NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 30 AUGUST 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010102-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 102
• Publication Date: August 30, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
Intelligence
OCPAS/CIG
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
30 August 1983
CPAS NID 83-204JX
30 August 1983
Copy 2 8 5
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Contents
Lebanon: Fighting in Beirut .................................................... 1
Poland: Preparing for Solidarity's Anniversary ...................... 2
Chile: Conciliatory Moves ........................................................ 3
USSR-China: Andropov Encourages Dialogue ...................... 4
Uruguay: Troubled Transition .................................................. 5
Philippines: Precautions for Aquino's Funeral ...................... 6
USSR-France: Gromyko Plans Visit ........................................ 6
Honduras: Counterinsurgency Operations .............................. 7
Special Analyses
Philippines: Impact of the Assassination ................................ 8
Chad: Prospects for a Federation .......................................... 10
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LEBANON: Fighting in Beirut
The Lebanese Government's deployment of three Army brigades
to south Beirut yesterday is likely to reinforce popular perceptions of
President Gemayel as inept and increasingly desperate.
In the several hours of intense fighting that resulted, Beirut
International Airport and US Marine positions came under heavy
shelling from several points. Two Marines were killed and several
wounded. The Lebanese Army halted its operations in the early
Clashes between Muslim militias and Lebanese Army units
continued throughout the day in West Beirut
Comment: The government may have hoped its use of force
would discourage violence such as the small arms firefight on Sunday
between Shia Amal forces and the Lebanese Army. Instead, the
chances of further fighting have increased, and more clashes are
likely to result in the closure of crossings between East and West
If the Army becomes entangled in fighting with Muslim militias in
Beirut, Army Commander Tannous probably will not send troops into
the Shuf when the Israelis withdraw. The Army would have difficulty
fulfilling its mission in the Shuf, and an attempt to commit forces both
there and to Beirut is likely to be beyond its capabilities.
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POLAND: Preparing for Solidarity's Anniversary
The authorities are using both persuasion and intimidation to hold
down demonstrations tomorrow commemorating Solidarity's third
anniversary.
The official media on Saturday took the unusual step of carrying
extensive excerpts from a debate between former Solidarity chief
Walesa and Deputy Premier Rakowski at the Lenin shipyards. The
media reported Walesa's defense of Solidarity and his call for
renewed dialogue as well as Rakowski's statement that there would
be no return of Solidarity.
Walesa later told Western journalists that he had informed the
authorities in Gdansk that tomorrow he would place a wreath at the
monument outside the shipyards and would address others who
might be present. The regime has mobilized extra police for this and
other possible demonstrations. It also has arrested at least several
hundred potential troublemakers, according to US Embassy contacts,
and employed massive shows of force in Warsaw and Gdansk.
Polish bishops, in a carefully worded communique, have urged
the regime to begin a dialogue and to resolve the question of amnesty
for martial law offenders and other issues. Some local priests have
endorsed participation in the planned boycott tomorrow of public
transportation.
The US Consul in Poznan reports that workers remain angry but
that they lack leadership and are not prepared to take on the regime.
Several workers in a factory known for its militancy doubt there will be
demonstrations tomorrow even though they hope some will occur. F-
Comment: The government's airing of the debate between
Walesa and Rakowski may be intended to show it no longer fears
Walesa and that it is confident it can control the streets. The regime
also may hope that some will interpret it as a sign it is willing to talk
Rakowski's comments clearly demonstrate, however, that the
authorities are not willing to soften their attitude toward Walesa or
Solidarity. The authorities also may be hoping to gain some credibility
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CHILE: Conciliatory Moves
The government's concessions to the opposition have improved
the atmosphere for negotiations,
Interior Minister Jarpa, following discussions with moderate
opposition leaders, has authorized the return of more exiles, ended a
five-year-old state of emergency, and announced that the government
will soon offer a plan for legalizing political parties. Opposition leaders
have acknowledged that these moves represent some progress, but
they are making additional demands and still plan a fifth day of
national protest on 8 September.
Comment: President Pinochet may have strengthened his military
backing by authorizing the concessions. He also has created a more
positive atmosphere because the concessions, although limited in
practical effect, are psychologically significant. Nonetheless, Jarpa
has already indicated that the opposition's demand that Pinochet
resign was unacceptable and that the government will not surrender
its powers to limit civil liberties.
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USSR-CHINA: Andropov Encourages Dialogue
General Secretary Andropov's positive statements on China seem
designed to set the stage for discussions this fall.
The Soviet leader, in his Pravda interview on Friday, hinted at an
interest in negotiations with China on arms control matters, and he
proposed discussing confidence-building measures that could be
taken in the border region. He said the USSR also is prepared for a
dialogue on broad international security issues.
Andropov made no dramatic new proposals and restated that
Moscow does not intend to abandon its Vietnamese, Mongolian, or
Afghan allies. Nevertheless, he indicated that Moscow will work for
gradual improvement in ties with China. In addressing Beijing's
concern that an INF accord could mean a redeployment of Soviet
SS-20 missiles into Asia, he emphasized that both countries' security
The initial Chinese reaction has been cool. A Xinhua release on
Saturday dismissed Andropov's statements as not substantive and
criticized his implied refusal even to negotiate on the issues of
Afghanistan and Kampuchea, two of China's three demands. The
Chinese have rejected previous Soviet offers to discuss confidence-
building measures and international security issues.
Comment: Andropov's remarks on China-his first in public
since he became General Secretary-probably outline the USSR's
agenda for extensive bilateral consultations during the next two
months. These include the visit to China next week of Deputy Foreign
Minister Kapitsa, the first discussions by the two Foreign Ministers at
the UN in over 20 years, and the resumption of political consultations
in Beijing in October.
The remarks seem to have been prompted partly by the recent
improvement in Sino-US ties and by Secretary of Defense
Weinberger's coming visit to China. Andropov, perhaps primarily for
the Soviet domestic audience, stressed the urgent need to improve
relations in view of the USSR's problems with the US. He also
expressed confidence that Moscow and Beijing are agreed on the
need to strengthen peace and thus free resources for domestic
economic programs.
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Political parties, despite a ban on political activities, are
organizing domestic and international campaigns to promote the
transition to civilian rule, scheduled for 1985.
The main issue is the future role of the military. Over 200 people
were briefly detained for taking part in antimilitary gatherings, student
demonstrations, and nonviolent protests this month-the first in 10
years of military rule. Church leaders have increased their support of
the transition.
In addition, major party leaders have elicited statements of
solidarity from Argentine counterparts and are planning trips to
Europe and the US to gain support. These efforts are intended to test
the government's ban early this month on political activity.
President Alvarez has given no sign that he is willing to relax the
ban. It is partly designed to intimidate politicians into granting the
military freedom of action on security-related issues and to concede it
a political role under a future civilian regime.
Comment: Although the political parties have wide popular
support, their organizations have atrophied during military rule, and
they probably will require at least several months to become effective
again. Alvarez's support is somewhat limited in all the armed services.
He is having to settle for a working consensus that the military should
enjoy enough authority under a civilian regime to prevent a repetition
of the leftist terrorism that developed in the early 1970s.
Majorities on both sides appear to recognize the risks of
protracted uncertainty, and they are likely to try to get talks going
again soon. The lack of strong leadership on either side and the
military's refusal to reduce its demands, however, suggest the
process will continue to be difficult.
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PHILIPPINES: Precautions for Aquino's Funeral
Comment: The government recognizes that the funeral could
occasion widespread violence and unrest, but it probably will try to
mollify the public by allowing limited demonstrations.
opposition leaders are trying to restrain radical elements in their own
ranks from fomenting violence. It appears that both the government
and the moderate opposition will try to avoid clashes that would be
likely to result in repressive security measures.
USSR-FRANCE: Gromyko Plans Visit
TASS announced on Sunday that Foreign Minister Gromyko is to
visit Paris early next month. The French press reported yesterday that
the visit is to take place next Monday and Tuesday. A presidential
foreign affairs adviser says Paris wants Gromyko to stop on his way to
CSCE closing ceremonies in Madrid, rather than arrange a special
visit, to balance French Foreign Minister Cheysson's visit to Moscow
last February. The adviser also says that President Mitterrand is likely
to meet with Gromyko.
Comment: This will be the first high-level French-Soviet meeting
since France expelled 47 Soviets accused of espionage in April. The
Soviets almost certainly will use the visit to try to persuade Paris to
change its position on INF, particularly its refusal to allow French
nuclear forces to be counted at the Geneva talks. Despite that issue
and others straining bilateral ties, Gromyko presumably also will try to
cultivate better relations.
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HONDURAS: Counterinsurgency Operations
A Honduran Army counterinsurgency operation near the
Nicaraguan border has captured several guerrillas from a group of
over 100 who reportedly infiltrated into Olancho Department from
Nicaragua last month. the
prisoners all say they were trained in Nicaragua and Cuba. The Army
is continuing its efforts to round up the remaining insurgents, who are
said to be demoralized and hungry.
Comment: The apparent attempt by Cuba and Nicaragua to start
an insurgency in Honduras is doing poorly. The Army is taking
effective action, and the remaining guerrillas pose little threat to
internal security. Nevertheless, the Sandinistas are likely to continue
sending trained insurgents into Honduras in order to put pressure on
the government.
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The press has characterized Benigno Aquino as a
man committed to democratic processes and
integrity in government, but his political career
shows that he was an opportunist, was frequently
duplicitous, and was consumed with ambition to run
the Philippines. The military distrusted Aquino
because of his contacts with opponents of Marcos
in the US and with Philippine Muslim rebels based
in the Middle East. The business community
doubted that Aquino could assure the political
stability required for a healthy business environment.
Like Marcos, Aquino switched parties when he found
it advantageous. Both men came from provinces with
traditions of political violence and both took part
in it.
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Special Analysis
PHILIPPINES: Impact of the Assassination
The assassination of Benigno Aquino will make it more difficult for
President Marcos to maintain internal stability at a time when he
already faces major decisions about the economy and the coming
National Assembly elections. Marcos also wants to insulate relations
with the US from the fallout Aquino's death may produce, but he
probably believes that bilateral relations are in for rough going in the
months ahead. Over the longer run Aquino's murder almost certainly
will polarize domestic politics by reducing the incentives for Filipinos
to work within the system.
Since April, the country's external finances have become
increasingly precarious. A restructuring of its $23 billion in foreign
debt is needed to prevent Manila from falling behind in its payments
in the next year. The Central Bank has few liquid funds, and its short-
term debt of $2.5 billion requires immediate attention.
Smaller US and West European banks are likely to view Aquino's
death as an alarm signal and further reduce credit lines to Philippine
borrowers in an effort to reduce risk. Manila has been sounding out
US officials for emergency financial assistance since early June, and
its efforts probably will intensify at the first sign of critical payments
problems.
Marcos also has to prepare for National Assembly elections next
May. The elections will be an internationally recognized test of his
willingness to liberalize domestic politics and strengthen the center of
the political spectrum. His challenge is to find a way to ensure a
victory by the ruling party, induce participation by moderate members
of the opposition, and appear fair in setting the election rules.
Relations With the US
In addition, Marcos is aware that considerable international
attention will be focused on President Reagan's visit in November. He
had expected to use the occasion to improve his status as a
statesman and put the stamp of legitimacy on his government.
Marcos now almost certainly fears that events connected to Aquino's
death will force cancellation of the visit.
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The President is likely to believe that his opponents in the US will
seek to persuade their contacts in the US Government that
Washington should cool its relations with Manila and try to promote
demonstrations in several US cities. In addition, Marcos presumably
expects the recently concluded review of the Military Bases
Agreement with the US to come under special scrutiny when
Congress considers it this fall.
Short-Term Outlook
If Marcos's past record is any guide, he will maintain tight security
but stop short of moves that would provoke a popular backlash.
There has been little violence so far, and Filipinos show little
inclination for organized political protest. Any use of heavyhanded
tactics by the government in the aftermath of Aquino's death would
further damage confidence in the government at home and abroad.
Although Manila seems likely to weather the next few weeks, the
assassination will permanently change domestic politics. Press
reports say that the Communist Party has offered to support
moderate opponents of the regime in an effort to inflict maximum
damage on the government. Even if this offer is not accepted, new
bridges are likely to be built among Marcos's diverse opponents, and
this does not bode well for internal stability.
The US Embassy reports that radicals are making considerable
progress through propaganda approaches to young people. They are
arguing that, because Marcos plotted the death of Aquino, legal
political activism is pointless. The radicals claim that they are the only
alternative, and this message is winning them new recruits.
The opposition currently does not have the power to bring down
the government, but its future prospects will depend heavily on
whether it can overcome its internal divisions and present a united
front. If the moderates boycott the election, they could lose their
chance to play a role in the country's political future.
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Special Analysis
CHAD: Prospects for a Federation
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French President Mitterrand probably has no definite plan for a
federation in Chad, but various parties have proposed the idea in the
past as a means to resolve the decades-long strife among Chad's
warring factions. The French are likely to envision a federal structure
that would provide considerable regional autonomy and a weak
central government as the basis for a compromise among the 11 or so
factions.
Chad could be divided into zones, each of which would be
controlled by one of the factions. Factional armies might be converted
into provincial police forces, with each required to supply some men
for a small "integrated" army.
Each zone and faction presumably would be represented in the
national government, with major groups likely to have a strong voice
in national development, defense, and foreign affairs. A chief
executive might be elected through a weighted voting system similar
to the US electoral college.
The government-in-exile of dissident leader Goukouni has
publicly condemned federation. In pursuing the idea Mitterrand also
will have to overcome the stiff resistance of President Habre, who is
committed to regaining his home territory in the north. If the scheme
gains momentum, Habre probably will look to the US for help in
resisting French pressure.
Obstacles to Federation
Even if the idea of a federated Chad were acceptable to the
various Chadian elements and concerned African states, there would
be many obstacles to its realization. Chad would have to jettison its
colonial inheritance of a highly centralized administrative structure for
an unfamiliar federal type of system similar to the one in Nigeria. The
Nigerian system has taken decades and considerable bloodshed to
Moreover, Chad's meager resource base is centered on cotton
growing in the southern and central areas, and, under a federation, a
revenue-sharing formula would have to be developed and enforced. A
federation also would have to be propped up by massive international
aid and presumably by supervisory forces provided by the OAU, UN,
or individual African countries.
continued
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A federated Chad might allow Libya to retain hegemony over the
north. In addition, if a pro-Libyan faction ended up controlling eastern
Chad, Tripoli would be in a good position to infiltrate Sudanese
dissidents to their homeland.
Short-term prospects for federation depend on France's ability to
convince representatives of Chad's principal factions to sit at the
bargaining table. Paris also has to gain widespread endorsement in
Africa for a federation. Many Africans almost certainly would resist
what would amount to the de facto partition of an OAU state.
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