NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 6 DECEMBER 1983
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T01094R000600010019-0
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 2, 2010
Sequence Number:
19
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 6, 1983
Content Type:
REPORT
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000600010019-0
Central
Intelligence
Director of Top SGGFei
National Intelligence Daily
6 December 1,983
Tuesday
QP 4tX
M
C4PY
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Top Secret
Contents
Syria-Lebanon: Reaction to US Airstrikes
USSR: Press Conference on INF Deployments
NATO: Defense Ministers Meet
UK-US: Foreign Policy Differences Highlighted
Poland: Walesa More Conciliatory
Warsaw Pact: Meeting of Defense Ministers
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6 December 1983
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Damascus said yesterday it will continue to fire on US reconnais-
sance missions overflying Syrian positions in Lebanon
In Damascus, Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam told the US
Ambassador that his government is concerned over reports of
increased US-Israeli cooperation in the region. Khaddam implied
Damascus believes that the US and Israel have reached an agreement
for joint military pressure against Syria.
Khaddam offered to guarantee that no forces within Syrian-
controlled territory would fire on MNF units if the US agreed to stop
the overflights. He also said he would personally urge Lebanese
opposition factions to agree to a firm cease-fire.
In Beirut the US Embassy reports that pro-Syrian groups and
some moderate Muslims have condemned the US airstrikes against
Syrian military positions as the first indication of closer US-Israeli
cooperation in Lebanon. Sunni Prime Minister Wazzan characterized
the attacks as an escalation of the fighting in Lebanon, but he
stopped short of outright condemnation.
An official TASS statement and remarks by Leonid Zamyatin,
head of the Central Committee's International Information
Department, yesterday gave Moscow's most authoritative reaction so
far. TASS suggested US-Israeli coordination in the strikes and
expressed Soviet "solidarity" with Lebanon, Syria, and other Arab
states. Zamyatin, at a Moscow press conference, said the USSR
would provide moral and material support to Arab countries and
predicted these states would repel US and Israeli aggression.
There has been no significant Soviet military reaction to the US
Comment: Although the Syrians apparently want to avoid
chances for military confrontation with the US, they see the US as
acting in concert with Israel to limit Syrian influence in Lebanon.
Damascus's offer to prevent fire on MNF units from "Syrian-
controlled territory" is disingenuous in its implication that Syria has
no role in Druze, Shia, and Palestinian attacks on the MNF from south
of the Syrian zone. This is clearly not the case.
The Soviets are trying to maintain their credibility with Syria and
other Arab states by showing diplomatic and moral support for
Damascus. Nevertheless, Moscow continues to avoid committing
itself to any military response or to any signal that Damascus can
expect Soviet intervention in a US-Syrian clash in Lebanon.
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USSR: Press Conference on INF Deployments
High-ranking officials at a press conference in Moscow yesterday
reaffirmed General Secretary Andropov's statement of 24 November
that INF talks could not be conducted unless NATO shows a
readiness to return to the situation existing before its INF
deployments.
First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko asserted that this
readiness must take the shape of "deeds" and not just words, but he
stopped short of demanding withdrawal of US missiles as a
precondition. Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov said that Soviet
counterdeployments would be comparable to NATO's and would be
"kept within those limits that are dictated by the actions of the NATO
countries."
Ogarkov emphasized that the Soviet weapons deployed in the
"oceans and seas" against US territory will be as effective as the US
weapons deployed in Europe, especially in terms of "flight time to
their targets." He later asserted that the accuracy of cruise missiles
and their ability, when flying low, to avoid detection make them "first
strike" weapons comparable to ballistic missiles. He stated that the
"operational-tactical missiles of greater range" to be deployed in
East Germany and Czechoslovakia would reach most of NATO's new
INF missile bases.
Comment: Korniyenko's statement might imply that a reduction
in or a freeze on NATO's deployments at some future date would be
sufficient for the talks to resume. Ogarkov's rationale for considering
cruise missiles as "first strike" weapons probably will serve as the
basis for a Soviet assertion that cruise missiles in submarines off US
coasts pose a threat to the US analogous to that posed the USSR by
NATO's INF missiles.
Ogarkov's remarks about the range of missiles in East Germany
and Czechoslovakia are consistent with the deployment of the 925-
kilometer-range SS-12/22, which can reach targets as far away as the
US cruise missile bases in the UK. His remarks about
counterdeployments being kept within the limits dictated by NATO's
deployments suggest that the size and pace of the Soviet military
response will correspond closely to NATO's deployments
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The Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence and Allied
concerns over armaments cooperation and "out-of-area"
responsibilities are likely to dominate Allied discussions when NATO
Defense Ministers meet today and tomorrow in Brussels.
The US Embassy in Athens says Prime Minister Papandreou
intends to raise the Turkish Cypriot declaration and the issue of NATO
exercises in the Aegean. He will not propose formal language on the
Cyprus issue for the communique but will restate the case for
including the Greek island of Lemnos in NATO exercises.
With NATO INF deployments under way, the Defense Ministers
plan to devote particular attention to achieving conventional force
improvement goals endorsed by NATO last year. According to the US
Mission to NATO, several of the Allies, particularly the West Germans,
may seek US assurances that armaments programs exploiting new
weapons technologies will involve West European industry.
Comment: Continuing Greek-Turkish disputes may resurface
over language contained in a study on the impact on NATO of
operations in Southwest Asia. In addition, several of the Allies,
including the Dutch, Germans, Norwegians, and Italians, may urge a
reassessment of US plans for its rapid deployment force. Some may
argue that resource constraints will prevent them from adequately
compensating for diversion of US forces from NATO.
Papandreou's statements on the Greek-Turkish dispute at
previous NATO meetings were not well received, and the Allies are
increasingly testy about the continuing intrusions of this bilateral
problem into NATO consultations. Papandreou may believe that the
Ministers should condemn the Turkish Cypriot action, but a request
for a collective judgment is likely to fail.
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5 6 December 1983
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UK-US: Foreign Policy Differences Highlighted
Prime Minister Thatcher is emphasizing that the UK has foreign
policy positions that are distinct from those of the US.
The British have expressed concern that the recent US-Israeli
accord will not improve prospects for reconciliation in Lebanon but
could increase the risks for their contingent on the Multinational
Force. The US Embassy in London warns that a US-Israeli "alliance"
would be likely to cause the UK to disassociate itself from US policy in
the Middle East and to renew its interest in an EC peace initiative.
Moreover, according to British officials, Thatcher has rejected advice
not to reply to a letter from General Secretary Andropov criticizing
INF deployments because she favors "enhanced dialogue" with the
East
Comment: Thatcher's actions do not represent a shift in foreign
policy priorities, and the Prime Minister remains a steadfast supporter
of the "special relationship" between the US and the UK.
Nevertheless, the exigencies of British politics and the differences
with the US over Middle East matters apparently have persuaded her
that a more distinctly British approach to some issues will be helpful
politically.
The British are particularly concerned that close association with
the US will put their interests in the Middle East at greater risk,
especially if the Arabs believe the US and Israel are now open allies
against Syria. In addition, differences over Grenada, the pending US
recertification of Argentina for arms sales, and warnings from some
MPs that British lives are at risk in Belize and Lebanon for US and not
British interests have encouraged Thatcher to play up her own foreign
policy role. She probably sees this as a way of deflecting criticism that
she has placed too much emphasis on her relationship with the
current US Government.
The Prime Minister's trip to Hungary early next year, the prospect
of additional trips to Warsaw Pact countries, and the decision to
respond to Andropov without polemics all are being used to show that
London's dealings with the East are not frozen. She wants to
underscore the point, during a time when US-Soviet relations are
troubled.
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6 6 December 1983
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POLAND: Walesa More Conciliatory
Lech Walesa's call yesterday for an end to some Western
sanctions against Poland coincided with new regime press attacks on
both him and the sanctions. He told Western journalists that he
expects a renewal of antiregime demonstrations but opposes them.
Comment: Walesa may be trying to appear more conciliatory in
order to counter regime criticism and to encourage the government to
negotiate with him. He is likely to develop his new position in a
promised speech on 16 December commemorating slain shipyard
workers and outline a plan for future action, but the regime probably
will not respond favorably. Although Solidarity militants will be
disappointed over Walesa's call, some people will welcome his appeal
for Western aid because they are concerned about expected price
increases and the future of the economy. Walesa's change of heart
may reflect the influence of church officials, many of whom have
privately called for an easing of sanctions.
WARSAW PACT: Meeting of Defense Ministers
Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers, who began their semiannual
meeting in Sofia yesterday, probably will concentrate on issues
related to Western INF deployments and Eastern countermeasures.
Moscow presumably has been disappointed by East European
responses to its previous efforts to enlist support for its position on
the INF issue. Defense Minister Ustinov and Marshal Kulikov arrived
in Sofia early-over the weekend-and they plan separate talks with
the Bulgarians after the Warsaw Pact meeting.
Comment: The early arrival of the Soviet representatives
probably indicates an effort to secure better East European
cooperation on INF at the meeting in Sofia. The most divisive issue
probably will be the Soviet demand that the East Europeans increase
their defense expenditures to cover the cost of military
countermeasures to NATO's INF deployments. East German and
Czechoslovak officials already are expressing concern about the
costs associated with the stationing of 925-kilometer-range SS-22s in
their countries.
Top Secret
7 6 December 1983
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