LATIN AMERICAN REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000301620001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 12, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Latin America
Review
12 April 1985
ALA LAR 85-009
12 Apri11985
ropy 3 8 9
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Review
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The Sendero Luminoso insurgents remain a formidable challenge
for the government and have expanded their areas of operation over
the last year, but their overall effectiveness has declined.
A series of personnel changes in the party and government in
preparation for a party congress in December suggests that
President Castro is paying greater attention to ideological issues and
to finding more effective economic managers
The Social Christian Party is beginning to heal internal divisions
stemming from its worst election defeat, but it has yet to find a way
to exploit the ruling party's vulnerability.
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production StctfJ; Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
i Secret
ALA LAR 85-009
l2 Aprit 1985
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Peru: The Continuing
Sendero Luminoso
Challenge
The Sendero Luminoso (SL) insurgents have
expanded their areas of operation over the past year
or so and are carrying out an active terrorist
campaign in the south-central emergency zone, but
the overall level and effectiveness of their activity
declined last year, according to the US Embassy. The
group has been constrained by the improved
performance of the security forces and by growing
revulsion among Peruvians over the insurgents'
wanton violence. Nevertheless, the guerrillas remain a
formidable challenge for the government, and their
prospects may improve if the next administration,
which takes office in July, fails to grapple successfully
with major economic dilliculties.
The Ayacucho "Heartland"
In recent months the security forces have begun to
make progress in combating SL in its original base
area in Ayacucho and elsewhere in the south-central
highlands. The improvement in the military's
performance is due in part to a decision by the Army
last May to establish some 50 counterinsurgency
bases, from which units of up to 100 men have
engaged in aggressive patrolling. Early last year the
Army began forming peasant defense groups, and-
although poorly armed-these organizations
frequently have acted as a bulwark against the
insurgents. The mobility of the guerrillas and the
well-entrenched support network they have developed
over the last 15 years have prevented the armed forces
from dealing a crippling blow to SL. Nevertheless, the
insurgents no longer enjoy the nearly uncontested.
domination of the region that they maintained from
,from Ayacucho.
The shift in the military's approach has put SL
increasingly on the defensive.
guerrilla leaders decided last spring to
1980 through 1982
1 Secret
ALA LAR 85-009
12 April 1985
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expand their area of operations to prevent the military
from surrounding them. In addition, SL has increased
its use of violence-occasionally wiping out entire
hamlets-in an attempt to deter villagers from
cooperating with the government. The military is
trying to win the confidence of peasants in the south-
central emergency zone through small-scale
development projects, although lack of funding has
hampered these efforts. Meanwhile, the US Embassy
and academic observers report that entire highland
communities, fearing violence on the part of both the
insurgents and the security forces, are abandoning
their ancestral homes for the relative safety of Lima
and other cities
Upper Huallaga Region
In an apparent attempt to reduce military pressure
against it in the south-central emergency zone, SL
began operations in the Upper Huallaga river valley
about a year ago. The opening of a second insurgent
front contributed to the impression that the movement
was rapidly growing, but recent evidence indicates
that the guerrillas have failed to gain a secure
foothold there. Unlike south-central Peru, where the
insurgents over the years built an extensive grassroots
network, they have been hampered in the Upper
The guerrillas
apparently have found little receptivity in this
traditional coca-growing region because local
inhabitants fear that an SL presence would threaten
their drug trafficking income by attracting the
attention of the security forces.
A rapid response by the military has been crucial in
deterring the guerrillas. Last July the armed forces
created a new emergency zone for the Upper
Huallaga region. By calling up reserve units, the
Army was able to deal with the threat in the north-
central highlands without reducing pressure on the
insurgents in the south. A major offensive last
September failed in its mission of encircling SL units,
but it prevented the guerrillas from solidifying their
presence in the Upper Huallaga. Subsequent military
operations have forced the guerrillas to flee into
adjacent areas where they have been conducting
sporadic attacks against government forces. On the
negative side, however, the military's fear of
jeopardizing its counterinsurgency campaign by
alienating local coca growers led it to block vigorous
police antinarcotics efforts temporarily earlier this
year.
Terrorism in Lima
SL activities in Lima, which had been crippled by the
arrest of several urban commanders in mid-1984,
resumed early this year with the bombings of the
headquarters of two major political parties and the
assassination of several police officers. The highly
coordinated nature of many of these attacks, coupled
with SL's willingness to depart from its previous
emphasis on nighttime operations, indicates that the
insurgents probably have rebuilt their terrorist
network in the capital. The cost to the movement of
resuming operations there remains high, however,
because of the success of the security forces in
arresting SL members.
Nevertheless, SL obtains a number of benefits by
pursuing a campaign of urban terrorism. Although
guerrilla actions in the remote Andean highlands
often go unnoticed by the international press, attacks
in the capital receive prominent coverage, thereby
enhancing the insurgents' image as a major
revolutionary force. During the Pope's visit in
February, SL's various operations in Lima
underscored the movement's flair for dramatic
gestures. Moreover, the US Embassy notes that urban
terrorism is potentially destabilizing because it tends
to undermine public confidence in the ability of the
civilian authorities to maintain order.
Election Offensive
In early March, SL began an offensive reportedly
designed to disrupt the national elections on 14 April.
Although a similar attempt to undermine municipal
elections in November 1983 failed to achieve its
objective, it did result in the cancellation of voting in
part of the south-central emergency zone. The US
Embassy believes that the major thrust of the current
insurgent campaign has been to force voters-
especially those in rural areas where SL is strongest-
to boycott the elections. To prevent this from
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occurring, the military will use some 40,000 troops to
provide security at approximately 4,000 polling places
throughout the country,
Outlook
Despite its setbacks over the past year, the SL's
dispersion, mobility, and self-sufficiency have enabled
it to deny the armed forces a decisive victory. In our
view, the most important factor contributing to SL's
continued viability has been the organization's
reluctance to engage the military in direct combat.
For the most part, guerrillas attacks have been
directed against isolated Civil Guard posts, peasant
self-defense groups, and vulnerable policemen in the
cities. The cyclical nature of SL operations-
characterized by alternating periods of vigorous
action and relative inactivity-has enabled the
guerrillas not only to regroup and replenish their
supply of arms, but also to rest and recuperate after
sustained offensives. SL's continuing independence
from foreign support or direction
and its practice of obtaining
weapons locally either by theft or attacks on security
forces, also have contributed to the movement's
durability by making it virtually invulnerable to
interdiction efforts.
The spread of the insurgency to new regions and its
entrenched strength in the south-central emergency
zone indicate that it will continue to force the
government to devote sizable numbers of soldiers to
the counterinsurgency effort in coming months. If
Peru's new guerrilla group, Revolutionary
Movement-Tupac Amaru, is able to mount sustained
operations, this would further tax the security forces
and probably provide SL additional breathing room.
SL's goal of a successful nationwide revolution
appears increasingly illusory, at least in the near term,
but we agree with the US Embassy's assessment that
the organization will remain a significant force for the
foreseeable future. Although it seems to have lost the
momentum it demonstrated early in President
Belaunde's administration, SL leaders probably are
buoyed by Peru's deepening economic difficulties.
They may reason that the movement will be well
positioned to exploit new revolutionary opportunities
in the years ahead.
even some previously optimistic
officers had come to believe that the government may
need five to 10 years to suppress the guerrillas.
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secret
Cuba: Streamlining the
Bureaucracy
The Castro regime, in its preparations for the Third
Congress of the Cuban Communist Party next
December, is making a number of personnel changes
in a reorganization that is likely to spread eventually
to all levels of the party and government. The initial
changes occurred in late January, when a special .
plenum of the party's Central Committee resulted in
the "release" of staunch party hardliner Antonio
Perez Herrero and one of his top aides. The most
recent shifts were announced earlier this month and
involve several ministerial-level posts. Similar
shakeups occurred prior to the party congresses in
1975 and 1980, and the changes often give clues to
the probable direction in Cuban policies over the next
several years. On the basis of changes made so far, it
appears that economic difficulties are forcing
President Castro to pay greater heed to his more
pragmatic advisers and find more effective
managerial leadership in the economic arena. Other
changes suggest the Cuban leader is concerned over
ideological issues. Additional managerial changes are
almost certain before the Third Party Congress in
December and bureaucratic infighting is likely to
intensify as heightened austerity forces managers to
compete with each other for ever-dwindling resources.
Perhaps the most significant of the changes
announced in the Cuban media on 1 April was the
removal of Francisco Garcia Valls from his job as
minister-president of the State Committee for
Finance, acabinet-rank post that gave him a seat on
the Council of Ministers chaired by Fidel Castro. A
member of the 26th of July Movement that brought
Castro to power in 1959, Garcia Valls held many high
positions in the economic field, including: vice
president of the Central Planning Board; and vice
president of the National Commission for Economic,
Scientific, and Technical Collaboration, the
governmental body responsible for managing all of
Cuba's economic, technical, and scientific ties with
the rest of the world. Throughout his long career, he
has been linked closely to Politburo member Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez, who is commonly viewed as
Castro's top adviser on foreign policy and economic
matters, and to former President Osvaldo Dorticos,
who, as Minister of Justice, committed suicide on 23
June 1983 after his ministry was found to be plagued
with corruption. No reason was given for Garcia
Valls's dismissal nor was his new position, if any,
identified. Nevertheless, his departure probably is
linked to Cuba's recent economic problems
Garcia Valls was replaced by Rodrigo Garcia Leon, 25X1
who has served since 1976 as first vice president of the
State Committee for Material and Technical Supply.
described Cuba's new economic austerity program ' as
an effort to maintain current production with
decreased spending through better management, and
claimed that Cuban planners believe there is much
waste in the economy because of poor management of
available financial resources. He also said that various
activities of the State Committee for Material and 25X1
Technical Supply are to be transferred to other
entities and ministries, which, perhaps, is why he was
free to be reassigned. The transfer of activities
reportedly is intended to rid the State Committee of
those peripheral responsibilities it has acquired over
the years that have made it highly inefficient and
unwieldy.
Another cabinet official removed was Minister of
Light Industry Manuel Millares Rodriguez, who
previously had served as the Central Planning Board's
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director for industry and as the Ministry of Mining
and Metallurgy's vice minister for production. His
replacement is Roberto Ogando Zas, whose
experience is largely political rather than economic.
He has held important posts in both the party and the
Young Communists League, the party's youth arm.
After long service as a party official on the Isle of
Pines, where he also managed a livestock and
agricultural project for a while, he became head of the
island's civil administration and subsequently served
as "governor" of Las Tunas Province in eastern Cuba.
In addition, he is a deputy in the National Assembly
representing the municipality of Las Tunas, the
provincial capital. As Light Industry Minister, he is
likely to be the focus of increasing attention of the
leadership as well as the public if he cannot maintain
production with fewer resources through improved
management.
An important change in the political arena occurred
on 26 March when Havana announced the
replacement of Nivaldo Herrera as head of the Cuban
Radio and Television Institute, the organization that
controls the broadcast media. The new chief is Ismael
Gonzalez Gonzalez, who holds a degree in psychology
and has had a variety of posts involving student
organizations and the Young Communists League.
Most recently, he was a member of the "coordination
and support staff" for Castro, according to the
Havana announcement. He seems to have had no
professional experience in radio or televison.
Herrera apparently has been under fire for some time,
according to the US Interests Section in Havana, and
probably was the unnamed target of criticism of radio
and television programming which was made by
Castro at the women's congress held in Havana in
early March. Herrera's dismissal may be a follow-on
to the removal of Antonio Perez Herrero as party
secretary for ideology in late January. At that time,
Perez Herrero's aide who supervised the ideological
content of the press, radio, and television also was
sacked.Z The promotion of Gonzalez from an obscure
staff position to czar of all broadcasting, as the
Interests Section points out, will ensure that the
programming quality suffers.
In an apparently unrelated move, the president of the
Cuban Academy of Sciences, party Central
Committee member Wilfredo Torres Yribar, was
reassigned after an eight-year tenure. Dr. Torres
previously had served as head of the National Center
for Scientific Research at Havana University.
Replacing him is Rosa Helena Simeon Negrin, who,
like Torres, was elected to the Central Committee at
the Second Party Congress in 1980 during the Castro
regime's drive to "democratize" the party. A member
of the National Directorate of the Cuban Women's
Federation (the regime's mass organization for
women), she had headed the Agriculture Ministry's
National Plant and Animal Health Center since 1978.
The remaining two appointments announced on
l April-although they heighten the impression of
bureaucratic change-involve posts of lesser
importance. Stepping down after five years as
president of the National Institute of Sports, Physical
Education, and Recreation is Carlos Galvan Vila.
Named to replace him is Conrado Martinez Corona,
who has been second secretary of the Young
Communists League since 1982. In addition, Cuba's
world-famous track star Alberto Juantorena was
appointed vice president of the institute, replacing
Miguel Llaneras.
Additional managerial changes, in our opinion, are
virtually inevitable prior to the Third Party Congress
in December. Bureaucratic infighting is likely to
intensify as greater austerity prompts increased
competition-for resources and as bureaucrats try to
defend their turf. Frictions already have developed
since last December; in response to a Central
Planning Board report extremely critical of the state
of Cuba's external debt, the ministers and other
managers who were attacked in the report all levied
countercharges against the Central Planning Board,
our judgment, bodes ill for Central Planning Board
rfhis, in
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Secret
president Humberto Perez, who must share part of
the blame for the country's current economic plight.
Rodrigo Garcia Leon, the newly appointed head of
the State Committee for Finance, confirmed recently
that Perez, an alternate member of the Politburo, had
come under special criticism and may be replaced for
poor performance.
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Bounce Back?
More than a year after the worst election defeat in its
history, the Social Christian Party (COPED is
beginning to heal the internal divisions that have
prevented it from functioning as an effective
opposition party. Despite growing public discontent
with the current Democratic Action (AD)
administration, however, COPEI has yet to find a way
to exploit the ruling party's political vulnerability.
The COPEI Tradition
Founded in 1946 by Rafael Caldera Rodriguez,
COPEI is a reformist party committed to
perpetuation of the welfare state within the context of
a vigorous market-oriented economy. Although it has
particularly strong roots in the middle class, the party
has attracted support in past elections from every
social stratum. COPEI and Democratic Action have
alternated in power since Caldera was elected
president in 1968 and, despite vigorous competition
for voter support, have continued to cooperate
between elections.
COPEI's foreign policy traditionally combines apro-
Western orientation with staunch nationalism. During
the Caldera period, Venezuela initiated diplomatic
relations with many Latin American military
dictatorships spurned under two successive
Democratic Action administrations. Caldera balanced
these moves, however, by establishing diplomatic ties
with the Soviet Bloc countries, and taking the first
step toward recognition of Cuba. He also negotiated
Venezuelan accession to the Andean Pact and
launched an economic cooperation program for the
Caribbean and Central America.
Although both Caldera and fellow COPEI leader Luis
Herrera Campins, who was president from 1979-84,
nurtured close bilateral relations with the United
States, they did not hesitate to differ vigorously with
Washington on particular issues. Thus, Herrera
openly sympathized with US support for the Duarte
government in EI Salvador but accused the United
States of betraying Latin America during the 1982
Falklands crisis
Herrera's Ill-Fated Rule
Great expectations accompanied Herrera's
assumption of office in 1979, but midway into his
term a glutted oil market, high-interest rates, and
world recession dashed popular hopes for a
prolongation of Venezuela's oil boom. By early 1983,
large foreign exchange losses, massive capital flight,
and foreign banker demands for payment of maturing
short-term debt induced the government to impose
foreign exchange controls, devalue the bolivar, and
freeze prices. As the recession deepened, imports were
cut nearly in half, unemployment doubled, and per
capita GNP fell sharply. With national elections
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symbolized by Venezuela's 36-billion-dollar foreign
debt-caused the government's stock to plunge
Herrera's failure to cope effectively with mounting
economic difficulties and the resulting nosedive in
COPEI's popularity led to an open split between the
Caldera and Herrera factions. Caldera, whose sixth
bid for the party's nomination was opposed by
Herrera, adopted a campaign strategy that sought
unsuccessfully to distance COPEI from the
incumbent administration. COPEI's shattering _
defeat, followed by a second lopsided vote for
Democratic Action in the May 1984 municipal
elections, cast a shadow over the party's future.
Calderistas correctly blamed this double setback on
the stigma of Herrera's ineffectual rule, and leaders
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Christians from acting as an effective opposition party
in 1984.
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The Factional Struggle
Although COPEI's internal alignments are not
dictated by major differences over principle or policy,
the style and public image of the Caldera and Herrera
factions contrast sharply. The Calderistas, reflecting
their leader's elegant mien, have a relatively elitist but
nonideological orientation. By comparison, the
Herreristas display stronger populist tendencies, are
more likely to be of mixed race, and often come from
rural and lower middle-class backgrounds.
Caldera remains COPEI's preeminent leader, but,
according to the US Embassy, "Calderismo" is
rapidly becoming synonymous with support for 44-
year-old Secretary General Eduardo Fernandez-a
Caldera protege and the current front-runner for the
party's 1988 presidential nomination. Almost all the
key figures within the party's 43-member National
Committee-including Caldera's other chief protege,
Oswaldo Alvarez Paz, First Senate Vice President
Hilarion Cardozo, and Chamber of Deputies
President Leonardo Ferrer-are Fernandez associates
who gained control of the party apparatus in 1979.E
The Herreristas continue to defer to Herrera
Campins, but their primary leader is now Senator
Pedro Pablo Aguilar, a former COPEI Secretary
General and possible candidate for the presidency in
1988. Rafae] Andres ("Pepi") Montes de Oca, a
controversial former Interior Minister who was
removed from the National Committee last year,
ranks third in the Herrera faction.
A Shaky Truce
Last August, at the first COPEI convention since the
elections, delegates overwhelmingly reelected
Eduardo Fernandez as Secretary General, thereby
solidifying the ascendancy of the Caldera faction.
Nevertheless, the publication of a COPEI opinion poll
that showed Caldera trailing Fernandez nearly
provoked a potentially disastrous falling out between
the two leaders. The Calderistas then held out an olive
branch to the Herrera faction by keeping Fernandez's
vanquished Herrerista opponent, Felipe Montilla, on
the National Committee.
public discussion of divisions in the Caldera camp,
and this indiscreet airing of the party's dirty linen led
to calls for Herrera's expulsion. At the COPEI
national committee meeting in January 1985,
Fernandez assumed the role of peacemaker,
permitting Oswaldo Alvarez-who will probably be
Fernandez's chief competitor for party leadership
after Caldera departs from the scene-to lead the
attack against Herrera. Less strident voices prevailed,
however, and a moderate resolution reflecting
Fernandez's conciliatory approach was adopted.
Alvarez suffered at least a temporary setback late last 25X1
month when the National Committee, led by
Secretary General Fernandez, issued a letter sharply
criticizing Alvarez for making public statements
about an internal party vote involving corruption
charges against a former COPEI official. This
incident demonstrates Fernandez's firm hold on the
party machinery but promises to keep the level of
tension within the leadership uncomfortably high.
Outlook
Amid persistent rumors of tension between Caldera
and Fernandez, a major unanswered question is
whether Caldera will choose to run again in 1988.
Although it is unlikely that the 68-year-old Caldera
can rejuvenate COPEI or inspire the voters, he
continues to be the party's grand old man and
undoubtedly can play the role of spoiler. Caldera
reportedly believes Fernandez would stand little
chance against Democratic Action luminary Carlos
Andres Perez, and failure by the senior COPEI leader
to step aside graciously might provoke a generational
leadership struggle that would hamper COPEI's
ability to take the political offensive.
Even if a measure of party unity can be achieved,
COPEI is still casting about for a political issue
capable of rallying the electorate against AD rule.
Following President Lusinchi's state-of-the-union
message in mid-March, Fernandez gave a preview of
COPEI's likely opposition strategy by focusing on the
issues of crime and economic stagnation. His 25X1
Factional quarreling resurfaced when the two former
COPEI presidents engaged in a vitriolic debate late
last year. The dispute was sparked by Herrera's
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declaration that "The country is not moving forward
nor are we living better" could become COPEI's next
campaign slogan
Despite the Lusinchi government's vulnerability on
issues ranging from inflation and unemployment to
crime, drugs, and corruption, lingering memories of
Herrera's maladministration, along with unresolved
intraparty rivalries, probably will continue to plague
COPEI, at least for the near term. A recent national
opinion poll revealed that, although Democratic
Action's approval rating had dropped to 41 percent, a
mere 14 percent of the respondents indicated
"acceptance" of COPEI. The fact that President
Lusinchi's personal popularity remains undiminished
by the nation's nettlesome economic and social
problems underscores the difficulty that COPEI,
seeking to regain its stature as a credible political
force, will face in months ahead.
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