AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200850001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 30, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Africa Review.
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Africa Review
Page
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Soviet Union.
Despite Moscow's efforts to court the Indian Ocean island states
with offers of limited military and economic aid, Soviet influence in
the region appears to be waning because leaders of the island states
are concerned about the consequences of close alignment with the
Tanzania: Growing Military Discontent
officers.
Dissatisfaction with President Nyerere's government is continuing
among lower ranking military personnel and spreading to senior
A rebel attack on the small town of Moba last month demonstrated
that, despite some improvement in military capabilities in recent
years, government forces are still hampered by serious deficiencies.
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subversive activities.
President Kountche's hold on power is threatened by a deteriorating
economy, opposition in the military to his plan to return the country
to civilian rule, and a possible renewal of Libyan-sponsored
yielded economic benefits, but only limited political gains.
Luanda's effort to cultivate relations with Paris, designed as part of
an attempt to balance its ties with the Soviets and Cubans, has
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Kenya: Improving Regional Relationships) 23
his concern for Kenya's internal security.
President Moi's efforts to improve relations with neighboring
Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania are guided primarily by
Uganda: Security Situation and Drought in the Northeast I 25
bordering Sudan and Kenya.
A drought-induced famine and deteriorating security conditions in
Uganda's Karamoja region threaten to destabilize the area
Sao Tome: Looking Westward?
The OAU: Still Divided and Ineffectual
Namibia: New Draft Regulations To Ex
Tanzania: Training Mozambican Forces
pand Territorial Army
Moderation
Ghana: Government Shuffle Reinforces Trend Toward Economic
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff Office of African and Latin American Analysi 25X1
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Secret ii
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Ocuret
Soviet Initiatives
The Soviet Union is courting the Indian Ocean island
states with limited offers of military assistance and
economic cooperation in an effort to encourage leftist
political elements, undercut Western influence, and
offset growing Western military capability in the
region. Moscow seeks to expand its presence, build
ties to area political and military figures, and, in the
long term, acquire access to air and naval facilities
Soviet efforts notwithstanding, however, it is our
judgment that Moscow's influence in the region now
appears to be waning. Concern among the leaders of
the island states over the domestic and international
consequences of close alignment with the Soviet
Union has blunted recent Soviet initiatives and
prompted at least a temporary swing to the West.
Regional leaders fear Soviet meddling in their
domestic affairs and are publicly reasserting their
nonaligned posture.
Soviet Inducements
Reluctant to commit more than token levels of
economic assistance in courting Indian Ocean
governments, Moscow has attempted instead to
exploit the security concerns of local leaders in an
effort to foster dependence on Soviet military
assistance. This tactic has proved particularly
successful with the prosocialist regimes in Seychelles
and Madagascar, where the leaders believe that the
potential for domestic upheaval or external
destabilization is high.
Seychelles. President Rene has long been fearful of
coup plotting-by both his own military and external
opposition groups. His near paranoia over security has
facilitated Soviet efforts to preserve and expand
existing military relations. For example, Moscow
repeatedly has sent warships to the area to
demonstrate support for Rene's regime during periods
of insecurity, and has provided military equipment
with associated training packages to the Seychellois
Army. More recently, Moscow provided Rene with a
communications network-linked to similar Soviet-
installed facilities in neighboring Tanzania,
Madagascar, and Mozambique-for use in an 25X1
emergency situation. Additional Soviet projects
include building two small ship repair facilities, and
refurbishing and filling fuel storage tanks on nearby
St. Anne Island.
Madagascar. The Soviets have played on President
Ratsiraka's fears of possible South African-backed
coup plotting to emplace a signals intelligence
network. The network, ostensibly for defensive
purposes, has the capability to monitor Western ships
and aircraft in the Indian Ocean region. Over the past 25X1
year, Moscow reportedly has offered five patrol boats
and training assistance for Malagasy security forces.
The Soviets have requested port access for Soviet
warships. Although Moscow has supplied most of
Madagascar's military equipment since the mid-
1970s, assistance levels have dropped in recent years.
Mauritius and Comoros. Moscow's attempts to gain
influence with both countries focus on developing
economic and military ties. The Soviets reportedly
have made several proposals to Mauritius, including
expanded economic ties, Aeroflot landing rights, and
visits by Soviet warships.
Secret
ALA AR 84-018
30 November 1984
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the Soviets have offered to supply Mauritius with a
small cargo ship and assist with coastal surveillance.
Indian Ocean Response
The emergence of leftist regimes in postindependence
Seychelles and Madagascar, combined with the
Mauritian shift toward nonalignment and the
traditional pro-West inclination of Comoros, has
resulted in a mixed regional response to Soviet
initiatives. Political and economic considerations,
however, have influenced recent decisions by Indian
Ocean leaders that have temporarily hampered
Moscow's efforts in the region.
Rene depends upon a show of Soviet political and
military support to bolster his fragile Seychelles
regime. Rene, however, now faces potentially serious
domestic fallout over continued close relations with
Moscow in the aftermath of unexpectedly strong
popular opposition to the Soviet presence. As a result,
he is attempting to project an image of greater
nonalignment. Last October, Rene publicly affirmed
he would not allow foreign bases to be established in
Seychelles. The President also indicated recently to
US Embassy officials that he wants to renegotiate the
terms of agreement for the USAF tracking station in
Seychelles-both as a bid for increased payments to
offset a short-term decline in revenues, and as a
further demonstration of his nonaligned posture.
Ratsiraka faces an array of economic difficulties in
Madagascar and is now turning to the West for
assistance. In our judgment, his recent statement to
US Embassy officials that Madagascar would close
the Soviet-supplied signals intelligence network
indicates a willingness to make certain political
concessions as an inducement to the West to grant
substantial aid. Ratsiraka continues to depend on
Moscow, however, for military equipment, training,
and spare parts.
The leaders of Mauritius and Comoros probably
harbor suspicions that the Soviet Union tacitly
supports leftist elements in their governments, and
they have consistently rebuffed most of Moscow's
Prime Minister Jugnauth feels rebuffed by a recent
US decision to limit Mauritian export quotas,
however, and may now try to develop closer economic
relations with East Bloc countries.
The Soviets may be encouraged by Abdallah's recent
acceptance of scholarships for 13 Comoran students.
We believe, however, that he accepted the offer as a
political gesture to demonstrate mild displeasure with
relatively low levels of Western economic assistance.
Outlook
The Soviet Union almost certainly will continue to
look for openings to sustain and expand its presence
and influence. Moscow may press for air and naval
access rights, though such access is not essential to its
operations in the area. In our judgment, the Soviets
are unlikely to devote substantial resources in pursuit
of these objectives.
Moscow the air and naval access its seeks.
certainly will prevent either leader from granting
Moscow is unlikely to achieve significant political
gains in Mauritius and Comoros as long as the current
leadership perceives that their interests continue to lie
with the West. Soviet influence probably will remain
stronger in Seychelles and Madagascar. Rene and
Ratsiraka are firmly committed to their own form of
socialism, but political and economic factors almost
Soviet influence in the region will fluctuate as
conflicting national interests dictate that Indian
Ocean leaders acquire both adequate defense systems
and substantial economic assistance. Moscow's
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L tt. CL
inducements in courting the Indian Ocean states are
not likely to appear attractive enough at present to
offset the potential political risk of losing Western
economic aid. Nevertheless, the unpredictable nature
of regional personalities and politics may periodically
bring to power elements inclined to move closer to
Moscow.
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Secret
Tanzania: Growing
Military Discontent
Discontent in the Tanzanian military, which until now
has been confined to the lower ranks, is beginning to
spread to the senior levels. Complaints also are being
heard again from troops on the island of Zanzibar.
Senior officers are increasingly concerned over
deteriorating economic conditions, lack of promotions,
President Nyerere's attempts to institute party
supremacy, and the possible loss of special privileges
now accorded them. Among the lower ranks,
longstanding complaints about lack of supplies and
training and abuse of privileges by senior officers
continue to erode morale.
Complaints Among Senior Ranks
Senior military officers, traditionally loyal to
Nyerere, are vital to his control of the 42,000-man
Defense Force. Recent events, however, have given
rise to growing rifts among military leaders and
sparked their unusual expression of dissatisfaction
with Nyerere's rule.
Internal Rivalries. Political infighting between
Minister of Defense Kimario and Chief of Defense
Force Musuguri has resulted in the rescinding of all
promotions granted since September 1983)
Musuguri is slated to
retire in early 1985, but his health problems and
political difficulties with Kimario may force him out
prematurely. Any successor to Musuguri will be
forced to deal with the same rivalries with Kimario,
who appears anxious to demonstrate his ultimate
authority over military matters. Nyerere may have
difficulty finding a replacement who is willing and
criticism in the past. Now, however, the growing
realization that Nyerere intends to maintain control
of domestic policy through his position as party
chairman-a position he plans to retain even after he
relinquishes the presidency-reportedly is frustrating
hopes for economic improvement.
Continuing Complaints From the Lower Ranks
Recent signs of discontent among senior officers come
against a backdrop of longstanding grievances on the
part of lower ranking members of the Tanzanian
military. The lack of adequate housing, clothing,
supplies, and equipment causes constant grumbling
among the troops. The lower ranks also criticize the
preferential treatment and special privileges accorded
to senior officers and resent their frequent abuses of
power. For example, goods which are intended for all
levels of the military are snapped up by senior officers
for personal use or for sale on the black market.
food
shortages have become so severe that military
personnel of all levels are forced to find their own
provisions. Low salaries and the effective lack of
promotions since September 1983 also have taken
able to deal with the Defense Minister.
Opposition to Party Supremacy. Complaints against
Nyerere's economic policies are not new in military
circles, but the hope that the economic situation
would improve with Nyerere's scheduled retirement
as President in late 1985-clearing the way for a
successor who might alter the socialist policies that
are preventing an economic recovery-has mitigated
Treason Trials
The treason trials for 19 defendants accused of
involvement in a January 1983 coup plot allegedly
involving some senior officers have added to tensions
Secret
ALA AR 84-018
30 November 1984
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 in the military. During the recently concluded
preliminary proceedings, low-ranking military
defendants raised numerous accusations against
various senior officers-including Major General
Kombe, Chief of the Tanzanian Intelligence and
Security Service-who may be called upon to testify
in higher court,
Nyerere has
indicated he will remove from command and place
under house arrest all those called to testify in the
high court trials, scheduled to begin in late January.
In contrast,
favor the prosecution and are hoping heavy sentences
will be handed down-a view that apparently places
the interests of junior and senior levels in direct
conflict. the lower ranks
are watching the proceedings closely to see if
implicated senior officers will be found guilty and
receive sentences similar to those given to junior
officers.
Zanzibari Discontent
In addition to the causes of discontent shared with the
mainland military, personnel from Zanzibar have
special concerns of their own.
current Zanzibari demands are similar to
those which preceded the unrest in late 1983 and
early 1984 and ended in the forced resignation of
Zanzibar President Aboud Jumbe. Zanzibari troops
want an increased share of:
? Senior military positions.
? Specialized training courses abroad.
? Large weapons stationed on Zanzibar.
Internal problems also have erupted among Zanzibari
military personnel.
there is a sharp division between levels of leadership
of the military division stationed on the island. In
addition, a serious race problem reportedly is
developing between black and Arab Zanzibari
soldiers over alleged favoritism toward Arabs.
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Defense Force officials are taking these problems
seriously and have begun to study ways of relieving
tensions.
Outlook
Nyerere remains dependent on the loyalty of his
senior officers to mitigate the threat posed by military
discontent. As long as he can guarantee their
preferential treatment and special privileges, he is
likely to retain that support. If, however, Nyerere
mishandles the two issues most directly bearing on
their interests-economic reform and the treason
trials-he runs the risk of seriously undermining his
base of support.
Similarly, Nyerere will have to resolve at least some
of the complaints from lower levels in order to defuse
tensions. Economic constraints will complicate any
effort to raise living standards, however, and an
attempt to achieve a more equitable balance of
perquisites between junior and senior ranks would
further weaken his senior-level support.
Although there is no evidence of any current effort to
mount a serious coup attempt, failure to deal with the
military's problems over the longer term could lead to
any of several plausible coup scenarios:
? A "palace coup" by high-level officers moving to
protect parochial interests threatened by the civilian
government or to preempt a coup from lower
military ranks.
? A broad-based coup drawing support from all ranks
to protect perceived military interests in a
deteriorating economic situation.
? A "grassroots" coup fomented by the lower ranks
against a civilian and military leadership unable or
unwilling to provide them the basic necessities.
Zanzibari troops do not have the manpower to mount
a coup of their own, but their separatist activities
could act as a catalyst for opposition in other sectors
of the military.
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Zaire: Rebel Attack
in Shaba
Zairian rebels attacked and held the small town of
Moba in eastern Shaba for two days last month-the
first rebel incident in the province since a major
invasion in 1978. Government forces quickly restored
control, however, and the Mobutu regime was never
threatened. We have been unable to identify the
rebels or the numbers involved. The rebel force
probably was comprised of local dissidents, but
several unconfirmed reports
suggest that responsibility lies with a Tanzanian-
based dissident group that has received training and
assistance from Libya.
The Moba affair represents the first opportunity since
the 1978 Shaba invasion to assess the Zairian military
in a crisis situation. In our view, although Zairian
capabilities have clearly improved, Kinshasa probably
would have required substantial Western assistance to
combat a rebel force similar to the ones that invaded
Shaba in 1977 and 1978.
The Moba attack may have been only a local incident,
but, if Zairian claims of Libyan and Tanzanian
complicity prove true, it could foreshadow an increase
in Tanzanian-based dissident activity in 1985. At a
minimum, we believe the international publicity given
to the rebel attack-particularly because it follows
the widely publicized but unfounded coup rumors in
Kinshasa last month-may inspire dissidents to try to
mount terrorist attacks against Zairian targets in
Kinshasa or Brussels in the near term.
The Event
Zairian rebel forces attacked the town of Moba-
located well to the northeast of Shaba's vital mining
heartland-during the early morning hours of 13
November and, with little apparent resistance from
the 80-man military unit reportedly stationed there,
took control of the town, port, and airfield. The
Mobutu regime, however, easily recaptured the town
48 hours later with a force comprised of a company
from an infantry brigade and a paratrooper battalion
from a French-commanded airborne brigade.
Although Zairian press reports claim that a total of
10 Zairian troops were killed, the US Embassy
reports that there was little fighting and have only
only five of the 80 troops 25X1
garrisoned at Moba reported in after government
forces retook the town, and the other 75 are presumed 25X1
still to be in the bush. 25X1
The Zairian press claims that government forces
killed 120 rebels and captured two. In our view,
however, the kill figures probably are greatly
exaggerated and are not supported by US Embassy
reporting, which suggests that most of the rebels fled
before Zairian military forces arrived. Despite search 25X1
operations in towns around Moba, government forces
have not had further contact with any rebels. The
rebels are believed to be in the bush in the Moba area
and, according to Embassy reporting, still have two
senior Zairian officers they captured on 13
November.) 25X1
Secret
ALA AR 84-018
30 November 1984
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secret
Reporting from the Moba area has been sketchy and
contradictory, but we believe that the rebels' identity
can be reduced to two possibilities:
places
responsibility for the attack on Tanzanian-based
dissidents who had Libyan support.F
an advance team of
the rebel force arrived in the Moba area four
months ago to recruit and train local residents, who
then participated in the attack. In our view, if
Tanzanian-based dissidents are involved, they most
likely are adherents of the Coalition of National
Unity-an organization that was formed recently
when the eastern front faction of the Front for the
National Liberation of Congo united with the
Lumumba faction of the Congolese National
Movement. Under this scenario the attack would
appear to be timed so as to embarrass Mobutu
before his inauguration to a third presidential term
next month.
Possible External Support
The extent of external support for the attack, if any,
remains unclear. In our view, if local dissidents were
responsible, it is very unlikely that they received any
support from external sources. If the Coalition was
involved, however, it probably had substantial help
from Libya.
The Moba attack was carried out by local
dissidents. The Moba area has long contained
dissidents, including cadre of the People's
Revolutionary Party, who periodically participate in
acts of banditry. In addition to opposing the
government, these dissidents participate in
profitable smuggling operations between Tanzania
and Zaire. According to a US Embassy source, a
recent crackdown by local government forces on the
smuggling operations may have precipitated an
attack by these dissidents on the garrison at Moba.
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In our view, if involvement of the Libyans can be
verified, the Moba attack also suggests that Tanzania
either cannot control Libyan activities out of Dar es
Salaam or has chosen to turn a blind eye. We do not
believe that Nyerere would go so far as to directly
support Zairian dissidents, but historically cool
relations with Zaire, possible Libyan promises of
economic aid, and Zaire's recent suspension of its
OAU membership might lead Nyerere-the OAU's 25X1
new chairman-to allow the Libyans more freedom in
support of the Zairian opposition movement.F 25X1
Performance of the Military
In our view, the Zairian military-particularly units
from the French-commanded 31st paratrooper
brigade-responded well to the rebel attack. The
deployment of two companies of the 31st paratrooper
brigade from Kinshasa to Kamina in north central
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Secret
13 November:
? Rebels attack military base in Moba, capturing
airfield, port, administrative building, and hospital.
? Radio contact is lost with company of 13th infantry
brigade stationed in Moba.
? On the orders of the provincial commander and
regional governor, two high-level military officers
commandeer a missionary pilot and his plane to
investigate situation in Moba. On landing at Moba,
pilot is killed by rebels and the two Zairians
captured.
? Commando company of 13th infantry brigade
arrives at Moba port. No rebel presence reported
(town of Moba located 4 kilometers inland).
? Company from intervention brigade dispatched
from Lubumbashi to secure road from Moba to
Lubumbashi.
? The two Aermacchi fighters fly reconnaissance
mission over Moba and report little visual damage
to town, virtually no movement on roads, and two
Zairian naval vessels in Moba's port.
? When no radio contact is received from missionary
and two Zairian officers after landing in Moba, of
the Shaba regional governor and commander of the
1st military region (Shaba) requisition
GECAMINES aircraft and fly to Kalemie.
? Commander of the Zairian ground forces flies to
Kalemie in a Belgian C-130 to direct operations.
? Zairian security officials contact Mobutu
vacationing in France to inform him of the attack.
14 November:
? Mobutu, apparently at the suggestion of senior
military officials in Kinshasa, remains in France so
as not to risk overpublicizing the attack.
? 1st military region, including all forces along
Zambian border, are put on alert.
? Platoon from 13th brigade at Kalemie sent by road
to Moba.
? Commando company of 13th brigade at Kalemie
sent by boat to Moba.
? Two Aermacchi fighters arrive at Lubumbashi from
Kinshasa for reconnaissance mission over Moba.
? C-130 arrives at Kamina from Kinshasa to deploy
troops of the 311th paratrooper battalion.
? 360 paratroopers of French-trained 311th
paratrooper battalion based in Kamina are dropped
on Moba.
? French-commanded 31st brigade based in Kinshasa
put on full alert and 360 troops deployed to
Kamina base in north central Shaba. Troops
transported in two C-130s, including Mobutu's
private plane, and a cargo plane.
? Zairian troops in control of port and parts of the
town. Radio contact reestablished with Moba.
? Zairian troops retake control of airfield and town.
? Zairian Government issues communique stating
that armed elements had attacked town of Moba,
but Zairian forces had liberated town on 15
November. Implicated Belgium and Tanzania in
events leading to attack.
? 214th infantry battalion of 21st brigade based in
Lubumbashi arrives in Moba.
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OVI ACA
Shaba and the airlifting of a paratrooper battalion
based in Kamina to the Moba area was done in a
professional way without major glitches, according to
the US Embassy. The troops were transported in
C-130s, and, according to an Embassy source, the
US-trained crews also performed ably. In our view,
Zaire's ability to transport its elite troops into a
remote area such as Moba shows important
improvement since the Shaba invasions of 1977 and
1978.
At the same time, the Moba attack also demonstrates
that the Zairian military still has a number of serious
deficiencies that would hamper its ability to cope with
a large rebel force. The military was unable to put an
effective fighting force into the Moba area until 48
hours after the rebel attack. In addition, we believe
Zairian military resources were stretched to the
maximum in responding to the attack. According to
US Embassy reporting, military officers were forced
to requisition or commandeer a number of planes and
trucks from Zaire's state enterprises in order to
transport troops. In our view, the shortage of military
transport, lack of intelligence, poor roads, and long
distances would have presented the military serious
problems if the invasion force had consisted of several
hundred men whose objective was to invade Shaba.
Even if Zaire were capable of transporting a large
number of troops to a remote area, inadequate
supplies would limit the troops' ability to fight a
protracted conflict. According to US Embassy
reporting, troops were dispatched to Moba with
inadequate food and fuel supplies, no communications
equipment, and limited ammunition. In addition, US
Embassy reporting indicates that military officials
were searching the Lubumbashi area for food and fuel
in the event that sustained military operations were
necessary.
The actions of the military company stationed at
Moba, which appears to have fled at the first sign of
conflict, illustrate the poor discipline and training in
military units stationed along most of Zaire's borders.
In addition, the 13th brigade, which has responsibility
for security in eastern Shaba, was able to muster only
40 men for the amphibious landing in the Moba area,
according to the US Embassy. These problems clearly
indicate that, other than the Western-trained troops
of the Kinshasa-based Special Presidential Brigade
and 31st airborne brigade, together with some units of
the Lubumbashi-based infantry brigade, the Zairian
military remains a very poorly trained and equipped
force. In our view, units of the Zairian military
stationed along most of Shaba's borders are incapable
of repelling even limited rebel attacks of this type
without assistance from other units sent by Kinshasa.
Conclusions
The small-scale rebel attack on Moba never
threatened the Mobutu regime and cannot be
compared to the approximately 2,000-man force that
invaded Shaba in both 1977 and 1978. In our view,
Kinshasa probably would have been forced to ask for
Western assistance to deal with a larger and better
armed invasion force.
The Zairian press) are 25X1
likely to exaggerate the size of the rebel force and its
external support, while emphasizing the performance
of the military against an externally supported attack,
in an effort to show that opposition to the Mobutu
regime is pointless. We believe, however, that the
Moba attack, coming as it did prior to President
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attended by several heads of state, has embarrassed
the Zairian leader and given the moribund opposition
movement a psychological lift. In addition, the
international publicity given to the attack on Moba
may inspire dissidents to try to mount additional
attacks on Zairian targets.F___1 25X1
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Niger and Its Neighbors
Mauri fl
Algeria
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Egypt
Sudan
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Niger: Kountche's Mounting
Problems
Niger's deteriorating economy-the product of an
extended slump in uranium exports and the effects of
this year's worsening drought-threatens to
undermine moderate President Seyni Kountche's 10-
year-old military government. We believe his hold on
power could erode if he is unable either to revive the
economy or persuade Nigeriens to accept a prolonged
period of economic austerity. Kountche's plan
gradually to return the former French colony to
civilian rule also could provoke opposition among his
military colleagues, who distrust civilians and are
reluctant to relinquish the perquisites of office.
Moreover, we believe Libya may attempt to capitalize
on the growing difficulties of its predominantly
Muslim neighbor by renewing subversive activities.
intent on developing his country as best
as its meager resources permit. His austere, dedicated
style has been shaped in part by his Muslim
background and service in the French colonial Army.
Despite Kountche's commitment to political reform
and economic modernization, however, he has made
little headway in Niger's development since seizing
power 10 years ago to eliminate corrupt and
inefficient civilian rule.
We believe a coup attempt in October 1983 by one of
Kountche's closest advisers highlighted the
vulnerability of the President's one-man military rule.
Kountche has failed to designate an heir or establish
formal succession procedures, and is dependent on the
Army, which put down the coup attempt. The US
Embassy reports that Kountche is now trying to
accelerate the development of political institutions
with the aim of eventually returning the country to
civilian rule. He has named civilians to almost all
cabinet posts and has established a committee to draft
a charter that would become the basis for a new
constitution. In our view, however, Kountche has yet
to find a workable power-sharing formula between the
military and civilian politicians, or to overcome the
military's distrust of civilians.
Mounting Economic Problems
Despite the largest uranium reserves in Sub-Saharan
Africa, estimated to total over 80,000 metric tons,
Niger is one of the world's poorest countries. Only a
small percentage of its 6.3 million population have
found employment in the small, modern, uranium-
dependent economy, which is suffering from a
prolonged slump. The majority still eke out a living as
subsistence farmers or herders. USAID statistics
indicate that this year's agricultural production
probably will be the lowest of the century, exceeding
the worst year of the great drought of the early 1970s
and raising the specter of widespread famine. F_~
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Prosperity in Niger seemed to be within reach in the 25X1
late 1970s, when rapidly rising uranium earnings
generated 80 percent of foreign exchange receipts.
This newfound revenue spurred a short-lived burst of
economic growth, prompting the government to begin
ambitious development projects. Despite the sharp
downturn in the world uranium market in 1980, the
government failed to curb expenditures and instead
borrowed heavily abroad, saddling the country with a 25X1
$800 million debt by the end of 1983. While export
earnings lagged, costs of imports, particular)
petroleum products and food, have soared 25X1
During the last two years, Kountche has attempted to
halt the downward economic slide by implementing
an austerity program and improving government
efficiency. Kountche has called for nationwide belt-
tightening and warned Nigeriens to expect several
more years of economic hardship. US Embassy
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 reporting indicates that the government already has
abandoned or cut back on many development projects,
cut student scholarships, frozen government salaries
and hiring, and reduced operations of several
government-owned companies. Moreover, Niamey
turned to the International Monetary Fund last year
for an $18 million one-year standby agreement and
has requested another $16 million one-year
arrangement for fiscal year 1985. The regime now is
even more dependent on foreign aid, which totals
about $210 million annually and comes largely from
France, West Germany, and the European Economic
Community.
Kountche's efforts to foster economic recovery were
dealt a serious blow this year by the worsening
drought. The UN Food and Agricultural
Organization estimates that, because of drought, the
1984 harvest will yield less than half of 1983's
production, resulting in a food deficit of some 375,000
tons. Starvation and disease have ravaged livestock,
and the FAO calculates it will take up to four years to
reconstitute the herds. The US Embassy estimates
that export earnings from livestock, the country's
major export after uranium, will drop 30 percent from
last year and fall at an accelerated rate as long as the
drought continues. The US Embassy calculates that
the balance-of-payments deficit will grow by some
$15 million this year due to declining export earnings
and probably will be on the order of $38.8 million.
The closure at the Nigeria-Niger border early last
year has compounded Niger's economic troubles.
Nigeria closed the border to combat black-
marketeering and gain control over its own
deteriorating economy. The closure has curtailed
economic activity in the border region where Nigerien
merchants traditionally profited from a vigorous
black-market trade, resulting in food shortages and a
sharp increase in prices for basic commodities.
Although Lagos has promised to open its borders to
permit US emergency food to reach Niger, Niamey
expects that administrative bungling and security
checks will delay shipments as has happened with
relief supplies bound for Chad via Nigeria.F_~
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Potential Sources of Opposition
The Military. The 3,700-man military, which so far
has firmly supported Kountche, is the only force
capable of removing him. We believe the loyalty of
the small officer corps-slightly over 100 men-could
be undermined if Kountche fails to control urban
public dissatisfaction over the economic decline or
pushes a return to civilian rule too determinedly.
Under such circumstances, senior officers could
attempt to deflect public criticism from the military
government by making Kountche the scapegoat for
the country's difficulties. While we have no evidence
of significant organized opposition among the Army's
lower ranks, we believe a coup attempt could be
triggered by a continued economic deterioration. In
the event the austerity program requires the military
to accept substantial reductions in salaries or benefits
and cutbacks in equipment, the enlisted ranks could
become convinced of the need for a radical
redistribution of political and economic power.)
Urban Elite. Most members of Niger's small,
educated civil service elite owe their employment to
Kountche, and, according to US Embassy reporting,
traditionally have been a pillar of support for the
government. Civil servants, however, have been hit
hard by inflation and austerity and are frustrated
with the slow pace of return to civilian rule. In our
view, they will be reluctant to continue to forgo pay
raises and benefits or to accept further reductions in
living standards. The US Embassy reports that
midlevel government workers were particularly hurt
last summer by cuts or elimination of their housing
allowances and other benefits.
Tribalism. Since independence, Niger's northern
nomadic tribes-less than 10 percent of the
population-have resisted attempts by successive
southern-dominated governments to control them.
The inability of the small military to police effectively
large portions of the northern territories opens these
areas to potential subversion. Although
some Tuareg and Toubou
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tribesmen may be accepting small arms and funds
from Libyan leader Qadhafi, the US Embassy reports
that these fiercely independent peoples are doing so to
maintain their nomadic lifestyle rather than out of
political sympathy for Qadhafi or Libyan policies.
Nevertheless, tribal discontent over the north's
meager share of power could serve Libyan interests by
providing a rallying point for opposition to Kountche's
southern-based regime. The US Embassy indicates
that the government's slowness to allot to the nomads
at least initially an adequate portion of relief
assistance to alleviate the harsh effects of the drought
this year has aggravated their traditional animosity
toward the government
Kountche's government also could face eventual
challenges from Hausa tribesmen in the south, who
make up more than 50 percent of the population.
According to US Embassy reporting, the Hausa have
long dominated Niger's commercial trade while
Kountche's fellow Djermas monopolize the military
and civil service. We believe this traditional balance
could be upset (a Libyan-backed Hausa coup attempt
took place in 1975) if the economic fortunes of the
Hausa are threatened or if they feel they are bearing
a disproportionate share of economic hardships.
Islam. According to US Embassy reporting, more
than 80 percent of Niger's population is Muslim, but
the country's moderate form of Islam has not played
an important political role, and we do not have
evidence to suggest an imminent rise in Islamic
fundamentalism. In our judgment, however, religious
firebrands could use Islam to rally opposition across
tribal lines by claiming the country's economic
downturn is the result of unrealistic efforts to
modernize at the expense of local cultures.F_~
The Libyan Factor
Libya's continued military presence in northern Chad,
the emergence of a Libyan-backed radical regime in
neighboring Burkina last year, and Tripoli's close ties
with left-leaning Benin have raised Nigerien fears
that Qadhafi will intensify his efforts to strengthen his
influence in the Sahel. Tripoli has referred to Niger as
"next in line after Chad" and has long laid claim to
portions of its uranium-rich northern border area.
Although the US Embassy reports that Qadhafi's
radical ideology holds little attraction for most
Nigeriens, we believe the country's mounting
economic and social dislocation could offer him new
opportunities to further his designs in the region.
We believe Qadhafi's efforts to establish a permanent
presence on the Nigerien frontier will allow him
greater access to Niger's northern border area. The
US Embassy reports the Libyans' ongoing 25X1
construction of an airfield astride Niger's border may
be designed to establish a permanent military
presence in the disputed territory, as they did in
Chad's Aozou Strip in the early 1970s. Many Libyan
airfields are located along the Libyan border,
however, and this airfield may represent another link
in the Libyan chain of frontier defenses. We believe
the airfield, when completed, will be capable of
accommodating any aircraft in the Libyan inventory.
Based on past practices, we believe that Qadhafi also
could try to exploit Niger's problems by providing
money, supplies, and training to potential coup
plotters or northern dissident groups. In recent years
Qadhafi also has sought to encourage domestic unrest 25X1
by broadcasting propaganda urging Nigeriens to rise
up against the government, bribing government
officials, and encouraging them to defect to Tripoli. In
April 1982, Niger alleged publicly that Libya was
behind a plot by northern Tuaregs to blow up the
major uranium processing plant at Arlite, 750 miles
northeast of the capital.
Although Kountche deeply mistrusts Libyan
intentions in the region, we believe that, in hopes of
placating Qadhafi, he recently responded favorably to 25X1
Tripoli's proposal that the two countries upgrade
relations. The US Embassy reports both the Libyan
and Nigerien Embassies currently are sparsely
staffed, with two Nigerien diplomats resident in
Tripoli and one Libyan administrative officer in
Niamey. Kountche 25X1
agreed to an exchange of ambassadors earlier this
year on the condition that Qadhafi repatriate several
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hundred Nigerien dissidents harbored in Libya and
refrain from interfering in Niger's domestic affairs.
In our view, Kountche-or any other Nigerien
leader-will continue to avoid publicly taking anti-
Libyan positions. Kountche has repeatedly indicated
that he believes his weak nation must continue to deal
with its stronger neighbor. Should Kountche be
displaced, new leaders, perhaps less suspicious of
Qadhafi's motives and in need of economic assistance,
could be particularly susceptible to Tripoli's
traditional blandishments of quick financial aid in
exchange for another Libyan toehold in the region
Other Foreign Policy Concerns
France has been Niger's most reliable and largest
source of technical, budgetary, and security assistance
since independence in 1960. Some 175 French
advisers are involved in every aspect of the country's
security. The US Embassy reports France has helped
to equip a Nigerien armored squadron to be stationed
in the northern town of Agadez to help protect against
possible Libyan encroachment. US Embassy reporting
from Niamey indicates that, although Niamey and
Paris do not have a formal mutual defense agreement,
France probably would intervene militarily if Niger
became the target of direct Libyan aggression.
France provided about 25 percent of Niger's total
foreign aid in 1982 as well as development loans on
concessionary terms to finance long-term government
projects. France also is Niger's largest trading
partner; it bought 82 percent of Niamey's exports in
1981, the last year for which reliable data are
available. France purchases the majority of the
country's uranium production and is willing to provide
price subsidies to maintain a reliable, long-term
source of supply.
Kountche is highly suspicious of Soviet motives in
Africa and limits Moscow's presence to a 10-man
embassy. The US Embassy reports the Nigerien
Government scrutinizes the activities of Soviet
diplomats, who complain that they frequently are
denied permission to travel ouside the capital.
Although Niamey renewed a 20-year-old cultural
accord with Moscow last year, Soviet assistance is
limited to several medical technicians and some 15
scholarships for Nigerien students in the USSR.F
Iran established an embassy in Niamey last March
consisting of six diplomats handled by a charge. In
our view, the new Iranian presence probably is linked
to Tehran's efforts to upgrade relations with Islamic
countries in Africa and to Niamey's attempt to sell
uranium. Iran
sought to purchase a small amount of Niger s
uranium last May under a barter agreement for
Iranian petroleum products. The deal apparently fell
through, however, because Niger already purchases
ample fuel supplies at relatively low prices from
Nigeria. Niamey has kept Iran's diplomats under
close surveillance, and Nigerien officials are
suspicious of Iranian efforts to foment religious
fundamentalism among the country's moderate Sunni
Muslim population.
The Kountche regime maintains close ties with
Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, all of which have
active embassies in Niamey. According to the US
Embassy, Riyadh has provided Niger with some $15
million in direct budgetary support and about $30
million in development funds since 1975.
US Relations
Niger's relations with the United States are excellent.
In fiscal year 1984, US security assistance reached
about $10.3 million and development aid totaled some
$19.6 million. Washington had budgeted about $22
million in development aid, $5 million in an economic
support fund, a $5 million military assistance
program, and $200,000 for military training and
education for fiscal year 1985. Niamey has purchased
several US C-130 transport aircraft and receives
spare parts and associated pilot and maintenance
training under the modest military aid program.
Washington also provided assistance to the Nigerien
Army to equip and train a new parachute unit located
at Maradi in central Niger for the first time in 1983,
and a small defense attache office is scheduled to open
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L V ict
early next year. Emergency food aid from the United
States is likely to total about $30 million by the end of
next year in response to Niger's serious food deficit.
In his capacity as current head of the Permanent
Interstate Committee To Combat Drought in the
Sahel, Kountche probably will voice his appreciation
for US emergency food assistance to Niger and the
region.
Prospects
We believe that Kountche probably will press ahead
with his program of austerity and longer term plans to
return to civilian rule. Barring an unlikely upturn in
the world uranium market, the Nigerien economy
probably will continue to weaken, increasing the
potential for instability and Libyan meddling.
Kountche can ill afford to increase Niger's debt and
will continue to appeal to Western and moderate
Arab sources for more foreign assistance.)
term economic assistance.
Though unlikely, we cannot totally discount the
possibility that, out of desperation, Kountche may
make risky foreign policy moves in hopes of promoting
uranium sales or gaining additional economic aid,
such as allowing relations to warm with Libya and
Iran. Tripoli or Tehran could use such an opening to
stir increased opposition to Kountche's moderate
regime by focusing local attention on his government's
inability to deal with Niger's dismal economic
prospects. We do not believe, however, that the
Libyans or Iranians are willing or capable of bailing
out Niger in the short run or providing major long-
Any successor regime, in our judgment, probably
would prove less stable and more vulnerable to foreign
meddling. Although a new government headed by
senior Army officers probably would retain a
moderate and pro-Western orientation, we believe less
experienced leaders would be more vulnerable to
Libyan exploitation of mounting public dissatisfaction
over the economic downturn. Moreover, the possible
emergence of a radical regime dominated by junior
Army officers could afford Libya the opportunity to
gain enough influence to use the country as a base for
subversion against an even more desirable regional
target-northern Nigeria, which has the largest
concentration of Muslims in black Africa.
Kountche has proved himself to be a political survivor,
and we believe he may be able to weather the economic
crisis and proceed gradually toward civilian rule if he
can moderate the impact of austerity measures. In our
view, however, he will find it increasingly difficult to
balance the need for austerity and progress toward
civilian rule with competing demands from his political
supporters that he protect their interests. While
Kountche has proved adept at defusing explosive issues
and controlling his opposition in the past, he may feel
compelled to resort to more authoritarian measures,
which would only discredit the regime and provoke
greater opposition.F_~
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Angola: Cultivating France
Since the early 1980s, Angola has attempted to
cultivate relations with France and a few other
Western countries in an effort to balance its ties more
evenly with the Soviet Bloc and Cuba. The bilateral
relationship that has developed between Paris and
Luanda has yielded economic benefits, but only
limited political gains.
Political Goals
In the first years after it came to power in 1975, the
Angolan regime was cool to France, believing that
Paris was continuing to supply arms to the UNITA
insurgents. The countries established relations in
1977, but Angola delayed sending an ambassador to
Paris until early 1980, mainly because of French
involvement in suppressing the Angolan-backed
dissident invasions of Zaire's Shaba region in 1977
and 1978.
Angolan relations with France began to improve in
early 1981 during a visit to Luanda by French
The relationship picked up after President Mitterrand
took office in May 1981. He and several of his top
advisers were concerned about Soviet and Cuban
influence in southern Africa and believed subtle
diplomacy, economic support, and occasional military
assistance could wean "progressive" regimes-most
notably Angola-from their Communist patrons. The
new government shifted the direction of France's
African policy by proclaiming a greater distance
between itself and South Africa.
Luanda apparently attempted to trade on the new
French policy by prompting Paris into pressing the
United States to abandon its support for South
Africa's insistence on linking a Cuban troop
withdrawal from Angola to a settlement in Namibia.
As a member of the five-nation "Western Contact
Group" seeking a settlement in Namibia, Paris 25X1
appeared particularly well positioned to play such a
role. 25X1
Although we believe French policymakers largely
ignored Angolan political advice, the Angolans may
believe their pressure on France succeeded. French
officials publicly condemned linkage, and in late 1983
Paris dropped out of participation in the Contact
Group-apparently at the initiative of Foreign
Minister Cheysson. The French action, however, did
not lead to the removal of the concept of linkage from
the ongoing negotiations on southern Africa.
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The bilateral political relationship, meanwhile, has
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traced in part to Angolan bungling. The Angolans, for 25X1
example, angered Paris when they issued a
"communique" during the visit of a senior French
delegation to Luanda in 1981 that they had failed to
The French appear divided over how best to promote
a regional settlement. The Foreign Ministry's
preference for distancing France from any effort to
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link a Cuban withdrawal from Angola to a Namibian
settlement reflects a belief that such efforts constitute
external interference in Angolan affairs and gives
South Africa a pretext to remain in Namibia. On the
other hand, US Embassy reporting indicates that key
presidential aides believe a prior understanding on the
Cuban troop issue may be necessary to reach a
settlement on Namibia, and that concerted Western
pressure may move Luanda toward a compromise. To
increase that pressure, we believe France may be
giving some limited assistance to UNITA.
French trade with Angola is largely one sided in
France's favor. France is second only to Portugal in
imports to Angola from non-Communist countries.
By far the most significant French economic
involvement in Angola has been in oil exploration and
production. A French company, Elf-Aquitaine, is the
operator of a foreign consortium that is lifting oil
from an Angolan offshore field. Elf is expanding its
exploration in this block with credit from a
consortium of French banks arranged last spring,
Elf
Economic Cooperation
The Angolans have had more success with France as a
source of investment and economic and technical
assistance. The two countries signed a cooperation
agreement in 1980 and have since implemented it in a
variety of areas.
Angola and France
subsequently signed four aid protocols funded at $300
million each. These are largely for export credits and
are insured up to 85 percent by a French Government
agency.
Among the projects funded have been a technical aid
program for reviving Angola's nearly defunct coffee
industry, two technical schools to train mechanics and
electricians, and a fish processing plant. We believe
Paris also has undertaken a variety of other aid
projects and has provided a limited number of
scholarships for Angolan students to study in France.
Angola plans
to invite France to participate in a project that will
expand the country's civilian air traffic control
system.
also has a 25-percent share in another offshore field,
and another French company TOTAL, has a 17.5-
ercent share in a third field.
Takula field off Cabinda.
a French
petrochemical and pipeline company has agreed to
participate with Gulf Cabinda in development of the
Angola, meanwhile, apparently hopes its economic
cooperation with France will expand even further.
According to a diplomatic report, the Angolan
Finance Minister invited the French to participate in
a long list of projects during a trip to Paris in July
1983. According to other diplomatic reporting, the
French were astonished by the emphasis President dos
Santos and his delegation placed on bilateral
economic ties during an unofficial visit to France in
September. Planning Minister do Nascimento
presented the French with a request for financial help
for a list of projects, and dos Santos paid calls on a
French aerospace firm and the head of Elf-Aquitaine.
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Prospects
We doubt that the Franco-Angolan relationship will
change much. Even if Luanda were to learn that the
French could be giving aid to UNITA, it might
choose to overlook the assistance in order to preserve
the economic benefits derived from the relationship
through the oil connection and French-financed
exports. Moreover, we believe the MPLA regime will
overlook its disappointment over Paris's inability to
soften Pretoria's policies or to unlink the issue of a
Cuban troop withdrawal in Angola from a settlement
in Namibia.
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Kenya: Improving Regional
Relationships
Over the past year, President Moi has cultivated his
image as a regional statesman and assumed a more
active role in dealing with neighboring Somalia,
Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania. His efforts to
improve his regional relationships, however, are
guided primarily by his concern for Kenya's internal
security.
Rapprochement With Somalia
The Kenyan Government has made significant strides
in improving the security situation in its Northeast
Province, which is inhabited mainly by ethnic
Somalis. Nairobi has combined a policy of
reconciliation with neighboring Somalia and a two-
pronged internal program of economic development
and pacification within the province. Earlier this year
Moi sent troops to the province to put down fighting
between two Somali subclans. The harsh tactics used
by the Kenyans came in for heavy domestic and
international criticism, but Mogadishu apparently
accepted Kenya's jurisdiction and appeared
appreciative of Nairobi's efforts to keep the Somalis
informed-particularly since the crackdown impacted
most heavily on ethnic opponents of Somali President
Siad. Last July, Moi accepted a longstanding
invitation from Siad to visit Somalia and normalize
Kenyan-Somali relations. Although there are still
problems, including the delineation of the border, the
US Embassy reports routine cross-border contacts
already have improved.
The rapprochement between Nairobi and Mogadishu
has persuaded ethnic Somali dissidents from
northeastern Kenya that they are about to lose their
sanctuaries in Somalia. As a result, the US Embassy
reports that more than 300 dissidents have
surrendered to accept amnesty, turning in over 350
weapons and quantities of ammunition. Kenya
recently granted amnesty to 18 members of the
Northern Frontier District Liberation Front's High
Command, many of whom are ethnic Somalis,
depriving the movement of much of its leadership.
Minister of State Mohamed, the only major Kenyan
politician of Somali extraction, has been acting both
as intermediary with the dissidents and public
spokesman for the government as it tries to better its
image. He has played a prominent role on the
development side, spearheading efforts to improve
regional conditions by constructing water systems and
airlifting emergency water supplies to communities in
the and province. His high visibility as a role model
for ethnic Somali cooperation could be useful to the
government in building momentum for the
pacification program.
Moi almost certainly believes his efforts to improve
relations with Siad will have a further beneficial
fallout for Kenya-namely, greater aid from the
United States, which is encouraging the
reconciliation. But further progress on mending
Kenyan-Somali relations is likely to be slow at best,
given the lingering suspicions on both sides.
The Ethiopian Angle
Moi followed his Somali rapprochement with a
September visit to Ethiopia. Addis Ababa, although a
Soviet client, has a longstanding military pact with
Kenya-based on mutual distrust of Mogadishu-
that Moi clearly does not want to jeopardize. If
relations with Somalia continue to improve, Kenya
may see less need to maintain military cooperation
with Ethiopia. occasional 25X1
joint military operations with Addis Ababa have been
motivated by perceptions by both countries that
Mogadishu is their most likely common opponent. We
believe some Kenyans, however, are beginning to see
Ethiopia as a greater long-term security threat
because of its role as a vehicle of Soviet influence and
because of the Mengistu government's alliance with
Libya. Kenya has suspected Ethiopia of supporting
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anti-Siad dissidents operating in Kenya's border area,
but has chosen not to surface the issue as a major
point of controversy between the two governments.
Uganda and Tanzania
Moi continues close contact with Uganda's Obote and
Tanzania's Nyerere. At Uganda's request last April,
he provided air, artillery, ground, and logistic support
for military operations against the Pokot ethnic group
which had been conducting raids against other tribes
in the Kenya-Uganda border region. Moi also ordered
security forces to help eliminate rustling and attacks
on tourists along the Kenya-Tanzania border. The
action reflects Moi's view that stabilizing the border
region is vital to Kenya's interest even if Nairobi is
forced to act unilaterally. Providing military support
as part of a joint effort, however, has contributed to
strengthened relations with Tanzania and Uganda.
Stabilizing conditions in the border area have
facilitated the resumption of trade made possible by
the recent political settlement of the prolonged
dispute among the three countries involving the
economic assets of the East African Community.
Prospects
Security issues are likely to remain the key element of
Moi's relations with his neighbors, although other
potential benefits-enhanced prestige as a regional
leader and increased trade opportunities, for
example-also will affect his policies. Uganda's
inherent instability, however, will make Moi reluctant
to move too close to Obote in order to preserve the
potential for cooperative relations with any successor
regime.
Moi also will be wary of getting Kenya caught
between Ethiopia and Somali in their smoldering
dispute over the Ogaden. In our view, the course of
the Somali-Ethiopian conflict in the Ogaden will have
an important impact on Nairobi's relations with both
countries. A revitalized Somali military would revive
Kenyan fears over Somali irredentism and hamper
improving ties. As long as Somalia remains militarily
weak and fully preoccupied by the threat from
Ethiopia, however, Kenyan officials probably will
move ahead cautiously with the reconciliation with
Somalia. We expect him to apply discreet pressure on
both Siad and Mengistu to curtail support for tribal
groups involved in cross-border operations-
particularly the use of Kenyan territory for transit to
target areas. In this regard, he is likely to play the role
of impartial peacemaker, trying to defuse
confrontation while attempting to avoid taking strong
positions which could jeopardize cooperative relations
with either side.
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Secret
Uganda: Security Situation and
Drought in the Northeast
A drought-induced famine and the deteriorating
security situation in the Karamoja region of Uganda
are generating cross-border raids by Karamajong
tribesmen that threaten to destabilize the Sudanese-
Kenyan-Ugandan border, according to the US
Embassy in Kampala. The Government of Uganda
has shown little interest in aiding the region, leaving
the question of famine relief to religious and
international donor agencies. A decision by Kampala
earlier this year to withdraw its security forces from
Karamoja led directly to the deteriorating security
situation.
Background
Karamoja is the largest region in Uganda,
encompassing 15 percent of the country. Its 275,000
Karamajong tribesmen are evenly divided between
farmers and herdsmen. The latter have long
supplemented their herds with raids against Kenyan,
Ugandan, and Sudanese villages.
Prior to the late 1970s, local police forces usually were
able to contain the raiders, but, since Karamajong
herdsmen captured several tons of modern Soviet
weaponry from Ugandan Army armories at the time
of the collapse of Idi Amin's regime in 1978, they
have been able to operate largely without fear of
reprisal. In 1983 and early 1984, these raiders struck
50 miles deep into Sudan, as well as into eastern
Kenya and central Uganda.
A joint Kenyan-Ugandan force supported by
helicopter gunships responded early this year by
attacking Karamajong settlements, causing heavy
casualties among the farmers and destroying their
grain reserves. The operations, however, failed to
engage the herdsmen whose raids precipitated the
military reprisals. The subsequent failure of the maize
and sorghum crops has forced tens of thousands of
Karamajong farmers to resettle around mission
stations and the regional headquarters of
international relief organizations.
While the Kenyan-Ugandan military operations and
the drought have devastated the farming
communities, the herdsmen once again have begun
raiding Sudanese, Kenyan, and Ugandan villages for
cattle and brides. A senior UN official recently told
the US Embassy that a Karamajong raid in October
captured more than 10,000 cattle from settlements in
southern Sudan. In early November, a second
Karamajong force killed 20 to 25 Sudanese soldiers
and policemen, kidnaped young women, and captured
several thousand cattle in southern Sudan, according
to US Embassy reporting.
The Government of Uganda, preoccupied with a
deteriorating situation in the Luwero Triangle, has
withdrawn most police and military units from
Karamoja, precipitating the collapse of regional and
local government organizations, according to US
Embassy reporting. Despite requests by Karamajong
community leaders and chiefs, Kampala has made no
effort to reorganize the infrastructure in the
northeast, leaving responsibility for the population to
local missions and international aid organizations.
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Prospects
UN officials and local missionaries believe that by
mid-December Karamoja will have exhausted its food
reserves and that, unless 1,500 to 2,000 tons a month
are provided for the next seven months, a major
famine will result. Uganda made a request for food 25X1
aid to the World Food Program in mid-November,
but has shown little interest in coordinating either the
transportation or distribution of relief.
Secret
ALA AR 84-018
30 November 1984
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Boundary repre entation is
not necessar Iy aUthoritativ
Tanzania
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secret
We agree with US Embassy reporting that, without
prompt action on Kampala's part, Karamoja will
experience a famine on the level of 1980-81, when
several thousand tribesmen perished. We also concur
with US Embassy reporting that the lack of a
responsive government security policy will engender
additional cross-border raids and military reprisals
that could further destabilize the Kenyan-Ugandan-
Sudanese border region.
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Secret
Africa
Briefs
Although the OAU succeeded in convening its 20th summit earlier this month, it
failed to resolve the internal divisions that have caused the collapse of past
summits and could threaten future ones.
In a presummit effort to gloss over deep conflicts and to achieve a show of
unanimity, the heads of state agreed to seat the Polisario's government, set aside
the Chad issue, and select Tanzanian President Nyerere as chairman. The seating
of the Polisario, the first guerrilla group to have full OAU membership status, and
the decision of Morocco to withdraw its membership as a result, set precedents
that could cause problems for subsequent summits
The resolutions of the 20th summit were formulated, as in the past, to portray
African consensus and were predictably uncontroversial. The statement on South
Africa by the heads of state, for example, condemns "the collaboration of certain
Western countries with racist South Africa" but avoids mentioning the United
States, presumably to avoid objections from moderate states. The official
resolution of the summit to be released later by the OAU secretariat, however, will
single out the United States and Israel for their policies toward South Africa. The
OAU's new emphasis on Africa's economic problems, particularly food and debt,
is not likely to lead to greater collaborative efforts by the highly diversified
African nations.
Namibia New Draft Regulations To Expand Territorial Army
South African authorities in Namibia on 31 October raised the age limit to 54 for
compulsory military service and began registering males 17 and over regardless of
race, political sympathies, or prior service. An Army announcement in mid-
November claimed that more than 17,000 whites, blacks, and mixed-race Coloreds
had registered at centers set up south of the border operational area. Pretoria,
however, has refrained from implementing conscription in the northern zone,
where most blacks live, because support for the South-West Africa People's
Organization (SWAPO) is strong in that area. The first new draftees probably will
be part-time reservists for conventional reserve and local counterinsurgency units.
More part-time forces are needed because Namibia cannot afford a large police
force and professional standing army
29 Secret
ALA AR 84-018
30 November 1984
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The new regulations suggest that Pretoria is accelerating plans to replace South
African troops in the territory with Namibians, according to the US Embassy in
Pretoria. A South African officer told a US official in October that the goal is to
assign full responsibility for counterinsurgency operations to the South-West
African Territory Force within two years. That force currently has about 11,000
Namibian soldiers in it. They make up 55 percent of all government troops in the
territory-up from 20 percent in 1980
SWAPO President Sam Nujoma has condemned the new draft regulations, saying
they are preparatory to a South African internal settlement in Namibia that would
prevent implementation of the UN plan for independence. He decried Pretoria's
use of Namibian proxies to continue the war against SWAPO, noting that it might
include drafting SWAPO officials themselves. Political and church leaders in
Namibia also protest that the measure could force Namibians to fight close
relatives in SWAPO.
Sao Tome Looking Westward?
Leftist Sao Tome, apparently seeking to diversify its relations away from heavy
dependence on the Soviet Bloc, has requested a military training agreement with
the United States as part of an effort to improve ties with the West. Moreover, the
country's Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defense have expressed a desire to
visit the United States. Since independence from Portugal in 1975, Sao Tome has
pursued a leftist foreign policy and has been a strong supporter of the radical
regime in Angola. Some 2,000 Angolan troops and 120 Soviets garrison Sao Tome.
Indications of Sao Tome's gradual shift toward better relations with the West
include a cabinet shuffle last February in which some pragmatic technocrats
replaced Marxist hardliners, improved relations with Gabon which harbors anti-
regime Sao Tome exiles, and a reduction of anti-American rhetoric. Sao Tome also
has requested Portuguese assistance in revising the school curriculum and
providing military assistance. Manuel Pinto da Costa, Sao Tome's only president
since independence, has admitted to US diplomats that his foreign policy lacks
balance, and indicated this would be corrected. In his national day speech last
July, da Costa avoided Marxist slogans and promised adherence to "strict
nonalignment."
Sao Tome's interest in the West, in our judgment, reflects the deterioration of the
cocoa-based economy, rather than an ideological reorientation. The infrastructure
has decayed, and most consumer goods and food must be imported. The Soviets
have not provided significant economic aid, and the few successful agricultural
schemes are done under Western auspices. Despite Sao Tome's moves, however,
there is no indication that Soviet and Angolan troops will depart. Moreover,
influential leftists, such as Foreign Minister Amorim, continue to control some key
posts.
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Tanzania will begin training a new 600-man
Mozambican battalion in December, under the terms of an agreement reached
early this year. Originally scheduled to start last March, the program was delayed
because the Mozambicans did not send their candidates in time. Training should
proceed this time, however, since all trainees are already in Tanzania attending
technical and specialized courses. At the end of the four-month course, the
battalion will return to Mozambique to train other battalions. President Machel is
expected to visit Tanzania to inspect the new unit before it returns.
During talks in late October, Tanzania reportedly agreed to accept an additional
350 Mozambican troops in specialized courses-including crew-served weapons,
communications, and administrative procedures-which are scheduled to begin by
the end of January 1985. Because both the battalion training and the specialized
courses are scheduled to extend into 1985, the two sides will reconvene in
December to discuss renewing or amending military agreements due to expire at
the end of 1984.
Tanzanian military officials anticipate a request to
participate in the opening of two new training camps in northern Mozambique.
This would require Tanzania's sending advisers and instructors out of the country,
a commitment which President Nyerere may be reluctant to make in the wake of
current difficulties within the Tanzanian military and increasing activism among
Zanzibari separatists. The Tanzanians also may hesitate to expand their military
assistance because of previous problems with Mozambique over payment and other
obligations. On the other hand, Tanzania's desire to help Mozambique in its
struggle against the insurgents and the prospect of obtaining foreign currency-
which Tanzania desperately needs-may make Dar es Salaam more responsive to
this request.
Tanzanian Prime Minister Salim announced to the National Assembly in early
November that he had instructed Regional Commissioners to lift roadblocks
instituted during the campaign against economic sabotage that began in March
1983. Perishable food items now can be shipped in unlimited quantities between
regions. In addition, each person is allowed to transport up to 500 kilograms of
cereal for domestic sale. Nevertheless, the government still requires a license for
amounts greater than 500 kilograms and prohibits the export of cereals.
The roadblocks were set up under former Prime Minister Sokoine to prevent
individuals from amassing and hoarding goods. The impact of the regulations was
particularly severe on families that owned plots outside cities where they resided
because it prevented them from bringing home food that they had grown. Sokoine
bowed to pressure to ease restrictions as early as July 1983, ordering roadblocks to
allow transport of up to 500 kilograms of grain between regions, but regional
authorities largely ignored this directive. Consequently, prices in drought-stricken
regions rose more than six times the level of prices for comparable goods in other
areas.
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US Embassy reporting indicates that pressure from the World Bank and
smallholder farmers was at least partially responsible for the lifting of the
roadblocks. Nyerere almost certainly recognizes that, if he is forced to request
additional food aid, his steps to expedite the distribution of locally grown food
would help defuse a politically volatile issue.
A mid-November government shuffle has strengthened Head of State Rawlings
and economic moderates, which should improve cooperation with Western
financial institutions and aid economic reform efforts. Moderates, already in
charge of finance and economic planning and the central bank, have acquired the
portfolios of agriculture, industries, and trade and now dominate a revamped
national economic commission. The government shuffle was motivated in part by
Ghana's effort to attract more substantial promises of Western aid at a Paris
donor's conference scheduled for 11-12 December
The effects of two decades of economic deterioration forced Rawlings to shift from
economic radicalism to orthodoxy in 1983, despite the misgivings of powerful
leftists in defense and security positions. Accra undertook a three-year austerity
program designed by the International Monetary Fund that included the
devaluation of the national currency, increases in cocoa and other producer prices,
and the elimination of subsidies on petroleum prices last year. So far, the regime
has adhered strictly to IMF policies, and, last August, received a 16-month,
$181.6 million standby credit. If Ghana fails to receive sufficient donor funding in
Paris, the regime's radical faction-which has criticized reliance on Western
governments and institutions-may find itself in a more influential position.
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