NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 10 NOVEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000500010074-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 74
• Publication Date: November 10, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
af~E,y~,f Director of I up
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
10 November 1983
CPAS NID 83-2 4
25X1
10 November 1983
Copy 2 8 5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
Contents
Palestinians-Syria: Cease-Fire Prospects ..............................
1
USSR-Palestinians: Policy on Arafat ......................................
2
China: Attack on "Spiritual Pollution" ....................................
6
USSR: Rumors About Recovery of Black Box ........................
7
Jordan: Reaction to Attacks on Personnel
7
USSR: Trends in Foreign Trade ..............................................
8
Nicaragua-Costa Rica-US: Concerns About Projects ..........
9
EC-Nicaragua: Food Aid ..........................................................
9
Special Analysis
Pakistan: Opposition Trying To Regroup ........:....................... 11
Top Secret
10 November 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
PALESTINIANS-SYRIA: Cease-Fire Prospects
Arab mediators are continuing their efforts to arrange a permanent
cease-fire between PLO chief Arafat and Fatah dissidents.
Arafat yesterday announced his agreement to a cease-fire and
said the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister had told him the dissidents also
have accepted. There has been no independent confirmation thus far
from the rebel side.
The Kuwaiti official is a member of the delegation from the Gulf
Cooperation Council that held talks on Tuesday with Syrian and PLO
leaders in Damascus in an attempt to end the conflict. The mediators
have scheduled further talks to strengthen the reported cease-fire
and arrange peace talks.
Comment: The cease-fire, if it takes hold, will be fragile at best.
Arafat will be willing to risk further fighting in hopes that Arab leaders
will succeed in preventing his opponents from forcing him to
surrender.
The dissidents and Syria, however, are unlikely to accept less
than Arafat's capitulation. The rebels will use the lull to prepare to
resume attacks if Arafat fails to reach an early agreement acceptable
to them and Damascus.
Top Secret
1 10 November 1983
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500010074-0
Top secret
USSR-PALESTINIANS: Policy on Arafat
The Soviets are avoiding public support for embattled PLO chief
Arafat for fear of alienating Syrian President Assad, but an emphatic
East German endorsement of Arafat suggests Moscow wants to avoid
appearing to desert him.
Palestinian news media have reported exchanges between Soviet
leaders and Arafat during the current assaults by Syrian-backed
rebels against his strongholds in northern Lebanon. Moscow
yesterday acknowledged receipt of Arafat's congratulations on the
anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, but it has not offered
direct support in response to Arafat's thinly veiled public plea in
mid-October for assistance against the rebels. The Soviet media's
limited factual coverage of the dispute has avoided explicit support
for Arafat's leadership.
The official East German news service on Tuesday carried a
Foreign Ministry declaration strongly endorsing Arafat and
condemning the escalation of fighting among Palestinians. The
statement appealed for a political dialogue and affirmed East German
solidarity with Arafat.
Comment: The renewed offensive against Arafat's forces
apparently has not altered the USSR's hands-off policy toward the
dispute. Moscow's refusal to respond to Arafat's plea for aid and its
near silence on the recent fighting reflect an unwillingness to alienate
Assad.
The East German declaration probably was approved in Moscow
and probably reflects Soviet misgivings about the dissidents' action.
The Soviet leaders may privately voice their concerns to Syria's
Foreign Minister, who is to arrive in Moscow today, but they are
unlikely to press Assad very hard.
The USSR probably is ambivalent about the radical domination of
the PLO that would result from the dissidents' victory. Moscow almost
certainly would welcome the radicals' resistance to participation in US
peace initiatives.
On the other hand, the radicals have not supported the
international peace conference with Soviet participation that Moscow
favors and have emphasized a strategy of military confrontation with
Israel that the Soviets believe hurts the Palestinian cause. The Soviets
would be concerned about PLO subordination to Syria and might
take some cautious measures to help the organization remain
independent.
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500010074-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
Iq
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
Top Secret
CHINA: Attack on "Spiritual Pollution"
Beijing's developing campaign against the spread of Western
influences in China will affect the coming party purge and may
represent a challenge to General Secretary Hu Yaobang.
Speeches by Politburo Standing Committee members Deng
Xiaoping and Chen Yun at the party plenum last month-convened to
begin a three-year "rectification" of the membership-prompted a
nationwide drive to criticize the spread of "bourgeois liberalism" in
China. Deng proposed a crackdown on Western philosophical ideas
and popular culture, which he claimed cause "spiritual pollution,"
especially among young Chinese. Several secondary leaders in
cultural work already have undergone public self-criticism for
publishing articles that depart from Marxist orthodoxy.
Comment: The drive against "bourgeois" and "rightist"
influences has distorted the once clearly antileftist focus of party
rectification efforts and may slow the process. Media commentary in
the provinces shows confusion over how to balance competing items
on the political agenda. Leftist targets of the purge may be able to use
Beijing's strong attack on liberalizing influences to counterattack.
After years of sustained criticism directed at China's leftists, the
immediate cause and the broader ramifications of Beijing's new
initiative are unclear. Deng apparently shares the concerns of some
party conservatives that political and economic reforms he has
promoted have caused side effects that eventually could jeopardize
the party's authority.
Viewed against recent rumors that Hu's standing as Deng's
political successor is in decline, the campaign may be an attempt to
undermine him. Hu has not made a major pronouncement on
"spiritual pollution."
Hu is a strong proponent of party supremacy, but some party
elders view many of his opinions as too liberal. Some of the first
targets of criticism in the new campaign have previously backed Hu
on ideological questions.
Top Secret
6 10 November 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
Top Secret
USSR: Rumors About Recovery of Black Box
A Soviet scientist says the
Soviets have unreleased recordings of cockpit conversations and
communications between the pilots of the South Korean airliner and
ground stations. The scientist believes the Soviets have recovered the
airliner's "black boxes" and that the information supports claims that
the plane was on a spy mission.
Comment: The Soviets are still searching in the Sea of Japan,
suggesting that the flight and cockpit voice recorders have not been
recovered. The source apparently believes the information he is
passing, but he could have heard about communications that, in fact,
are the same as those already released by the US. The USSR may be
using Soviets with contacts in the West to circulate rumors justifying
the shootdown. Moscow could be preparing to make a statement
strengthening its claim about US involvement in the incident, hoping
to embarrass the President during his visit to the Far East.
JORDAN: Reaction to Attacks on Personnel
Many Jordanian military officers are seeking retribution against
the Syrian-sponsored Abu Nidal organization, Black June, the prime
suspect in the recent terrorist attacks against Jordanian diplomatic
personnel in three countries. The killing of one security guard and the
wounding of another at the Jordanian Embassy in Athens on Monday
occurred less than two weeks after assassinatio
Jordanian Ambassadors in New Delhi and Rome
Comment: The Jordanian officers hold the Syrians to be as
responsible as Nidal for what they see as efforts to intimidate and
humiliate the Jordanian Government. Although they would like to
erase any impression that Jordan is sitting by helplessly in the face of
such attacks, they probably have only limited capability to take
retaliatory action. Moreover, senior government and military officials
are unlikely to countenance such action, given Syria's unquestioned
military superiority and its new boldness in the region.
Top Secret
7 10 November 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
I op oecrei
USSR: Trends in Foreign Trade
Recently released Soviet data show a growing shift in trade
toward other Communist countries, particularly in Eastern Europe.
Trade increased by 7 percent in the first half of this year compared to
the same period in 1982, with almost all of the improvement occurring
in trade with Communist nations. Moscow's hard currency position
has changed little compared with last year, although incomplete
Western trade data indicate a 30-percent increase in spending for
Western machinery. This growth was offset, however, by a decline in
purchases of agricultural products, particularly US grain, which
dropped by about 50 percent.
Comment: The USSR had stated its intention to increase trade.
with other Communist states. Much of the increased value of the
Soviets' exports to their Communist partners is caused by higher
Soviet oil prices, which in turn forced Eastern Europe to provide a
greater volume of exports to the USSR. The rise in machinery
purchases from Western countries largely reflects Soviet
requirements for the gas export pipeline, as well as a rebound to
levels recorded before hard currency shortages in 1981 forced
spending cutbacks.
Top Secret
8 10 November 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
North
Pacific
Ocean
Top Secret
10 November 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
Top Secret
NICARAGUA-COSTA RICA-US: Concern About Projects
Nicaragua is likely to criticize several new civilian construction
projects in northern Costa Rica, which are being built with the help of
US military engineers. In late September Costa Rican President
Monge proposed US help in several development projects, which
include roadbuilding, improvement of an airstrip in the north, and
medical treatment for refugees in UN camps. Panama also has agreed
to provide assistance, and San Jose is seeking the support of some
South American nations as well.
Comment: The development plans will benefit the economy but
will also improve security by providing access to remote regions.
The projects' similarity to US-assisted efforts in Honduras will
increase anxiety in Nicaragua over what the Sandinistas regard as
US-sponsored military operations on their northern and southern
flanks. Managua already has charged that the activities contradict
Monge's neutrality policy. The Costa Rican request for assistance
from other Latin American countries probably is an attempt to
counter such accusations by regionalizing the effort.
The EC Commission has announced its intention to give
Nicaragua 4,000 tons of wheat as part of the EC's worldwide food
aid program. The grant, valued at $628,000, will be distributed in the
first half of 1984. In addition, the Commission last month allocated
Nicaragua 7,200 tons of cereals as emergency relief for drought
conditions. Last year Managua received only token amounts of wheat
as food aid from the Community.
Comment: EC food aid is granted for humanitarian reasons,
and Nicaragua's inclusion this year does not reflect greater West
European political support for the Sandinista regime. The Ten,
however, are taking a more active interest in Latin American
developments and may be increasing food aid to step up EC political
and economic involvement in the region. The food aid also helps the
Community reduce its growing stockpile of agricultural products,
especially grains and dairy goods. Bolivia, Grenada, Guyana, and
Honduras also are receiving allocations under the current EC
programs.
Top Secret
9 10 November 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
Top Secret
Boundary representation is
not necessarily auttroritative.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500010074-0
Top Secret
Special Analysis
PAKISTAN: Opposition Trying To Regroup
Antigovernment violence is declining, with President Zia
apparently winning the first round against the opposition. The political
parties remain divided but will have new opportunities to foment
agitation as Zia takes a series of measures to reestablish civilian rule.
Additional serious violence would make it difficult for him to achieve
his objective of becoming the civilian president.
Pakistani officials believe law and order is bein restored in rural 25X1
Sind Province.
The US Consulate General in Karachi reports 25X1
only scattered demonstrations since late last month.
Opposition to Zia has remained limited elsewhere. Only a few
politicians have courted arrest in Baluchistan and North-West
Frontier Provinces, and there have been no large demonstrations. In
crucial Punjab Province, protests by lawyers and leftist labor
elements have been easily contained, and most Punjabis have
remained passive observers.
Zia's Tactics
The Pakistani President has stood firm in rural Sind by deploying
Army and paramilitary units to reinforce local police. US diplomats
report that at least 20 towns have been searched for arms and
ammunition, and 4,000 political activists and party workers-mostly
from the center-left Pakistan People's Party-have been arrested,
substantially reducing the ranks of those available to organize further
protests. Zia has avoided a serious incident that might have polarized
sentiment outside Sind against him.
The President also has moved to isolate the People's Party-the
largest party in the loosely knit Movement for the Restoration of
Democracy-branding it subversive and a tool of foreign interests.
This characterization is aimed in part at capitalizing on popular
resentment of "Indian interference." Remarks by Prime Minister
Gandhi that she was concerned over the level of violence in Sind
strengthened Zia in Punjab.
In an apparent effort to divide his opponents, Zia has been
holding talks with leaders of some conservative parties. The most
powerful People's Party leader in Sind, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi,
believes the disturbances have had their maximum impact, and he is
Top Secret
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500010074-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500010074-0
Top Secret
ready to begin negotiations,) ISo far,
however, the Movement has shown little inclination to negotiate.
Zia's tactics appear to have allayed the concern of some senior
Army officers that his Sind policy was too lenient, while satisfying
other advisers who had recommended he negotiate with th
politicians.
Opposition Divided
The opposition is divided and regrouping, but it is not cowed.
People's Party leaders reportedly are unhappy with the uneven results
of the civil disobedience campaign.
Conservative and religious politicians are not prepared to make
common cause with the People's Party. They fear it will suppress
them if returned to power and that it will reverse the steps Zia has
taken to Islamacize the nation. Zia has played to these fears by
emphasizing his commitment to Islamization.
Provincial elections are to be held next year, possibly as early as
March. Zia's decision on who will be eligible to be candidates-which
could come in December-is likely to provide the opposition its next
issue for nationwide demonstrations.
Most Pakistanis believe that Zia intends to exclude the parties.
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
LOA-1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500010074-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
Top Secret
Zia has not ruled out an accommodation with some of the parties,
but anything less than full participation will not satisfy most of the
center-left opposition. The opposition would probably interpret any
offer from the President as a sign of weakness. On the right, Zia must
be careful not to appear to be conceding too much to the left or to be
weakening his Islamization program.
If, as is likely, Zia does not compromise with the politicians in the
Sind and move to redress the separate political and economic
grievances there, discontent will persist and renewed violence is
likely. The unrest could be aggravated by Soviet and Indian
involvement.
If violence erupts again, Americans may become targets. The
Embassy reports that US support increasingly is seen as crucial to
Zia's survival,
Protracted violence would threaten Zia's image as a strong "law
and order" leader. In addition, the US Consulate in Karachi predicts
that renewed violence in Sind will lead to more disruption and
sabotage of the vital road and rail links between Karachi and the
Punjab. Economic disruption in the Punjab would particularly
undermine Zia's authority and the military's confidence in his ability to
lead Pakistan.
Top Secret
13 10 November 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/09: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500010074-0