NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 24 OCTOBER 1983
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020019-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
23
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 26, 2010
Sequence Number:
19
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 24, 1983
Content Type:
REPORT
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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
24 October 1983
-
Top-s""-copy 9 O)
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Contents
Lebanon: Iranian-Backed Shias Behind Bombing .................. 1
Grenada: Regime's Isolation Grows ........................................ 4
USSR: Shift on INF Talks ........................................................ 6
Western Europe: Mass Protests Against INF 7
Philippines: Further Unrest Expected .................................... 8
Iran-Iraq: Fighting in Iraq Continues ...................................... 9
Cuba-Honduras: Support for Insurgents ................................ 10
Hong Kong-China-UK: Improved Atmosphere for Talks ...... 11
Special Analysis
Ell Salvador: The Military Balance .......................................... 13
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I French MNF`\
Headquarters destroyed
,a ian Embassy
Suq al
G herb
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LEBANON: Iranian-Backed Shias Behind Bombing
(Information as of 2300 EDT)
Evidence points to Iranian-backed Lebanese Shias as
perpetrators of the bombing attacks against the US and French
Multinational Force contingents yesterday. Syria also may have been
involved. The bombings have not yet dissuaded o osition leaders
from attending national reconciliation talks.
of Super Etendard aircraft to Iraq
The suicidal tactics employed in the bombing strongly resemble
those used by Iranian agents against Iraqi targets in Paris and
Baghdad. The targeting of French troops also makes Iran a likely
suspect because of Iran's strong opposition to the delivery by France
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Iran's motive in sponsoring these attacks would probably be to
force the withdrawal of the Multinational Force contingents. A high-
level Iranian official stated that he hoped the US and France had
"learned their lesson." He boasted that the "the Muslim people" in
Lebanon had acted in accordance with Khomeini's principles of
The nature of these pro-Iranian Shia splinter groups precludes
effective countermeasures by US forces. Desperate terrorist acts by
individuals willing to sacrifice their lives are almost impossible to
prevent. Moreover, since these groups are composed of a few
hundred individuals scattered throughout the Shia neighborhoods of
Beirut, it would be very difficult for US forces to target them for
mountains has caused any political leader to back off from the talks.
Implications for Reconciliation Talks
Nearly all the opposition leaders scheduled to participate in
national reconciliation talks next week in Geneva have condemned
the bombings. Neither the attack nor the continued fighting in the
Comment: Although many of the opposition leaders genuinely
abhor the use of extreme terrorist violence, their main motive in
denouncing the attacks is probably to deflect any possibility that their
own groups could be accused of complicity. The bombings will serve
to remind opposition leaders that armed groups can respond to
unpopular political decisions with terrorist violence. The effectiveness
of the bombings will almost certainly comp rs to
remain cautious and unyielding in the talks.
reignite the cycle of violence in the capital.
Any US counterattacks against targets within Beirut, however,
would probably be condemned by most opposition leaders and could
continued
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to obtain a first-hand reading of the situation in Beirut.
Reactions to the Bombings
The other states involved in the Multinational Force-France,
Italy, and the UK-were among the several Western states promptly
to deplore the bombings. The French Government has recalled
Foreign Minister Cheysson from an EC meeting in Athens and
dispatched Defense Minister Hernu and military chief of staff Lacaze
Egyptian Foreign Minister Ali has called for "restraint" by the
superpowers and "all parties in the area." Saudi Foreign Minister
Saud expressed hope that the bloodshed would not wipe out "the
optimistic picture" created by the recent cease-fire.
"military answers" are provided there.
Soviet media coverage has been brief and factual. Central
Committee secretary Zagladin publicly deplored the attack but
asserted that the "tragedy" of Lebanon would continue as long as
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0 1000
Kilometers
Trinidad and
Costa RI Tobago
P~Aama Venezuela Y G ~yana
Suriname
Caribbean Sea
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Les Tantes
o:e
4 sSaline Island
Frigate Island
Large Island
Bonaparte Rocks
Atlantic
24 October 1983
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GRENADA: Regime's Isolation Grows
Eastern Caribbean leaders have agreed to ostracize Grenada,
while that nation's new military government is warning of an imminent
cooperation with Grenada.
Heads of state of the English-speaking Caribbean nations
meeting in Trinidad voted yesterday to suspend Grenada's
membership in the Caribbean Community, the regional trade and
integration organization. Jamaica, Barbados, and six smaller island
states also supported military intervention to restore acceptable
conditions in Grenada, but these measures were opposed by Trinidad
and Tobago and Guyana, with the Bahamas and Belize abstaining.
The Caribbean leaders also ratified economic sanctions already
announced by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to
suspend trade agreements; cut communications, and halt financial
within 10 to 14 days.
In the first major policy statement since it seized power last
Wednesday, a Revolutionary Military Council spokesman called for
national unity, stressed the need for continued economic
development in a mixed economy, and stated that Grenada would
continue its independent nonaligned foreign policy. The announced
policy included improved relations with the US. The spokesman said
that the Council would appoint a cabinet representing all interests
US Embassy officials arrived in Grenada on Saturday and
reported that Americans at the US medical school are fine.
Conflicting reports about the imprisonment or death of Grenadian
citizens and former ministers have continued. A ranking official of the
Cuban Embassy in Grenada said that former Deputy Prime Minister
British diplomat in Grenada reportedly met with the wife of
independent journalist Alister Hughes, who says that, contrary to
press reports. Huahes is alive and has been in jail since Wednesday.
Former Minister of Agriculture George Louison also is alive and in
the hospital, according to an official of the US medical school. A
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Radio Free Grenada reported yesterday that an invasion was
imminent. Military personnel and militia members were mobilized
Saturday, and those with government-owned vehicles were told to
turn them in. Radio announcements yesterday called for militia
members to report to three military posts on the northern coast of the
island.
Comment: The stated policy of the new ruling military council
appears to be essentially the same as that of the former regime,
although little is known about the new leaders. President of the
Military Council Austin is generally described as being less radical
than the other three leaders and was more closely associated with the
late Prime Minister Bishop. Vice Presidents James and Layne and
former Ambassador to Cuba Cornwall are described by Grenadian
exiles as extreme radicals. Cornwall and ne are doctrinaire
Marxists as is Coard.
The Caribbean leaders' decision to suspend Grenada from the
Caribbean economic community was about as far as they could go,
given the organization's normal reliance on unanimous consent. The
opposition of Prime Minister Compton of Trinidad and Tobago to
military intervention is key because Guyana or Belize were not
expected to support such action. The virtually unanimous revulsion in
the Caribbean over the recent events in Grenada will make it
increasingly difficult for Cuba to openly support the new military
rulers.
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talks should continue at least until NATO INF deployments begin.
Recent statements by Soviet INF delegation members in Geneva
reflect a shift to the position taken by other Soviet spokesmen that the
On 12 October chief Soviet INF negotiator Kvitsinskiy warned that
the Soviets would walk out before deployments start. The same day,
party Central Committee spokesman Zamyatin said Moscow would
continue negotiating until the US begins deploying missiles.
continuing to seek a negotiated settlement
Six days later, Kvitsinskiy stated that the USSR was prepared to
talk until US missiles are deployed. He added, however, that the
Soviets might consider such deployments as beginning on
22 November, the day after West Germany's Bundestag is expected
to reaffirm in a formal vote Bonn's support for deployments while
Another Soviet INF delegate, meanwhile, recently left open the
possibility of negotiations after deployments begin. This notion also
was raised last week by Aleksandr Bovin, a political commentator
with ties to General Secretary Andropov. Bovin warned, however, that
the USSR would still respond with counterdeployments, making it
necessary for "new ne otiations" to address higher levels of nuclear
weapons.
Moscow have decided.
Comment: The change in posture of the Soviet INF delegation
suggests that the USSR has concluded that its earlier threats to break
off talks were impeding its efforts to block deployments. The delay in
the Soviet delegation's adoption of the current line indicates the
negotiators are not always well informed about what policymakers in
The statements by the Soviet INF delegate and Bovin about the
possibility of postdeployment talks are consistent with Foreign
Minister Gromyko's remark to West German Foreign Minister
Genscher on 16 October that no Soviet decision has been reached on
what to do about the n ions after US deployments begin.
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WESTERN EUROPE: Mass Protests Against INF
The large-scale demonstrations against INF deployments that
took place over the weekend are unlikely to weaken the resolve of
West European governments to deploy the missiles, but they probably
will deepen differences between governments and opposition groups,
particularly in West Germany.
Nearly 2 million people marched throughout Western Europe this
weekend to protest the anticipated deployment of INF missiles. In
London, thousands of protesters rallied at Hyde Park in the biggest
demonstration by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament since
Prime Minister Thatcher defeated proponents of unilateral
disarmament in the election last June. The protests have been
spurred by a British press report that the first cruise missiles are
scheduled to arrive in the UK on 1 November.
Demonstrations in West Germany drew large crowds as a climax
to 10 days of protests there. In Bonn, the scene of the central protest
event, nearly 300,000 demonstrators listened to a speech by Social
Democratic Party chairman Willy Brandt. He rejected missile
deployment and indirectly rebuked the US for not accepting the
Soviet offer to reduce SS-20 missiles to the level existing before the
NATO two-track decision.
Communist-sponsored demonstrations in Italy also were large,
but rallies in Austria and Sweden were much smaller. The protest in
Brussels yesterday reportedly was the largest demonstration in
Belgian history
The demonstrations were for the most part peaceful and not
politically strident. The only major outbreak of violence took place
when a bomb exploded in an uninhabited building at a West German
military intelligence facility.
Comment: West European governments will not be swayed by
the demonstrations. In the UK, however, they will give the Labor Party
new ammunition to attack the government. In West Germany the
forthcoming parliamentary debate on INF is likely to polarize the
government and the opposition as a result of the Social Democratic
Party's movement toward rejection of deployment.
The peacefulness of the protests this weekend does not preclude
violent incidents when the missiles start arriving.
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PHILIPPINES: Further Unrest Expected
The poor economy is leaving President Marcos little room to
maneuver to stem growing political disaffection with his regime.
Labor strikes last week involving approximately 50,000 workers
added fuel to demonstrations calling for Marcos's resignation. The
strikes shut down the Bataan Export Processing Zone, disrupted
international communications, and closed roughly half the city's
elementary and high schools.
Manila has warned of additional layoffs and fuel rationing as a
result of recent austerity measures to cope with the country's severe
financial problems.
Radical groups, meanwhile, are blaming the US for the economic
crisis. A leftwing group plans to hold a demonstration against the
presence of US bases in the Philippines in front of the US Embassy on
Wednesday
Comment: There is no way for Marcos to avoid the fallout from
harsh austerity measures that Manila has been forced to take
because of its severe financial problems. Expected fuel price
increases will add to labor unrest during the next year
Moderate opposition leaders presumably believe that the
economic situation will help them by keeping the business community
and labor groups firmly in their camp. They are holding out for
additional political concessions by Marcos before agreeing to take
part in National Assembly elections scheduled for next year.
Marcos's use of harsh methods to break up strikes and
demonstrations, however, will further damage the President's poor
public image. The redeployment of additional troops to Manila may
portend a stonper crackdown if demonstrations continue unabated.
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Caspian
Sea
Soviet Union
~~ (S Afg ah n n'sta
24 October 1983
Soviet Unio
)Dezfdl
Ir,
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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IRAN-IRAQ: Fighting in Iraq Continues
Iran's initial success in recent fighting along the northern portion
of the border has prompted Iraq to retaliate against Iranian cities.
Iraq has reacted by increasing its airstrikes on Marivan,
headquarters of the Iranian operation, and by launching surface-to-
surface missile attacks on Dezful and Masiede-e Soleyman according
to Iranian communiques. In addition, the Iraqis claim to have mined
the approaches Bandar - omeini, Iran's only functioning port
with a railhead.
Comment: The outcome of the border fighting is still unclear, but
the Iranians probably will try to consolidate their gains to secure
control of the important border crossing from Marivan to Panjwin
before winter weather makes further heavy fighting difficult. Iraq's
strategy of punishing Iran by attacking population centers is unlikely
to alter Iran's determination to continue its war of attrition.
Iraq's claim to have mined Bandar-e Khomeini is not confirmed. A
similar Iraqi claim earlier in the war and repeated Iraqi attacks on
merchant ships have failed to deter vessels from calling at the port.
Iranian officials have repeatedly warned publicly and privately that
the Strait of Hormuz would be closed if the Iraqis interfered with
Iranian oil exports. Iran's second naval exercise near the Strait of
Hormuz in less than a month is part of its campaign to demonstrate
the seriousness of its threats.
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CUBA-HONDURAS: Support for Insurgents
The Honduran Army has captured or killed most of the
96 members of the infiltrated guerrilla group, according to the US
defense attache. Desertions by the insurgents and their lack of food
aided the Army. Prisoners claim that some 2,000 Hondurans have
received Cuban training and that another group of some 175
insurgents is scheduled to infiltrate Honduras in the near future.
Comment: The prisoners probably exaggerate the number of
guerrillas in training. Nevertheless, the Honduran Army apparently is
concerned about insurgent incursions. Tegucigalpa probably can
contain future threats, unless Havana and Managua are able to bring
about a substantial increase in the size of the guerrilla forces and
provide them with adequate logistic support.
President Castro evidently attaches high priority to relieving
pressure on Nicaragua and punishing Honduras for aligning itself with
the US, even though Havana recognizes that conditions in Honduras
are not ripe for revolution. The lack of popular backing for the
infiltrated insurgents supports such an assessment.
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HONG KONG-CHINA-UK: Improved Atmosphere for Talks
Serious economic problems in Hong Kong have led China and the
UK to show greater flexibility in their talks on the colony's future.
The countries ended two days of talks in Beijing on Thursday by
issuing a joint statement describing the discussions as "useful and
constructive." They have agreed to meet again next month
Press reports indicate that Prime Minister Thatcher, in a recent
letter to Premier Zhao, dropped London's insistence on a formal
British presence after China regains sovereignty and instead asked
only for a substantial British role. The Chinese have sqbseauentiv
toned down their media attacks on the UK's position.
Last week the Hong Kong Government stabilized the local
currency by abandoning the free-floating exchange rate in favor of a
fixed rate of 7.8 Hong Kong dollars per US dollar. The colony's two
note-issuing banks now are required to back Hong Kong dollars they
issue by depositing an equivalent amount of US dollars with the
government. The British authorities also lifted the 10-percent
withholding tax on interest earned on Hong Kong dollar deposits to
encourage increased holdings of local currency.
Comment: Both sides are anxious to prevent a recurrence of the
near panic in Hong Kong that followed the talks last month when the
local currency's value fell almost 15 percent overnight. By enacting
monetary controls, the British hope to end the speculative
transactions that heightened the crisis atmosphere. Thatcher's letter,
meanwhile, seems designed to placate the Chinese and promote a
calmer environment for discussions
The improved atmosphere may be short lived. The monetary
controls are unlikely to do more than stabilize temporarily the value of
the local currency so long as the colony's uncertain future continues
to cause capital flight.
Moreover, the two sides remain far apart and have not yet begun
to discuss the complex details of turning Hong Kong over to Chinese
control when the UK's lease expires in 1997. The Chinese are still
urging an early British concession on sovereignty, while London seeks
to preserve a British role to ease concerns in Hong Kong and abroad
that China will radically alter the colony's way of life.
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Boundary repro entation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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24 October 1983
Honduras
TEGUCIGALPA
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Special Analysis
EL SALVADOR: The Military Balance
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The tactical stalemate in the war continues. The current guerrilla
offensive has blunted much of the momentum built by the Army during
the summer, and government forces now are largely on the defensive.
Both sides are improving their military capabilities, but problems in the
Army weaken its chances of gaining a decisive ed e ore the
election scheduled for early next year.
The guerrillas began their long-awaited joint offensive in early
September by attacking San Miguel City. Since then, they have
extended their operations to eastern and central El Salvador.
The insurgents continue to sabotage electrical facilities and
bridges, attack small towns and isolated government posts, and
ambush relief forces. The frequency and magnitude of these
operations underscore the continued mobility and strength of the
guerrillas, despite a summer of government offensives.
The insurgents probably now believe they have regained the
initiative, especially in the east. They recently proclaimed the
establishment of a regional government in northern Chalatenango
Department, where they claim to have killed or wounded 1,000
government troops and to have captured over 300 weapons. Although
this claim is likely to be exaggerated, the guerrillas probably have
inflicted heavier losses on government forces since early last month.
In addition, after serious disagreement earlier this year, insurgent
factions now are achieving closer cooperation.
Aid From Nicaragua
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The insurgents have used captured arms and those received from
Nicaragua to supply more militia units. They now have some 8,000 to
12,000 armed combatants, including both regulars and part-time
fighters.
Nevertheless, the guerrillas still face difficulties in attracting
popular support. This is particularly true in areas such as San Vicente
and Cabanas, where the government has had effective civil action
programs or competent field commanders.
The Government's Performance
During its summer campaign, the Army made more use of small-
unit tactics and ambushes. It also sustained field operations in the
insurgents' traditional base areas to disrupt insurgent logistic and
supply networks. A fourth immediate-reaction battalion trained by US
instructors in Honduras was p into
ac
tion
- an
training of
new
"hunter" battalions continues.
~
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the US Embassy reports the government has
implemented in San Vicente many of the civic action programs called
for in the "national campaign" plan
The start of the guerrilla offensive last month coincided with
growing fatigue among Army troops and shortages of supplies. Most
government forces have reverted to a defensive posture, although
some local sweep operations continue.
Reliable military sources claim that several key officers are
displeased with Defense Minister Vides's direction of the war effort.
They may urge him to make some command changes by the end of
the year, including appointing a new chief of staff.
The Army will continue to gain strength by forming new elite units
and by improving training. It has demonstrated the ability to take to
the field for sustained operations and to improve its small-unit tactics.
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Continued US aid at least at the current level, however, will be
necessary to offset Nicaragua's support for the insurgents. Moreover,
unless chronic problem areas such as command and control
weaknesses, poor leadership, and lack of effective security measures
show some improvement in coming months, the Army will be hard
pressed to sustain any initiatives.
The guerrillas, meanwhile, probably will try to sustain their military
momentum, particularly in the east, by carrying out sporadic hit-and-
run raids, acts of economic sabotage, and perhaps an attack on a
departmental capital. If they continue to be resupplied from
Nicaragua and if they keep withdrawing in the face of superior forces,
they probably will be able to sustain periodic offensives from now until
the election. Neither side, however, is likely decisive military
advantage in the near term.
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