LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200990001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Latin America
Review
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ALA LAR 84-010
1 June 1984
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Latin America
ReviewF 25X1
Guatemala generally supports the broad objectives of US policy in
Central America, but key decisionmakers are pursuing several
specific goals that are at variance with US interests and reflect
Guatemalan opinions or requirements.
Economic and political problems have exacerbated longstanding
ideological rifts within the ruling party, causing President Alfonsin
between competing factions and thereby preserve party unity.
As part of its drive to improve relations with Latin American
governments, the Castro regime has increased its participation in a
wide variety of regional meetings, but we doubt it will soon be
invited to rejoin the inter-American system.F---]
The Socialists' ambiguous commitment to parliamentary democracy
has been a source of political instability in Chile, but there is now a
somewhat better-than-even chance that the party can transcend its
checkered past and emerge as a significant force for moderation and
Uruguay, Alvarez Impedes Election Preparations I 21 25X1
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Uruguay's 11-year-old military government and civilian politicians
have failed to resolve key issues necessary for national elections to
proceed on schedule next November, and the President appears to be
the primary architect of the impasse.
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Brazil: Military Unhappiness
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Production Staff Office of African and Latin American Analysis
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
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Policy and US Relations
Overall, Guatemala supports the broad objectives of
US policy in Central America. Chief of State Mejia
and Foreign Minister Andrade, however, are pursuing
a number of specific policy goals that are at variance
with US interests and that reflect Guatemalan
nationalism, ethnocentric views of Guatemala's role in
the region, and growing resentment of Washington in
the armed forces. In our opinion, only a normalization
of bilateral relations with the United States-to
include a restoration of military aid-could move
Guatemala to a position substantially more supportive
of the particulars of US policy. Guatemalan leaders
are likely to continue to pursue closer ties to Mexico
to effect the repatriation of Guatemalan refugees in
Mexico. In this effort, we believe they will continue to
adopt positions at Contadora and on regional issues
that may be closer to those of Mexico than to those of
Honduras, El Salvador, and the United States.
Makers of Policy
Chief of State Mejia and Foreign Minister Andrade,
in our opinion, are the primary architects of
Guatemalan foreign policy, particularly regarding
Central American issues and relations with the
United States. US Embassy reporting indicates that a
number of other officials--military and civilian-
have varying degrees of influence, but none are
consistently consulted on a broad range of domestic,
foreign, and national security issues.
Mejia has delegated substantial authority to Foreign
Minister Andrade to design and implement strategies
consistent with his overall foreign policy goals. We
believe, for example, that Andrade has major
influence over Guatemala's role in Contadora-an
area of little interest for Mejia-in bilateral relations
with Mexico, and in the Belize dispute. The Foreign
Minister also has substantial input into the conduct of
Guatemalan relations with the United States,
although we do not consider him the primary force.
Andrade's power stems from Mejia's confidence in
him, particularly for his ability to perceive longer
term costs and benefits that Mejia, keenly aware of
his temporary caretaker status, at times fails to
consider. As a result, we believe that Andrade can
persuade Mejia to modify foreign policy positions.
Andrade probably was instrumental in convincing
Mejia, for example, that active participation at
Contadora would be more helpful in ending
Guatemala's regional isolation and in improving its
international image than would Mejia's initial 25X1
preference for reactivating the Central American
Defense Council (CONDECA), a regional military
alliance. We judge, however, that Andrade's
association with the Mexicans at Contadora is
allowed by Mejia and the military because they want
Mexican cooperation on the voluntary repatriation of
Guatemalan refugees from southern Mexico.F__ 25X1
Andrade recognizes that political power in Guatemala
rests with Mejia and the military and that ultimately
he serves at their behest. Knowing his influence is 25X1
circumscribed by the military, he does not interfere
with military issues or other domestic policies. He is
not universally trusted by the senior military officers,
and we believe that some of the Foreign Minister's
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The substance of Mejiac foreign policy is conditioned by his
personal experiences and his perception of Guatemala's domestic
needs, A strong nationalist and staunch anti-Communist, Mejia is
a military man whose career has been largely devoted to defeating
Guatemala's 20-year-old Marxist-led insurgency. Mejia is
preoccupied with the guerrilla problem at home and apparently has
two primary foreign policy objectives: obtaining foreign assistance
to fight the insurgents and, simultaneously, undermining their
credibility by restoring legitimacy to the Guatemalan Government.
Chief of State
Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores
statements, particularly those critical of the United
States, may be designed to demonstrate his nationalist
credentials and to ingratiate himself with the younger
senior officers. His public reproofs of Washington,
however, also express resentment of the United States
that Andrade knows is widespread in the military.
The senior field commanders who placed Mejia in
power-loosely called the Council of Commanders-
wield substantial power, but both the council as a
whole and its most influential member, General
Lobos, are much more involved in domestic issues and
internal security problems. No council member stands
out as an important foreign policy voice, and in
general the commanders support Mejia's goals of
garnering foreign military and economic aid to bolster
their counterinsurgency capabilities and of restoring
credibility to the government. We have no evidence
that Mejia's foreign policy-including his conduct of
relations with the United States-is a divisive issue
among his senior commanders.
Guatemalan Views of Central America
The Mejia regime's goals of restoring domestic and
international legitimacy to the government and
gaining material assistance to aid Guatemala's war
against the insurgents are behind its desire to play a
more active role in Central America. Guatemalan
policy in the region, however, is distinctly colored by
three strong perspectives on the current situation in
Central America, some of which are not shared by
most of the other nations of the area.
First, Guatemala believes that its size and population,
resource base, relative economic strength, geographic
location, counterinsurgency success, and historic role
in the region argue for its adoption of a more assertive
role. Attempts by other countries to obtain
Guatemalan backing in disputes with Nicaragua-
particularly efforts by the United States and
Honduras-have strengthened the national sense of
strategic importance. Moreover,
leverage with the United States and others.
statements by Mejia and Andrade over the past
several months indicate that this courting of
Guatemala has led them to believe that they have
Second, Guatemala does not see Nicaragua as a
direct military threat nor as a critical supporter-
much less the lifeline-of its domestic insurgents.
Mejia has publicly accused the Sandinistas of
supporting the Guatemalan guerrillas, but
he views the guerrillas' use of
Mexican territory as a more important factor in their
survival. Moreover, the Guatemalans consider the
spread of Communism in the region, represented by
the Sandinistas, as a manifestation of the larger East-
West struggle of the superpowers that should be
primarily addressed by the United States. Thus, they
believe that policies designed to diminish the
Nicaraguan threat are of more direct benefit to the
United States and Guatemala's neighbors.
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Foreign Minister
Fernando Andrade Diaz-Duran
Third, Guatemala believes Washington is calling the
shots in Central America. The Embassy says Mejia
and Andrade frequently intimate that "Core Four"
unity at Contadora, the attempt to revive the Central
American Defense Council, the Regional Military
Training Center (RMIC) in Honduras, and the
Granadero I military exercises are all US inspired and
directed. Thus, they want to deal directly with the
United States on such initiatives, not with their
Central American neighbors-particularly
Honduras-who they believe have little to offer in
return for Guatemalan support.
Policy Approach to the Region
Guatemala's approach to Central America primarily
reflects its desire for a resumption of US military
assistance, increased economic aid, and a
normalization of relations with Washington. Given
Mejia's preoccupation with the counterinsurgency
effort, we have little doubt that the Guatemalans view
their relations with the United States on a strictly
quid pro quo basis
The Mejia government apparently believes that, if the
United States wants Guatemalan participation and
support strongly enough, Washington will renew
military aid. In our judgment, Mejia and Andrade
Andrade covets power and delegates little or no authority to his
subordinates, particularly on major foreign policy issues. He
appears to be an elitist-even among Guatemala's elite and
prefers to associate with those he considers the prime movers on
consistently withhold full cooperation with the United
States on Central American initiatives as part of a
strategy to exact concessions. They do not want to be
so uncooperative, however, that the United States
loses interest in obtaining their support and, instead,
moves to minimize Guatemala's role and further
isolate it in the region. As a result, Guatemala's policy
appears inconsistent as the government alternately
assures US officials of its support for US objectives,
while adopting actual policy positions that at best only
halfheartedly support US goals.
We judge that the Guatemalans are likely to maintain
their aloofness to elicit tangible benefits from
Washington in return for their increased
commitment. Meanwhile, they probably will pursue
improved relations with other regional actors,
particularly Mexico, where Guatemalan efforts may
be inimitable to US interests.
Contadora, At Contadora, the Guatemalans are likely
to continue their inconsistent and equivocal support of
"Core Four" unity. They probably perceive few direct
or immediate benefits from unconditional
endorsement of hardline positions opposing Nicaragua
in the talks. Conversely, Embassy reporting shows
they fear that a settlement imposing restrictions on
Nicaragua's military and political institutions could
infringe on Guatemalan sovereignty by effecting
similar constraints on its electoral process, armed
forces, and paramilitary civilian defense force
program. A more neutral posture in the Contadora
proceedings holds some potential gain for Guatemala
in terms of improving its standing with an
international community keenly focused on the
dynamics of the peace process.
The Mexican Angle, Mejia and Andrade also view
moderation at Contadora as a means of extracting
concessions from Mexico on border issues. The
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Guatemalans are especially interested in the
voluntary repatriation of some 40,000 Guatemalan
refugees from Mexico. The military hopes to house
returnees in new "model villages" it is constructing in
the frontier area. In our opinion, the Guatemalans
believe that no other single development could so
enhance their domestic and international image as the
return of refugees who fled previous political violence.
The refugee camps in Mexico, according to Mejia, are
a continuous source of insurgent propaganda
concerning human rights abuses. For other observers,
they represent a vivid reminder of past brutal military
repression in Guatemala. In statements to US
Embassy officials, both Mejia and Andrade have
explicitly tied a Guatemalan posture at Contadora
consistent with Mexico's to the Mexicans' willingness
to assist with a voluntary repatriation program or, at a
minimum, their willingness to move the camps away
from the border area.
Mexican officials announced in early May that they
intend to relocate two refugee camps away from the
border soon, in the hope of improving the security of
the refugees. Guatemalan and Mexican officials
reportedly have been negotiating a settlement of the
refugee problem since at least February,
Regional Military Initiatives. The Guatemalans
have not pursued multilateral military cooperation
with their northern tier neighbors, El Salvador and
Honduras, for similar benefit-cost considerations. In
our opinion, General Mejia's initial support for
reviving the Central American Defense Council
(CONDECA) reflected his belief that it could be an
indirect conduit of US military equipment, provide a
market for Guatemalan-produced ammunition, and
propel him into a leadership role in Central America.
Mejia's interest rapidly lapsed when he realized that
none of these benefits would materialize. Conversely,
the mutual defense pact posed the risk of embroiling
Guatemalan troops in potential Honduran-
Nicaraguan hostilities.
Mejia sees little direct benefit from Guatemalan
participation in the Regional Military Training
Center or in joint military exercises such as the
current Granadero I maneuvers. The Guatemalans
continue to waver on the nature and extent of their
future involvement in such initiatives, probably as a
ploy to exact a quid pro quo for their cooperation.
Although they apparently would like to engage in
these types of operations to reduce their regional
isolation, they view unrecompensed participation as
needlessly diverting precious resources from
counterinsurgency efforts at home. The presence of
two Guatemalan instructors at the RMTC and
Mejia's reluctance to definitively rule out
participation in future joint operations are designed to
persuade the United States that greater cooperation
in regional initiatives would follow if Guatemala had
more resources.
The Importance of US Assistance
We judge that a renewal of US military aid and
increased economic assistance is the only likely
incentive-short of a Communist insurgent victory in
El Salvador-capable of moving the Guatemalans to
a substantially more supportive position behind US
objectives in Central America. Even then, however,
their strong nationalism, ethnocentrism, and domestic
policy focus will ensure that they remain a less-than-
pliant ally and wary of multilateral approaches to
regional problems. Moreover, their military success
against the guerrillas has come without US
assistance. As a result, there is resentment in the
armed forces toward the United States, particularly
among younger officers who have not undergone US
training and have had little contact with their military
counterparts from the United States. Their growing
"go it alone" attitude is likely to impose limits on the
extent of future US-Guatemalan cooperation.
We believe the Guatemalans place as much symbolic
importance on the restoration of aid as they do on its
tangible impact on their counterinsurgency program.
Mejia views his two foremost policy objectives-
obtaining US material support and ending the
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Secret
international opprobrium of Guatemala--as closely
linked. The removal of US restrictions on military aid
to Guatemala, imposed because of human rights
abuses, will continue to be viewed by any Guatemalan
government as a critical step toward improving its
image.
Coveting this symbolic support, Mejia and Andrade
are likely to insist on a restoration of military aid as
the sine qua non of improved bilateral relations and
regional cooperation. As if to assist US
decisionmaking, they stress economic needs over
military and, according to US Embassy reporting,
emphasize that Guatemala's military equipment
needs are few. Mejia has told US officials that he
wants helicopters for medevac purposes, spare parts
for inoperative aircraft, heavy construction equipment
for civic action projects, financial assistance for
`model villages" to house displaced persons and
refugees, small patrol boats to interdict arms, and
technical and financial assistance with elections.
The Guatemalans see their needs and requests-as
small, and thus are frustrated by Washington's
perceived myopia, particularly in light of the large
sums of military and economic assistance provided to
El Salvador and Honduras. Furthermore, many high-
level Guatemalan officials particularly in the
military believe that the country's record in
improving human rights, moving toward elections,
and success against the Marxist guerrillas warrants
the resumption of US aid. They believe they have
earned the acknowledgment of these accomp-
lishments--taken at some domestic political risk-
that a resumption of military assistance would imply.
In our opinion, Mejia and his senior civilian and
military advisers understand the role of Congress in
the foreign aid appropriations process but, believing
they have done their part, now consider Congressional
opposition a problem for the Reagan administration.
Moreover, although the Guatemalans appreciate that
many in the US Government sympathize with them,
they do not recognize that as equivalent--in symbolic
terms-to having the support of the US Government.
Little Prospect for Policy Change
We do not expect any substantial change soon in
either Guatemalan foreign policy in Central America
or in relations with the United States. We believe the
policies Mejia and Andrade are following are
consistent with their goals of acquiring resources to
fight domestic insurgents and of increasing the
government's legitimacy abroad. These objectives are
widely accepted in the officer corps, and Mejia's
strategy to attain them has generated little internal
criticism. Guatemalan policy in Central America, in
our opinion, is not dependent on the personal
orientations of the current policy architects but rather
reflects broader national values that have been
conditioned over the last few years by
counterinsurgency success at home and the nation's
sense of international isolation.
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OMIVC
Argentina.. Radical Party Politics
Economic and political problems have exacerbated
longstanding ideological rifts within President
Alfonsin's ruling Radical Civic Union Party. These
differences have affected government policy on a
range of issues as Alfonsin has tried to maintain a
balance between competing factions to preserve party
unity. Recently, however, the President seems to be
moderating his aggressive policy positions in an effort
to improve relations with Argentina's traditional
power brokers the military and Peronists. Although
the Radicals' internal difficulties are manageable,
several factors could deepen splits, erode Alfonsin's
ability to govern, and encourage the opposition.
Alfonsin and his left-of-center Renovation and
Change faction gained control of the Radical Party in
mid-1983 after a 10-year struggle with the more
moderate National Line faction, which had
dominated the party since the 1940s. Alfonsin formed
his group in the early 1970s to move the party toward
more progressive stances that could broaden its appeal
beyond its traditional middle-class following.
After securing the presidential nomination, Alfonsin
set out to expand the party's historic 25-percent share
of the electorate. Ile pledged to reactivate the
economy, curb the power of the military and the
Peron ist-dominated trade union movement, defend
human rights, and foster open government. Alfonsin
won 52 percent of the votes cast last October and took
office in December with plans to use his mandate to
implement his programs swiftly.
Cracks in the Facade
The magnitude of Alfonsin's victory at first obscured
the existence of factionalism within the Radical
Party, but the problem has grown since the President
took office and is manifested in disputes on a range of
critical issues. According to press reporting,
there was considerable internal party debate on
economic policy as inflation far outstripped official
even before 25X1
Alfonsin's election, leftists within his Renovation and
Change faction formed the "Coordinating Group. "
Moderate leftists formed the rival Popular
Intransigence faction headed by a key Radical
legislator, Ruben Rabanal. More politically
conservative Radicals had no formal organization,
but they gravitated around Julio Saguier, mayor of
Buenos Aires and a close Alfonsin confidant. In
April, this group allied 25X1
with Popular Intransigence to form the Intransigent
Renovation, a label underscoring their adherence to
Alfonsin 's programs-and aimed at containing the
party's left wing. Smaller factions include the
moderate "Cordoba Clique, " centered in Argentina's
second-largest city, from which Alfonsin selected his
Vice President, Victor Martinez. The party also has a
small group of hardline nationalists, including
regional bank president and well-known economist 25X1
Aldo Ferrer and legislator Luis Leon.
projections after a slight dip in January. Human
rights advocates in the party were miffed by the
President's decision to prosecute only former regime
leaders instead of all military officers accused of 25X1
excesses. Peronist successes in blocking the labor
reform bill in late March and in provoking sporadic
labor unrest exacerbated the Radicals' squabbling.
In general, the party left has pushed for a tough line
in dealing with the Peronists, the military, and the
IMF and commercial lenders. Moreover, according to
US Embassy reporting
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oriented foreign policy. Further
wing was important, but he planned to take steps to
limit its influence in Congress, in his Cabinet, and
pressed for expanded ties with Cuba and Nicaragua
and support for opposition groups in neighboring
countries. Party moderates generally agree with these
policy objectives but, according to
___]US Embassy reporting, are more willing to
compromise with Argentina's traditional power
brokers and are more realistic in dealing with foreign
lenders. They are also more moderate on foreign
policy issues. For their part, Radical hardline
nationalists have focused primarily on debt
negotiations and the Beagle Channel and Falklands
disputes-in which they oppose any accommodation.
Alfonsin's Response
The President's initial vacillation in response to the
factional pressures conveyed the impression-
especially to the military-that he was indecisive.
the
armed forces saw him as susceptible to leftist
pressures and unable to put together coherent policies.
Until about mid-March, according to US Embassy
and press reporting, Alfonsin allowed party leftists to
? Behind the early aggressive moves against the
military.
? Behind the decision to push the labor reform bill
through Congress without consulting the Peronists
or other legislative blocs, thereby antagonizing
potential supporters and assuring the bill's defeat in
the Senate.
? Among the strongest advocates of a tougher stand
against the US bankers' insistence on a March
deadline for the payment of interest arrearages on
the external debt.
In the wake of key legislative defeats and continuing
economic setbacks and in anticipation of budget
debates and debt negotiations, however, Alfonsin has
moved gradually toward party moderates.
the
among his close advisers.
Alfonsin is also trying to distance himself from the
left by dealing with them through intermediaries.
The President has made some staffing changes that
reflect his more moderate orientation. The most
visible was the replacement of his combative labor
minister in April with a moderate who has close ties to
both major party factions and is acceptable to the
Peronists. Moreover, one Argentine political observer
has pointed out that Alfonsin has allowed other
moderates among his close advisers to assume a larger
role in policymaking. Even before the shift in the
labor portfolio, for example, Alfonsin had appointed a
moderate union leader as his personal representative
to smooth over differences with the Peronists. In
economic policy, Raul Prebisch has emerged as a
voice of moderation to counter the often shrill
criticism of foreign lenders by party and
administration spokesmen. Moderate Angel Robledo,
one of the few prominent Peronists to serve in the
administration, is an adviser on military affairs.
Further, according to press reports, Alfonsin has
resisted pressures to call a party convention to elect a
new leadership. Like other Radicals elected to office,
he is bound by tradition to relinquish his post as party
leader to avoid conflicts of interest and provide the
party with full-time leadership. We agree with some
political observers who believe that Alfonsin wants to
retain control at least until the congressional election
in 1985 to help keep the lid on potential divisiveness.
Outlook for the Party
Although the splits apparently are still manageable,
they will almost certainly be aggravated by inept
presidential performance, further economic setbacks,
or Peronist successes. This disunity will complicate
policymaking and diminish Alfonsin's ability to hold
his electoral coalition intact. Moreover, persistent rifts
could dash the Radicals' hopes of capturing control of
the Senate in the congressional elections.
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In his efforts to maintain party unity, the President
faces his greatest challenge from party leftists.
Failure to curb them would almost certainly seriously
hamper efforts to placate the military and reach an
accommodation with opposition labor and political
leaders. It would also tend to substitute opposition
charges that Alfonsin is an ineffective leader, unable
to keep even his own house in order, let alone deal
with Argentina's economic and political problems.
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seat-ea
Cuba: Using Regional Meetings
To Cultivate Latin America
As part of Cuba's drive to improve relations with
Latin American governments-and to better its
hemispheric image at a time of heightened animosity
between Havana and Washington-the Castro regime
has expanded participation in regional meetings
during the past year or so. Previously, Cuba had relied
mainly on enticing Latin Americans and others to
participate in the numerous conclaves it has long
sponsored at home. Cuban leaders evidently consider
the new activity useful for:
? Facilitating contacts with other governments.
Displaying Castro's foreign policy "moderation,"
especially on Central American issues, in contrast to
Washington's purportedly aggressive policies.
Encouraging some Latin American leaders to put
forward the notion that Cuba should be reintegrated
into the inter-American system.
Despite some improvement in bilateral relations,
however, we believe that Havana doubts it will be
invited to rejoin the inter-American system any time
soon
Cubans Posing as Statesmen
Cuban delegates to recent conferences in Latin
America almost invariably portray their participation
as a reflection of Havana's "deep" concern over the
region's fundamental socioeconomic disparities and its
readiness to work collectively to overcome them. In
contrast to the usual Cuban assertiveness in such
other Third World forums as the Nonaligned
Movement, Havana has not sought to dominate or
manipulate these meetings. It has been especially
cautious toward the regional organizations it
expresses greatest sympathy for, such as the Latin
American Economic System (SELA) and the
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA),
both of which Cuba views as free of US influence.F_
This tactic apparently is paying off. SELA's
permanent secretary visited Cuba in February to
review with Castro the results of the just concluded
Latin American Economic Conference in Quito.
According to media accounts, Castro reaffirmed his
full support for SELA and his "commitment" to
strengthening Latin American economic cooperation.
A leading Venezuelan newspaper covering this trip
reported that Cuban and SELA officials agreed that
SELA's role should be enhanced because the
Organization of American States is "unable" to
resolve regional problems. Subsequently, a SELA
meeting was held in Havana to study the
"breakdown" of Latin American industries and to
coordinate Latin America's position for a forthcoming
gathering of the Group of 77 and the fourth UN
meeting on Industrial Development in Vienna.F___1 25X1
The Cubans have skillfully exploited the high
visibility and direct access to many top Latin
American figures afforded by the meetings. As the
regional solidarity arising from the Falklands war
faded, Havana shifted smoothly to the latest cause
that could enable it to benefit from hemispheric unity: 25X1
the need to address collectively the region's mounting
economic and social problems and to overcome the
"indifference" of the industrialized countries.
Cuba's Multiple Purposes
Attendance at multilateral meetings enables Cuban
officials to visit countries with which relations are
strained or nonexistent, and to receive invitations that
host governments might otherwise find awkward to
extend. The Cuban Vice Minister of Foreign Trade,
for example, led a delegation to a special meeting of
the Latin American and Caribbean Sugar Exporters
(GEPLACEA) in Rio de Janeiro in August 1983-the
highest ranking Cuban official to visit Brazil since
relations were broken in 1964.
Similarly, despite Dominican President Jorge
Blanco's animosity toward the Castro regime, two
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Selective List of Cuban Attendance at International
Meetings in Latin America, January 1983-April 1984
January
Montevideo
Eighth Meeting of High-Level Governmental
Experts, UN Development Program
Department chief, State Committee for
Economic Cooperation
February
Cartagena
Latin American Coordination Meeting for
UNCTAD VI
Minister of Foreign Trade
May
Buenos Aires
Fourth Conference of Latin American Planning
Ministers
Vice President, State Planning Board
Bogota
Forum of experts on world economic crisis,
sponsored by ECLA and SELA
Vice President
Cartagena
Celebration of 450th anniversary of the city
Foreign Minister
Quito
Meeting of ECLA-SELA
Minister-President, State Committee for
Economic Cooperation
June
Caracas
Congress on Latin American Political Thought
President, National Assembly of the People's
Government
August
Caracas
Ninth Pan American Games
Vice President, Council of Ministers
Rio de Janeiro
Extraordinary Session, GEPLACEA
Vice Minister of Foreign Trade
San Jose
World Telecommunications Year Seminar
NA
September
Grenada
First NAM Conference for Small Developing
Countries
Directorate chief, Ministry of Foreign
Relations
Lima
Fifth Ibero-American Congress of Education
Director, Central Institute of Education
Sciences
Kingston
Preparatory Committee for the Law of the Sea
Convention
Vice Minister of Foreign Relations
November
Quito
Political Commission of Latin American
Parliament
Member, National Assembly of the People's
Government
Lima
First Ibero-American Meeting
President, Havana Provisional Assembly of
the People's Government
January
Quito
Latin American Economic Conference
Vice President
February
Santo Domingo
Meeting of Latin American Parliament's Human
Rights Commission
Representatives of the National Assembly of
the People's Government
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Cuban representatives attended a meeting of the
Human Rights Commission of the Latin American
Parliament in Santo Domingo. The Cuban
representatives, who remained relatively quiet and
moderate during the proceedings, met with members
of the Dominican Congress and received an invitation
for a Cuban parliamentary delegation to visit the
Dominican Republic. Subsequently, a Latin
American Parliament delegation, headed by its
Dominican Vice President, traveled to Havana in
April to observe elections for the Cuban People's
Government. In meetings with senior Cuban officials,
according to the Cuban Communist Party official
daily, Granma, the visitors were assured of Havana's
support for the Parliament and told that Cuba hopes
to become a full member, instead of an observer.
Economic gatherings in particular have afforded
Havana ample opportunity to blame the United States
for its alleged exploitation of Latin America, without
the Cubans appearing isolated or in the forefront.
Havana has suggested that Latin American
governments seriously consider renegotiating their
debts as a bloc, but so far Cuba has not been
vociferous on the subject nor has it gotten out in front
of other delegations on this or other controversial
issues. Instead, the Cubans usually portray Havana as
disposed to go along with majority views formulated
at the meetings.
Cuban representatives also use regional meetings to
explain the alleged moderation of Havana's Central
American policy to Latin Americans and occasional
Europeans. Although far from uniformly successful,
they reportedly have been effective in some cases. For
instance, the Dominican Foreign Secretary informed
our Embassy in Santo Domingo that he gained the
impression from other Latin American officials at the
SELA meeting in Caracas last September that Cuba
was shifting to a more accommodating stance on
Central America and would eventually support a
peace formula developed by the Contadora group.
Similarly, the US Interests Section in Havana was
informed by the Venezuelan Charge that the head of
the Cuban delegation to the June 1983 Congress on
Latin American Political Thought in Caracas had
impressed Venezuelan politicians with the moderation
of Cuban views on Central America.
In addition, the Cubans utilize most of the
conferences they attend as forums for interviews on a
range of topics outside the scope of the meetings
themselves. Last year, for example, at a seminar on
world economic problems sponsored by SELA and
ECLA, Cuban Vice President Rodriguez used the
media to voice criticism of the United States, call for
Latin American unity without ideological barriers,
and claim that Cuba is not intervening militarily in
any Latin American country.
Other Multilateral Gains
Havana also is expanding its contacts with Latin
American governments in other multilateral contexts.
It has become more active and sophisticated in
soliciting Latin American support for representatives 25X1
from Cuba or governments it favors on boards or
committees of international agencies. In exchange,
Havana often has agreed to vote for candidates from
countries willing to cooperate. Cuban representatives
actively competed last year for positions on the
governing body of the World Health Organization
and succeeded in placing a Cuban in the vice-
chairmanship of the Pan American Health
Organization.
Moreover, Havana has stepped up participation in
regional cultural activities. During the
commemoration of the bicentennial of Simon 25X1
Bolivar's birth in 1983, for example, Cuban
representatives attended events in several countries,
including Colombia and Venezuela. During the year,
Cuban media also carried numerous features about
the celebrations. These gestures evoked generally
positive responses, especially in Colombia and
Venezuela where several news stories cited them as
evidence of Cuba's desire to rejoin the inter-American
system.
Outlook
Havana has reason to be pleased with reaction to its
higher profile and its success in using regional forums
to complement its other efforts to improve bilateral
relations with hemispheric neighbors. We believe the
Cubans will persist, at least over the near term, and
especially if the Central American situation remains
at a critical level. The Castro regime has little other
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maneuvering room to counter US policies in Central
America or to respond to Washington's efforts to
persuade Latin American governments to keep Cuba
at arm's length.
On balance, however, we doubt that Havana's more
active participation in regional meetings will soon lead
to a larger Cuban role in regional organizations or
that Latin American governments will be more
disposed to follow Havana's guidance. In our view, the
Cubans will continue to see their intensified regional
activities essentially as a means to advance bilateral
relations rather than as a way to gain leadership of
the inter-American system
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The Socialists' ambiguous commitment to
parliamentary democracy has been a persistent source
of political instability in modern Chile. The Socialist
Party historically has been divided between advocates
of violent revolution and moderates pledged to a legal
transition to socialism. Support for armed revolution
by a significant sector of the party undermined
Salvador Allende's effort from 1970 to 1973 to follow
a peaceful road to socialism and helped precipitate the
coup that brought General Pinochet to power. The
radical/moderate split in Socialist ranks has also
weakened the party and reduced its appeal to many
workers, thereby enabling the well-disciplined,
Moscow-oriented Communists to establish themselves
as the major spokesmen for Chile's working class.
We believe that this pattern is changing. A decade of
military rule has instilled in many Socialists a new
respect for democracy and the rule of law. In our
view, there is presently a slightly better than even
chance that the party can transcend its checkered past
and emerge as a significant force for moderation and
reform. The appearance of an explicitly anti-
Communist Socialist Party would improve the
prospects for a peaceful transition to democracy and
enhance the stability of any post-Pinochet regime.
Almeyda Versus Altamirano
Although by 1979 the Socialist Party had splintered
into over a dozen factions, the party's fundamental
ideological debate is reflected in the confrontation
between the factions led by Clodomiro Almeyda and
Carlos Altamirano.
Altamirano, a senator during the Allende period and
currently living in exile in Mexico City, represents
what was the moderate wing of the party before
1973.' His followers emphasize the need for
' Altamirano and Almeyda have switched roles since the Allende
years. At that time, Altamirano was a revolutionary firebrand and
Almeyda-Allende's foreign minister-was a relative moderate. P
nonviolent opposition to Pinochet. This faction has
grown wary of alliances with the Communists,
especially since they abandoned their traditional
opposition to armed struggle in the late 1970s. The
Altamirano Socialists have muted the harsh class
struggle rhetoric of the Allende years and have
publicly begun to advocate a democratic political
system and a more equitable distribution of income
within a mixed economy.
The Almeyda group is the heir of the Socialist Party's
radical wing, which prior to 1973 often took stances to
the left of the Communists. The faction has publicly
pledged to seek the violent overthrow of Pinochet and
today works virtually hand in glove with the 25X1
Communists. Almeyda currently lives in East Berlin,
and his faction has adopted a pro-Soviet foreign
policy, including refusal to condemn the invasion of
Afghanistan. Domestically, the Almeydistas espouse
revolutionary socialism. Like the Communists, they
occasionally adhere to democratic procedures out of
expediency, but, in our view, representative
democracy is not one of their goals.
Although the struggle between Altamirano and
Almeyda epitomizes the basic division within Chilean 25X1
Socialism, in recent years the party's center of gravity
has shifted from these exiled leaders to others inside
Chile. Many of the exiled leaders, removed from
Chilean political reality, have adopted hardline
positions and advocated violent resistance to Pinochet.
The party chiefs at home, sensitized to the regime's
power, have generally been more cautious, lest armed 25X1
resistance jeopardize their tenuous semiopen status.
The increasing influence of internal over exiled cadres
has strengthened the Socialists' moderate wing. The
best evidence of this was the formation in 1983 of the
Socialist Political Unity Committee, which includes
the Altamirano faction.
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The Political Unity Committee
The Committee for Political Unity (CPU) brought
together seven Socialist groups, united by their
distaste for the Almeyda faction's pro-Sovietism,
advocacy of violence, and pact with the Chilean
Communists. It quickly joined the Democratic
Alliance, the opposition coalition dominated by the
Christian Democrats. Although the group has formed
a central committee with representatives from most of
its factions, it suffers from the usual personalist
conflicts, quarrels between exiled and internal leaders,
and a generation gap between older militants and
those who reached political maturity during
Pinochet's rule.
the committee is also divided over its
relationship with the Communists. Some members
want the committee to serve as a conduit between the
Democratic Alliance and the other opposition
coalition, the Communist-dominated Popular
Democratic Movement. Others prefer distancing the
Committee for Political Unity from the Communists
and unequivocally aligning with the democratic
opposition.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, we believe that the
committee is becoming a cohesive force with the
potential to revitalize the Socialist Party and set it on
an unambiguously democratic and reformist course.
The committee is more united by its opposition to the
Almeydistas than divided by ideological disputes.
Although it includes Marxists, democratic socialists,
and social democrats, most members seem satisfied
with endorsing Marxism only as an analytic tool while
emphasizing commitment to democratic means and
ends. Furthermore,
recent hardline positions taken by the
Communists have disillusioned many Socialists, who
are becoming less interested in acting as a bridge
between the Christian Democrats and the radical left.
The latest sign that the Committee for Political Unity
is coalescing was the selection last month of Carlos
Briones as secretary general and Hernan Vodanovich
as his deputy. Briones-exiled following the 1973
coup-was associated with the Socialists' moderate
wing under Allende and at that time pushed for an
understanding between the government and the
Christian Democrats. Vodanovich is from the
Altamirano sector and represents the younger
Socialist leaders who stayed in Chile after the coup.
Although their selection is only valid until a party
congress elects permanent officers, it sends a clear
message of moderation and may help heal the rift
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Prior to 1973 the Socialist Party was characterized
by ideological squabbling, personal rivalries, intense
.factional infighting, and a near-total lack of
disciplined and professional cadres. The repression
that followed General Pinochet's coup exacerbated
these weaknesses and shattered the party's always
precarious unity. Roughly two-thirds of top Socialist
leaders were removed by assassination, imprison-
ment, or exile. Lacking (unlike the Communists) an
underground tradition, the party had great difficulty
establishing a clandestine organization, and contact
between exiled leaders and the rank and file became
tenuous. By the late 1970s, factionalism had reached
ludicrous levels: according to one press report, in
1979 there were 14 semi-independent Socialist Party
factions. These were divided ideologically, along
personalist lines, according to organizational
disputes, and because of differences over tactics.
The Radical Party was the other main socialist/
social democratic force in pre-1973 Chile. Although
they never became so fractured as the Socialists, the
Radicals were divided over similar ideological and
personalist questions. One of the three main Radical
factions (Democracia Radical) abjured socialism and
shifted to the right. Another (the Radical Party
proper) adopted a non-Marxist, anticapitalist stance
and was divided between a radical leftist tendency
and a more moderate internal wing. A third Radical
faction (the Social Democratic Party) tried to mold
itself into a European-style social democratic force.
emerged in their absence.'
We believe that there is a reasonable chance that the
Committee for Political Unity will consolidate its
gains and eventually transform itself into a modern
Socialist party along the lines of Venezuela's
Democratic Action or the Spanish Socialist Workers
Party. In so doing it would be in a position to lay
claim in free elections to the 15 to 20 percent of the
vote historically won by the Chilean Socialist Party.
The Challenge From the Left
Most of the remaining Socialist factions present no
effective challenge to the committee's effort to
restructure Chilean Socialism. Several minuscule
Socialist groups also claim to be the legitimate heirs
of the pre-1973 Socialist Party, and the committee's
position is further complicated by its ambiguous
relationship to three Christian socialist parties, with
which it forms the loose Socialist Bloc coalition. We
see a bleak future for all these factions, however. All
are tiny, internally fractured, and rent by ideological 25X1
and personalist disputes. The Christian socialist
groups are split between segments belonging to the
Socialist Bloc and factions that work with the
Communist opposition coalition. They may linger on
for several years but in the long run are likely to 25X1
disappear, be absorbed by the Almeyda faction, or
join the committee.
The committee does, however, face a serious rival in
the Almeyda group, since 1983 a member of the
Communist-dominated opposition coalition. Although
in 1982 the US Embassy considered the Almeydistas
one of the largest Socialist factions, we believe that
the group's prestige and influence have declined 25X1
sharply and that it will be hard pressed to wrest the
mantle of socialist legitimacy from the Committee for
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The Almeyda faction is in disarray, and many of its
top leaders and some of its rank and file have been
expelled by the central committee. Some of the most
dynamic internal leaders-such as Julio Stuardo-
have since joined the CPU. The Almeydistas have
also abandoned the venerable Chilean Socialist
tradition of independence from foreign influence. The
Almeyda faction's connections with the USSR and
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Socialist, Social Democratic, and
Radical Party Factions in Chile,
May 1984
Spark-terrorist group)
Aimeyda Socialist
faction
MDP
Socialist Front
None
Socialist Convergence
BS
Christian Left (IC)
BS
MAPU (Christian
Socialist)
BS b
Blas Tomic
MAPU-OC (Christian
Socialist)
BS b
Socialist Committee for
Political Unity (CPU)
Carlos Altamirano
Hernan Vodanovic
Julio Stuardo
Aquin Soto
Party
MAS/USOPO/
19 April Conver-
gence
One sector of
"Humanists"
Social Democratic
Movement
AD
Jorge Mario Quinzio
Socialist Democratic
Party (PSD)
AD/FSD
Luis Bossay
Radical Party (PR) c
AD/FSD
Anselmo Sule
Enrique Silva
Cimma
a Key: MDP = Popular Democratic Movement (Communist
front)
BS = Socialist Bloc
AD = Democratic Alliance
FSD = Social Democratic Federation
b Factions of both these parties also belong to the MDP.
c The PSD and PR are in the process of uniting.
Cuba (via its relationship with the Chilean
Communist Party) are very close and, as noted, are
reflected in its foreign policy stances. This has blurred
the distinctions between Communists and hardline
Socialists, since both groups agree on virtually every
important issue and appear to be almost equally
responsive to Soviet wishes.
If Chile-as appears increasingly probable-achieves
a peaceful transition to democracy that avoids serious
polarization, we believe that the extremist, violence-
prone Almeydistas will become even less attractive to
potential Socialist voters. We do not, however, expect
the Almeyda faction to vanish soon. It will probably
subsist for some time as a Communist appendage,
serving that party's interests by masking the full
extent of Communist control over the Popular
Democratic Movement coalition.
The Possibility of Socialist Unity
Prior to 1973 Chile's oldest party, the Radicals,
espoused non-Marxist democratic socialism, and two
of its descendants-the present-day Radical Party
and the Social Democratic Party-have retained this
orientation within the Democratic Alliance. Last
March, these two groups took initial steps toward
reuniting under an explicitly social democratic
program. The Radical Party appears to have curbed
the influence of its exiled extremist titular leader
Anselmo Sule and disciplined its unruly youth wing.
Although afflicted with the usual problems of
personalism and generational conflict, we believe that
the still-unnamed new party has a good chance of at
least partially reviving the old Radical Party's
fortunes. In our view, it may be able to win up to 15
percent of the vote in free elections.
The leaders of the new party have already evinced
interest in cooperating with other socialist and social
democratic groups. They have created a loose Social
Democratic Federation with a rightwing socialist
faction and may seek an understanding with the
Committee for Political Unity. This would enhance
prospects for an effective electoral force on the
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Oeerea
democratic left, but we do not think that formal
fusion is likely in the near term. The Radicals were
Chile's quintessentially bourgeois party, and
embracing their successors too closely would hamper
the committee's efforts to compete with the
Communists and the Almeyda Socialists for worker
support.
Nevertheless, we judge that democratic socialists and
Social Democrats probably will eventually arrive at
some form of cooperation. Ideological differences
between the two groups are not substantial, and both
want to assure that in the future the Chilean left is
dominated by democrats rather than Communists.
Working together, the committee and the reunited
Radicals might garner up to one-third of the vote-
enough to constitute a non-Communist, center-left
option.
Implications for Political Stability
If the Committee for Political Unity and the Social
Democratic Federation emerge as cohesive entities,
the most immediate result will be a stronger
Democratic Alliance. With a more powerful left wing,
the principal democratic opposition coalition will no
longer appear a mere facade for the Christian
Democrats and would be better placed to compete
with the Popular Democratic Movement. Ironically,
such a development might also diminish rightist
objections to the Alliance. The unification of the
committee and the Social Democrats has forced both
groups explicitly to reject violence and repudiate
revolutionary socialism. Thus, they probably will
become somewhat more palatable to rightist sectors,
which had feared that the Alliance was a Trojan
Horse for the insertion of Communism into the
moderate opposition movement.
A stronger Democratic Alliance would be a
stabilizing force during the transition to civilian
government. With a cohesive Alliance standing
between the right and the radical left, Pinochet's
argument that Communism is the only alternative to
continued military rule would lose credibility. If the
Alliance came fully to overshadow the Popular
Democratic Movement, the government might even
agree to a slightly faster transition schedule.
A strong, responsible, non-Communist left would be a
highly positive innovation in the Chilean party
system. The instability of pre-1973 Chile was largely
a product of the electorate's division into
irreconcilable thirds of left, right, and center. If the
Communists can be marginalized and the Socialists
retain their devotion to democracy, the way would be
open for alternation between center-left and center-
right coalitions. Chile might then avoid a replay of the
political polarization that brought an end to what was
once one of South America's most stable democracies.
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Uruguay: Alvarez Impedes Election
Preparations
Uruguay's 11-year-old military government and
civilian politicians have failed to agree on ground
rules for national elections scheduled for next
November. They also have been unable to resolve key
issues, such as the role of the armed forces under
civilian rule. The stalemate and the short time left to
resolve it, combined with President Alvarez's success
in perpetuating a climate of uncertainty, raise doubts
that the elections will be held on time.
Alvarez, who has long sought to extend his term,
appears to be the primary architect of the impasse. He
has exploited tensions within and between the major
Blanco and Colorado Parties, which partly accounts
for their failure to agree on a strategy for bringing
about an orderly transition. Moreover, he has thus far
prevented the armed forces-which are formally in
charge of the transition and reportedly in favor of it-
from exercising an effective role by capitalizing on
their fear that the election might bring a leftist or
antimilitary government to power.
Fostering Factionalism and Interparty Strife
Because the military high command designated him
as President for a truncated three-and-a-half-year
term to effect the transition to civilian rule, Alvarez is
publicly committed to the November 1984 elections.
US Embassy reporting since before he took office has
speculated, however, that he would position himself to
continue as President, either by extending his term or
by winning election for an additional five years.
We agree with the Embassy assessment that Alvarez
is pursuing such a strategy primarily by attempting to
postpone a change of government. He has sought to
exacerbate dissension within Uruguay's major
parties-the progressive-dominated Blancos, and the
more moderate Colorados. At the same time, he has
tried to prevent these parties from working together to
restore constitutional rule. His success appears to be
based on an adroit use of his authoritarian
presidential powers to keep his political opponents off
balance by:
? Alternatively cracking down on civilian leaders or
lifting bans on their political activities.
? Regulating the media through censorship decree
laws.
? Changing the electoral laws to permit minority
party factions to field candidates.
? Granting political favors to conservatives and
leftists-including illegal groups-to undercut
moderate elements essential to a smooth political
transition.
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to restore the political rights of the Blanco Party's 25X1
presidential candidate, Wilson Ferreira. Instead,
Alvarez insists that, if Ferreira, who now resides in
Argentina, returns to Uruguay, he must face a
military trial for having maligned the armed forces
Alvarez's treatment of his political adversaries varies
greatly, depending on circumstances and his tactical
objectives. For example, he has refused to pardon or
when they seized power in 1973.
On the other hand, this March the President released
Liber Seregni, leader of the illegal leftist Broad Front
coalition, who had served 11 years of a 14-year jail
sentence for subversion.
the liberation of Seregni served the 25X1
dual purpose of demonstrating that the government
was sincere about the political transition while 25X1
weakening Blanco Party support by siphoning off
some of its leftwing followers. Even though Seregni
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cannot run for public office-because of continuing
restrictions on his political activities-he meets freely
with various groups and,
extreme left, including the Communists.
We believe that Alvarez's strategy has generally been
to ignore moderate Colorado leaders, such as front-
runner Julio Sanguinetti, with whom a political
dialogue might be possible. Instead,
government schemes to deepen divisions
within the party as well as to undermine Sanguinetti's
political strength. In early May, Alvarez modified the
electoral law, easing requirements for minority
factions to nominate their own candidates. The
government asserted that this was a democratic move,
party's small progovernment factions.
but the Colorados accused Alvarez of favoring the
to hold similar rallies.
Polarizing the Political Scene
Although Alvarez justifies his public initiatives as
necessary to move the transition forward, in our view,
they often have had the effect of further polarizing
political sentiment and reducing the ground for
compromise or dialogue between civilians and the
military. The closings of newspapers and radio
stations have become so frequent as to virtually end
coverage of political developments independent of
official pronouncements. Some political leaders have
privately told US Embassy officials that they believe
Alvarez is attempting to weaken or eliminate the
centrists by attacking them. As evidence, they note
that the government has authorized public
demonstrations by leftists, including the May Day
celebration this year, that was organized by outlawed,
Communist-controlled workers' organizations. At the
same time, it has refused permission for legal parties
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Institutional Weaknesses
Despite recurrent efforts to reopen discussions with
civilian leaders, the military high command seems
unable to attract the politicians to the conference
table. When the long-awaited draft of a proposal to
lay the groundwork for a new constitution was
presented last month, it evoked a sharp negative
reaction. One Blanco leader, for example, deemed it
unacceptable and essentially unchanged from a
proposal offered by the military a year ago.
We believe that the military's lack of access to civilian
leaders is an obstacle it will not easily overcome. In
our view, one of the most crucial factors complicating
Uruguay's return to democratic rule relates to the
evolution of the military regime itself. Until 1981,
when Alvarez assumed office, the Uruguayan
generals resisted the emergence of a strong
presidential system, preferring to remain the power
behind the throne. Consequently, they failed to
establish channels of communication with the political
parties. Their decision to allow Alvarez to preside over
a lengthy transition period reflected their preference
to continue to deal with the civilian politicians at
arm's length. This situation was tailormade for the
ambitious Alvarez, who has manipulated it to his own
Ferreira also works to Alvarez's advantage
widespread hatred in the military of Blanco leader
Outlook
We believe it is premature to assess the probability
that elections will be held on schedule or to predict
what the ground rules are likely to be, but the current
signs are not favorable. The longer the political
impasse persists, the more likely that public
demonstrations-already occurring regularly and
sometimes attracting hundreds of thousands-will
become more frequent and hostile. We believe that
politically linked violence-sponsored by both right-
wing and leftwing groups-probably will escalate,
particularly if elections are postponed. Even if the
impasse is broken, the government has failed thus far
to shape an environment for elections that would be
widely accepted as giving the winners a legitimate
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advantage.
Moreover, Alvarez has prevented the high command
from asserting the unified leadership needed to move
the transition forward. He has the support of some
senior officers----particularly in the Army-and has
been able to neutralize some of his opponents by
relegating them to minor posts. He also plays on the
armed forces' fears of a terrorist/Communist
resurgence or of military trials-similar to those in
Argentina---after the civilians return to power. The
mandate to govern
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Secret
Latin America
Briefs
Brazil Military Unhappiness
A retired general whose stance appealed to a substantial number of junior officers
unhappy with current Brazilian economic policy made a relatively strong showing
last month in his losing bid for the presidency of the prestigious Military Club. The
challenger had announced his intention of converting the club from its generally
social functions into a political forum. He is noted for his rightwing nationalist
views, including opposition to the IMF, multinational companies, and US
influence in Brazil. Although few officers agree with his extreme political stance,
many saw the election as an 25X1
opportunity to protest the Army budget, inadequate training, and a perceived
decline of professional standards.) 25X1
The reelection of the incumbent, the high command's preferred candidate,
indicates that the military leadership still retains control over the officer corps and
that most officers remain committed to the armed forces' withdrawal from politics.
Nevertheless, the challenger's ability to win 40 percent of the vote reveals
extensive military unhappiness and raises the danger that the current economic
difficulties and the transition to civilian rule could further weaken military unity.
A Santiago court has begun to investigate allegedly illegal property transactions
involving President Pinochet and several close aides. The case, brought by a group
of moderate opposition lawyers, has quickly become a major political issue. The 25X1
government has organized a series of public demonstrations of support for
Pinochet that have included Cabinet ministers and Armv generals.
the generals decided to endorse the President /-~.)^
publicly only after he agreed to adopt a more collegial governing style and to
consult more closely with the ruling military junta. 25X1
The judicial process, which includes several layers of appeal, will take months to
unfold. Conclusive proof that Pinochet or his associates illegally profited from his
office would disturb the military, which takes pride in its reputation for integrity.
Pinochet's loud protestations of innocence and his hasty mobilization of support
indicates his awareness that even the appearance of impropriety can harm him. He
may not keep the reported promise to govern in a less autocratic fashion, but the
scandal has at least temporarily increased his vulnerability to pressures from inside
and outside the government. The opposition has sensed this weakness and will take
advantage of it by pressing the government to shorten the schedule for transition to
Secret
ALA LAR 84-010
1 June 1984
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Secret
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