NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000301270001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 4, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Near East and
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Directorate of
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Seeref
Near East and
South Asia Review
Articles Iraqi Foreign Policy: The Case for Postwar Moderation) I 25X1
The moderating trend in Iraqi foreign policy is likely to outlast the
country's war with Iran, as Baghdad will need good ties with the
moderate Arabs to counter continuing hostility from Iran and Syria
and will seek more extensive political and economic ties with the
United States and Western Europe to balance its ties with the East.
The Communist Party of Iraq 5
The Communist Party of Iraq continues to be weakened by
factionalism, following years of ruthless repression by the ruling
Bath Party, but Communist activities during the past year suggest a
persistence that could lead to its resurgence under more favorable
India: Improving Military Capabilities Against Sri Lanka 9
The increased ethnic violence in Sri Lanka since mid-1983 has been
the major catalyst leading New Delhi to expand its military strength
in the south, although fears of increased foreign involvement in the
Indian Ocean and a desire to provide better protection to outlying
island territories have been contributing factors.
India: Discord in the Nuclear Community) 13
The Indian nuclear community is deeply split, with differences over
the technological direction of the program and even safety standards
hinging largely on personal allegiances to present and past directors
of the Department of Atomic Energy, and these differences have
resulted in delays in the nuclear program.
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Bangladesh: A Hot Winter for Ershad?I 17
President Ershad is seeking to break Bangladesh's political
stalemate by offering to hold a parliamentary election in early 1985
and proposing political concessions to win the opposition's
participation, but the opposition is insisting on preconditions that are
unacceptable to Ershad and his military backers.
Junior Pakistani Army officers have had more contact with the
Islamic world than with the West and generally have come from a
more religious background than senior officers, but most do not
appear to differ substantially from their seniors about Pakistani
policy toward the West and Islam.
The legitimacy of Sudan's ruler, or the popular acknowledgment of
his right to govern, remains the central issue in Sudanese politics
almost three decades after independence, and the leader's top
priority is to retain power by controlling the security services and
gaining support from factious northern elites.
As a microcosm of the strains evident throughout Saudi society,
Jiddah may serve as a bellwether for change throughout the
Kingdom, and its future may reflect the government's ability to
meet successfully the challenges posed by the marriage of modernity
and tradition in Saudi Arabia.
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the
authors,
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Secret
Iraqi Foreign Policy:
The Case for Postwar
Moderation
The moderating trend in Iraqi foreign policy is likely
to outlast the country's war with Iran. Baghdad will
need good ties with the moderate Arabs to counter
continuing hostility from Iran and Syria and to
promote Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's aspirations
to regional leadership. Iraq's desire for expanded
political and economic ties with the United States and
Western Europe is also likely to encourage
moderation. Because of these considerations Iraq is
unlikely to resort to terrorism against moderate Arab
or Western states after the war. The USSR will
remain Iraq's major arms supplier but is unlikely to
be able to extract significant political concessions
from Baghdad.
Baghdad's attempts to play a broader regional role
after the war will cause some problems in its relations
with the moderate Arab states and the West. Iraq's
leadership aspirations will revive its traditional
rivalries with Cairo and Riyadh, which have
ambitions of their own, but Baghdad probably will not
allow such differences to jeopardize overall relations
with them. Iraq will oppose US efforts to strengthen
military ties with the Gulf states
Background
Iraq has significantly moderated its foreign policy
since the late 1970s. In the early and mid-1970s Iraq
backed groups trying to subvert the conservative
monarchies of the region, was a haven for radical
Palestinian terrorist groups, and adopted the hardest
line of any Arab state toward Israel. In 1978 Iraq led
the move to isolate Egypt for subscribing to the Camp
Iraq's desire to establish itself as a leader in the region
and its sense of vulnerability between frequently
hostile Iran and Syria have been major factors
encouraging Iraqi moderation. Iraq began courting
the Gulf Arabs and Jordan in earnest in 1978 as it
sought to fill the leadership vacuum created by
Egypt's isolation. In 1980 renewed hostility with
Damascus and the emerging Iranian threat added
impetus to Baghdad's efforts to improve relations with
Arab moderates. Iraq particularly sought good ties
with Jordan, partly as a counterweight to Syria, but
primarily to ensure an economic lifeline through the 25X1
port of Al Aqabah. Iraq loaned Jordan several
hundred million dollars to improve the port
Baghdad's growing oil revenues and its desire to
diversify its civilian and military trading partners also
led it to expand ties with the West in the late 1970s.
By 1980 Iraq was importing three-fourths of its
civilian goods from non-Communist countries, up
from about one-fourth in 1974, and Western countries
were winning contracts for most major development
projects. Baghdad also began turning to the West-
particularly France-for military equipment, and by 25X1
1980 it was obtaining one-third of its arms and
materiel from non-Communist countries, up from
about 5 percent in 1974
Since the war with Iran began, Baghdad has softened
its rejectionist stance toward Israel and recently
began signaling its support for a Jordanian-PLO
agreement on negotiations with Tel Aviv. Iraq has
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-002
4 January 1985
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resumed dealings with Egypt and probably will fully
normalize ties with Cairo in 1985. Baghdad also no
longer allows international terrorist groups to operate
out of Iraq. Last year it expelled Abu Nidal's Black
June Palestinian terrorist group.
Postwar Moderation?
Some observers regard Iraq's moderation as purely
expedient and believe Baghdad will revert to radical
policies when the war ends. Iraq's need for Arab and
Western support in the war has contributed to the
moderating trend in its policies. Nevertheless, we
believe the factors that have encouraged this trend
will continue to play a major role in shaping
Baghdad's postwar policies.
Continued Iranian and Syrian hostility will strongly
influence Iraq's position. Even after Khomeini dies
and the war ends, the Iraqis are likely to be faced with
a hostile clerical regime in Tehran. As long as the
potential for renewed hostility with Iran exists, Iraq
will need to keep open logistic lines through Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. This will force Baghdad to
maintain reasonably good relations with the Arab
moderates
Despite Iraq's reluctance to support Syria in a conflict
with Israel, Baghdad remains hostile to Tel Aviv. This
animosity is deeply rooted in the Iraqi leadership and
populace. Moreover, Israel's attack on Iraq's nuclear
reactor in 1981 and its refusal to rule out a future
strike have humiliated and infuriated the Iraqis.
Should Israel become involved in a war with Jordan
or Egypt, Iraq would commit substantial forces to
support them.
Economic Concerns. The ability of Iran and Syria to
shut down key Iraqi oil and supply routes has
reinforced Baghdad's longstanding concern over the
country's economic vulnerability. Iraq has relied
heavily on financial aid from the Gulf Arabs in the
war. They have provided over $25 billion in direct aid
and oil sales. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait also have
served as major transshipment points for military
cargo, and Jordan's port of Al Aqabah has served as a
crucial gateway for Iraqi civilian and military
Syrian support for Iran in the war has deepened the
longstanding hostility between Damascus and
Baghdad. In 1981 Syria allowed Iran to use a Syrian
airbase to stage an air raid on an Iraqi airfield that
killed some Iraqi military personnel.
hostility is reinforced by the personal hatred between
Saddam and Syrian President Assad.
Syrian actions make it likely that Iraq will step up
efforts after the war to counter Syrian policies. To
accomplish this Iraq is likely to continue to cooperate
with Arab moderates who have supported it during
the war. Moreover, in our judgment, Iraq would give
only token support to Syria in the event of another
imports.
The oil pipelines Iraq is building through Turkey and
Saudi Arabia will link its interests more closely with
the region's moderates and thus increase Baghdad's
interest in their stability. Moreover, Iraq regards the
Gulf regimes as fragile, according to US diplomats in
Baghdad, and realizes that efforts to subvert them
would be likely to play into the hands of Iran, which is
working through the large communities of Gulf Shias
to destabilize those states.
Iraq is determined to resume its ambitious economic
development program and intends to rely primarily on
Western companies. Western governments may be
able to use Iraq's desire for expanded economic ties to
encourage continued Iraqi moderation.
Popular Opinion. Senior and middle-level personnel
in the Bath Party and the military are not likely to
look favorably on postwar adventurism. Iraqi Foreign
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Minister Tariq `Aziz has told US diplomats the Iraqi
people will not tolerate adventurist policies by the
government after the sacrifices made fighting Iran.
With some 300,000 Iraqi casualties in the war,
according to our estimate, virtually every family in
this country of 15 million has experienced the death
or injury of a relative. The war has brought great
economic hardship as well. Iraq has slashed civilian
imports by almost half in the last two years.
Leadership Aspirations. Iraq's aspiration to regional
leadership will encourage Baghdad to maintain good
ties with the Arab moderates. Saddam is likely to
present Iraq as a protector of the Gulf and realizes
that resuming its prewar support for opposition
movements in the region would encourage the Gulf
regimes to put distance between themselves and Iraq
and draw closer to the West. Iraq will need moderate
support to counter Syrian policies and probably hopes
improved ties with Egypt and Jordan will increase its
opportunities for influencing the Arab-Israeli peace
process.
Iraq's stance on Arab-Israeli issues is likely to be
governed by its desire to thwart Syria. Iraq is likely to
take a harder line on conditions for Jordanian-PLO
negotiations with Israel, but it will try to avoid
alienating the moderate Arabs with whom it will seek
cooperation on other issues. Iraqi officials have told
US diplomats they prefer an international conference
on the Arab-Israeli dispute. Iraq probably believes
that such a conference would enhance its chances of
influencing the peace process
Looking to the United States. Iraq's interest in
improved relations with the United States is likely to
outlast the war. Iraq's decision to normalize relations
reflects a basic tenet of Saddam's foreign policy
balanced relations with both the superpowers.
Moreover, Iraq's large military and economic deals
with the Soviets earlier in 1984 probably reduced
fears by the more pro-Soviet members of the Iraqi
leadership that better ties with the United States
would damage relations with the USSR.
Baghdad wants to expand trade and commercial ties,
especially in the areas of agriculture and oilJ
acquiring US agrobusiness technology. Largely as a
result of bureaucratic mismanagement of its land
reform, Iraq has gone from agricultural self-
sufficiency in the 1960s to net food importer today.
Iraq also is likely to exploit improved ties by
attempting to purchase US military equipment. Iraqi
officers have been impressed with the performance of
some US weapons during the war. Baghdad also may
seek US help in acquiring arms from Western Europe.
Since US arms are not crucial to Iraq, Baghdad will
view Washington's responses to its requests primarily
in political terms and as an indication of the US
attitude toward the overall relationship.
Finally, Saddam believes greater balance in relations
with the superpowers will serve his goal of
establishing Iraq as a leader in the nonaligned
movement. The war prevented Iraq from acting as
host to the nonaligned summit conference in 1982,
and Saddam still wants to be host for the next one,
scheduled for 1986. Moreover, Saddam probably
believes improved ties with the United States will
enhance Iraqi regional leadership by encouraging
Arab moderates to cooperate with Baghdad.
Mistrusting the Soviets
The USSR will continue to be Iraq's principal arms
supplier but probably will not be able to extract
significant political concessions in return. Even at the
height of Iraqi dependence on Soviet arms in the mid-
1970s Baghdad granted only token representation in
the government to the Iraqi Communist Party.
Moreover, Moscow's arms embargo early in the war
and the poor performance of some Soviet equipment
have convinced many Iraqi leaders that they should
reduce their dependence on Soviet weapons after the
Postwar Conflicts
Despite Iraq's desire for continued good ties with the
Arab moderates, Baghdad's efforts to establish itself
as a regional power are likely to bring it into conflict
with its moderate allies and the United States on
some issues.
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Iraq probably will concentrate its ambitions on the
Gulf and will want to participate in the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC). The Gulf states almost
certainly will resist full Iraqi participation, fearing
that linking themselves militarily to Iraq would anger
Iran. Baghdad will push aggressively for membership
in the GCC through diplomatic means, but it is not
likely to resort to force to get its way.
Kuwait is likely to bear the brunt of Iraqi ambitions.
Baghdad will press Kuwait to resolve their
longstanding border dispute and accede to Iraq's
request to lease the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Al
Warbah. Iraq is determined to gain territorial
changes to strengthen the security of its developing
naval and commercial port at Umm Qasr, opposite
the islands. Following the war, Baghdad intends to
expand significantly the Umm Qasr naval base and
will use it as a berth for 10 warships purchased from
Italy. Moreover, Iraq intends Umm Qasr to serve as a
partial alternative to its major port at Al Basrah,
which is more vulnerable to Iran. It has built a
shipping canal connecting the ports, thus bypassing
the Shatt al Arab
Iraq's pursuit of regional leadership is likely to
rekindle its traditional rivalry with Cairo. Egypt
probably will be critical of Iraqi efforts to dominate
the GCC, and frictions may develop as the two states
vie for influence over Jordan. Baghdad is not likely to
allow rivalry to develop into hostility, however, as long
as Iraq is working to isolate Syria
Iraq probably will view US efforts to strengthen
military ties with the Gulf states as a threat to its own
aspirations as protector of the Gulf. Iraq also believes
a large US presence in the Gulf would promote
greater superpower rivalry that would be detrimental
to its independent policies. Baghdad almost certainly
would consider postwar US efforts to improve ties
with Iran as a direct threat to Iraqi security.
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The Communist Party of Iraq
The Communist Party of Iraq continues to be
weakened by factionalism, following years of ruthless
repression by the ruling Bath Party. Communist
activities during the past year, however, suggest a
persistence that could lead to its resurgence under
more favorable conditions.
The Iraqi Communists went underground in 1979
following widespread arrests, executions, and other
harassment. They gave up two minor Cabinet posts
and inclusion in the Progressive and Patriotic
National Front, a grouping of Iraqi political parties
that nominally runs Iraq. Since then most of the
Communist Party leadership has remained in exile,
and the party has been inactive, with the exception of
guerrillas fighting in the mountains of northern Iraq.
The Ba`thist-Communist rivalry has deep roots that
go back to the bloody struggle for political power in
the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Estimates of Communist strength are tenuous because
of the clandestine and fractious nature of the party.
Communist Party strength inside
Iraq and abroad at about 2,500.
the Communists number 1,500 inside
Iraq and little more than 1,000 abroad
there are 600
members and 1,500 to 1,800 independent supporters
in northern Iraq. there are another
200 members in southern Iraq and 200 to 240
members abroad. Most other estimates put the
number of exiles closer to 1,000.
Communists still possess organizational
the party
distributed large numbers of antigovernment leaflets
clandestinely throughout Iraq on a single night last
April. The tract called on former members to rejoin
The following month, 2,000 students of Mosul and
Irbil Universities and the Technological Institute of
Kirkuk participated in the most serious public
demonstrations since the Ba'thists seized power in
1968.
Ithe participants as mostly
Kurds and Communists who were protesting the
summer callup of male students to active duty in
Iraq's Militia
The approximately 800 Communist guerrillas in
northern Iraq remain an irritant to the government.
US diplomats in Baghdad report that Communist
guerrillas, supported by the dissident Kurdish
Democratic Party, continue armed attacks against
government forces, loyal Kurdish tribesmen, and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by Kurdish
dissident Jalal Talabani, who had agreed to a cease-
fire with the government.
A Party Divided
The Iraqi Communists show no signs of overcoming
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their divisions, a weakness that has plagued them 25X1
since the founding of the party 50 years ago. 25X1
there appears to 25X1
be a growing divergence between the aging,
ideologically committed party leadership, represented
by Secretary General Aziz Muhammad and other
Politburo members, and newer middle-level cadres
who tend to be younger and more heavily represented
in the larger Central Committee and in the guerrilla
groups.
Several Communist guerrilla leaders call for armed
struggle against the Iraqi Government and oppose
efforts at reconciliation,
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-002
4 January 1985
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They blame the party's top leadership
for joining the Progressive and Patriotic National
Front in 1973 and making the party's overt apparatus
vulnerable during the Ba`thist crackdown. These
fighters also resent the risks that they are taking while
the old leadership leads a life of perceived ease and
inaction abroad
Other party elements are pressing the old guard to
reconcile with Baghdad.
In addition to polarity over strategy, the Communists
are divided by religion and ethnic background. Most
of the party's members are Kurds, Shias, and
Christians rather than the Sunnis who dominate Iraqi
identity into Communist doctrine creates recurring
friction.
Foreign Ties
Iraqi Communists have failed to receive sufficient
foreign support to overcome their weaknesses. The
party receives limited support from the USSR,
Eastern Europe, Syria, South Yemen, and radical
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Government Response
Ba'thist leaders take the Communist threat seriously,
recalling the bitter struggle with their ideological
rivals in the 1950s and 1960s and the popular appeal
of the Communists as late as 1978.
The government has employed carrot-and-stick and
divide-and-rule approaches to contain the party.C
Iraq released about 200
Communist prisoners last year and called in former
Communist official Hafiz al-Tukhmachi to discuss
possible ministerial positions for tame Communists.
Baghdad deals harshly with those who fail to
cooperate, deterring prospective Communists and
active members alike.
Iraq executed 152 Communist
prisoners in late 1983, most of whom had been
detained since 1980-81.
Prospects
We believe that the Communists are unlikely to
threaten Iraqi stability unless one or more of the
following developments takes place:
? A younger, more dynamic leadership emerges.
Secretary General Aziz Muhammad
is 60 and has headed the party for 20 years. His
leadership has usually been weak and indecisive, in
our judgment.
? The party concentrates its organizational talents on
constructing a clandestine network in Iraq. Even if
the party is legalized, to be effective it must create
an underground network divorced from the existing
one, which has been compromised. Building on the
present nets or relying on an overt structure would
leave the party vulnerable to roundups by the
security services.
? Iraqs economy is unable to fulfill popular 25X1
expectations. he 25X1
party depicted itself in 1978 as the only political
element genuinely concerned with improving the
working and living conditions of the common Iraqi.
It also attracted supporters and sympathizers
through a clever campaign criticizing official 25X1
corruption and human rights abuses. If the
government cannot resume its development program
war are dim because their support for Iran and
Syria undercuts their popular appeal.
after the war with Iran because of low oil revenues,
the Communists are certain to try to exploit this
weakness. Prospects for the Communists during the
? The Soviets significantly increase support for the
Communists with the aim of overthrowing Saddam.
We believe that this is highly unlikely over the next
few years because Moscow appears satisfied with its
relations with the Saddam regime and regards
prospects fora Communist seizure of power as thin.
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India: Improving Military Capabilities
Against Sri Lanka
A major military buildup is now under way in south
India. In our view, increased Tamil-Sinhalese violence
in Sri Lanka since mid-1983 has been the major
catalyst leading New Delhi to expand its military
strength in the south, although fears of increased
foreign involvement in the Indian Ocean and a desire
to provide better protection to outlying island
territories have been contributing factors. Despite
improved Indian capabilities and the likely
continuation of ethnic violence in Sri Lanka over the
next year, New Delhi probably will seek to maintain
stability on the island through a mix of threat and
persuasion rather than through military intervention.
Military Buildup
In the aftermath of the ethnic bloodletting in Sri
Lanka in 1983, India's Defense Council, chaired by
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, considered military
options for dealing with another serious outbreak of
The Air Force established a Southern Air Command
with headquarters at Trivandrum this past summer.
reconnaissance support to the Navy.
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Overhead photography indicates that Trivandrum can
now accommodate large jet aircraft with the recent 25X1
extension of its runway. New airbases and units are to
be established along the southern coastline
Capabilities for Intervention
India, in our view, can successfully project a small
combat force across the straits on short notice. As
facilities and force levels in the south expand, Indian
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-002
4 January 1985
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KSbUI Peshawar
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Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative
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capabilities to intervene in Sri Lanka in even greater
force will be possible.
We estimate that the Navy's six modern Soviet
landing ships and four Indian-built utility landing
craft are capable of moving in a single lift one fully
equipped combat battalion with some supporting
armor. Each Soviet-built ship can carry 180 to 200
troops or 80 to 100 men with about six armored
vehicles. The small Indian craft can hold 120 troops
or one armored vehicle, according to the Indian press.
The Navy is augmenting its amphibious lift
capability. The first of three indigenously built large
amphibious landing ships (LSTs) is now fitting out in
eastern India, and
overhead photography. We expect the LST to enter
service sometime in 1985. It is longer and wider and
therefore should have a larger capacity-than the
British LST it resembles, which has a lift capacity of
up to 530 troops and either 20 heliconters or 16 tanks
near future.
Naval exercises in eastern India in spring 1984
suggested that the Navy may have begun to establish
India's first naval infantry force, although the
evidence is still tentative.
that the Navy has long wanted
a brigade-size amphibious assault force, but up until
this year only regular infantry and mechanized Army
units are believed to have been used in annual
amphibious training exercises.
India has only a limited capability to airlift troops and
supplies, a deficiency the Air Force is moving to
correct by replacing its obsolete fleet of transports
with two new Soviet planes.
In addition,
since July, India has received more than 12 of 98
AN-32 light transports on order, according to
imagery. They are based at Agra, home of India's
elite airborne brigade.
The Southern Air Command is still a skeletal
command and is unlikely to reach its full military 25X1
potential for some time. Although fighters from the
north could be quickly deployed to southern airfields
in an emergency, we believe the Air Force will be slow
to divert frontline aircraft on a permanent basis from
the more strategically important air commands
adjacent to the Pakistani border during the next year.
Moreover, the creation of new airfield and
maintenance facilities in the south with adequate
support equipment and spare parts will take time.
Sri Lankan Capabilities
Sri Lanka's 25,000 military forces (active duty and
reserve personnel combined) can offer only token
resistance to direct military intervention by India, in
our view. They are primarily an internal security
force-understaffed, ill equipped, and poorly trained
and disciplined-according to US Embassy and
assessments. The Army is lightly
armed and has -few armored personnel carriers, the
Navy has only small patrol craft, and the Air Force
has no combat aircraft.
Continued Indian Concerns
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, like his mother, has
publicly expressed concern over the deteriorating
communal relations in Sri Lanka. The Indian
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Government has been under continual domestic 25X1
pressure for the past 18 months to support Tamils in
Sri Lanka, according to US diplomatic reporting.
Rajiv has urged Sri Lankan leaders to try harder to
reach a political settlement and undoubtedly is
disappointed over the recent breakdown in the
government's communal reconciliation talks.
Although Sri Lankan President Jayewardene hopes to
counter the growing insurgency through new arms
purchases and better anti-insurgency training, Indian
political leaders are skeptical of his government's
ability to maintain order. Sri Lankan security forces
have not been able to control the violence, and the
level of insurgent activity is on the rise, according to
US Embassy and press reporting. Repressive
measures by government forces against Tamil
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have given added momentum to the insurgency.
Outlook
India is unlikely to intervene militarily in Sri Lanka
over the next year, despite the likelihood of a
continued high level of ethnic violence and little or no
progress toward a political settlement. We believe
New Delhi's most likely strategy toward Colombo will
be to seek to maintain Sri Lanka's stability through a
mix of threat and persuasion rather than through
direct military intervention. New Delhi under newly
elected Prime Minister Gandhi probably will continue
to offer its diplomatic good offices to assist Colombo
in resolving its ethnic problems.
India probably would weigh in militarily only if
violence on the island:
? Erupts into uncontrolled, islandwide bloodletting.
? Is not contained and spills over into southern India.
? Provokes a massive flow of refugees into India.
? Threatens to precipitate intervention by foreign
powers.
As the preeminent power in South Asia, New Delhi's
military strategy is founded on the premise that it has
the right to intervene in the affairs of its smaller
neighbors to protect what it considers to be its
national and regional interests.
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India: Discord in the Nuclear
Communityp
The Indian nuclear community is deeply split.
Differences over the technological direction of the
program and even over safety standards hinge largely
on personal allegiances to present and past directors
of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and have
resulted in delays in the nuclear program. We believe
newly elected Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi may
attempt to improve the DAE's performance by
appointing a new chairman sympathetic to Rajiv's
interest in Western technology and modern
management techniques.
DAE debate swirls around the personalities of these
two men, the substantive issues go to the core of the
nuclear program and will simmer even if one or both
of India's leading nuclear figures should pass
prematurely from the scene.
Nuclear Weapons
Ramanna is a well-known proponent of a nuclear
weapons program, but he apparently does not
represent a majority within the nuclear community.
Background
The Indian nuclear program, renowned as a Third
World success, has been highly politicized by India's
prime ministers. Both Indira Gandhi and Morarji
Desai tried to undermine the influence and diminish
the achievements of the other through their
appointments to the Department of Atomic Energy
and use of publicity surrounding the programs.
In 1978 Desai demoted Raja Ramanna, a favorite of
Gandhi's and the architect of India's 1974 nuclear
test, and appointed Homi Sethna, an advocate of civil
nuclear power, as chairman of the DAE. Animosity
between Sethna and Ramanna began with the 1974
test, a political showpiece that resulted in the cutoff of
Western nuclear technology and which Ramanna kept
concealed from Sethna until the last minute.
In 1980 Gandhi reappointed Ramanna as director of
Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), apparently
reversing the emphasis on civil nuclear power that
Desai had sought. In 1983 Ramanna became
chairman of the DAE when Sethna retired, although
we believe Gandhi retained Sethna as a personal
nuclear adviser to maintain an alternative line to the
nuclear establishment. These arbitrary shifts of
nuclear advisers with different viewpoints and access
to government officials promoted a deep-seated
rivalry between Ramanna's pronuclear weapons group
and Sethna's nuclear power advocates. Although the
Safety and Management
Ramanna and Sethna have clashed sharply and
publicly over safety standards, with Ramanna
questioning whether India can afford to observe the
same high standards as Western countries. According
to press reporting, disagreements between the two
scientists delayed for two years the appointment of a
regulatory body to lay down norms on safety
measures. We believe the recent death of an engineer
at the Kota heavy water plant underscores the need
for high safety standards and highlights Ramanna's
laxity on this point
Other scientists worry about Ramanna's willingness
to sacrifice safety and good management for personal
loyalty. He violated a longstanding tradition of having
an engineer counterbalance a scientist in the two most
powerful positions in the nuclear establishment by
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-002
4 January 1985
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INDIA
ORGANIZATION OF THE ATOMIC EN EIRGY ESTABLISI-NENT
Prime minister
_- Rajiv Gandhi
Atomic Energy Commission
Raja Ramanna
Department of
Atomic Energy
(Bombay)
Bhabha Atomic Research Reactor Nuclear Fuel
Research Center Center Center
(Bombay) (Kalpakkam) (Hyderabad)
P. K. Iyengar C. V. Sundaram N. Kondal Rao
Heavy Water Power Projects
Projects Engineering Division
(Bombay) (Bombay)
N. Srinivasan H. R. Srinivasan
appointing P. K. Iyengar, a physicist and his good
friend and protege, as director of BARC. Many
engineers believe that, with two scientists guiding the
power program, more problems will be created than
solved, since they do not have a basic understanding
of the intricacies involved in power plant operation.
lyengar's appointment stirred dissension at BARC,
with nuclear officials openly critical of Iyengar and
refusing to respond to his direction.
According to Indian press reports, Indira Gandhi
shocked the nuclear community when she accepted
Sethna's retirement in August 1983 and gave his
position to Ramanna. Ramanna's position was
strengthened and Sethna's reputation tarnished when
a committee appointed to investigate criticisms of the
nuclear program appearing in the press indicted the
performance of the DAE both in terms of
performance and the technological route chosen.
According to the US Embassy, the head of the
investigative committee was close to Ramanna and
had longstanding differences with Sethna. The report
went beyond its mandate and argued that India
should switch to light water reactors obtainable from
the USSR, a position that Ramanna supports.
The US Embassy reports that BARC senior officials
have stated that under Ramanna's administration the
organization's name is "tarnished by its dismal
performance, false claims of achievements, inspired
leaks to the press, and near fratricidal warfare among
factions." Gossip in Bombay scientific and
professional circles details intramural bickering,
favoritism in appointments, exile of scientists to
meaningless work, and ineffective leadership. The
professional staff complains that Ramanna hampers
communication between scientists in his efforts to
control the program
BARC and DAE
officials believe the country's nuclear leadership may
be in flux, and they are attempting to position
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Secret
themselves to take best advantage of the new political
Self-Reliance
Indian nuclear officials are even taking sides over the
longstanding policy of self-reliance, which dictates
indigenously produced nuclear fuel and equipment.
This policy took root in the late 1960s when India
rejected the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to
preserve its weapons option.
The factions advocate nuclear self-reliance as a goal,
but they disagree over how much to sacrifice for it.
According to diplomatic sources, some members of
the community believe India should retain its
unsafeguarded facilities capable of producing
explosive material. Nonetheless, they would accept
limited safeguards over the power program that would
open it to foreign observation but permit India to
import the technology necessary to make it work more
effectively. A very few would even sacrifice the
weapons option in favor of the power program by
accepting full-scope safeguards
A related disagreement is over which technology to
import. Both Soviet and Western suppliers require
some form of safeguards, but Ramanna is reputedly
sympathetic to a Soviet offer of light water reactors.
Employing these would divert the technological
direction of the program away from heavy-water-
moderated natural uranium reactors, which have
failed to provide promised levels of energy under
Sethna's civil power program. Presumably, Ramanna
is willing to compromise on the goal of self-sufficiency
to avoid similar criticisms of his own administration.
most of the
nuclear community believes Soviet technology is
substandard. Some, including Sethna and the head of
the Nuclear Fuel Center in Hyderabad, would prefer
to import Western nuclear technology if safeguards
requirements were not an obstacle.
Outlook
In our judgment, the high profile of the nuclear
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Rajiv Gandhi. Gandhi and his close advisers have a
demonstrated interest in the business-oriented, high-
technology world of the West and also see the West as
a source of investment. Rajiv and his advisers are
likely to ask for a reappraisal of the nuclear program,
including the questions of self-reliance and its
commitment to the large-scale civil nuclear program.
This will have repercussions in the debate over the
purchase of Soviet technology and may open the door
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Bangladesh:
A Hot Winter for Ershad?
President Ershad is seeking to break Bangladesh's
political stalemate by offering to hold a parliamentary
election in early 1985 and proposing political
concessions in return for the opposition's
participation. The two opposition alliances have not
rejected Ershad's offer but are insisting on
preconditions that are, so far, unacceptable to Ershad
and his military backers.
Ershad to Opposition: Let's Make a Deal
The main features of Ershad's 15 December proposal
are:
? Parliamentary election to be held in April 1985.
? Most of the martial law offices to be dismantled by
the end of January.
? Martial law to be phased out and suspended
constitution to be reinstated once the parliament is
seated.
? Election to be supervised by neutral election
commission and government ministers to be banned
from running as candidates.
Since then, the regime has also promised to restore
basic political rights, stay neutral in the election, and
remove government-backed Janadal Party members
from the Cabinet before the election is held.
Ershad's proposals are the furthest he has gone in
response to opposition demands. We judge that he is
trying to persuade more moderate elements of the
opposition alliances to endorse his election offer, thus
dividing the opposition and giving the proposed
election some legitimacy. At the same time, Ershad is
trying to prove to the military that he is in control and
that he can deal effectively with the opposition.
Although US Embassy sources report that he retains
the backing of most senior military officers-his
tenure as commander in chief has been extended to
December 1985
Ershad, in our view, believes he can
win the parliamentary election and then run for
president himself.
Ball in Opposition's Court
So far, the two main opposition alliances, the Seven-
Party Alliance and the Fifteen-Party Alliance, have
sharply criticized Ershad's offer but have not rejected
it outright. The Fifteen-Party Alliance, headed by the
Awami League, has stipulated that martial law must
be lifted before any election takes place and that
Ershad must remain impartial during the election.
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which
heads the moderate Seven-Party Alliance, has called
for a more gradual dismantling of martial law and for
allowing former party leaders who were arrested for
corruption to participate in the election. The Jamaat-
e-Islami, the major fundamentalist organization,
supports the opposition's demands and has held its
own antigovernment rallies. The only major political
party that has endorsed Ershad's offer is his own
Janadal Party, which has little political credibility.
We believe both opposition alliances are hedging their
bets in the hope of further concessions. It is unlikely
that Ershad or the military will agree to lift martial
law before the election or allow imprisoned BNP
officials to run for office.
Ershad's election offer comes at a time when the
opposition has become bolder in challenging the
regime's authority. Since September both opposition
alliances have engaged in civil disobedience, including
general strikes, mass rallies, and "noncooperation
movements" that seek to withhold tax payments to the
government. The most recent action was a 48-hour
general strike on 22-23 December that had wide
participation, according to US Embassy reports,
despite a temporary ban on political activity.
I The continuing
spiral of disobedience has been a source of
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embarrassment for both Ershad and the military. The
election proposal was probably designed, in part, to
break the spiral.
Efforts To Break Stalemate
According to US Embassy sources, Ershad and his
advisers have been negotiating with the BNP to
secure its participation in the proposed election. The
BNP is heavily factionalized, and Ershad hopes to
exploit its divisions to attract proregime forces within
the party. A major stumblingblock in this strategy,
however, is the personal animosity of the BNP's
leader, Begum Kaleda Zia, toward Ershad. Begum
Zia, the widow of the late President Ziaur Rahman,
holds Ershad responsible for her husband's
assassination in 1981.
Unhappy Choices for Ershad
If most political parties refuse to take part in the
proposed election, Ershad will be faced with several
unpalatable choices. First, he could go ahead with the
election in April with his Janadal Party and several
conservative and Islamic breakaway factions of the
BNP participating. The regime would probably use
repressive measures to halt attempts to boycott or
disrupt the balloting, but the credibility of such an
election would be slight.
Another option would be to hold a national
referendum on Ershad's policies. The Fifteen-Party
Alliance and the Jamaat-e-Islami, however, have
already rejected this idea.
A third choice would be to once again postpone the
election, as Ershad did twice in 1984. Another
postponement would increase military disgruntlement
with Ershad's inability to consolidate his authority.
many in both the
military and the BNP believe that BNP leader Begum
Zia would be more willing to negotiate with the
regime if Ershad was replaced.
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Attitudes of Junior Pakistani
Army Officers
Junior Pakistani Army officers have had more contact
with the Islamic world than with the West and
generally have come from a more religious
background than senior officers. Still, most junior
officers regard the United States relatively favorably,
and their views do not appear to differ substantially
from their seniors about Pakistani policy toward the
West and Islam. The junior officers are not fervent
Muslims but appear to be more suspicious of India
than senior officers and more interested in the current
Turkish model of government, in which the military
assumes an active role in leading the country. F_~
Background and Training
Junior Pakistani Army officers have had less contact
with the West than senior officers. We estimate there
were as many as 10 times more Western trainers in
Pakistan and Pakistanis training in the West during
the 1950s and early 1960s than there are today.
Junior officers have had more contact with Arab
military organizations than previous generations of
Pakistani officers. According to
pen literature, the number of Pakistani military
personnel stationed in the Middle East and North
Africa has increased from 900 in 1972 to
approximately 18,000-nearly 4 percent of all
Pakistani armed forces personnel. In addition to its
military training missions abroad, Pakistan's service
schools, military bases, and ships serve as training
centers for about 1,000 Arab military students at any
Junior officers have also been more exposed to Islamic
influence through their families than senior officers.
Since Pakistan's independence, many members of the
Pakistani lower middle classes, where Islamic ties are
strongest, have entered the Army as part of the
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Persian Gulf economies has made military service less
attractive to Pakistan's more secular upper classesF__1
Islamic fundamentalism is not a strong force among
Pakistani junior officers.
about 25 percent of the junior
officers are fervent Muslims. About 50 percent are
moderate supporters of Islam, and about 25 percent
are secular in outlook.
most junior officers dislike the religious
fanaticism of the Khomeini regime.
junior officers usually o no
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observe fasts during Ramadan and have ignored a
recent order to pray several times a day. Other foreign
military personnel note that young officers usually
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insignificant space on exams at the Quetta Command
and Staff College-a key steppingstone toward senior
Army positions.
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identify with the Islamic world and resent the Israeli
occupation of Jerusalem, but they have a somewhat
condescending attitude toward Arabs, whom they
consider to be poor fighters and primitive desert
dwellers. This latter view is held particularly by those
who have served in the Middle East. We believe that
the young officers are jealous of Arab oil wealth and 25X1
resent the fact that Pakistani workers perform menial
jobs in the Arab Gulf states. F___1 25X1
The West and the USSR
Pakistani junior officers appear to be as pro-Western
as their seniors despite less contact with the West.
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and are grateful for US military aid. Officers have
enjoyed their training experiences in the West, and
they prefer to vacation in the West rather than make
a pilgrimage to Mecca
At the same time, junior officers-like senior
officers -have negative feelings about the West and
do not want to see Pakistan too closely tied to the
United States. past US
arms embargoes as well as US support for Israel have
produced resentment. Both generations of officers
believe that the United States may lose interest in
Pakistan if concern about Afghanistan subsides.
Neither generation wants US bases on Pakistani soil
or extensive joint exercises
Both junior and senior officers dislike the Soviet
Union.
generations of officers abhor Soviet atheism and
resent the Soviet alliance with India. Many believe
that the Soviets' ultimate goal is a naval base on the
Pakistani coast. junior
officers sometimes express frustration over President
Zia's reluctance to deal forcefully with Afghan and
Soviet violations of Pakistani airspace. We believe,
however, that the junior officers would probably act in
the same way if they were faced with command
decisions.
Tougher Attitude Toward India
.Junior officers appear to have had less contact with
Indians and hold a more negative view of them than
do senior officers. Few officers under 40 have had
more than sporadic encounters with Indians during
trips abroad. Although they believe India is intent on
dismembering Pakistan, junior officers do not
underestimate the Indian military. They believe
Pakistan would have trouble avoiding defeat in war. A
handful of senior officers still in the Pakistani Army
served with Indians in the British Indian Army, and
most had many contacts with Hindus and Sikhs
before partition in 1947. President Zia fought
alongside Indian troops in the British Army in Burma.
Turkey has developed a successful system in which
the military intervenes to reestablish order in times of
unrest or government paralysis and sets the broad
outlines of government policy during periods when
civilians are in power. The younger officers have little
faith in the ability of the old Pakistani
establishment-landowners, politicians, lawyers, and
bureaucrats-to solve Pakistan's problems or in the
parliamentary and judicial systems inherited from the
British. The officers believe that they have an
obligation that transcends their military duties to
their country.
Outlook
The similarity of views between senior and junior
officers about Islam, the West, and the Soviet Union
indicates that Pakistan's military will probably
continue to support a generally pro-Western, but at
the same time nonaligned, stance. The junior officers'
more suspicious attitude toward India, however, will
work against both an improvement in Indo-Pakistani
relations and probably against pressures to forgo a
nuclear weapons program.
We expect the attraction of the Turkish model will
continue. Junior officers who come to power will
probably be even more strongly inclined than senior
officers are now to ensure stability either by direct
rule or by insisting that a civilian government does
their bidding.
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Sudan: The Problems of
Governance
Forecasting developments in Sudan is risky, but-as
President Nimeiri's troubles in recent months attest-
governing that country is riskier. Sudanese politics pit
numerous factions against each other and frequently
against a central government struggling to stay in
power. Focusing on Nimeiri's mercurial personality or
on foreign meddling may partly explain political
outcomes in Sudan. This emphasis, however, neglects
a major problem facing any Sudanese leader-how to
get the various organized groups to accept his right to
Challenges Facing the Government
The legitimacy of Sudan's ruler, or the popular
acknowledgment of his right to govern and his ability
to represent fairly the interests of diverse groups,
remains the central issue in Sudanese politics almost
three decades after independence. Sudanese heads of
state lack undisputed authority on the basis of
traditional tribal or clan custom because of the
numerous ethnic, linguistic, and cultural divisions
within the population. Neither President Nimeiri nor
his predecessors have succeeded in portraying
themselves as charismatic leaders like Muhammad
Ahmad, the "Mahdi," whose piety and opposition to
British rule a century ago earned him widespread
allegiance. Moreover, spokesmen for Sudan's political
elites have failed to devise a durable formula for
sharing power, checking potential abuses of power,
and arranging for orderly succession.
Northern Realities. In the predominantly Arab
Muslim north, persistent rivalries among key groups
help keep alive disputes over the President's right to
rule. Traditional rivalry between the Ansar and
Khatmiyyah sects limits the chance that a national
leader who belongs to one of these groups will keep
the loyalty of the other. The Muslim Brotherhood's
longstanding call to transform Sudan into an Islamic
state challenges Ansar and Khatmiyyah claims to
national leadership. This challenge makes it hard for
a Sudanese leader to build a stable coalition of
Muslim forces and, indeed, stiffens Ansar and
Khatmiyyah opposition to the ruler if he appears to
cooperate closely with the Brotherhood. Nimeiri's
growing detachment from the Brotherhood and from
policies it favors, together with his conciliatory
gestures toward the Ansars, is intended partly to
reduce just such opposition.
Rivalry between Muslim Brothers and Communists
splits the ranks of Sudanese who seek fundamental
political and economic change. Both these groups
appeal to educated professionals, labor union
members, and students. A government alignment with
Communists eventually would prompt an opposing
coalition of Muslim Brothers, Ansars, and, possibly,
Differences among northern elites over policy toward
southern Sudan further complicate the ruler's
legitimacy. Ansars and Muslim Brothers generally
favor Islamization and Arabization of the south, but
Communists, union members, and some influential
Khatmiyyahs endorse a measure of southern
autonomy and development. Consequently, a
conciliatory policy toward the south diminishes
conservative Muslim support for the government,
while a hardline policy weakens the backing of
"progressive" forces for the regime.
Longstanding disputes over Sudan's foreign relations
also make it hard for the government to build a
durable popular base. Ansars generally oppose close
ties with Egypt because they remember Cairo's
cooperation with Britain a century ago in crushing the
nationalist government set up by their founder, the
Mahdi. As a result, Ansars at a minimum are hesitant
to support a pro-Egyptian Sudanese leader against his
regional enemies. At a maximum, Ansars might
cooperate with Egypt's regional opponents who want
to weaken the bonds between Khartoum and Cairo.
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In contrast to the Ansars, Khatmiyyah elites
generally support Sudanese leaders who cultivate
close relations with Egypt. This stems from Cairo's
preferential treatment of the sect dating back to the
1880s. The Khatmiyyahs, however, are more flexible
than the Ansars in their position on foreign affairs,
and they will seek any regional support necessary to
retain their relative affluence and access to high-level
government posts.
Muslim Brothers tend to side with the Ansars against
the Khatmiyyahs and a pro-Egyptian Sudanese
government, largely because of Egypt's anti-
Brotherhood policy dating from 1954. The
Brotherhood's support for an evolutionary process of
Islamization in Sudan, its fear of repression by an
Egyptian-backed Sudanese regime, and the
cooperation it has received from Nimeiri in recent
years, however, make it cautious about openly
challenging the government's policy.
The Southern Problem. In the black, non-Muslim
south a legacy of cultural belittlement, political
domination, and economic neglect by northerners
keeps key groups poised to oppose the leader in
Khartoum. Southern elites trained in Christian
missionary schools and in the West are more prone
than animist chiefs to organize an insurrection and
have filled most of the leadership roles in the main
southern dissident organization, the Sudanese
People's Liberation Movement. Southern opposition
increases if southern leaders perceive northern
attempts to Islamize and Arabize the south, exploit
southern resources, and impede southern autonomy.
Southerners become more inclined to oppose the ruler
if he appears to be aligning with fervent Muslim
elements in Sudan and elsewhere in the region.
Southerners fear that the growth of Islamic
fundamentalism strengthens northern sentiments to
oppress them. Moreover, most southerners believe
that in a north-south crisis, Cairo would back
Khartoum at the expense of southern interests to
ensure its water supply from the Nile River.l
Tensions among the powerful Dinka, Nuer, and
Lotuka tribes, however, limit southern cooperation.
The Dinkas, the largest tribal confederation in the
south, and the Nuers are traditional rivals for
leadership in the Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile
Provinces. Lotukas and other tribes in Equatoria,
meanwhile, are suspicious of the Dinkas and resent
Dinka attempts to gain preeminence in southern
politics. These frictions-if exploited by the central
government-can weaken a southern dissident
movement.
Economic Issues. Sudanese elites outside the
government always link, to some degree, the regime's
legitimacy to its economic performance. Opposition
increases if development projects fail and if droughts
and fluctuations in world market prices for Sudanese
cotton reduce foreign exchange earnings and diminish
the regime's ability to provide basic goods and
services. The more a ruler excludes key elites from the
policymaking process, the greater will be his blame
for a faltering economy.
The economic expectations of urban professionals,
trade unionists, and students in the north are
especially troublesome for a Sudanese regime. These
groups-though split along sectarian and ideological
lines-can paralyze important services and organize
demonstrations if they believe the government is
incompetent or corrupt.
The Military. The military's support for a Sudanese
regime depends largely on a combination of:
? The soldiers' satisfaction or disgruntlement, on a
personal level, with their pay and perquisites and, on
a professional level, with their equipment, training,
and self-esteem.
? The regime's economic policies, to the extent that
they prevent or provoke civil disorder.
? The regime's handling of the southern problem. F-
Senior officers have the most privileges and thus the
most to lose by involvement in an abortive coup. They
might not move to save the ruler, however, if they
faced mounting disciplinary problems in the ranks,
civilian riots in Khartoum, and a military stalemate in
the south
Lower ranking officers, who lack the financial cushion
of their senior colleagues, tend to be more sensitive to
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Secret
corruption and budgetary mismanagement. Their
disaffection will increase if government policy
heightens resistance in the south, where they are
obliged to fight in harsh terrain with poor equipment
and inadequate logistic support.
The Ruler's Responses
The Sudanese leader knows that his country's
heterogeneity severely limits his legitimacy and keeps
his tenure uncertain. His top priority, therefore, is to
retain power by controlling the security services and
gaining support or at least neutrality from factious
northern elites. This task consumes most of his time
and political resources, leaving little for economic
planning and state building.
Mixing intimidation with rewards is a frequently used
Sudanese strategy for retaining power. A ruler in
Khartoum will foster insecurity among his senior
officials, especially if he gains office through a coup.
For example, to discourage competitors and
encourage dependence on his patronage, Nimeiri
arbitrarily rotates his officers, transferring them from
posts of prominence to obscurity or retiring them.
Nonetheless, he avoids liquidating the "disloyal" out
of respect for the Sudanese distaste for political
violence and to avoid emboldening desperate
opponents.
Nimeiri appears to find the "carrot-and-stick"
approach irresistible for making or breaking civilian
coalitions. Offering posts and favorable economic
decisions to one group while threatening to curtail its
political activity may temporarily split, for example,
Ansars from Muslim Brothers. Nimeiri's recent
decision to end the 15-month imprisonment of Ansar
leader Sadiq al-Mahdi conforms to this strategy. F_
Nimeiri's maintenance of a political organization
supplements his carrot-and-stick strategy. An
authoritarian "mass" party such as the Sudan
Socialist Union serves to co-opt opponents through
membership or publicize their abstention as a lack of
civic responsibility. Through the single party, Nimeiri
can portray himself as receptive to broad political
participation while retaining some influence over any
elites who join.
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Jiddah: Saudi Arabia's
Second Capital
the Hajj-the
annual pilgrimage when Muslims from all over the
world travel to Mecca (about 70 kilometers west of
Jiddah) to perform their religious obligation-the
recently completed Hajj terminal adjacent to King
Abd al-Aziz airport The
air-conditioned, open, tentlike structure is the
processing point for all pilgrims arriving in the
Kingdom by air. The terminal is divided into two
sections, which allows the Saudis to separate
potentially hostile pilgrimage delegations, such as
Iranians and Iraqis. The pilgrims are grouped
together at the terminal by nationality or language
and are bused to Mecca with their "mutawwif," a
Saudi Government-approved guide required of all
foreign pilgrims. The Hajj terminal was first opened
to pilgrimage traffic in 1982, and in 1984 over 35,000
pilgrims a day were processed at the peak of the Hajj
season.
The City
From the airport, Jiddah is due south along Mecca
Road-a six-lane highway jammed during weekday
rush hours and on Friday evenings, which is the end of
the Saudi weekend. Both sides of Mecca Road are
lined with large retail stores, office buildings, small
shops, and restaurants. Closer to town, there are
larger, Western-style shopping malls where small
groups of teenage Saudi boys and girls gather in the
evenings to flirt discreetly in what has become a new
courting ritual in Jiddah. "Cruising" along Mecca
Road during congested hours also is popular among
young Saudi men as a way to catch glimpses of
unveiled Saudi and Western women in other cars.
Mecca Road winds its way to the suq-the market or
East. Crowded and congested, the area has undergone 25X1
a transformation during the past few years as older
buildings from the turn of the century have been torn
down and replaced by modern structures, mainly
large office buildings. Although the Saudi
bazaar-that is the center of the city and still
Jiddah's shopping hub. It is here that the gold shops
abound and Saudi and expatriate shoppers bargain in
traditional fashion with the local merchants. Most of
the shopkeepers are Yemenis, mainly from South
Yemen, who rent their shops from Saudi landlords.
According to the local shopkeepers, Prince
Muhammad bin Abd al-Aziz, King Fahd's eldest
brother, owns most of the property of the central suq.
The area surrounding the suq is downtown Jiddah,
and it resembles many other large cities in the Middle
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Government recently has taken steps to preserve some
of Jiddah's traditional buildings, years of
indiscriminate leveling of city blocks have changed
the face of the inner city.
The southern edge of the city is ringed by an oil
refinery and the port of Jiddah. King Faysal Naval
Base is a short distance farther south. King Abd al-
Aziz University and the old airport stretch along
Jiddah's western perimeter. The escarpment, which is
the western side of a mountain range running the
length of the Hijaz (the western region of Saudi
Arabia), provides a dramatic backdrop to the city in
the east.
The western edge of the city has been edging into the
Red Sea. Soaring real estate prices and a shortage of
undeveloped property in prime city locations have
encouraged the Saudis to push out Jiddah's shoreline
over the past 10 years. In some areas, as much as 2
kilometers of coastline have been reclaimed by
landfill. The US Consulate compound in Jiddah once
straddled the shoreline but is now located about a
kilometer from the present corniche. The corniche
itself has undergone significant development as the
municipality has allocated nearly $500 million over
the past five years to beautify a 70-kilometer stretch
of the city's coast. The corniche is very popular with
both Saudis and expatriates, especially on weekend
afternoons when the beaches are inundated by
picnickers. Social and legal proscriptions against
mixed swimming and Western-style beach attire,
however, have encouraged most of Jiddah's
Westerners-as well as Westernized Saudis and other
Arabs-to congregate at more remote enclaves such
as the "Creek," which is a small inlet north of the city
where Riviera fashions and lifestyles prevail.
The People
Saudis. There are approximately 1.2 million people
living in Jiddah, but only about half are Saudis. Most
Saudis living in Jiddah are native Hijazis, inhabitants
of the western region of the Kingdom who are of
mixed ancestry and who are considered ethnic hybrids
by their Najdi (central region) cousins. They are
frequently referred to disparagingly as "baqiyat al-
hujjaj" (remnants of the pilgrims), as many of their
forefathers originally came to Saudi Arabia on
pilgrimage and then remained. Many prominent
Saudis from Jiddah (including the mayor) have ethnic
Persian, Turkish, and Pakistani surnames.
According to an Embassy assessment, about three-
fourths of the Saudis in Jiddah belong to the upper
and middle classes. Although there is great economic
disparity within this group, from multibillionaire
businessmen to junior government officials, all are
able financially to live comfortably. The standard of
living is high by Western standards. Many families
own several cars, usually new and expensive models.
Most own their own homes. All children attend
school, an increasing number through the university
level. Family members frequently travel abroad,
many for extended periods.
The remaining Saudis of Jiddah (approximately
150,000) constitute the "lower class." Lower class
Saudis typically earn less than $1,500 per month. It is
not unusual for a family, or extended family, of eight
to 10 members to live in a three-room dwelling. Some
of these Saudis are taxicab drivers, government
clerks, policemen, and National Guardsmen. Few
adults are educated, and many are illiterate. Less
than half have traveled outside the western region of
the Kingdom, and many are dark skinned, indicating
African ancestry. Most of these lower class Saudis are
recent arrivals to Jiddah. Born in nearby rural areas,
the Asir highlands, or the Tihama (Jizan) coastal
plain, they have relocated to take advantage of better
economic opportunities.
The Embassy believes the members of Jiddah's lower
class, despite their low social and economic standing,
are significantly better off than most Saudis who live
in rural areas. Medical services are readily available
in Jiddah and are free to Saudi citizens. Virtually all
families own a car, and most have electricity and
associated appliances, such as color television sets.
Basic Western-style commodities are also affordable
to most. Although malnutrition exists, it is due to poor
dietary habits rather than an inability to buy
nutritious foods. According to the Embassy, there are
no homeless Saudis in Jiddah.
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Non-Saudis. The other half of Jiddah's inhabitants
are other Arabs, Africans, Asians, West Europeans,
and Americans. Some of these non-Saudis,
particularly the Arabs and some Africans, have lived
in Jiddah for 20 years or more and are permanent
residents of the city. The average stay for most
Asians, Europeans, and Americans, however, is five
years or less.
Although some expatriates including almost all of
the 50,000 Europeans and Americans who reside in
the city-are professionals working in both the public
and private sectors, most are menial laborers who
accept unskilled or semiskilled jobs that traditionally
are shunned by Saudis. They typically live in ethnic
enclaves in the city or in foreign worker compounds
attached to project sites. Some, especially Muslim
Africans, are pilgrims remaining illegally in the
country. Among the poorest non-Saudis are those
from the Yemens, Sudan, Sub-Saharan Africa, and
the Indian subcontinent. Almost all of these groups
live under conditions comparable to or below Saudi
lower class standards. North Yemenis, the largest
single group, are relatively better off, as they are
granted special immigration and work privileges.
The Life
Jiddah is by far the most cosmopolitan of all Saudi
cities. Although the trappings of modernization and
Westernization can be found virtually anywhere in
the Kingdom, Jiddah has had a longer exposure to
outside influences. As the major port of entry for
pilgrims as well as the diplomatic capital of the
Kingdom for over 50 years (the government directed
that all embassies be relocated to Riyadh last
October), Jiddah has served as Saudi Arabia's melting
pot.
Notwithstanding the city's reputation for relative
social "liberalism," the same strictures that exist
throughout Saudi Arabia are enforced in Jiddah.
Women are not allowed to drive and can legally work
only in positions deemed proper by the government
and religious establishment, such as teaching and the
medical professions. Unaccompanied women cannot
check into a hotel without written government
authorization. Public displays of affection between
men and women for example, holding hands-are
prohibited. Alcohol is illegal. Public movie theaters
are proscribed by law, although several existed in
Jiddah during the reign of King Faysal (1962-75).
Restaurants are required to have one dining facility
for families and another for men, and all commercial
establishments must close during prayer times. All of
these strictures apply to both Saudis and expatriates
living in the Kingdom.
The recent rise in Islamic "awareness" in the Middle
East and the concomitant trend toward greater social
and religious conservatism throughout Saudi Arabia
has prompted local officials in Jiddah to take
additional steps to stem what the government believes
are the politically unhealthy effects of
Westernization. In the past two years, Jiddah's
hairdressing salons for women and video game parlors
have been closed, all common public gatherings of
men and women have been banned, and censorship
standards have been made more stringent.
Nevertheless, the active enforcement of these
religiously motivated laws is less rigorous in Jiddah
than in other large cities. Although Jiddah has its own
contingent of "mutawwa'in"-religious police who
serve as sidewalk vigilantes-their activities pale in
comparison to those of their brethren in Riyadh and
Dhahran.
Violation of these social strictures is theoretically
punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, but there
are varying standards of justice in Jiddah. If a
prominent Saudi is involved, the violation is generally
regarded as an "indiscretion" and is overlooked. If it
is an "average" Saudi with little influence among
local officials, he is assessed a nominal fine and given
a warning against any repetition. Non-Saudis,
however, particularly Asian and African laborers, are
shown little leniency and usually bear the full weight
of Saudi justice. In any case involving non-Saudis,
however, royal family members or other influential
Saudis can alter the sentence.
The Government
Three levels of Saudi government-local, provincial,
and national-are involved in the governing and
development of the city of Jiddah. The local
government, headed by Mayor Muhammad Said
Farsi, has been responsible for cleaning up and
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modernizing the city over the past five years. A
protege of King Fahd, Farsi frequently uses
heavyhanded and intimidating tactics on residents of
Jiddah who oppose his plans for the city. Farsi is best
known for his penchant for erecting eccentric
monuments throughout the city, such as a 12-meter
bicycle and a 6-meter thumb.
Jiddah also is the seat of government of Mecca
Province, which is headed by Prince Majid bin Abd
al-Aziz, a half brother of King Fahd, who lives in
Jiddah. Majid and Farsi have locked horns in the past
because of conflicting views regarding the city's
development. Majid has prevented Farsi from
enacting some of his programs, particularly plans for
razing entire city blocks to make way for modern
buildings and improved roads. Moreover, the governor
has frequently sided with local residents against the
ambitious mayor.
Although the summer capital of the Saudi
Government is in Taif, which is about 100 kilometers
cast of Jiddah, most Saudi kings-including King
Fahd-have spent at least half of their summers in
Jiddah. King Fahd and most senior princes have large
palaces in Jiddah and bring their families and staff
with them during the summer months as well as on an
irregular basis during the rest of the year. Many
government officials also make the annual trek to the
western province, and some maintain homes in both
Riyadh and Jiddah. Consequently, the royal family
and the national government keep a close eye on life
in Jiddah.
Outlook
The city of Jiddah will continue to expand. Although
much of the Kingdom's economic and diplomatic
activity is gradually being transferred to Riyadh,
Jiddah will remain an important commercial and
financial center. Its proximity to Mecca, its more
relaxed social environment, and its Red Sea location
make it a more attractive home than Riyadh for many
Saudis and most expatriates.
Over the next several years, however, Jiddah probably
will experience classic urban maladies that could have
political implications:
? The city will continue to attract poor and
uneducated Saudis from rural areas. The result will
be a steady increase in the size of Jiddah's lower
class neighborhoods.
? The Kingdom's decreased oil revenue has resulted in
a slowing of the city's development. In Jiddah, the
result has been a smaller pie for more people.
Consequently, many of the inflated expectations of
urban youth will not be fulfilled.
? The city's heterogeneity has caused tension between
Saudis and non-Saudis. Saudis blame the recent
increase in the city's crime rate on the growing
number of expatriates. Strains between the two
groups probably will increase as expatriates provide
scapegoats for Saudis dissatisfied with developments
in Saudi society.
? Contrasts between modernity and tradition are
more apparent in Jiddah than in any other Saudi
city. Jiddah's native liberalism is contrary to the
Kingdom's recent trend toward greater social and
religious conservatism. Tensions between
"modernists" and "traditionalists" are on the rise,
and manifestations of this tension could develop.
As a microcosm of the strains evident throughout
Saudi society, Jiddah may serve as a bellwether for
change throughout the Kingdom. Moreover, Jiddah's
future may reflect the government's ability to meet
successfully the challenges posed by the marriage of
modernity and tradition in Saudi Arabia.
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