committee by joining with
nonaligned states demanding a debate on preventing nuclear war.
Three weeks ago the committee reestablished working groups on
banning chemical, nuclear, and radiological weapons and on
protecting non-nuclear-weapons states from nuclear attack. With
nonaligned support, however, the Soviets have continued to impede
work on these issues, and they have continually demanded the
nuclear test ban group be authorized to negotiate a treaty.
Comment: When the committee reconvenes in mid-June, the
Soviets probably will be more defensive if, as seems likely, they fail to
divert the attention of the chemical weapons group from detailed
discussions of questions of verification. To do so, the Soviets will
continue to try to shift the focus by urging the committee to draft a
chemical weapons treaty text, which the US opposes, and by pushing
The Soviets recently indicated some slight flexibility on chemical
weapons verification, and many nonaligned delegates sympathetic to
Western initiatives probably would accept any US-Soviet agreement
on verification. Moscow also will be likely to exploit a draft nuclear
test ban treaty that Sweden intends to present this summer.
Moreover, with nonaligned support, the USSR could further divert the
committee's attention by raising outer space arms control issues.
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ETHIOPIA: Military Developments
Military activity is increasing in northern Ethiopia, but the situation
in the Ogaden is returning to normal.
Since mid-April, government forces have initiated new attacks in
Eritrea Province. They are trying to interdict guerrilla supply lines and
to improve their position around the rebel stronghold of Nakfa. After
initially withdrawing, the Eritreans have launched counterattacks to
slow the Ethiopian drive
Comment: The government probably is preparing for another
assault on Nakfa, a primary target of the unsuccessful offensive last
Despite the return of Ethiopian and Cuban units to their garrisons
in the Ogaden, tensions there remain, and more clashes could occur
at any time. During the recent fighting, the Cuban forces apparently
followed previous patterns and deployed defensively around their
garrisons. There is no reliable evidence that any Cuban units were
involved in the hostilities or that they moved into the border area.
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LEBANON: Sectarian Fighting Resumes
The US Embassy in Beirut reports heavy fighting broke out on
Thursday between Druze and Christian militias in the Alayh District
Comment: Druze and Christian Phalange militiamen have been
eager to resume fighting since mid-February, when the Phalange-
dominated Lebanese Forces militia suffered a setback at the hands of
the Druze. Despite the Israeli presence, the political and military
struggle between the Druze and the Christians is likely to intensify.
Fighting will increase communal hatred, making it more difficult to
extend government authority into the area in the event of an Israeli
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ITALY: Pertini Agrees to Election Date
President Pertini is expected to dissolve parliament tomorrow or
Monday. He has agreed that an early general election be held with
local elections already scheduled for 26 and 27 June. Pertini hopes
holding the two elections concurrently will enable his Socialist Party
to capitalize on its strength in local races to improve its vote in the
general election
Socialist Party chief Craxi, however, remains concerned about his
party's election prospects and plans a vigorous personal campaign.
He is particularly worried that a recent scandal in Turin will damage
the party, especially in several of the larger cities. Craxi privately
concedes that a score of less than 12 percent of the vote in the
general election will be seen as a Socialist defeat.
East German leader Honecker's cancellation of his visit to Bonn
this year is unlikely to lead to a serious deterioration in bilateral
relations. The US Embassy reports officials in the East German
foreign policy advisory institute yesterday played down the
cancellation and claimed the regime wanted to conduct business as
usual with West Germany.
Comment: East German leaders probably decided that the
prospects for a successful summit were poor because of the hostile
publicity fostered by Franz Joseph Strauss and other conservative
West German politicians over recent border incidents. The East
Germans may have calculated that a cancellation now might influence
the Bundestag debate on foreign policy next week in Bonn. They
probably hope the move will help persuade moderates in the Kohl
government of the need to bring Strauss and his supporters under
control, in order to "protect" intra-German relations. East Germany's
urgent economic needs continue to oblige it to cultivate close
relations.
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USSR-MONGOLIA-CHINA: Harder Line on Troop Withdrawals
The USSR has toughened its public position on troop withdrawals
from Mongolia. Last Tuesday Pravda reprinted excerpts from an
article in the Mongolian Communist Party newspaper criticizing
Chinese efforts to persuade the Soviets to make such withdrawals.
Moscow embellished the excerpts by inserting praise for its insistence
that China discuss the issue directly with Mongolia. Pravda also used
stronger language advising the Chinese that US activities in the Far
East are the real threat to their security, in cautioning against
collusion with Washington, and in outlining terms for improved
relations with Mongolia.
Comment: The toughened language of the excerpt clearly reflects
Moscow's desire to underscore its policy on matters involving third
parties. At the same time, Pravda was careful not to close the door to
the possibility of a pullout, noting that Soviet forces in Mongolia have
always withdrawn as soon as circumstances have allowed. There is no
indication that the increased Soviet criticism will induce Beijing to
drop its preconditions for normalizing relations with Moscow or to
curtail its public criticism of the USSR's foreign policy.
USSR: Sakharov May Leave
Dissident physicist Sakharov, who has been kept in isolation since
1980, has been offered a teaching position by a university in Vienna.
He also is considering an earlier, unpublicized invitation from Norway
to live there. Western media have linked the Austrian invitation to an
earlier statement by the Soviet Minister of Justice on Swedish
television that Sakharov probably would be allowed to emigrate.
Ministry officials later withdrew the suggestion, noting the emigration
issue was outside the competence of their office.
Comment: Soviet authorities would prefer not to appear to be
encouraging Sakharov to emigrate but evidently want him to leave.
They seem to want a quick disposition of several longstanding human
rights cases that have attracted Western publicity. Dissident writer
Georgiy Vladimov has been given his exit visa for West Germany, and
the Pentecostals who left their refuge in the US Embassy are in the
process of getting their visas for Israel. The Soviets apparently prefer
that departing dissidents announce intended destinations other than
the US.
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USSR: Fast Start for Spring Grains
The spring grain sowing campaign in the USSR is well ahead of
the normal schedule. The Central Statistical Administration reports
that as of Monday, 26.1 million hectares had been sown, double that
of a year ago and second only to the record sown in 1975. Additional
grainland is still to be planted in the European USSR and east of the
Comment: If farmers maintain this pace and complete planting
ahead of schedule, chances are good that the spring crop-which
usually accounts for two-thirds of total grain production-will reach
the crucial flowering stage before the summer's hottest weather.
Weather conditions, however, will still play the key role in determining
final grain output. Even with a bumper spring grain harvest, damage
already sustained by the winter grains will prevent the USSR from
reaching its goal of 238 million tons this year.
SWITZERLAND-USSR: Soviet Press Office Closed
Swiss authorities yesterday closed the Novosti office in Bern,
expelled its only Soviet correspondent, and arrested its two Swiss
employees. The government accused the office of interfering in the
antinuclear and peace movements in Switzerland and stated it would
remain closed for the time being.
Comment: In the past year two Soviet military attaches accused
of espionage were forced to leave Switzerland, and a Polish attache
found with Swiss military documents was banned from returning to
his post after a trip home for medical treatment. Bern's actions
yesterday probably reflect a growing determination to restrict
Communist espionage activities in Switzerland.
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Nowruz Oil Slick
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BAHRAIN-SAUDI ARABIA: Threat From Oil Spill
Oil from the damaged offshore well at Nowruz has been sighted
north of Bahrain and northeast of the Saudi Arabian coast, near Ras
Tanura. Bahraini officials expect the slick will first pollute shorelines
from Umm Nasan to Sanabis and then move east toward Manama.
Additional fragmented slicks as large as 7 kilometers long and 50
meters wide have been reported to the north.
Comment: Strong winds are pushing the patches toward Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain. If they persist, some of the desalinization plants
on the affected coasts would probably have to cease operation as
long as the oil remains in the area. Any water shortages, however,
would be localized.
ALGERIA-ITALY: Gas Accord Signed
The signature on Wednesday by Algiers and Rome of the final
agreement for the purchase of Algerian natural gas will allow gas to
begin flowing through the trans-Mediterranean pipeline soon,
possibly as early as June. The last obstacle was cleared when the
Italian Senate approved a subsidy to cover the difference between the
sale price and the market price-to be paid to the state-controlled
Italian gas company. An Italian official says Rome now can begin
deliberations about buying Soviet gas.
Comment: Rome will probably continue to delay concluding a gas
deal with Moscow in order to reduce its large trade deficit with the
USSR and to persuade it to lower gas prices. Production problems in
Algeria's major gasfields are likely to prevent it from meeting all of its
export commitments. Sales of oil exported through the pipeline offer
the greatest profit for Algeria, and Algiers probably will cut deliveries
of liquefied natural gas to the US and other customers, in order to
meet its commitments to Italy.
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Multinational Force Areas of Responsibility in Beirut as of 1 April 1983
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30 April 1983
Beirut
InteirnationaI
Airport
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Special Analysis
WESTERN EUROPE-LEBANON: Status of the MNF
The mounting violence in Beirut has not shaken the commitment of
France, Italy, and the UK to provide troops for the Multinational Force
while negotiations on the future of Lebanon proceed. All three
governments currently are prepared to take risks in order to assist the
Lebanese Government and to advance their own foreign policies. The
MNF has already been in place longer than expected, however, and
both the British and Italian Governments may have second thoughts
about their continued participation if the effort becomes too costly in
lives or money.
The French evidently expect a lengthy stay in Lebanon, and Paris
has indicated it is prepared to expand its contingent. Rome also
expressed a willingness to consider increasing its participation.
There is growing concern, however, about the slow pace of the
negotiations. The three governments are worried that, with each
passing month, the danger to their troops will increase.
France hopes to strengthen longstanding ties with Lebanon and
to underscore its commitment to pursue a balanced policy in the
region. Italy uses its participation to demonstrate an assertive foreign
policy and to expand its role in Mediterranean affairs. The UK
committed troops to show its support for the US peace initiative and
to promote a role for London.
Composition and Operations
The MNF consists of about 5,300 US, French, Italian, and British
troops. The French contingent of some 2,000 men includes
paratroops and mine-clearing specialists from elite intervention
forces.
Italy is contributing 700 support troops and 1,300 combat troops
equipped with armored personnel carriers. A British armored
reconnaissance unit with 100 troops and 22 armored scout cars
joined the MNF in early February.
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The mission of the MNF, under ground rules worked out with the
Lebanese and Israeli Governments, is to provide a "presence" and to
assist the Lebanese Government in reestablishing its authority in the
Beirut area. The MNF troops conduct patrols and back up Lebanese
forces within the sectors for which they are responsible.
French combat engineers also perform the dangerous work of
clearing roads and buildings of mines, booby traps, and unexploded
ammunition. Two Italian battalions have been assigned practically full
time to guarding refugee camps within their sector.
Since January, there have been sporadic attacks on MNF patrols.
Three attacks in mid-March left one Italian soldier dead and several
Italian, French, and US troops wounded.
The MNF contingents are not expected to prevent infiltration or
engage militarily the warring factions in Lebanon. As a result, Israel
does not see the MNF as a force capable of protecting its interests or
preventing threats to its troops or territory.
Prospects for Continuing Support
French Defense Minister Hernu has said that Paris probably
would agree to send another 1,500 troops if the US would also
expand its commitment. Defense and Foreign Ministry officials claim
that public support for the MNF is substantial, but they worry that
France's contribution may appear to be excessive.
The French officials also would prefer that a multilateral
peacekeeping force ultimately be brought under UN auspices,
perhaps in the form of an expansion of the UN Forces in Lebanon.
Paris, however, probabl would not make this a condition for
continued participation.
In Italy-as in the UK-public support for participation in the
MNF is fragile and depends largely on holding down costs and
casualties. Following attacks in mid-March on Italian troops, the
Italian parliament launched an inquiry and Defense Minister Lagorio
led a delegation to Lebanon. During the inquiry, legislators
questioned the cost of the operation-Italy is spending about
$4 million per month to support its contingent-and the practical
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Lagorio successfully parried these questions during the
parliamentary debate, and both he and Foreign Minister Colombo
have since reiterated Rome's support for the MNF. Although the
coming election probably will not lead to a change in these policies,
Rome's determination could erode over time.
After the bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut, Colombo said
that, without progress on troop withdrawals, Italy might be forced to
reconsider the political basis of its commitment. Moreover, the
government has pledged not to ex and Italy's commitment without
consultation with parliament.
The British Government is likely to agree to extend its contingent
from May to August, but its contingency financing for the effort will be
exhausted by the end of the summer. Unless the Ministry of Defense
picks up the bill, the British unit will have to be withdrawn at that time.
In addition, the public reaction to any British casualties probably
would force the government to rethink its willingness to participate.
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