LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000201140001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 21, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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I MASTER FILE CUPY
uu NOT GIVE OUT
on MARI ON
America
21 December 1984
ALA LAR 84-023
2I December 1984
Copy 3 9 3
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Directorate of
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Review
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pressures could ignite leftwing violence at a later date.
We foresee little chance of a serious terrorist movement emerging
over the next six months, but growing social, economic, and political
beginning to put forth their agendas for the postelection period.
Political activity has started to intensify as interest groups that have
been all but shut out of the governing process for two decades are
interests.
A lasting peace is unlikely, but the cease-fire accepted by three of
the country's four guerrilla groups should hold for at least the next
several months, because both sides believe it serves their short-term
The powerful Bolivian Workers' Central has underscored its potency
as a political force in recent months by using repeated general
strikes to force President Siles to shy away from austerity measures.
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summer.
President de la Madrid's austerity policies are beginning to bring
economic recovery, but dissatisfaction with belt-tightening and the
government's stalled anticorruption campaign probably will lead to
scattered violence as the nation prepares for major elections next
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ALA LAR 84-023
21 December 1984
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World Sugar Glut: Squeezing Caribbean Sellers I 19
Depressed prices and a sharp decline in sugar use in the United
States have trimmed export earnings in key Caribbean Basin
countries. The sugar market is likely to remain oversupplied for a
number of years, creating hardships on the populace and the
potential for political unrest among Latin American sugar exporters.
Guatemala: Striving To End Isol atio
p
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Costa Rica: Impact of Banana S utdown
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Colombia: A Tottering E
conomy
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Production Staff Office of African and Latin American Analysis
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
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Argentina: Prospects for
Leftist Terrorism
The recent extradition from Brazil to Buenos Aires of
Montonero terrorist leader Mario Firmenich has
again focused public attention on the danger of a
resurgence of leftist terrorism in Argentina.
Terrorism by the left has been a persistent source of
political instability in Argentina and has played a
central role in undermining the authority of both
military and civilian regimes. President Alfonsin's
response to the first inklings of terrorist
reorganization shows, in our view, that he understands
the gravity of the threat.
We foresee little chance of a serious terrorist
movement emerging over the next six months.
Nevertheless, the political scene is volatile and the
Alfonsin government may not be able to contain the
social, economic, and political pressures that could
ignite leftwing violence at a later date.
Return of the Montoneros
The Montoneros, who first emerged in the late 1960s,
have long sought to convert Peronism into a
movement of the revolutionary left. After Juan
Peron's death in 1974, the Montoneros clashed openly
with the Peronist party's conservative leadership and
were expelled from the movement by his widow and
successor, Isabel. The Montoneros continued to
struggle for what they termed "authentic Peronism,"
becoming one of South America's largest, wealthiest,
and most deadly terrorist groups. Nevertheless, they
were crushed after the military coup of 1976. The few
Montoneros who were not killed or captured by the
armed forces were forced into exile, where they
launched a largely ineffectual propaganda campaign
against the military.
Exiled Montonero at a press
conference: the movement's military
numerous Montoneros returned to Argentina in the
months following the election in October 1983 of the
new civilian government. Any expected lenience from
the authorities, however, did not materialize.
Alfonsin, who personally abhors terrorism and needs
to hold the left accountable for its crimes if he is to
Secret
ALA LAR 84-023
21 December 1984
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successfully prosecute the military for its excesses
during the antiterrorist campaigns of the late 1970s,
took a tough stance regarding the Montoneros. Two
top Montonero leaders, Ricardo Obregon and Oscar
Bidegain, were arrested soon after returning to
Buenos Aires in December 1983, and Firmenich has
remained in custody since his extradition from Brazil
in October 1984. Moreover, public statements by
government officials indicate that Alfonsin-despite
cutbacks in military spending-intends to preserve
the military's ability to monitor terrorist capabilities.
Internal Divisions
These arrests, in our view, dealt a severe blow to the
Montonero movement and have hindered its efforts at
reorganization. With their most experienced leaders
in prison or in hiding, the Montoneros' once solid
chain of command has broken down.
two basic currents have emerged: a
relatively moderate majority faction loyal to
Firmenich, and more violence-prone groups whose
leadership is unclear.
The Firmenich faction has publicly abjured violence,
asserting that the Montoneros will now concentrate on
electoral politics. Before his arrest, Ricardo Obregon
announced the Montoneros' dissolution as an armed
force and their reconstitution as the Authentic
Peronist Party.
instead of forming an independent
party~ntoneros have attempted to infiltrate the
regular Peronist movement's radical left wing, the
Peronist Intransigence and Mobilization (IMP)
faction. The IMP is headed by Peronist Senator
Vicente Saadi, a well-known Montonero sympathizer
whose newspaper, La Voz, was formerly subsidized by
Montonero ransom money,
We believe that the Montoneros'
current goal is to gain full control of the IMP and use
it to turn the entire Peronist movement toward the
revolutionary left. The Montoneros are supplementing
this strategy by infiltrating Peronist-controlled trade
unions and rural cooperatives.
We believe that the Firmenich faction's rejection of
violence is a tactical maneuver and that it would
return to armed struggle under more favorable
circumstances. The Montoneros have pledged in the
past to work for peaceful change, but they quickly
reverted to violence when conditions shifted.
Furthermore, members
of the group are rearming and continue to train in
terrorist tactics and guerrilla warfare. Recent public
statements by Roberto Perdia and Fernando Vaca-
the top Montonero leaders not in prison have hinted
at a resumption of violence if Alfonsin continues to
"persecute" the movement.
The immediate danger, however, stems from those
Montoneros who question the leadership's cautious
stance. Although not formally structured into an anti-
Firmenich group and divided among themselves, these
Montoneros doubt that they can ever dominate
Reorganization of the ERP
Argentina's other significant leftist terrorist group is
the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). In contrast
to the vague populism espoused by the Montoneros,
the ERP is rooted in Trotskyite Marxism-Leninism
and has drawn inspiration more from Castro and Mao
than Peron. Emerging concurrently with the
Montoneros, the ERP was smaller and was
concentrated in Argentina's interior provinces, where
it conducted sporadic rural guerrilla warfare until the
late 1970s. Like the Montoneros, the group was
E Post 85 percent of its cadre and close to 95
percent of its weapons, safehouses, and vehicles
during that period.
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An Argentine of'Basque origin, Enrique Gorriaran,
about 42, is the ranking leader of the People's
Revolutionary Army (ERP). A founder of the ERP in
1970, Gorriaran was arrested one year later and
imprisoned in southern Argentina. In 1972 he escaped
to Cuba, returning to Argentina the following year to
participate in the ERP's rural guerrilla campaign.
US diplomats report that, by the late 1970s,
Gorriaran led the ERP s military wing, which
attacked businessmen and labor leaders and
assassinated police and military personnel. He fled
the country following the 1976 military coup and
resurfaced in Nicaragua,. fighting alongside the
Sandinistas. Gorriaran led the hit team that
assassinated former Nicaraguan ruler Somoza in
Paravnay iii 19807 --1
Mario Firmenich, 36, is on trial in Buenos Aires for
kidnaping and homicide. A founder of the
Montoneros, Firmenich gained notoriety in the early
1970s for his involvement in two bold terrorist acts:
the kidnap/murder of former Argentine President
Pedro Aramburu and the kidnaping of two Argentine
businessmen, which resulted in a record $60 million
ransom. After the 1976 military crackdown, he
moved abroad and tried to mobilize support for the
Montoneros in Latin America and Western Europe.
These same sources report that he
remains friendly with Sandinista leaders and in 1981
was involved in smuggling Cuban arms to El
Salvado
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CC.CI
Press reports indicate that remnants of the ERP-
probably no more than 100 persons-returned to
Argentina in the wake of Alfonsin's election. As with
the Montoneros, the group split into moderate and
radical sectors. Unlike the Montoneros, however, the
ERP appears to be fairly cohesive and well organized,
with orders issued by exiled leaders in Managua,
Nicaragua.
These leaders-chief of whom is Enrique Gorriaran-
evidently believe that the moment is not ripe for the
resumption of armed struggle in Argentina,
the
exiled ERP chiefs have justified their failure to return
home by alleging that Alfonsin wants to arrest them
to complement the Montoneros already imprisoned.
Gorriaran pledged at a press conference in Managua
earlier this year that, for the time being, ERP
members in Argentina will use violence only in self-
defense.
the ERP is seeking to
expand its political base by infiltrating the small but
influential far left Intransigent Party (PI). The ERP
has chosen the PI because the two groups are
ideologically compatible and,
because the ERP wants to
avoid competing with Montonero penetration of the
Peronists. The ERP has also been active in a handful
of leftist labor unions and some of Argentina's human
rights organizations. Its overall success in these
penetration of the Intransigents
important PI leadership posts.
that the ERP's long-term goal is to return to
armed struggle. In the meantime, however, the
group's more moderate sector has effectively reigned
in unruly elements who want to initiate violence
permission for an ERP cell to recover an arms cache
in Argentina dating from the late 1970s. While
reassuring as to the movement's short-term intentions,
this may indicate that the ERP has at least a
rudimentary capability to undertake terrorism if and
when it abandons its current policy of relying solely
ERP-Montonero Contacts
One of the more disquieting developments is a trend
towird ERP-Montonero cooperation; the two
movements recently have set aside longstanding
ideological disputes and have begun to work together.
An ERP-Montonero meeting was held in Cordoba
Province in April 1984, according to press reports
and
Ithe two groups
have agreed to cooperate in order to infiltrate labor
unions. The political organizations with which the
Montoneros and the ERP are linked have also been
moving closer together:
the IMP and the PI are trying to coordinate efforts to
politicize and manipulate several human rights
groups.
Foreign Support
Although ERP-Montonero collaboration may ease
logistic barriers-such as lack of sufficient weapons
and funds-to a resumption of terrorism, in our view,
the radical left would require considerable foreign
support to mount a serious threat to Argentine
democracy. At present, prospects for such aid are
dim:
mid-1983,
? The PLO, which previously trained and funded the
Montoneros, refused appeals for renewed aid in
? Mexican officials are terminating safehaven
arrangements and government jobs they formerly
provided for exiled Montoneros,
? The Cubans,
want to ingratiate themselves with Alfonsin and will
therefore use their considerable influence over the
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Secret
the ERP may be similarly
Remaining ERP and Montonero contacts with the
Sandinistas, Chilean MI R, and the remnants of the
Uruguayan Tupamaros are highly unlikely to
compensate for the lack of substantial Cuban and
East Bloc backing.
Outlook
We believe that the ERP and the Montoneros will
concentrate on political activity over the medium
term. Both groups recognize that, in the wake of the
terrorist bloodletting and military repression of the
1970s, there is scant popular support in Argentina for
political violence. And the Alfonsin government's
arrest and prosecution of Montonero leaders has sent
a clear message to the left that a return to terrorism
will bring swift retribution.
The Montoneros will not, in our view, succeed in
wresting control of the Peronist movement from the
center right. Senator Saadi and the IMP faction have
recently suffered a series of setbacks and appear to be
losing status within the party. At best, the
Montoneros can hope to retain a voice on the Peronist
left via the I M P or, if the movement splits, dominate a
small independent radical Peronist faction. The ERP
has slightly better prospects for expanding its political
influence through the Intransigent Party. The PI did
well in recent student elections, and polls show that it
could become a vehicle for the expression of leftist
discontent with Alfonsin. The party, however, lacks a
national structure and following, and its radical
ideology has historically precluded it from attracting
more than 5 to 10 percent of the electorate.
Although leaders of both the ERP and the
Montoneros are likely to be preoccupied with political
machinations over the coming months, violence by
dissident elements of both organizations cannot be
discounted. This is especially true in the case of the
Montoneros, where discipline appears to be weakest.
We believe that the Montoneros' radical fringe does
have some capability to conduct kidnapings and
assassinations. Such actions could be triggered by
further arrests of terrorist leaders, a harsh verdict in
the trial of Firmenich, or provocations by rightwing
terrorists. But we also believe that, under present
circumstances, isolated acts of leftist violence can be
effectively contained by the security forces.
Over the long run, however, there is a danger that the
radical left could resume full-scale terrorism.
Argentina's new democracy remains fragile and has
not yet been fully tested. Severe and prolonged
economic pressures, or a power vacuum stemming
from the assassination or incapacitation of Alfonsin,
could jeopardize political stability. Such a scenario
would probably include militant labor unrest,
widespread social disorder, and a growing disaffection
with democratic institutions on both the right and the
left. Under these conditions the ERP and the
Montoneros might be tempted to take up arms once
again. The press reports that rightwing terrorists are
also reorganizing and were responsible for several
recent bombings of leftist and government targets;
further attacks could spur a response from the radical
left. The consequences of such developments are
uncertain, but the stage would then be set for
escalating left-right violence, growing political
polarization, and a possible reentry by the military
into the political system.
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JCLICL
Brazil: Transition Progress
The Brazilian armed forces are committed to
returning to the barracks following the indirect
election of a civilian president in January and his
inauguration in mid-March. Political activity has
started to intensify as interest groups that have been
all but shut out of the governing process for two
decades are beginning to put forth their agendas for
the postelection period. This activity is taking place
against the backdrop of continued economic
difficulties and residual military concerns about the
ability of the civilians to govern the country
effectively
The prospects of a smooth transfer of power are
strengthened by broad popular support for a return to
civilian rule and the likelihood that Tancredo
Neves-- the experienced and moderate candidate, will
be the new president. With his victory virtually
assured weeks before the election, Neves has been
able to concentrate on building good relations with the
military, on further widening his political base, and on
shaping the broad outlines of key policies.
The Military Legacy
The military leaves office with a mixed record. On
one hand, the regime has fulfilled promises made in
1979 that it would complete the political liberalization
process begun in the mid-1970s. On the other hand,
Brazil, after high growth rates in the 1970s, will be
less prosperous economically when President
Figuciredo leaves the presidency than when he
assumed office. Inflation is now running at an annual
rate of' over 200 percent and relations with foreign
creditors are strained. While he inherited a difficult
situation, Figueiredo's vacillation did little to reverse
the downward trend, in our judgment.
As economic performance has slipped, public support
for the military regime has declined. The
government's political opponents made significant
gains in the 1978 and 1982 direct elections for
congressional, state, and local offices. In the current
presidential race, Paulo Maluf, the government's
candidate, has been unable to gain wide popular or
electoral college support. This has virtually assured a
victory for Neves, who has assembled a broad-based
electoral college coalition comprised of his own
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and
anti-Maluf dissidents from the government's Social
Democratic Party (PDS).
Building a Consensus
With his election a near certainty, Neves has shifted
his energies from campaigning for office to ensuring
an orderly transfer of power. Working in his favor are
his political moderation, his long experience in public
life, and especially his commitment to the "rules of
the political game" in Brazil that prize compromise
over confrontation.
Negotiations With the Regime
Neves began consultations with officials of the 25X1
military regime several months ago, and talks have
reportedly grown in frequency and depth since he
emerged as the likely winner in late October.
Neves, in exchange for 25X1
continued military support of the transition process,
has agreed to:
? Block inquiries into past human rights abuses and
protect President Figueiredo and his family from
investigations into allegations of corruption.
Name Cabinet-level military ministers acceptable to
the high command.
? Avoid appointing leftists to key posts in his
government.
? Avoid legalizing outlawed leftist parties, at least 25X1
until after a new constitution is promulgated in
1986.
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ALA LAR 84-023
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Tancredo Neves-likelv next
president.F__1
hopes not only to ensure a smooth transition, but also
to lay the foundation for converting his diverse
electoral coalition into a new, broadly based political
party that would provide the congressional backing he
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Partly as a result of these discussions, the prospect of
a government headed by Neves no longer troubles
most leaders of the military regime,
Nonetheless, an apparent minority of
officers remain concerned that Neves may be
susceptible to manipulation by his leftist supporters
and that he may be unable or unwilling-to put
down strikes or social disturbances. Some are also
worried that Neves will be unable to make good on his
assurances that he will block investigations into
human rights abuses and corruption under military
rule.
Negotiations With Supporters
Negotiations focusing on the makeup of the new
administration also are under way between Neves and
the various political groups that support him. Neves
intends, according to most observers, to form an
ideologically and regionally balanced government. In
doing so, according to US Embassy reporting, he
believes he needs to govern effectively.
Neves has met with PDS dissidents to discuss the
composition of his Cabinet, which they believe should
be dominated by moderates rather than leftists. At
abandoning his coalition.
possible appointments with Neves representatives.
Neves is seeking geographic balance as well. The US
Consulate in Porto Alegre reports that he has
indicated he will appoint people from economically
important Rio Grande do Sul Province to key posts.
Politicians in the northeast also have been discussing
Policy Directions
In setting policies, as in selecting personnel, Neves has
sought to achieve political balance and to avoid
antagonizing key groups. He has generally avoided
controversial positions in public on economic issues,
where his policies will have a major impact on his
political support and on international lenders'
perceptions of his government. He has been somewhat
more forthcoming publicly on foreign affairs,
probably because he plans no important departures
from current policies.
Economic Policy
The direction of Neves's economic policy-and the
selection of people to help guide it-have consumed
nearly as much of his attention as the talks with the
military. Neves, however, has avoided putting forward
specific proposals that could alienate any segment of
his constituency. His pronouncements have been
tailored to his different audiences, and he has spoken
in generalities that appeal to virtually all Brazilians
support for growth, more favorable terms from
international lenders, and reduction of inflation. He
tries to appear receptive to ideas from an ideologically
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Press and US Embassy reporting suggest that
members of traditional interest groups- the political
left, the Catholic Church, and organized labor--
widely believe that the election will lead to an easing
of pressing economic and social problems. Their
anticipation has been heightened by the fact that
Neves, the likely winner, is a member of the
opposition. At this juncture, these groups appear to
be tentatively formulating their agendas for the
postelection period.
The political left has actively supported Neves's
candidacy. The left comprises primarily the leftwing
.faction of Nevess PMBD and the Brazilian
Communist Party; and it includes the politically
ambitious governor of Rio de Janeiro, Leonel
Brizola. US Embassy reporting indicates that
members of leftist groups hope to hold key posts in
the new government, especially in the areas of
economic planning and social welfare. The left is
badly divided, however, and goals are often vague. In
general, these groups appear to favor a more Third
World-oriented foreign policy, a more equitable
distribution of wealth, and a tougher posture toward
foreign creditors and the IMF. Some leftist students
and others advocate investigations into past human
rights abuses and corruption and a break with
international creditors.
Organized labor, which embraces about 20 percent of
Brazil's 44 million workers in 300 local unions, is
.formally banned from participation in partisan
politics, but the prohibition has not been strictly
enforced and union members have actively worked for
various candidates. Even so, the labor movement,
weakened by 20 years of military rule and badly
divided, has not managed to formulate a coherent
strategy. Union leaders are likely to press for
substantial real wage increases andfor changes in the
current labor code to give there greater independence
from state control. More militant labor leaders have
threatened strikes and demonstrations if their
demands are not met.
The Catholic Church has tried to play a moderating
role cinder the military, but an important segment of
the hierarchy has adopted an openly adversarial
posture toward the regime, espousing views that often
coincide with those of the left and labor. Cardinal
Arns of Sao Paulo has been a key figure among
activist clergy, especially in urban areas. In 1985,
according to the US Consulate General in Sao Paulo,
the Cardinal plans to press for independent labor
unions, land reform, and measures to ease problems
stemming from large-scale urban migration.
Moreover, he intends to continue his strong support
for the development of grassroots Christian
organizations that encourage social activism.
The business and industrial sectors generally give
priority to the maintenance of a steady, cautious
course that would sustain economic recovery.
According to the Brazilian business press,
commercial interests are generally pleased with the
current government's economic adjustment program
and do not want any dramatic shifts in policy that
might harm exports, tighten credit, or push inflation
upward. The US Consulate in Sao Paulo, the
country's main industrial center, reported several
months ago that, although conservative business
leaders would accept Neves as president, they would
press for a significant role in economic policy making.
The middle class, including the government
bureaucracy, could ultimately present Neves with his
most difficult challenge. It is the least clearly defined
group and lacks a formal institutional structure, but
polling statistics indicate that it wields the most
electoral clout. It encompasses diverse elements of
society, ranging from skilled workers to small
businessmen. Despite its heterogeneity, the middle
class is united by a desire to protect its eroding
standard of living. Thus, it has resisted IMF
adjustment programs that have contributed to high
unemployment. The middle-class grip on the vast
federal, state, and local government bureaucracies
provides considerable leverage over government
initiatives and is likely to complicate Neves's ability
to implement stabilization measures, especially those
that would cut back public spending. Moreover, the
prevalence of middle-class delegates in the Brazilian
Congress may well hinder Nevess legislative
program.
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Secret
diverse group of economic advisers, according to US
Embassy and press reporting.
judgment, he will continue to avoid introducing
dramatic policy changes. As a result, in coming weeks
we expect him to continue consulting successfully
with the military and building relations with other key
Privately, however, Neves is working to put together
an economic policy aimed at reassuring foreign
creditors and the Brazilian business community,
He has made
direct and indirect contacts with foreign lenders to
inform them of his intentions to honor Brazil's
financial obligations. His representatives also arc
working with officials of the regime on the foreign
debt and other economic issues.
high-level economic policy-making posts, but that he
will keep them in check by surrounding them with
moderates in second-echelon positions.
he hopes to bring economic
into key planning and ministerial posts.
Foreign Policy
Neves's general public statements on foreign policy
issues suggest to us that he plans no major departures
from current policies. In a recent speech, he reiterated
his commitment to nonintervention in the affairs of
other nations and to a continued strengthening of ties
with Latin American countries. He reaffirmed
Brazil's identity with the Third World, eschewed
involvement in East-West disputes, strongly endorsed
the Contadora peace initiative in Central America,
and was critical of superpower interference in regional
disputes
On foreign economic policy, Neves's speech
emphasized the political nature of the external debt
problem and criticized high interest rates. He also
denounced protectionism, especially in the United
States, while at the same time staunchly supporting a
bill in the Brazilian Congress that would defend the
country's nascent computer industry from foreign
competition
Political Prospects for 1985
We believe Neves will continue to make an orderly
transfer of power his top priority, and thus, in our
interest groups.
Neves faces potential difficulties soon after the
election, however, stemming from the fragile nature
of his electoral coalition and the fluidity of the
political landscape. There are already indications in
the Brazilian press, for example, that leftists among
Neves's economic advisers are disenchanted with his
middle-of-the-road approach. A number of potential
appointees have hinted that they may not join the new
government in order to run in the 1986 congressional
and local elections. There also have been numerous
indications that a realignment of Brazil's political
parties will occur in 1985, and that some leftist parties
will oppose Neves, which would rupture his coalition.
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Limps Along
Building on cease--fire accords signed earlier this year,
the government recently opened formal negotiations
with three of the country's four guerrilla groups.
Although it appears increasingly unlikely that a
lasting peace will result, the cease-fire should hold for
at least the next several months, as both sides believe
all three guerrilla
it serves their short-term interests.
President Betancur, who has made a settlement with
the guerrillas his major priority, is determined to
prevent the truce from unraveling before he leaves
office in 1986. Last month he authorized government
spokesmen to initiate a "national dialogue" with the
guerrillas, which focuses on proposals for sweeping
reforms in such areas as rural land ownership,
education, labor, public health, and public services.F
Colombia's rapidly growing economic problems,
however, have weakened Betancur's ability to fund
reform and aid programs. Determination by congress
to protect its legislative prerogatives also has
restricted his maneuvering room on concessions to the
guerrillas. Consequently, little progress has been
made to date, and Betancur is facing mounting
criticism from important interest groups for coddling
the insurgents.
Most notably, senior military officers worry that the
guerrillas will be more formidable when the
insurgency resumes because they will have had time
to rebuild their forces, a situation the military views
as inevitable. Having failed in earlier efforts to
denigrate Betancur publicly, however, military
leaders now emphasize their support for the
government's peace efforts. This change probably
reflects a judgment by the high command that the
military's public stature will be enhanced-and its
budget increased- -if the insurgents are blamed for
causing the cease-fire to collapse.
groups that have accepted the cease-fire are openly
strengthening their political bases, while
simultaneously preparing for a return to hostilities.
The 19th of April Movement (M-19) has taken the
lead on the political front by naming Ivan Ospina as
its candidate for the 1986 presidential election,
holding rallies, and working to strengthen labor
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support. Nonetheless, the 25X1
group also is recruiting and training new guerrilla
cadre and consolidating its position in rural
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the M- 19, like the other 25X1
guerrilla groups, continues to kidnap wealthy private
citizens and extort money. Also, in exchange for
financial aid from local narcotics traffickers, M-19
leaders have agreed to stage demonstrations against
Colombia's extradition treaty with the United States.
Moreover, an M-19 leader has publicly urged 25X1
traffickers to carry out threats to kill US Embassy
personnel.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC)-the country's largest insurgent group-
recently transformed its cease-fire agreement with the
government into a one-year truce. It probably was
prompted to do so by military pressure and concern
that the M-19 might upstage it in the bid for political
power. The group's leaders plan to create a political
party and reportedly will spearhead efforts by the
Communist Party to unite the country's leftist forces
Secret
ALA LAR 84-023
21 December 1984
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Secret
into a political front for the 1986 elections. In fact,
the Communists plan to promote Manuel Marulanda
and other FARC leaders as candidates in 1986,
The People's Liberation Army (EPL}-the smallest
and most volatile of all the signatories of the cease-
fire agreement-recently withdrew from the national
dialogue over what it termed a lack of political
guarantees, unjustified arrests, and government
accusations that some of its members are involved in
drug trafficking. Although the group relented on an
earlier threat to end the cease-fire, the belligerence of
its leaders makes it unlikely that the group will even
go through the motions of participating in the
negotiations. Meanwhile
= EPL leader Oscar Calvo agreed last September
to help the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of
Ecuador develop an insurgency capability by offering
to provide paramilitary training in Colombia for
selected party members.
Outlook
The cease-fire is likely to continue for at least several
months, because of the importance Betancur places on
his reputation as a peacemaker and the apparent
belief by most guerrilla leaders that they need time to
rebuild. Nevertheless, the President's political skills
will be tested as he responds to growing public
impatience with continuing rural violence and with
the demands of firebrand guerrilla leaders, some of
whom already are threatening to resume the armed
struggle.
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Impact
The powerful Bolivian Workers' Central (COB) has
underscored its potency as a political force in recent
months by using repeated general strikes to force
President Siles to shy away from austerity measures.
The Central's actions are partly a response to
economic conditions but also reflect a deepening
power struggle among union factions. Although COB
Executive Secretary Juan l,echin remains the most
dominant figure within the labor movement, his
influence has been diluted, making confrontations
with the government even more difficult to manage.
Notwithstanding recent major concessions to labor,
strikes probably will resume in coming weeks,
especially if the private sector follows through on
plans to lay off large numbers of workers. In that
event the Central, which already bears a heavy
responsibility for undermining Siles, probably will
help galvanize military coup plotters and spark the
President's overthrow.
Background
The COB is the umbrella organization for the vast
majority of the country's workers. Formed in 1952 in
the aftermath of the revolution, the COB retains a
strongly populist and nationalistic orientation. Its 53
affiliated unions range from Communists and far-left
splinter groups to very conservative factions. Despite
this ideological diversity, it has become one of the
hemisphere's most active, influential, and intransigent
labor movements.
Over the years the COB has alternated between
participating in government and serving as an
implacable opponent of both state and private
management. Using hunger strikes, mass
demonstrations, and political negotiations, the union
played a key role in bringing about the return to
constitutional government in 1982. But after allowing
Silos an initial honeymoon period, labor leaders have
repeatedly staged national strikes to prevent the
President from implementing necessary economic
adjustment measures. In response to this pressure,
Silos has granted many of labor's demands.
Nevertheless, the economic plight of the worker
continues to worsen, thereby causing increasing
divisions within the COB over the choice of tactics.
Major Factions
Juan Lechin, the preeminent labor leader since 1952,
remains a dominant figure because of his strength in
the miners' union and his position as the COB's
executive secretary-a post he has held for more than
30 years. An anti-Communist nationalist who
practices pragmatic populism, Lechin is also
motivated by an intense personal rivalry with Bolivia's
two other patriarchs: President Siles and former
President Paz Estenssoro. Of these three, only Lechin
has not been president, and his desire for this office
remains strong even at the age of 72.
Lechin's most persistent challenge in the COB has
come from the Communist Party of Bolivia.
According to the US Embassy, the Communists used
their strong organizational base to maintain contact
with workers during military rule in the 1970s, while
many other union leaders-including Lechin-were
exiled abroad. The party's efforts to expand its
influence have been aided by Soviet financial
assistance and scholarships for study in the USSR,
according to the US Embassy. Communist inroads
have been greatest within the miners' and factory
workers' unions, but the party has also gained support
with the bank and urban teachers' unions. In addition,
the Communists controlled the ministries of mining
and labor until last month, and this strengthened their
access in these critical areas.
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ALA LAR 84-023
21 December 1984
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Ultraleft factions, including the radical Socialist
Party, the Maoist Marxist-Leninist Communist
Party, and the Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers'
Party, also compete with Lechin for influence within
the COB. These groups can count on some support
among bankworkers, civil servants, and mining and
factory workers. In addition, the new COB secretary-
general, Walter Delgadillo, is a member of the radical
labor faction of the Movement of the Revolutionary
Left, until recently a member of the ruling coalition.
Delgadillo has gained prominence and popularity by
calling for a tough stance in dealing with the
government. The militancy of these groups has forced
Lechin to speak out against the radicals' repeated
demands for general strikes, and he has had to resort
to threats of resignation to gain leverage against
them.
Showdown at the COB Congress
Competition among the labor factions came to a head
at the COB's National Congress in September. At the
base of the conflict was the long-brewing showdown
between the Communist-led faction and Lechin's
Revolutionary Unity Command (DRU), a collection
of several radical groups. Delays and disorderly
debates during the Congress produced a mood of
frustration, irritability, and deepening fragmentation.
The DRU emerged victorious, winning a clean sweep
of the elections and ousting the Communists from the
Executive Committee. The Communists whose
stature with labor's rank and file had suffered because
of the party's participation in what is increasingly
seen as an inept government-also lost the positions of
secretary-general and international relations
secretary.
Growing Labor Divisiveness
In the wake of the Congress, however, it has become
increasingly apparent that divisiveness within the
COB has weakened Lechin's control. For the first
time in 32 years, his reelection as executive secretary
was not unanimous. On 9 November, the union
launched a 48-hour general strike for higher wages,
and, when the government rejected labor's
"emergency plan," the COB announced an indefinite
general strike. According to the US Embassy, the
decision for the second strike was made following a
heated COB general assembly in which the radical
factions overruled the Communists and Lechin, both
of whom argued for less drastic measures. Moderate
COB leaders conceded to US Embassy officers that
the strike was ill conceived and that they hoped an
excuse could be found to justify calling it off.
On 22 November the COB suspended the general
strike after the government announced an economic
package laden with concessions to labor. The
Communists used the package as an excuse to leave
the Cabinet, citing the failure to nationalize banks
and flour mills. Having joined the opposition, the
Communists defied the COB's decision for a
temporary lull and pushed to extend the strike in an
apparent bid to regain the popularity and leadership
positions their participation in the government had
cost them. Lechin, on the other hand, opposed the
strike during a COB general assembly, also for largely
tactical reasons. Realizing the government had
conceded all it would, he evidently hoped to
undermine the Communists and his newest rival,
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Secret
Walter Dclgadillo, by depicting them as irresponsible
for continuing to weaken the economy.
Notwithstanding Lechin's actions, however, miners
and other key groups continued the strike for another
week.
Outlook
In our judgment, labor protests are almost certain to
resume in the weeks ahead. In the face of the recent
655-percent increase in minimum wages, the private
sector is threatening massive layoffs, which in turn
could lead to violent rallies and plant takeovers.
Spiraling inflation, food shortages, and growing
unemployment also strengthen the likelihood of
renewed labor agitation. Competing factions in the
military have been plotting for some time, and
another wave of strikes probably would help unify
these groups and encourage them to depose Siles.
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Mexico: Near-Term Prospects
President de la Madrid, who came to power at a time
of unprecedented economic crisis, will begin his third
year in office this month. His austerity policies are
beginning to bring economic recovery, but
dissatisfaction with belt-tightening and the
government's stalled anticorruption campaign
probably will lead to scattered violence as the nation
prepares for major elections next summer.
Meanwhile, Mexico's leaders will attempt to bolster
the ruling party's popularity by touting improving
economic prospects, manipulating traditional pork
barrel measures, and emphasizing greater
independence from the United States in international
affairs.
Modest Economic Progress
De In Madrid's austerity policies have brought
Mexico back from the brink of financial ruin. In
recent months, the economy has begun to recover
from the sharp decline in 1982-83. Economic activity
began to pick up at midyear, and GDP will grow 2 to
3 percent this year. Moreover, foreign creditors early
in 1985 will ratify an agreement reached last
September to reschedule about half of the country's
$98 billion external debt.
Continued recovery is likely in 1985, but for the
present, economic problems persist. The purchasing
power of Mexicans has fallen almost a third over the
past two years, and the government this month
announced deep cuts in politically sensitive food
subsidies. De in Madrid also has yet to gain the
confidence of the business sector, whose investment is
needed for a strong recovery.
Mounting Political Pressures
Embassy reports indicate that many Mexicans blame
the government for mismanaging the economy.
Mexicans also complain of rising crime in urban areas
and do not believe that de la Madrid's widely
publicized "moral renovation" campaign has
appreciably reduced official corruption.
De la Madrid probably will be able to avert large-
scale social unrest, as he has in the past, by telling
Mexicans that continued sacrifice is necessary if the
country is to recover. In addition, he will skillfully
manipulate patronage and other resources to keep
Mexico's leftist groups divided and to ensure that
support for the National Action Party, the country's
second strongest political force, is kept largely
confined to the north.
A major test for the government will come in July,
when Mexicans will elect all members of the
Chamber of Deputies, seven governors, and numerous
mayors. The ruling party probably will concede the
opposition some local victories throughout the
country. It is likely, however, to employ pork barrel,
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intraparty reform, to maintain control of all
governorships and the vast majority of deputy seats.
As a part of the reform effort, the party is
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Violent demonstrations, possibly involving clashes of
partisan supporters and takeovers of local government
buildings, are likely to occur in the north, and possibly
in other areas, during the election period. Such
disorders probably will remain localized, however, and
the government should be able to contain them using
civilian security forces and, if need be, the Army.
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ALA LAR 84-023
21 December 1984
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Possible Bilateral Strains
Although Mexico City will try to maintain a generally
friendly tenor in its ties with the United States, the
coming elections could aggravate occasional strains in
relations. As a part of its effort to discredit the
National Action Party, for example, the ruling party
has launched a verbal broadside against its
conservative rival for sending observers to last
summers Republican Convention in Dallas. Ruling
party officials also allege that the National Action
Party receives financial assistance from US sources,. a
charge that the opposition party denies.
Differences over Central America also could figure in
the campaign. De la Madrid is likely to curry favor
with domestic leftists by emphasizing Mexico's strong
support for the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.
Mexico City is Managua's principal supporter in the
Contadora negotiations and, despite Mexico's own
economic difficulties, continues to supply petroleum
to Nicaragua on a concessionary basis.
Dc la Madrid, although more conservative than his
two immediate predecessors, almost certainly would
condemn any major US efforts to increase pressures
on Managua. Mexico City probably would maintain
such a stance even should Managua take delivery of
Soviet M1G-21 aircraft or other sophisticated military
hardware. Moreover, the Mexicans probably would
blame the United States should the Contadora
negotiations collapse and fighting intensify in Central
America.
Mexican-US ties also could be strained in the months
ahead if the United States places new restrictions on
Mexican imports or strengthens immigration laws.
Mexican officials objected not only to the substance of
Simpson-Mazzoli bill but also to the fact they were
not more extensively consulted before the legislation
was introduced during the last session of Congress.
Mexico is likely to adopt positions in multilateral
forums on disarmament and North-South issues
intended more to refurbish de la Madrid's nationalist
and Third World credentials than to please
Washington. In the UN General Assembly, for
example, Mexico is likely to side with the USSR and
Cuba more often than with the United States.
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World Sugar Glut; Squeezing
Caribbean Sellers
The world sugar market is in its most depressed state
in decades, with spot prices slumping to under 5 cents
a pound. Moreover, prospects for revival are slim, in
part because of stiffened competition from nonsugar
sweeteners. Depressed prices and a sharp decline in
sugar use in the United States have trimmed export
earnings in key Caribbean Basin countries such as the
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Panama. While
some exporters, such as the Dominican Republic, are
beginning steps to reduce dependence on sugar, we
believe the sugar market will remain oversupplied for
a number of years, creating hardships on the populace
and the potential for political unrest among Latin
American sugar exporters.
A Severely Depressed Market
Even though there has been a glut in the sugar market
since 1981, production increases are expected to again
outpace consumption growth in the present 1984-85
market year that began in September. These increases
will keep prices low and further add to already
massive world stocks. According to an industry
forecast, world sugar production for 1984-85 will hit
97.9 million tons, 300,000 tons above the previous
season and 1.3 million tons above estimated global
consumption. End-of-year stocks are expected to
balloon to 41.2 million tons or 43 percent of
consumption--greatly exceeding the 25-percent level
that is considered the norm for a balanced supply and
demand situation.
This growing stock overhang has pushed world raw
cane sugar prices on the spot market to below 10 cents
per pound in 24 of the last 27 months. During the last
five months, prices have dipped below 5 cents per
pound, also reflecting the failure in June of
negotiators to reach a new International Sugar
Agreement as well as a recent announcement by
major US soft drink producers of a switch from sugar
to 100-percent high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) in
canned, bottled, and fountain soft drinks. The latter
development is expected to result in a 600,000-ton
drop in sugar demand.
Excess Supply-Role of Special Arrangements
The excess supply stems in part from the fact that
about 40 percent of global sugar exports are traded at
prices well above the world market rate. This is
especially true for Latin American sugar exporters
(see table). In addition, in many sugar-exporting
countries the domestic price of sugar has actually
been raised during this period of depressed world
prices in order to maintain producer incomes. In sum,
producers are not receiving appropriate price signals
to curtail production.
Exports of raw cane sugar to the US market-as
regulated by the US import quota-are set this
season at 2.31 million tons, accounting for about 8
percent of global trade. Exporters with US quotas--
including many Caribbean and South American
producers--receive premium prices for this sugar,
ranging between 17 and 20 cents per pound
depending on freight costs and whether or not the
country is eligible for duty-free exports into the US
market under the Generalized System of
Preferences.
Exports into the European Community (EC) by
African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries are also
governed by a quota under terms set down by the
Lome Convention. For 1984-85 the quota into the
EC has been set at 1.3 million tons, accounting for
about 5 percent of world trade. This raw cane sugar
also earns premium prices ranging from 17 to 24
cents per pound.
Secret
ALA LAR 84-023
21 December 1984
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Caribbean Basin Countries:
Sugar Marketing
analysts, the Philippines, for example, currently
earns about 24 cents per pound on the 350,000 tons
of sugar it ships under LTAs
Percent of Percent of Exports Not
1981-83 Exports Under
Production Under Special Special Ar-
Exported Arangements a rangements
as Percent of
Production
Barbadosb 84
92
Belize b 93
65 33
Costa Rica 29
82 5
Cuba 92
74 24
Dominican Republic 74
46 40
Guyana b 87
77
Haiti 14
100
Jamaica 6 70
100 NA
Nicaragua 42
5 40
Panama 56
_
56 25
Saint Christopher 93
91 8
and Nevis
Trinidad and Tobago b 72
100 NA
a 1984/85 US import quotas, the EEC's Lome convention quotas,
and average Cuban special arrangement exports 1981-83.
b These countries have both US and EEC quotas.
As a result of quotas, special trading arrangements,
and long-term contracts, approximately 6 million tons
of raw cane sugar will remain this season to be sold at
the world price of 5 cents per pound if a buyer can be
found. Indeed, much of this season's expected global
production surplus-about 1.3 million tons-is free
market raw cane sugar which has no apparent outlet
and must be added to stocks.
Pressure From Other Sweeteners
Lack of steady growth in consumption is a major
concern of the world's sugar producers. Both caloric
and low-caloric nonsugar sweeteners are making very
damaging inroads into some of sugar's largest
markets-the United States, Japan, and Canada. The
effect of the rapid decline in US sugar consumption in
the face of fairly constant domestic production has
been a sharp contraction in US sugar import
requirements-from 4.4 million tons in 1979,
representing about 15 percent of the global import
market, to this season's base import quota of only 2.3
million tons. For those developing countries that
depend on the US sugar market for a large portion of
their foreign exchange earnings-the Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, Panama, and others-the
erosion of the US sugar import market threatens their
sugar industries:
? Cuba's exports to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe,
and China-estimated at about 5.3 million tons
annually or about 19 percent of global trade and
about three-fourths of Cuba's total annual
exports earn premium prices of an estimated 30 to
40 cents per pound for sales to the Soviets and
somewhat less for sales to Eastern Europe and
China under special trading arrangements.
? Approximately 2-4 million tons of sugar are sold
under Long-Term Agreements (LTAs) or contracts,
providing exporting countries with a hedge against
price fluctuations as well as guaranteed markets.
LTAs are used extensively by Australia, South
Africa, and the Philippines. According to market
? Dominican Republic shipments to the US market
averaged over 700,000 tons annually during 1974-
78, but this season's import quota has been cut to
406,000 tons, down approximately 80,000 tons from
the 1983-84 quota. According to Embassy
reporting, the cut will cost the Dominican Republic
some $28 million this season. As sugar is the most
important agricultural employer and the largest
earner of foreign exchange-accounting for 39
percent of total Dominican export revenues-the
health of the sugar industry is pivotal to the
economic health of the nation and a bellwether of
general political stability.
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Guatemalan shipments to the US market averaged
over 170,000 tons annually in 1974-78, accounting
for about half of total sugar exports. This season's
quota of 111,000 tons will mean that a larger
percentage of exports will have to be marketed at
the depressed world price or be added to already
bulging domestic stocks. Sugar is the key crop in
Guatemala's Pacific coastal lowlands along with
cotton and is a high seasonal employer of
Guatemala's huge highland Indian population. In
recent years, the government has requested sugar
producers to grind all available cane in order to
maintain employment and counteract recession.
Panama sells almost all of its surplus sugar to the
United States. Shipments, which averaged 93,000
tons annually in 1974-78, have been set at 67,000
tons for 1984/85, down 16 percent from last year.
As in many of the other Central American
countries, the sugar industry in Panama is a labor-
intensive employer, and it is the country's leading
agricultural earner of foreign exchange after
bananas.
Outlook-Major Reform Needed
Market analysts believe that exporters will have to
adjust to the new facts of the sugar market. This
means that significant structural changes may have to
be undertaken by some LDC sugar exporters, a
painful process for those exporters with few real
economic alternatives and a high dependency on sugar
export revenues. Some countries apparently are
beginning to see the need to reduce economic
dependence on sugar, and there is also growing
interest in alternative uses of sugar-such as the
sugarcane-derived fuel-alcohol program in Brazil.
Many market analysts, however, believe the cane-for-
alcohol (ethanol) option may be viable only for larger
countries where economics of scale can be achieved.
The Dominican Republic could provide a development
model for the many smaller Caribbean Basin sugar
producers. The head of the Dominican State Sugar
Council (CEA), Eulogio Santaella, announced
recently that his government plans to diversify crops
and decrease dependency on sugar exports, which
account for about 40 percent of annual export
earnings. According to Embassy reporting, CEA,
which controls about two-thirds of the sugar-
producing capacity, is interested in joint ventures with
US investors for pineapple, tomato, and citrus
production/processing and export expansion. The
CEA's goal in these joint ventures would be the
transformation of sugar lands without excessive
reduction of employment. According to the Embassy,
Santaella's approach-which reportedly also reflects
the views of President Jorge Blanco-depends on
attracting additional foreign investment and could
benefit from the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which
provides investment incentives as well as duty-free
access for many agricultural products into the US
market.
Nevertheless, unless the Dominican Republic's
deemphasis on sugar is matched by the world's largest
exporters-Cuba, the EC, and Australia, for
example-the outlook for the sugar market remains
bleak. At least one of these countries-Cuba-is
moving in the opposite direction. Current Cuban plans
to boost production from about 8 million tons to 12
million tons by 1990, could, if carried through, dump
several million tons of new sugar on the free market
annually. If US imports of sugar remain low because
of shifts to nonsugar sweeteners and world prices are
held down by general overproduction, the currently
depressed export earnings of key Caribbean states will
remain so for a number of years, creating hardships
on the population and potential for political unrest.
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Latin America
Briefs
group should enhance his credibility with other political parties at home.
discussed with several Social Democratic Party leaders their possible return to
Guatemala to resume political activity. While a final decision on the party's
participation apparently has not been reached, Mejia's willingness to talk with the
Chief of State Mejia's efforts to improve Guatemala's image and reduce its
political ostracism were boosted in December through a state visit to Costa Rica
and talks with Colombian President Betancur, who briefly visited Guatemala.
Mejia met with Guatemalan exile leaders in San Jose, probably to demonstrate the
military's commitment not only to holding elections next year but also to its
neutrality in the contest. According to local press reports, the Chief of State 25X1
meet IMF guidelines.
Mejia also used his meeting with Costa Rican President Monge to help settle
commercial trade differences between the two countries. US Embassy and local
press reports indicate that, under the agreement reached by Mejia and Monge,
Guatemala will immediately repay some $19 million of its outstanding $62 million
commercial debt owed Costa Rica, thereby allowing normal trade-now halted for
some two months by the repayment issue-to resume. The new trade arrangement
is likely to benefit Mejia's domestic standing by reducing criticism of the regime's
inability to reduce unemployment, resolve its foreign exchange difficulties, and
isolation in the region and elsewhere.
Guatemalan officials also were buoyed by the visit of President Betancur to
Guatemala on 7-8 December, the third time that Mejia has met with the
Colombian President. Although the meeting produced little in the way of tangible
results, we believe Betancur's praise of Guatemalan progress toward
democratization will encourage Mejia to continue his efforts to end Guatemala's
The government fears considerable economic dislocation and leftist labor unrest if
United Brands follows through with plans to close its banana production facility on
Costa Rica's Pacific coast. The company's intention to shut down is based on
several years of diminished profits, banana disease, and a recent two-month
23 Secret
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Communist-inspired strike by banana workers that resulted in several million
dollars in lost revenue. According to the US Embassy in San Jose, United Brands
has rejected a government proposal to lease its Golfito operation to a Costa Rican
banana growers cooperative that would pay off the lease with new banana
earnings. The company, instead, is holding out for a sale of its property and is
asking for $15 million, with $10 million down and the remainder payable over five
years at 15-percent interest. Meanwhile,
government officials are considering expropriation of the operation to maintain the
production infrastructure and keep the 2,500 workers employed.
The planned shutdown will worsen Costa Rica's already troubled economy. Before
1984, the Golfito plantations produced some $40 million annually in foreign
exchange earnings-equivalent to almost 5 percent of Costa Rica's exports. San
Jose depends on export revenues to help service its external debt, now among the
highest in Latin America. The loss of the earnings from the United Brands'
banana operation is likely to affect adversely the proposed standby agreement with
the IMF. Moreover, government officials told US Embassy personnel that the
company's plan to fire 1,000 workers by 31 December 1984 will increase the
10-percent unemployment rate and probably will result in social unrest.
The government also fears leftist agitation. The leftists, who have traditionally
been strong in the Pacific coast labor organizations than elsewhere, probably will
attempt to exploit displaced workers by encouraging them to seize the land. US
Embassy officials report rumors alleging the recent arrival of small arms for the
banana workers. With the security forces already spread thin, the presence of arms
would significantly increase the potential for violence
President Betancur is facing his most difficult test since he entered office in
August 1982. His attempts to keep campaign promises over the next few months
will conflict with a cash-flow crisis that probably will lead to a suspension of some
debt-service payments. To save face and secure foreign financial support, he
probably will adopt IMF-backed austerity measures that, although economically
beneficial in the longer run, will produce higher unemployment and inflation,
lower economic growth, and political and social unrest through 1985.
.
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Cuba Chronology
Zimbabwe press reports rumors that some of the Cubans to be evacuated from
Ethiopia and Angola may wind up in Zimbabwe and Ghana.
Fidel Castro sends a message of condolence to Indian Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi for the assassination of Indira Gandhi, saying he has lost a loyal friend.
The 10th Cuba-Poland Intergovernment Committee on Economic and Scientific-
Technical Cooperation meeting ends in Havana. Foreign Trade Ministers
Cabrizas and Nestorowicz sign a trade protocol.
Soviet television reports on an interview with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in which he
reflects on the importance of the cooperation agreement signed and the CEMA
meeting in Havana.
GOSPLAN President Nikolay Baybakov and Humberto Perez sign the ceremonial
document of the second Cuba-Soviet meeting for economic and social development
for 1986-90. Baybakov departs Havana.
In an interview with Pravda, Fidel Castro says the fraternal friendship and
multilateral cooperation between the USSR and Cuba have been and always will
be the basis of Cuba's foreign policy.
Bridgetown press announces that Trevor Munroe, leader of the Marxist Workers
Party of Jamaica, has gone to Cuba to discuss improving relations.
4 November Guyana press reports that Foreign Minister Malmierca will leave for Georgetown,
Guyana, on 7 November.
During his speech commemorating the USSR's October Revolution, Jose Ramon
Machado Ventura reviews Soviet economic aid to Cuba and says that Cuba's
relations with the USSR are a source of pride.
Granma announces proposals, including a state mortgage system and private
leasing, to allow Cubans currently paying rent to own their homes beginning in
July 1985.
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Raul Castro greets Juan Almeida, Nicaraguan Minister of Culture Ernesto
Cardenal, and Czechoslovakia's leader Strogual upon their return from India
where they attended Gandhi's funeral.
Zimbabwe's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Witness Magwende, arrives in Havana.
He and Isidoro Malmierca discuss the international situation, especially Central
America and the Caribbean.
Prensa Latina from Rio de Janeiro reports that the Chief of Staff of the Brazilian
Armed Forces, Brig. Waldir Vasconcelos, says Brazil will reestablish relations
with Cuba.
Reuters reports that Cuban officials have resigned themselves to the fact that they
will be forced to deal with Ronald Reagan for four more years.
Vice President of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation receives
Zimbabwean Foreign Minister Witness Mangwende to discuss cooperation.
In an interview with Japan's KYODO news service, First Vice Foreign Minister
Jose Viera says that Cubans in Nicaragua will help the Central American country
if it is attacked by the United States.
8 November Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca and President Forbes Burnham of Guyana
discuss bilateral and international relations during a meeting in Guyana.
During an interview in Havana with Prensa Latina, Soviet Ambassador Katushev
says that the USSR and its people would be by the Cuban people's side should the
US attack Cuba.
9 November The Venezuelan National Council for Science and Technology and the Cuban
State Committee for Economic Cooperation sign a cooperation agreement.
Fidel Castro and Zimbabwean Foreign Minister Witness Mangwende discuss the
international situation and bilateral relations during a meeting in Havana.
10 November Isidoro Malmierca meets with Guyana's Vice President Ranji Chandisingh.
Malmierca says Cuba and Guyana are reevaluating all levels of their relations.
13 November CEMA delegations meet in Havana to study the growth of Cuba's electricity
generation plants and the improvement of technical and organizational
maintenance levels.
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15 November Granma reports that the Angolan Government has proposed that a four-part
agreement be signed by Angola, Cuba, South Africa, and SWAPO, for a gradual
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.
Fidel Castro sends a message of congratulations to Nicaraguan President-elect
Daniel Ortega on his election by the Nicaraguan people as President.
Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Andres Yebra and Argentine Minister Roque
Carranza and Vice Minister Pedro Casdo Bianco sign a maritime transport
cooperation agreement to expand bilateral trade.
Fidel Castro meets in Havana with Jamaica's former Prime Minister and
President of the People's National Party, Michael Manley.
16 November Alternate Cuban Ambassador to the UN Alberto Velazco San Jose says Cuba has
voted against a resolution adopted by the United Nations regarding the presence of
Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere states that the OAU summit has unanimously
rejected the idea of linking Namibia's independence on the withdrawal of Cuban
troops from Angola.
18 November Prensa Latina reports that the Angolan-Cuban plan on the gradual withdrawal of
Cuban troops from Angola involves only the Cuban forces in southern Angola,
between parallels 13 and 16.
20 November Spain's Minister of Transportation, Tourism, and Communications Enrique Baron
departs Cuba. During his visit he met with Fidel Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez,
and other Cuban officials.
21 November Fidel Castro and Jesus Montane discuss the international situation and matters
regarding the existing ties between their parties with Tetsuzo Fuwa, Japan's
Communist Party Presidium chairman.
22 November Afghanistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Shah Mohammad Dost discusses
bilateral topics and international issues with Vice Minister of Foreign Relations
Pelegrin Torras.
Cuba and Mexico sign a new trade agreement at the international CEMA
exposition in Mexico. The agreement will amount to $90 million by the end of the
year.
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23 November Isidoro Malmierca and Boureima Compaore, Ambassador of Burkina, sign a
reciprocal agreement in Havana on the free use of the buildings housing their
respective diplomatic missions.
Granma publishes a letter to Fidel Castro from Kendrick Radix, President of the
Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement, expressing gratitude for Cuban aid in
constructing Grenada's new airport.
Granma publishes the complete text of the proposal made by Angolan President
dos Santos which will allow the withdrawal of 20,000 Cuban soldiers from Angola.
26 November Carlos Rafael Rodriguez gives the closing speech at the second congress of the
Association of Cuban Economists. He says Cuba's economy has grown at a rate of
nearly 10 percent.
Isidoro Malmierca and Mozambique's Minister of Foreign Affairs Joaquim
Chissano meet in Havana.
During the third meeting on foreign trade between Cuba and Mexico in Mexico
City, an agreement is signed to grant each other tariff concessions and export
licenses for products of interest.
29 November In an interview, Ecuador's Foreign Minister Edgar Teran positively evaluates
diplomatic relations with Cuba and says there is no special conflict between the
two countries.
Uruguay's President-elect Julio Sanguinetti, in an interview in Tiempo Argentino,
says it would be positive to resume relations with Cuba.
Havana press reports that Cuba and the United States have resumed talks in New
York on the possible repatriation of about 3,000 Cuban "undesirables."
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