AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200960001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 19, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
T\ Intelligence
FlUE. COPI I
Africa Review
-ter
ALA AR 85-009
19 April 1985
Copy 3 5 2
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5eeret
Liberia: Aftermath of the Assassination Attempt
eventually could pose a serious threat to the regime
Tension has eased following an unsuccessful assassination attempt
against Head of State Doe, but the incident and Doe's response are
diverting attention from a deteriorating economic situation that
support.
Increasing opposition from leftist party officials and the military
could force President Sassou-Nguesso to abandon his recent turn
toward the West unless he succeeds in shoring up his internal
Western countries.
Despite Mozambique's Marxist policies and dependence on Soviet
Bloc military aid, most of its economic assistance comes from
Sierra Leone: Stevens To Stay on Temporarily
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
Page
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief.
Secret
ALA AR 85-009
19 April 1985
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AB tklles
Liberia Aftermath of
the Assassination Attempt
Tension in Monrovia has eased following an
unsuccessful assassination attempt on 1 April against
I lead of State Doe and his subsequent release from
detention of leading opposition party figures, who
initially were suspected of involvement with executed
ringleader, Lieutenant Colonel Flanzamaton.
Although the would-be assassin alluded strongly to
backing from a US citizen in his public confession,
Doe has avoided overt ani:i -US moves. Doe marked
his fifth year in power on 12 April with a speech that
ignored the assassination attempt and emphasized the
need for national unity and economic recovery.
Despite his mild response thus far, many Liberians
believe Doe sought at first to use the assassination
episode as an opportunity to suppress aspiring
opposition parties further and to try to obtain more
support from the United .States. We believe several of
Doe's advisers are likely to continue to exploit his
security concerns by advocating additional tampering
with the process of returning to civilian government
and moving toward a more nonaligned foreign policy.
By concentrating on short-term political crises-many
of the regime's own making Doe will continue to
divert resources away from dealing with a
deteriorating economic situation that may, in the long
run, prove a greater threat to his tenure.
Flanzamaton, deputy commander of the Executive
Mansion Guard, fired 30 rounds from a 50-caliber
machinegun into Doe's jeep. Doe managed to escape
unhurt, but two of his bodyguards were injured.
Flanzamaton was arrested three days later outside
Monrovia, and executed on 8 April.
The regime's swift arrest of leading opposition figures
and the implausibility of Flanzamaton's assertions of
opposition and US involvement led many observers to
speculate that Doe was using the attack as a pretext to
hamstring the opposition and to pressure the United
States for more support. Flanzamaton claimed that a
US citizen and the leaders of three opposition parties
offered him $ 1 million to kill Doe. Liberian security
services promptly detained Gabriel Matthews, leader
of the populist United People's Party; Edward
Kesselly, head of the centrist Unity party; and Tuan
Wreh and Harry Greaves, leaders of the moderate 25X1
Liberian Action Party. Rumors of mistreatment of
the opposition politicians led their followers to
threaten mass demonstrations if the leaders were not
released.
Three days after his initial allegations, Flanzamaton
recanted, and claimed several key military leaders
were involved. Flanzamaton was summarily executed,
while 15 officers and enlisted men who responded
inadequately to the attack were sent to prison. Doe
released the civilian politicians, who appeared to have
been well treated and who called for a standdown
from demonstrations. Although the release defused
tensions in Monrovia, Doe's motorcade was jeered by
crowds.
Lingering Doubts
The US Embassy reports that many Liberians remain
skeptical of the government's version of events.
According to the Embassy, Doe is almost always
accompanied by fellow Krahn bodyguards, yet the
Secret
ALA AR 85-009
19 April 1985
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two guards injured were from other ethnic groups.
Liberians who have viewed the jeep wonder how
anyone could have escaped unharmed. Flanzamaton
reportedly calmly walked away and was still in
Monrovia three days after the attack. Flanzamaton's
initial confession also raised doubts. He reportedly
seemed unfamiliar with the names of those whom he
was accusing and appeared to be using notes. F__1
Political Opposition
Doe still appears committed to returning to civilian
government providing he can control the process and
emerge as an elected president. Successful elections,
scheduled for October would allow him to claim
domestic and international legitimacy, while scuttling
the transition would increase the potential for
instability. Rioting is likely if Doe makes himself
president without benefit of elections. Many Liberians
no longer believe a fair election is possible.
Although opposition party leaders were cleared and
released, their participation in the return to civilian
government remains uncertain. Doe's efforts to secure
his election as president are making it difficult for
more than one or two lesser parties to organize and
register. At the moment, no party outside Doe's own
National Democratic Party of Liberia is fully
registered. As the registration deadline draws near,
the two major opposition parties probably will not be
allowed to complete the process in time, and protest
demonstrations are possible. F_~
While opposition party leaders are trying to restrain
their followers, tensions are likely to heighten as the
election approaches. Serious confrontation, violence,
or a coup could be triggered by several events,
including an overreaction by Doe to an opposition
demonstration, or his blatant manipulation of the
elections.
Several options remain open to opposition leaders.
They could choose to back a single candidate.
Another alternative would be to seek a coalition with
Doe in hopes of obtaining some of their objectives by
working within the administration. Several leaders
have proposed a boycott to tarnish the outcome of the
elections.)
Military Reaction
In recent months, the combined effect of a
deteriorating economy, delinquent payment of
salaries, and constant political uncertainty has eroded
morale and discipline within the armed forces.
Contributing to the malaise is the growing belief
among many officers that the Army will be dragged
into inevitable political violence, with resultant
military casualties. Individual acts of insubordination
The open grumbling of many troops about Doe's
failings makes Flanzamaton's charge of military
involvement more credible than his previous claim of
civilian backing. Several military officers, including
Emanuel Seyon, the former commander of the
Executive Mansion Guard, have been sentenced in
connection with Flanzamaton's action. Some officers
whom Flanzamaton implicated have been put on short
rations, while others-considered loyal by Doe-have
received promotions.
Any future attempts against Doe will most likely be
taken by an independent actor or by a small group
such as those who participated in Doe's original
takeover. military
units outside Monrovia sutler from poor
to prevent such a coup.
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nacres
Economic Misananagemenii
Doe's preoccupation with real and imagined threats to
his regime has diverted hire from dealing with
economic problems and long-tern development
planning. Recent announcements of revenue
collection schemes, stopgap responses to the banking
crisis, and draconian punishment of debtors--which
the government claims sparked Flanzamaton's
attack-underscore the regime's inability to
comprehend the causes of and cures for the country's
economic woes. Many of these moves have been made
in the mistaken belief that they will be popular with
the electorate.
reforms. Pervasive corruption, capital flight, and
political uncertainty also have hampered economic
recovery
The administration's short-term measures are
burdening the economy with immediate problems.
While there is a plentiful supply of rice in the
warehouses in Monrovia, a shortage exists in the
marketplace. Doe's attempts to collect outstanding
debts have created a severe cash shortage, while
retailers can obtain rice from the warehouse only on a
cash-and-carry basis. Queues of 50 to 60 frustrated
buyers have. been seen at many of Monrovia's stores.
Riots over government efforts to increase the retail
price of rice during the waning days of the Tolbert
administration paved the way for Doe's takeover five
years ago. F_~
Slack world demand for Liberia's iron ore and rubber
exports, together with fiscal mismanagement, is the
major factor contributing t .o the economic crisis.
Liberia's use of the US dollar as its currency has
increased import costs and eroded export
competitiveness because the dollar is appreciating.
Liberia's ship registry, the largest in the world and an
important revenue earner, is declining due to
increased competition and stagnation in world
maritime commerce.
With the help of the I M F and the US Economic
Support Fund program, plus several debt
reschcdulings, Liberia has managed to bump along
from one financial crisis to another. But the country
has a less than satisfactory record in implementing
austerity measures needed to create a basis for
structural adjustments. The regime's administrative
weakness and frequent lapses in fiscal discipline have
been key obstacles to effective implementation of
In the absence of a sharp increase in export earnings,
continued large capital inflows to Liberia are essential
to stave off an extreme financial crisis and to set the
stage for economic recovery. A further sharp drop in
Liberia's economic fortunes could threaten the
transition to civilian government.
Senior Liberian officials recently met with US
advisers in hopes of finding solutions to Liberia's 25X1
economic and financial problems. Topics for
discussion included Liberia's tax system, currency
problems, and inefficient public corporations. While
long-.range goals and objectives might be agreed upon,
Liberia's track record on implementing economic
reforms does not bode well for the future.F__1
Implications for the United States
The attempted assassination illustrates the fragility of
the political situation in Liberia, where the United
States has important military access rights,
communications facilities, and investments totaling
$430 million. Although the United States has been
cleared of allegations of involvement in the
assassination attempt, we suspect that Foreign
Minister Eastman is still maneuvering to put
Washington on the defensive. He has long favored a
more nonaligned and less pro-US foreign policy. He
probably would like Doe to make new demands,
including more bilateral economic aid, rent for US
communication facilities, and bonuses for Doe's senior
military colleagues, who are scheduled for retirement
if a civilian government is installed in January.
Eastman may try to capitalize on the recent trip to
Liberia of Ambassador Marchuk, Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Deputy Chief of the Second African
Department, which was planned well in advance of
the assassination attempt. Marchuk sought an
exchange of ambassadors and a resumption of talks on
economic cooperation and trade relations with
Liberia
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necrer:
Congo., Sasson Under Fire
Moderate President Sassou-Ngucsso is facing
increased opposition from hardline leftist party
officials who feel threatened by his moves in the last
two years to consolidate power and to improve ties
with the West. In addition, there are
grumbling from the armed forces over government
policies and the poor state of military preparedness.
We believe Sassou will move quickly to try to suppress
opposition and shore up support in the military and
party. Failing that, he may be forced to slow or even
reverse Congo's recent turn Westward.
Sources of Discontent
['resident Sassou's military-based and highly
factionalized regime, which has ruled since 1979, is
dominated by fellow northern officers who are loosely
allied with southern civilians. Many of the civilians
are entrenched in the single ruling party and civil
service. Although leftists are represented in the
regime's military and civilian ranks, moderates
presently predominate under Sassou. In recent years,
Sassou has liberalized the economy, increased the
influence of moderates at the expense of ideologues,
reduced Congo's dependence on the Soviet Union, and
improved relations with the West in search of needed
economic aid and private investment.F-7
discontent with
Sassou among party hardliners, smoldering since last
July's party congress, has become more open and now
threatens Sassou's control over the party. Sassou
created numerous enemies at the congress when he
removed or demoted a number of influential hardline
officials opposed to improved relations with the West.
Sassou also has alienated senior party members by
bypassing the party on important decisions. In
addition, he
has refused repeated requests by some party officials
to release Thysterc Tchicaya, the party's leading
leftist ideologue, who once was the second most
powerful figure in Congo. Tchicaya is being held on
questionable charges of coup plotting.
Secret
ALA AR 85-009
19 April 1985
In 1=chicaya's absence, Pierre Nze, a senior party
member with close ties to the Soviets, probably is
leading hardline opposition to Sassou. The President
replaced Nze as Foreign Minister after the party
congress because his hardline views conflicted with
Sassou's policy of improving relations with the West.
In our view, Nze has support in the Politburo-the
party's principal decisionmaking body. He may be
planning to confront Sassou at the next Politburo
meeting, a move that probably would lead to an open
power struggle. According to the US Embassy, Nze
recently held a private strategy meeting with fellow
hardliners in the party and Cabinet that was attended
operational capability is at its lowest point ever
because of budget cuts, lack of s are parts
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mismanagement, and theft. 25X1
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officers, many of whom support closer cooperation
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with the Soviet Union. Senior officers met recently to
discuss the problems of the military in preparation for
a meeting with Sassou, according to the US Embassy.
The Embassy reports that Sassou has instituted
extraordinary security measures at recent presidential
functions.
Outlook
Brazzaville clearly is undergoing one of its periodic
power struggles,
believe that, on balance, key military and security
leaders still support Sassou, this support could erode
rapidly if he does not defuse the current situation.
Sassou probably will attempt to reach a compromise
with hardliners, perhaps by offering to slow Congo's
move Westward. An increase in hardline influence
probably would result in improved relations with the
Soviets, diminish US access to senior Congolese
officials, and lead to increased anti-Western rhetoric.
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,n eerer
Mozambique: Sources of
Economic Assistance
Unrealistic economic policies, insurgency, and four
straight years of alternating drought and floods have
left Mozambique increasingly dependent on external
economic aid. Despite the country's Marxist policies
and dependence on Soviet Bloc military aid, the bulk
of economic assistance has come from Western
countries.
Western Bilateral Aid
In 1984, Mozambique received about $180 million in
economic assistance from the West.' The United
States, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom provided for about 80 percent of this
aid, according to US Embassy reporting.
Aside from drought relief, which comprised roughly
one-fourth of all incoming aid, the majority of
Western assistance was earmarked for agricultural
and industrial rehabilitation in accordance with
Maputo's emphasis on restoring existing facilities
rather than building new ones. France and Denmark
have contributed to agricultural production and
marketing, while Germany, Switzerland, and Italy
have focused on the industrial sector.
Mozambique has become a priority country in the
Italian aid program. 'Traditionally, Maputo has been
the second-largest recipient of Italian project aid, and
last year was the second-largest recipient of food and
emergency aid as well. In 1984, Italy contributed
$39.4 million in assistance, according to Embassy
reporting. Of that amount, $12.4 million was devoted
to emergency aid, and $18.7 million went to
infrastructure projects.
' Although we are able to distinguish most aid commitments from
actual disbursements, about 15 percent of the $180 million figure
consists of promised aid. Such commitments apparently are
included in the figures for France, Sweden, Italy, and the
Netherlands.
The Swedish Government's aim is to decrease
Mozambican dependence on South Africa and to
improve food supplies. Aid is concentrated in import
substitution, rehabilitation and maintenance of
infrastructure, and support to family farms.
The Netherland's assistance consists mostly of
balance-of-payments and agricultural support. The
Hague is helping with the rehabilitation of the port of
Beira and the city's sewer system.
The British recently have articulated a strong interest
in the viability of the Machel government, but, due to
financial stringency in Whitehall, this interest has not
substantially boosted British aid, which totaled $14
million in 1984. This included $3.7 million in new aid,
$8.8 million from previous commitments, and $1.7
million for disaster relief.
Other Western Aid
Western multilateral organizations also have been
helpful to Mozambique. The European Community
contributed about $8 million for development
assistance in 1984, and gave $16 million in emergency
food aid. Partly as a condition for debt rescheduling,
Mozambique joined the International Monetary Fund
and World Bank in 1984. This gives Maputo access to
about $62 million in special drawing rights from the
IMF.
The October 1984 Paris Club rescheduling of
Mozambique's bilateral debt to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development countries
provides for $404 million in principal repayments that
came due from July 1984 to June 1985 to be spread
Secret
ALA AR 85-009
19 April 1985
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Major Contributors of
Economic Assistance
Amount of Total Designated
for Emergency Aid
1. United States _
40.50
15.80
2. Italy _
39.40
3. Sweden
30.80
4. Netherlands
17.30
_
5. United Kingdom
14.00
6. Soviet Union
13.00
NA
7. France
11.80
b
8. Denmark
8.30
0.05
9. Japan
7.80
0.60
10. China
5.00
11. Switzerland _
3.80
12. West Germany
2.30
13. Belgium
2.30
14. Norway
1.20
15. Portugal
0.30
0.05
16. Romania
0.06
NA
No bilateral emergency relief contributed, however, some emer-
gency aid distributed through independent organizations.
b Total does not include 5,000 tons of food aid.
Total does not include powdered milk donation of 400 tons.
out over ten and a half years. Prior to the debt
renegotiation, Mozambique's debt service ratio was
45 percent--one of the highest in Africa. Without this
debt relief, Mozambique could not have continued to
import consumer goods.
Eastern Aid
According to the US Embassy, East Bloc countries
provided only about $18 million' in economic
assistance last year-one-tenth of the West's total.
The largest Bloc donor was the Soviet Union, which
granted about $13 million worth of assistance. Other
East European countries gave small amounts of
2 This excludes the extensive Bloc advisory presence in
Mozambique, The East Germans, for example, have hundreds of
personnel involved in agriculture and in mineral and natural gas
exploration projects.
emergency drought relief. China also assisted Maputo
with a grant of approximately $5 million worth of
consumer goods.
Outlook
For the most part, we believe that Maputo's ability to
continue attracting bilateral aid will depend on its
effectiveness in dealing with insurgents, who are now
active in all 10 provinces and show no sign of abating
their attacks. Guerrilla activity already has forced
several countries to withdraw advisers from rural
areas, and we expect donors to become increasingly
reluctant to fund projects that cannot be protected
from sabotage. While the United States and several
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secret
European countries want to provide economic
assistance to encourage Mozambique's turn to the
West, the continuing guerrilla attacks perpetuate
Maputo's dependence on the East for military
assistance.
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ovuuuk
Africa
Brief
Sierra Leone's parliament has granted 85-year-old President Siaka Stevens-
whose term expires in June-a six-month extension, to allow more time to arrange
an acceptable solution to the country's looming succession crisis. The ruling All
People's Congress party postponed its scheduled mid-April convention-which was
to either confirm Stevens for another seven-year term or announce his designated
successor-allegedly because voter lists were not drawn up, according to the US
Embassy. While Stevens recently indicated he will step down after the extension
ends, some of his colleagues believe he will never yield the post. Others speculate
Stevens will indeed resin if he is confident a successor can protect his reputation
and economic interests.
accepted Momoh as the President's successor. Stevens's delay in deciding his
future and the stagnant economy may fuel discontent among junior officers who
In the meantime, General Momoh--the head of the military and current leading
candidate either to replace Stevens or to be named the first vice president and
hence the designated successor to the presidency-is continuing to lobby for
broad-based tribal and Army support. US Embassy reporting indicates that some
leading civilian politicians, including chronically ill First Vice President S. I.
Koroma-who is expected to be removed from office at the convention-have not
are said to be eager to see some change.
J_ 1 Secret
ALA AR 85-009
19 April 1985
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Secret
Secret
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