NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW SUPPLEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000301510002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 21, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Near. East: and
South Asia Review
Supplement
21 June 1985
NE
21 June 1985
ropy 2 5 8
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Top Secret
Near East and
South Asia Review
Supplement
Libya: Qadhafi's New Activism in the C~arihhPao
Libya's determination to expand its involvement in the Caribbean
has resulted in new ties to the military regime in Suriname and to
proindependence radicals in the French Caribbean departments, but
the rejection by English-speaking Caribbean leftists of Libyan calls
for violence in pursuit of political objectives will limit Qadhafi's
South Yemen: Prospects for Political Instability~~ 11
the rise and could easily get out of hand.
Political rivals in Aden are positioning themselves for the crucial
Yemeni Socialist Party congress in October, and the prospect of
further violent confrontations between South Yemeni factions is on
Some articles are preliminary views oj'a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the
Ju 91en 85
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Libya: Qadhafi's New Activism
in the Caribbean
Libya's determination to expand its involvement in
the Caribbean has resulted in new ties to the military
regime in Suriname and to proindependence radicals
in the French Caribbean departments. Libyan support
probably would improve the capabilities of French
Caribbean separatists for militant action and provide
opportunities for Tripoli to establish a limited regional
base of operations in Paramaribo. On the other hand,
the rejection by English-speaking Caribbean leftists
of Libyan calls for violence in pursuit of political
objectives will limit Qadhafi's influence.
Background
Qadhafi's immediate objectives are to undermine US
and French interests in the region. Qadhafi regards
the United States and, to a lesser extent, France as
the principal impediments to achieving his broader
leadership aims in the Third World, including the
At the root of Qadhafi's involvement lies his
increasing determination to undermine US policies in
what he refers to as Washington's "backyard." In a
major policy speech last September, Qadhafi
explicitly linked Libya's aggressive posture in Latin
America to what he claims are threats to his regime
from US naval operations in the central
Mediterranean
a afi is targeting French interests
in the Caribbean because he is bitter over what he
regards as continuing French "imperialism" in
Libya's new activism in the Caribbean was presaged
by Qadhafi's decision last fall to put Musa Kusa-one
of his most radical advisers-in charge of Libya's
Latin American activities. Kusa heads the
International Center for Revolution (ICR), an
organization created by Qadhafi in late 1983 to
spread his personal philosophies of revolution,
promote cooperation among radical groups worldwide
as well as Libya's influence in radical circles, and
coordinate Libyan financial aid and paramilitary and
terrorist training for regional dissidents. The ICR
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subsumes the Libyan organization traditionally
charged with maintaining contacts with Caribbean
leftists-the "Third World Center for Resistance to
Imperialism, Zionism, Racism, and Reaction,"
Libyan Tactics
Kusa's ICR has
developed a Caribbean program combining
intelligence gathering; use of financial aid,
intimidation, indoctrination, and propaganda;
exploitation of regional Muslims; and economic
involvement as tools of political influence:
? Kusa and his principal deputy, Mukhtar Quannas,
have met with key eastern Caribbean leftist leaders
at least twice since fall. The Libyans have been
impatient with the reliance of leftist leaders on local
electoral processes to achieve political objectives.
Instead, Tripoli has urged them to adopt a militant
approach. To this end, senior Libyan officials have
pressed leftist leaders to send members of their
organizations to Libya for subversive training.
? The Libyans are urging Caribbean leftists to adopt
Qadhafi's revolutionary philosophies as blueprints
for action
senior Libyan o cia s eman a ast year that
regional leftists undergo ideological training to
expand their political consciousness and gain power.
Libya also is working to create local political
organizations modeled on Qadhafi's revolutionary
system in Libya. The Libyan People's Bureau in
Caracas last year promoted the establishment of
five small "people's congresses" in Venezuela.
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Top Secret
? Tripoli is working to gain influence among
Caribbean Muslims to promote its anti-Western
policies
Libya arranged and funded the Third Caribbean
Islamic Conference in Curacao in April. Libyan
participants pushed for a public condemnation of
Western influence in the region, according to the
US Consul General in Curacao. Tripoli recently
also established a branch of its Islamic Call Society
in Curacao and wants to set up an Islamic Call
Society office in Suriname. We believe Tripoli
intends to use its Islamic Call societies as channels
for financial handouts to dissidents in the region and
to identify and recruit subversives.
~ Libya is
interested in establishing a Caribbean newspaper to
spread its radical views and attack US and French
policies.
? Libya is considering expanding its economic activity
in the area. Libyan officials inquired about
purchasing a recently closed oil refinery in
Netherlands Antilles
Tripoli also wants to open
Libya's aggressive activities are accompanied by an
effort to establish regional bases of operation.
Libya's
cultivation of Suriname is tnten e o gain even more
freedom to operate in Paramaribo
Despite its broad economic and military promises,
Tripoli anticipates expanding relations slowly to test
Surinamese leader Bouterse's commitment to
revolution.
Top Secret
Bouterse, in turn, is suspicious of Qadhafi, partly
because he fears that foreign activities in Suriname
could help local radicals to threaten his power. In
addition, Bouterse's key military advisers oppose
Libyan military assistance, and Bouterse probably is
wary of directly antagonizing Washington. Still, we
believe the Surinamese leader would cooperate with
the Libyans in nonviolent regional activities in return
for sufficient financial inducements. Bouterse,
therefore, is likely to continue courting Tripoli until
he finds other sources of foreign assistance to alleviate
Suriname's financial problems.
The Regional Threat
Qadhafi so
far has made only limited progress in expanding his
regional influence. Libya's traditional clients-leftist
leaders from the English-speaking islands of St.
Lucia, Dominica, and Antigua-are
moderates.
willing only to pay lipservice to Qadhafi's ideology to
gain financial handouts. These leftists have resisted
Libyan demands for violent action because of
concerns that such activities would damage their
political standing and risk government retaliation.
Moreover, many English-speaking Caribbean leftists
are trying to broaden their appeal by minimizing
radical rhetoric and forming alliances with political
We believe senior Libyan officials are making some
compromises in their dealings with English-speaking
leftists because they recognize that increased pressure
to adopt a militant approach would further alienate
them ripoli is
temporarily toning down its calls for violent action to
concentrate on building its assets in the region
We believe the failure of the Libyans to persuade
En fish-speaking leftists to adopt militant tactics has
g
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fueled Qadhafi's determination to make contact with 25X1
proindependence radicals in the French Caribbean
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Top Secret
Libya's Expanding Relations With Suriname
The opening o.J'a Libyan People's Bureau in
Paramaribo last February marked the beginning of
growing ties between the two countries. Surinamese
Army Commander Desire Bouterse and senior
government officials signed economic cooperation
agreements during their visit to Tripoli in March that
could eventually total $100 million. Tripoli agreed to
buy Surinamese agricultural products and to
consider oil exploration and industrial development
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are courting t e Popular Union for the Liberation of
Guadeloupe (UPLG), the most active non-Marxist
proindependence group in the Caribbean
departments. Despite public condemnation by the
UPLG of several terrorist bombings over the last two
years, local authorities believe that the terrorists
belong to a clandestine wing of the Union.
Shortly after meeting with senior Libyan officials in
Tripoli last March, UPLG leaders held a conference
in Guadeloupe of groups seeking independence from
Since the conference in Guadeloupe, UPLG leaders
have visited Barbados to improve contacts with
several groups, including leftists, students, labor, and
Outlook
Libya's aggressive policies in the Caribbean will
continue to meet with mixed results, in our view.
Potential Libyan supporters almost certainly will
continue to be alienated by heavyhanded Libyan
efforts to im ose Q dh fi'
d
departments over the last several months. Radical
groups in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French
Guiana have demonstrated a willingness to use
violence to pursue their political objectives. Moreover,
the French separatists appear to .have the political
commitment, organization, capability, weapons, and
terrorist knowledge lacking among English-speaking
p a a s ra
ical ideology. In
addition, Libyan influence will be constrained by
geographic distance and cultural insensitivity toward
the region. Tripoli also is likely to encounter local
government opposition to its efforts to expand
economic and cultural activities in the Caribbean.
We believe that Libyan frustration with the English-
speaking leftists' continuing poor electoral prospects
almost certainly will prompt renewed calls by Tripoli
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Toa Secret
for more militant action. A resumption of
heavyhanded Libyan pressure will antagonize
English-speaking leftists and strain relations
A less likely scenario is that Qadhafi and his advisers
will continue to soft-pedal their calls for increased
militancy by English-speaking leftists. Diminished
Libyan pressure on English-speaking leftists for
violent action would encourage them to continue
providing Tripoli with regional assessments a~
information as well as entree to local leftists.
Moreover, Tripoli's tactical shift, if sustained, would
reduce-some strains in its relations with Havana.
Cuba's advice to English-speaking leftists to pursue
moderation, which is intended to help strengthen their
popular support, until recently conflicted with Libyan
calls for increased militancy. More compatible
policies, however, are unlikely to prompt coordination
of the two countries' support for regional leftists.
Qadhafi's and Castro's personal rivalry and disdain
for each other's revolutionary philosophies lie at the
root of longstanding mutual suspicions.
Libya has better prospects for inciting violence in the
French-speaking areas. We believe Qadhafi will
increasingly focus attention on radical French
Caribbean groups because of their willingness to use
more militant tactics. Moreover, Qadhafi perhaps
believes that successful terrorist operations by
proindependence French-speaking radicals will
encourage English-speaking leftists in the Caribbean
to use similar tactics.
Because French separatists have little hope of
achieving independence through the political process,
their- increasing desperation may drive some to use
more militant action. Libyan support would amplify
the separatists' capabilities for violence and further
undermine stability, but it probably would not lead to
an early solution to the independence issue. Most
Top Secret
French Antilleans oppose independence, and only a
few local leftists openly support terrorist tactics.
Moreover, increasing evidence of Libyan efforts to
destabilize the French departments is likely to prompt
a crackdown by French security authorities.
According to the US Embassy
in Paramaribo, Western governments, including the
French, are particularly concerned that Libyan
involvement in Suriname will lead to military support
for radical separatists in French Guiana.
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Top Secret
South Yemen: Pros ects for
Political Instability
Political rivals in Aden are positioning themselves for
the crucial Yemeni Socialist Party congress in
October, and the prospect of further violent
confrontation between South Yemeni factions is on
the rise. President Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani
achieved a commanding lead in the recent basic party
elections, and he hopes to use that support to oust his
rivals during the party congress. Ali Nasir's
competitors, who believe he may be strong enough to
succeed, have little to lose b rovokin a
confrontation. in late
May clashes occurred between supporters of Ali Nasir
and his rivals that included assassination and coup
attempts. Although Western diplomats indicate that
the recent incidents probably were intended to remind
Ali Nasir that his rivals will not easily give up their
positions and did not represent a serious bid to seize
power, further confiict appears likely and could easily
The Cauldron Boils
Ali Nasir's victory in the basic party elections has
strengthened the perception among his rivals that he
will have the political strength to oust them at the
party congress in October. As a result, we believe that
they may be thinking about getting him first. Western
diplomats and knowledgeable observers suggest that
the rivals at least want to convince Ali Nasir that he
must take their interests into account before the party
congress. According to this view, the clashes in May
were designed to demonstrate a capability to defend
their positions outside of party channels.
Ali Nasir's ideologically disparate rivals have
attacked both his foreign and economic policies. They
claim that efforts to normalize relations with Oman
and the ending of support for the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Oman and the National Democratic
Front insurgents of North Yemen have not produced
anticipated increases in foreign aid from the Arab
Gulf states. Ali Nasir's opponents also blame him for
Aden's poor economic performance and call for a
return to a more socialist-oriented system
Ali Nasir's rivals have been
armed and have joined forces to oppose him. One of
the rival groups attempted to seize the state radio
station in Aden in late May, according to Western
diplomats. In response, Ali Nasir supporters from his
Shabwa governorate stronghold have been
transported to Aden. Both factions have attempted to
assassinate their opponents.
Soviet backing for Ali Nasir, a crucial element in
Aden's internal politics, may be wavering. His appeals
to Moscow for support brought only the response that
the growing confrontation was an "internal problem,"
Nevertheless, we
e ieve t at oviet officials prefer Ali Nasir to his
rivals. Moscow's apparently lukewarm support could
be intended to warn him against a further expansion
of contacts with the West, an outgrowth of his efforts
to improve Aden's economy. In our view, Moscow is
not likely to take an active role in South Yemeni
domestic politics unless political violence jeopardizes
Outlook
Because the stakes are high for both sides and the
issues that sparked the infighting have not been
resolved, we believe that further militant posturing is
likely and could easily get out of hand before the
party congress. Ali Nasir stands abetter-than-even
chance of emerging victorious from a confrontation,
largely because he has more assets in the state
security, government, and party bureaucracies. His
rivals, however, have substantial support in the armed
forces and could use their military backers to try to
Although Ali Nasir has arranged difficult political
compromises in the past, he probably will not be able
to fashion an agreement that protects his recent party
gains while reassuring his rivals that he will not oust
them. Instead, he could try other tactics, such as
having the party discipline Ali Shayi Hadi-who
attempted to seize the radio station-and making a
Top Secret
NESA NFRAR 85-014C
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Politburo member, former Dep-
uty Prime Minister, former'De-
ferase Minister, opportunistic,
Ali Nasir's chief rival. ~~
Politburo member, Defense
Minister, opportunistic but
pragmaeic enough to dead with
Former President, formea? party
secretary general, ousted in
1980 coup, member of Central
Cornmittee general secretariaP,
hardline pro-Moscow idea
Politburo rnember, chairman o,?
Highea? Party Conerol Commit-
tee, probably backing Antar.
political deal with the relatively pragmatic Salih
Muslih Qasim. Even then, however, Ali I~Tasir would
still have to deal with opposition from Ali Antar and
Abd al~Fattah Ismail.
for economic aid.
Implieati?n~ t'?r the Ua~ited States
If Ali ~Iasir prevails, we would expect him to continue
his moderate foreign policies and his efforts to
improve Aden's economy. I3e probably would
continue to look to the Nest and the moderate Arabs
ousted from power in 1980
If his rivals prevail, Aden may return to its former
policy of exporting revolution in the Arabian
Peninsula. both Antar and Ismail supported
subversion in l~lorth Yemen in the past, and, under
them, military clashes with 1~Iorth Yemen near the
Marib oilfields would be more likely. Antar or Ismail
could be expected to promote closer cooperation with
the Soviet Union. Antar agreed to the establishment
of Soviet bases in South Yemen during Soviet
Admiral Gorshkov's visit to Aden in 1983-a
development we believe Ali Nasir has long opposed.
Ismail's links to Moscow were well developed even
before the USSR granted him exile when he was
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