DDA EXCHANGE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
55
Document Creation Date: 
December 13, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 5, 2001
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 1, 1976
Content Type: 
CIAPER
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1.pdf1.52 MB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 october 1976 (tic! excnange `IN 'III 0 � II � WE .1�1 � M � , . 1,.. DDA/MAS FILE COPY PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE FROM 7C18 remnfirlelnfiml Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 "... just as it is more exciting to build a new boat than to scrape away the barnacles year after year, there is a tendency to give higher priority to a new dramatic policy initiative than to consider the programs we already have to see how they can be improved�to scrape away the 'barnacles,' that build up over time around almost any program or agency." President Ford Memorandum for 0/OMB dated July 24, 1976, that inaugurates the Presidential Management Initiatives program in the Federal Government. Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 fe, Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL ddcKiF7 excnange A publication designed to furnish a medium for the exchange of ideas, concepts, information, and techniques that are of common interest to the personnel who are engaged in resource management in the Directorate of Administration. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Classified by 000288 Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category: �58(1). (2). and (3) Automatically declassified on: date impossible to determine CONFIDENTIAL 1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 2 CONFIDENTIAL staff SENIOR EDITORS Jerry Booth Kent Cargile Jean DeBlois Hazel Harrison Kent Schott Jerry Starli per Glenn Steele Wendell Tewell ASSOCIATE EDITORS Parker Archibald Hal Bean Bob Zunzer MANAGING EDITOR Helen Vigness ADMINISTRATIVE ASSOCIATE Karen Foley OS 5311 OP 7165 OC 8-8366 OL 8-8131 OF 2767 ODP 6979 OMS 7724 OTR 3107 CMO-DDA 4142 AI-DDA 5003 EO-DDA - 6535 M&AS-DDA 5226 EEO-DDA 7726 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 25X1 pproved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL pprov index COMMENT 4 VOL. I, NO. 3 6 FORUM 10 INNOVATION ersonnel Rotation Program 33 Conference Building 35 crIDDA__Pio N ADMAG�Administration Management Advisory Group 39 Position Management 41 Cafe Coronary 43 PDP�Personnel Development Program 44 .7ATURES 47 swine Hu vaccine�A Shot in the Dark? 50 ABOUT DDA Help Wanted 55 Fighting Inflation 56 Life Savers 58 Is CONFIDENTIAL 3 is &III II III 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL comment 4 Without a doubt, these last two years have been the most traumatic in the Agency's history. Beginning with Watergate and the subsequent publication of the Seymour Hersh article in The New York Times on 22 December 1974, we have undergone exper- iences which could have had us hanging on the ropes awaiting the proverbial knock-out blow. Through persistance, dedication and dogged determination, we hung on, managed to weather the storm, and now we should be able to get back to our normal day-to-day activities. Unfortunately, how- ever, "day-to-day activities" now are different and include more work than they did two years ago. For example, today we have the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts to cope with, as well as the resultant new directives or executive orders, all of which add new dimensions and challenges to our way of life. Just this week, I initialed off on a report which indicated that Michael J. Malanick Associate Deputy Director for Administration CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 v Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL we had a backlog of 1207 unanswered FOIA requests and, considering the fact that it takes about an average of two months to reply to one request, it's easy to see that the backlog will be with us for some time unless some relief comes along. Then too, each time a story about the Agency appears in the press, you can bet your bottom dollar it will be followed by FOIA requests. Further- more, some changes in public attitudes have brought with them a movement to change our security policies and practices and, while many of them could be for the better, some may represent a radical differ- ence from what we would like to see. The unwanted notoriety we have experienced has precipitated a closer examination of our relationships with other elements of the Government at the federal, state and municipal level. Changes in senior manage- ment have brought in new perceptions and concepts and we're being asked to explain or reexamine our personnel policies and practices. With the new oversight bodies in the Congress and heightened interest by the House Appropriations Committee, we are obviously going to have to justify more than ever before the need for each and every program we hope to undertake and each expenditure we want to make. All of the above are just a few of the challenges we will face not only in this coming year but in all those that follow. But just as we survived three intensive investigations and have re- ceived much harsh public criticism, we can and will continue to stand tall in the Community, thanks to the efforts of people such as you who are in this Directorate. (Unclassified) CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 5 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL na 3 The DDA ... 1977 Happy New Year! October 1 marks the beginning of our fiscal year. Just as you and I begin the new calendar year with resolutions, we also begin the new fiscal year with Directorate resolutions. We, in the Directorate of Administration, resolve to: Revise, as required, and reissue under current date all Headquarters Regulations (HR's) by 31 December 1977. Some regulations no longer provide current guidance or may be suspect because of their very age. The update will attest to Agency users and to external reviewers the currency of these Agency policy statements. Extend the overseas security program by 30 September 1977 to include personal, residential, and facility protection. Assassinations, robberies, riots, terror- ist actions, kidnappings�all present a real and present danger to our fellow employees overseas. Their safety dic- tates extension of the program from primary focus on our installations to encompass the personal security of our employees and dependents in their homes, travel to and from work, etc. Develop and implement by 30 September 1977 a program for 30-year mandatory declassification of records. In September 1977 the Agency will celebrate its 30th birthday. The birthday also marks the beginning date when CIA records fall within the purview of the 30-year mandatory declassification law. 6 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 Install automated field terminal (AFT) communication systems in field stations by 30 September 1977. Communications is the vital link with our overseas stations and the life blood of intelligence. The objective denotes our commitment to maintenance of a communications system equal to the demands levied on it and to expecta- tions of excellence. Produce a booklet during FY 1977 de- scribing information that is available through the Office of Personnel's Statistical Reporting Branch. We recognize that managers do "need to know." The booklet will provide a means for our managers to optimize use of information being accumulated for their purposes. Develop a plan for electronic funds trans- fer for employees payrolled openly as CIA and for CIA RDS annuitants. This is one more step in our efforts toward improving efficiency through capitalizing on use of the computer's capability for handling information. Put into operation by April 1981 a reliable and expandable on-line data processing system (SAFE) to facilitate the intelligence analysts' access to and use of intelligence data. SAFE is a major, multi-million dollar project in which Congress, OMB, and senior Agency officals are interested. Creation of the system will require a high degree of technical and mana- gerial skills and close coordination between components in DDA and DDI. CONFIDENTIAL 7 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL Design and institute a universal courier receipt form. At the present time the Agency uses seven different forms. Adoption of a single form will result in obvious effi- ciencies. Revise techniques in communicating with the public on Freedom of Information Act, Privacy Act, and Executive Order Declassifi- cation matters by 1 March 1977 to enhance the CIA image and to improve public relations. We see an opportunity to take advan- tage of communications with the public, required by law, to achieve yet another Agency goal. Develop long-range forestry, wildlife, envi- ronmental and conservation plans and pro- grams, and set goals for improv and water resources control at 8 Continue the program on counterterror- ism that provides behavioral science sup- port and guidance to appropriate personnel and components of the Agency and the intelligence community. Terrorist activity continues. Establish- ment of this objective for FY 1977 recognizes the critical importance of the Agency's counterterrorism program. These resolutions, of course, are some of the objectives under the Directorate's MBO program for FY 1977 selected for this article as samples of the variety and scope. Some Directorate objectives represent new ven- tures; others reflect continuing, on-going activities. Some objectives are innovative; some are of critical importance; some seek to solve problems. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 I 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL Many people have devoted many hours during the past few months to formulating the statement of objectives. The product of their efforts�the objectives of the Director- ate of Administration for FY 1977�is the symbol of our problems, priorities, and interests as perceived by the senior manag- ers. They illustrate our response to the myriad challenges facing us, they hint of the political and social environment in which we must now function, and they point the direction in which we are going. (Unclassi- fied) CONFIDENTIAL 9 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL One of the most important developments was the discovery in 1960 that properly applied pressure on the chest could cause effective circulation of blood in an individual after his heart had stopped. This procedure, when combined with mouth-to-mouth artifi- cial respiration, is called cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Scientific studies have shown that this combination is an effective means of sustaining life in emergencies. It has been estimated that six to ten per cent of sudden death victims could be saved by nonmedical persons trained in cardiopulmonary resusci- tation. Your OMS has the special training aids and trained personnel to provide instruction in this technique. An example of an effective training aid is the Recording Resusci-Anne, pictures of which are shown. This is the most advanced mannequin available for teaching and test- ing people in effective cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The mannequin realistically simulates the physiological conditions found in a human in need of resuscitation. It CONFIDENTIAL 11 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 illow doing away with the present ersome logging of night and weekend ;s by employees. The system is idable to provide compartmentafttrof al areas, such as a signal or computer and preliminary planning is already way for coverage of outlying buildings. inswer to questions most frequently , the new SACS badge will show the current badge number. It will be sary to wear the badge exposed at all within Agency buildings. (In fact, until s devices become operational at a ic Headquarters building entrance or r,..,mjite Agency building, entry pro- E._31!ith the new SACS badge will n the same as they are now). When s equipment is operational at an ice, a forgotten four-digit code num- II be handled in the same manner as a ten badge. It is estimated that employ- miliar with the equipment will be able isit a device in eight to ten seconds, during peak periods. There are no it plans to require employees to exit ih the devices during rush hours, CONFIDENTIAL Informing them cies, and other on employee gnment decision zed for action. A sently by John icer DDS&T, is to be taken to 3 and has already 'gned to sharply ! shop applicant Staff Personnel responsible for eer Counseling itly published. A fine occupational I IP sr occupations, iavement among will aid coun- the internal job ssed and your I actions toward achieving more meaningful "Career" devel- opment for employees may be around the corner. On the other hand, for those employees who entertain rather exagger- ated expectations for career achievement, Agency management can truly say "I beg your pardon, I never promised you a rose garden." (Unclassified) security BADGES, BADGE MACHINES AND SACS Jim Nolan More than two million entries into the Headquarters building are made each year by Agency employees and badged visitors. Typically, each entry is based on the recognition by a guard of a plastic badge with a photograph. This method of control- ling access is common throughout govern- ment and industry, and has changed little CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 hi ng 'shed om- ')ject or a ount the oup con ie to ( de- liven ;E: is not a, to has still ancy teled po- 'sncy (tuct, eeacs- CONFIDENTIAL rum our thing !SERVICES 10 lith A Heart EL 12 !Career Committee�Action rning Careers f1 Badge Machines And SACS 'ION \lew In Records Scheduling ion And The Paper Media 14 18 19 22 cial Systems And Audit in CATIONS 24 For A Crisis: The OC iency Destruction Program )CESSING 27 tial Management Initiatives� incy Evaluation Study For 5mputers 29 'ncy Language Problem and Ynmersion Training medical services Office With a Heart John P. Haley 25X1 The drama of new life-saving techniques has entered the home via television, news- papers, and periodicals. As a result, the public has become increasingly aware that cessation of the heartbeat and breathing need not always be synonymous with death. Each year almost three-quarters of a million Americans die suddenly from many causes�poisoning, drowning, suffocation, choking, electrocution, and smoke inhala- tion. Death from any of these, including the most common cause of sudden death�the heart attack, can in many instances be prevented by the proper application of these new techniques. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL and Records Service (NARS) approval. As a result we are engaged in a large scale effort to schedule the entire Agency records collection. Component records officers throughout the Agency are doing the cre- ative work of surveying records in their offices and drafting schedules. The Records Administration Branch, ISAS, is the Agency focal point in this effort, and in coordination with the Directorate Records Management Officers is negotiating with NARS the appraisal and approval of the schedules. It will take several months to complete the scheduling and approval process. In the meantime record collections awaiting de- struction are being held in the Agency Records Center. Next year the scheduling and destruction backlog should be elimi- nated, and we will be able to concentrate on refining the schedules to make them more useful to each Agency Office. (Unclassified) logistics AUTOMATION AND THE PAPER MEDIA It is almost common practice for the casual reader to take for granted the thousands of printed words which confront us in a typical work day. Reports, bulletins, notices, working papers, correspondence, and memoranda are among the many types of publications available to us�most of which are produced through the facilities of the Printing and Photography Division (P&PD), OL. Rarely is the reader aware of the processes necessary in developing the paper media. P&PD, until recently, prepared its product with age-old, time-proven methods and equipment to provide a high quality print image. The activities leading to the creation of a printed image centered around the linotype machine, a device invented in 1885; the monophoto machine, a low-speed CONFIDENTIAL 19 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL phototypesetter based on patents dating from 1900, was developed circa 1953; and the EPIC system, a specialized batch- oriented composition program developed approximately 10 years ago to prepare magnetic tapes for imput to phototype- setting equipment. Primarily through the EPIC system P&PD attempted to more closely interrelate the publishing and printing functions through the automation of text editing and typographic composition. Until now, how- ever, the available technology and the location of P&PD's typesetting facilities rela- tive to the publishers have combined to create systems and procedures which, while adequate for some work, were not respon- sive enough to support the growing require- ment for faster moving current intelligence products. This prompted some publishers to seek alternative methods of satisfying their need for greater speed and control. These methods, generally including the use of word processing equipment not designed for extensive publishing work, led to impro- visation with the predictable result of com- promised quality and economy. The use of word processing equipment allowed some improvement in publications throughput time, and gave the publisher a degree of control over his work which permitted him to make the last minute changes that current intelligence products require, but at too high a price. The rental bill for the marginal improvements that word processors made possible exceeded $250,000 per year. Even with that expendi- ture, over 60% of the pages printed as finished intelligence were produced in type- script (i.e., typewritten) rather than typeset form. These problems together with P&PD's responsibility for maintaining an up-to-date and efficient printing facility led to the development of the Electronic Text Editing and Composition System (ETECS). This system forges an electronic link between publishers and printer which further im- proves throughput time, give the publisher even greater control over his work, and eliminates or reduces the negative aspects of publishing via word processing equip- ment. 20 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL ETECS was developed by P&PD with the assistance of the Office of Data Processing after a thorough evaluation of the needs of the Agency's publishers. The system was installed in January 1976 and became a part of P&PD's production cycle in June 1976. The initial ETECS installation was designed as a test vehicle. It was to be evaluated on its performance in supporting portions of the publishing requirements of the Central Ref- erence Service, the Office of Economic Research, and the Office of Scientific Intelli- gence. ETECS has performed well in the "test" environment and received wide user acceptance. Plans for installing ETECS terminals in the Office of Current Intelli- gence and other publisher offices in the Headquarters Building are currently under- way. ETECS is comprised of optical character readers for text entry, direct access storage devices for data retention, video display terminals (VDT's) for text editing and typo- graphic formatting, printers for proofing and small reports generation, and a magnetic tape unit for the production of tapes to drive a phototypesetter, all linked to and con- trolled by a minicomputer. Although this assemblage is of the latest design, and is inherently effective, it is ETECS' configura- tion which makes faster job turnaround, higher quality, and greater publisher control CONFIDENTIAL 21 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL possible. Components which are on-line to ETECS have real-time ability to access, edit, compose, and proof their publications data. In effect the publisher has the option of processing material for publication through whatever text preparation and composition phases he wishes except for actual typeset- ting. Those things the publisher opts not to undertake, P&PD will do. ETECS is replac- ing systems which involve many iterations of a cumbersome, slow, and expensive edit/proof cycle; and it eliminates proce- dures which result in a reasonably priced, quality product only 40% of the time. ETECS is an example of the latest in the state-of-the-publishing art, and experience has demonstrated the improved quality, responsiveness, efficiency, and cost effectiveness that this technology makes possible. Success in ETECS' initial applica- tion has precipitated significant benefits, but when viewed in terms of its potential for optimizing the Agency's entire publishing program this first installation only repre- sents the first chapter of a long story. (Unclassified) 22 finance COMMERCIAL SYSTEMS AND AUDIT DIVISION 25X1 25X1 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL duties performed by an auditor in support- ing the procurement process, let's assume the Agency is placing business with a contractor for the first time. Prior to the award of a contract, an auditor must visit the contractor's facility and perform a survey of the contractor's internal controls and accounting practices to determine that the flow of information within its accounting system is reliable and to analyze the fairness of its cost accounting practices. The auditor will then determine if the fiscal capabilities of the contractor are sufficient to risk doing business with him. If his evaluation at this point reveals no serious problems, he then will determine the reasonableness of the contractor's cost proposal. After consulta- tion with the appropriate Agency Technical Officer, the auditor will prepare formal written reports of his findings. These reports are forwarded to the contracting officer responsible for the negotiation of a contract. When the contracting officer decides he is ready to negotiate a contract, the auditor will act as an advisor on the contract negotiation team. Later an auditor will, at the contrac- tor's plant, audit the actual costs to deter- mine that the contractor has followed the general and special terms of the contract. In addition, he must be certain that the con- tractor has followed the rules and regula- tions of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations, Cost Accounting Standards, generally accepted accounting principles, and the accounting practices set forth by company policy. When the job is completed by the contractor, the auditor will perform a final audit which completes the audit cycle. The Audit Branches also perform truth in negotiation audits of completed firm fixed price non-competitive contracts in excess of $100,000. This audit is for the purpose of evaluating the accuracy, completeness and currency of costs or pricing data submitted by the contractor. The Audit Branches maintain a special liaison relationship with the Dept. of De- fense, Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). DCAA has established six regional offices and in instances where the Govern- ment has large outlays of defense money, has audit offices in contractor's plants. The CONFIDENTIAL 23 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL Los Angeles audit office of CSAD, for instance, has a liaison arrangement with the DCAA Regional Director of that area. In order to insure that the Government pays fair and reasonable prices for desired quality, information is passed between DCAA and CSAD. In pursuit of this goal the relationship has been beneficial to both organizations. The Agency's needs are so varied that it finds itself doing business with organiza- tions as small as one person and as large as multi-national corporations. As an illustra- tion of this diversity, CSAD as of 1 July 1976 is auditing about 2,200 contracts placed with 380 contractors. The Proprietary Systems Branch (PSB) is concerned with Agency owned or controlled commercial type activities. PSB concurs for the Director of Finance in Administrative and Liquidation Plans and has custody of protective documents such as stock certifi- cates, notes, assignments, etc. The branch 25X1 approves and/or develops accounting sys- tems for proprietaries and performs consul- 24 25X1 tations on accounting and proprietary mat- ters. It performs certifications of proprietary financial transactions and analyzes, recon- ciles and processes financial statements issued by the proprietaries. PSB also main-25X1 tains the General Ledger and accounting records for the Voluntary Investment Plan and issues financial and statistical reports. It also gives financial advice and assistance to and prepares tax returns for non-appro- priated fund activities, such as EAA and GEHA. (Unclassified) communications PLANNING FOR A CRISIS: THE OC EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION PROGRAM D.K. Aitken 25X1 Fast-breaking events which lead to the evacuation of the official American presence in the field present a variety of problems to OC. The 1967 Middle East crisis, the Viet- nam evacuation, and the current situation in CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL Lebanon are examples of cases where it is critically important to maintain secure com- munications up until the last possible mo- ment before evacuation. The example of Beirut proves that there may be no way of knowing just how long a crisis situation will last. Maintaining a communications capability in the face of imminent evacuation means a certain amount of material and equipment must remain functional up until the actual moment of departure, and must be quickly and completely destroyed at the proper time. A sound destruction program is the key to planning for communications in such a situation. As part of its emergency planning, OC has developed a worldwide emergency destruc- tion program to ensure the timely and systematic safehavening and/or destruction of classified cryptographic material and equipment, and classified files. The objec- tives of the program can usually be met without severely affecting OC's primary functions of providing essential, secure communications in a crisis. OS has helped OC develop this program by providing basic guidelines which OC has adapted to its own unique communications role. Both components together periodically review the procedures in the program to determine if they should be revised or updated. Basic to this destruction program is an emergency destruction plan, and every OC facility overseas has one. Each plan varies according to local conditions and circum- stances, since experience has shown the plan must be tailored to fit the post to be effective. Every professional and nonprofes- sional communicator is thoroughly indoctri- nated in emergency planning, and is trained in the use of such destruction devices and techniques as incinerators, desintegrators and sodium nitrate. The emergency destruction plans are divided into three phases. The three phases permit the amount of classified holdings to be gradually reduced as the threat to the security and tenability of the OC facility escalates. Because of the unique OC re- quirement to maintain secure communica- CONFIDENTIAL 25 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL tions, the three phases differ from the emergency destruction routine of other Agency components at the post. These three phases have been successfully com- pleted in time periods ranging from twenty minutes to a number of weeks, depending upon the amount of classified material and equipment to be destroyed and the situa- tion. Before any phase of the plan may be implemented, authorization must be granted by the senior Agency official present at the post. The plan defines the duties and responsibilities in enough detail to maintain full operational effectiveness under each action phase. All OC personnel review the emergency destruction plan upon arrival at the OC facility and, at a minimum, semiannually thereafter. A clear understanding of the intent of the emergency destruction plan is vital. OC and its overseas representatives also make a concerted effort to ensure that the plan is an integral part of the post's E&E plan approved by the principal officer. In part, this coordination is intended to ensure that adequate emergency destruction de- 26 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL vices and emergency power for their opera- tion will be available when needed. OC's major assets in the emergency destruction program are its personnel in the field. While there is no sure formula for predicting an individual's action or reactions during an emergency, OC personnel have proved remarkably cool under the pressure of a sudden or prolonged crisis. Over the past ten years, many OC personnel have had occasion to use their emergency de- struction plans with no known serious com- promise of classified material or equipment. Emergency destruction planning is a con- stant process and experience teaches many lessons. As the need arises, OC reviews and amends its emergency destruction program to ensure that it is the best possible in the face of ever changing world conditions. (Unclassified) data processing Presidential Management Initiatives- Efficiency Evaluation Study for Minicomputers Under the Presidential Management Ini- tiatives program the Agency was asked to identify to the Office of Management and Budget ten efficiency evaluations that could be completed before the end of FY 1977. Efficiency evaluations focus on a given activity to determine, if there are ways of achieving cost savings, or a more efficient approach to providing a service, or a less burdensome way of achieving program objectives. One such efficiency evaluation proposed by the Office of Data Processing and subsequently selected by the Comptroller for submission to OMB was an on-going study to determine if an information storage and retrieval application could be per- CONFIDENTIAL 27 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL formed more efficiently by a standalone minicomputer than by the large scale multi- application computer systems of ODP. This study is an important step in a continuing program in ODP to define the role of minicomputers in the Agency. Currently, large scale computer systems are used by ODP to provide computer services to a wide range of applications and users throughout the Agency. Many of these can be classified as information storage and retrieval applications. Information storage and retrieval systems have much common- ality in the functions that are performed and the ADP techniques that are used to accom- plish these functions. When large central- ized computers are used for these applica- tions, service to customers is affected by competition among the customers for com- puter resources, interaction among applica- tions which can slow down response time to one or more users, and occasional system outages. In this study ODP has selected an appropriate application involving a data base containing information on Special Clearances. Data will be converted for use on a minicomputer, programs will be pre- pared, and operational tests will be per- formed and evaluated to determine if the minicomputer can provide greater reliability (i.e., less downtime from system failure) and better response time for storage and retriev- al functions at less cost. ODP expects to complete this study by January 1977. (Unclassified) 28 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL training THE AGENCY LANGUAGE PROBLEM AND TOTAL IMMERSION TRAINING The Agency is losing a high percentage of its foreign language skills through retire- ments. Today only 54 percent of the univer- sities and colleges in the United States require foreign language as a degree re- quirement, and young officers entering the Agency are bringing fewer foreign language skills with them. One of the methods now used in OTR to help stop the erosion of our language skills is total immersion train- ing, also referred to as language houses. These proarams. conducted at the are limited to 12 students. i ney live together in a residential setting for a four-week period with four or more native-speaking instructors. The foreign language only is spoken around the clock, making the training stressful for student and instructor alike. In addition to the native-speaker, Agency officers with fluency in the target language and with specialized knowledge also visit as lecturers and role-players to insure that the training is oriented to clandestine operations work. The programs are conducted in close co- ordination with the operating components; last year's Russian total immersion program was a joint enterprise of OTR and the Soviet East Europe Division. To date, 100 Agency officers have partici- pated in language houses. Fifty percent of the officers who began the program with an elementary 2 to 2+ speaking proficiency have reached the professional 3 level or better; 70 percent of the officers have improved their language skills at least one- half level; all have developed confidence in dealing with operational problems, which are emphasized. Those who benefit most from the instruc- tion are officers with a 2 or 2+ speaking CONFIDENTIAL 29 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL it 30 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL proficiency and are designated for overseas assignment shortly after the course. These officers clearly have the proper background and motivation to obtain maximum benefit from the training, and leave the course with the necessary preparation to conduct Agency business abroad. Our language houses do not produce miracles or native speakers, but they do provide a sound approach to the difficult problem of enabling officers with a good foundation to reach professional competency. In FY 1977 the Language Learning Center will offer total immersion courses in Chi- nese, French, German, Spanish and Rus- sian. With careful student selection, these programs are making a major contribution to offsetting dwindling Agency language skills at the professional level. (Unclassified) CONFIDENTIAL 31 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Mil Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL 32 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL innovation DDA PERSONNEL ROTATION PROGRAM CMO/DDA Agency management has long been con- cerned about the multi-discipline develop- ment of Agency officers ultimately capable of assuming the most senior positions such as Staff and Division Chief, Office Director and Deputies and Associate Deputies at the Directorate level. It has been generally recognized that those individuals possess- ing the broadest possible backgrounds will be best qualified to assume these high level executive positions in the Agency of the future. Recognizing the need for such develop- ment in the Directorate of Administration and because of our particularly diverse functions, the Deputy Director for Adminis- tration, last May, announced the establish- ment of the senior DDA Personnel Rotation Program. The pilot phase of this effort was designed to operate on a limited basis but as experience is gained its expansion is envisioned. Each DDA Office Director (except Director of Medical Services) was asked to identify at least one position at the GS-15/16 level which could be staffed by an officer from another sub-group. Further, at least two officers (GS-14/15) from each sub-group were to be nominated as candidates for rotation. Each Office was asked to ensure that all qualified employees were consid- ered for participation. CONFIDENTIAL 33 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86700114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL Provided with position descriptions for each job and biographic background for each nominee the Senior Personnel Re- sources Board (SPRB) members began the arduous task of matching people with posi- tions. Their selections were forwarded in 34 Assignees early August and the SPRB convened in mid-August to reach agreement on assign- ments. As a result of this selection effort the following rotational assignments were an- nounced by Mr. Blake on 27 August: Career Sub-Group Position for Which Selected MS Instructional Development Group/OTR MT Personnel Officer-SAS/Office of Deputy for Plans and Control/OP MP Support Planning Officer/M&AS/DDA MZ Chief/Engineering Support Division/OC ML Chief/"C" Division/ODP MF Logistics Planning Officer/Chief/Plans and Programming Staff/OL MG Accountant/Member, Planning Staff/OF MC Deputy Chief/Technical Security Division/OS CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL The Career Management Staff/DDA is presently working out final administrative arrangements including assignment timing. The assignment duration, while flexible, will generally be for a two-year period and a letter of understanding will outline adminis- trative details of the assignment. The parent Office will maintain career management responsibility for their participating career- ist. The Deputy Director for Administration sees this as the necessary first step in the endeavor to ensure that the Directorate's future leaders are well rounded individuals experienced in numerous administrative fields. Plans are presently being developed to establish a similar rotation program for GS-09 through GS-13 officers. Senior Direc- torate management is enthused about these programs and will closely monitor their progress. (Confidential) CONFERENCE BUILDING Work was begun early last summer to reconfigurerrade the sleeping quar- ters in the Building and to addi- tionally provide a seminar-study area, lounge/TV room, a game room and honor bar facility. New carpeting was put in place thoughout, and the complete interior of the building was renovated and repainted. CONFIDENTIAL 35 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Mil Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL 36 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL The total sleeping capacity of the LAUREL Building consists of 34 single bedroom and 13 single bed/sitting room duplex accom- modations. There is also a VIP bedroom suite and, if required, the seminar-study area can be converted into an additional VIP accommodation. Conference rooms are lo- cated on both the first and second floors, and each can conveniently accommodate up to 24 people. A 25-meter swimming pool with diving boards is located adjacent to the building and is available for use on the "buddy" system. The LAUREL Conference Building is lo- cated at the rear of the Public Works Building, just off Raccoon Road. It is more convenient to the Main Gate than most other STC facilities, but transportation is needed to get to the Mess Hall. Bus service and other transportation can be provided when required. The LAUREL Conference Building has already been used by small working groups who have found its relative isolation highly conducive to work and its accommodations comfortable and pleasant. (Unclassified) CONFIDENTIAL 37 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL The total sleeping capacity of the LAUREL Building consists of 34 single bedroom and 13 single bed/sitting room duplex accom- modations. There is also a VIP bedroom suite and, if required, the seminar-study area can be converted into an additional VIP accommodation. Conference rooms are lo- cated on both the first and second floors, and each can conveniently accommodate up to 24 people. A 25-meter swimming pool with diving boards is located adjacent to the building and is available for use on the "buddy" system. The LAUREL Conference Building is lo- cated at the rear of the Public Works Building, just off Raccoon Road. It is more convenient to the Main Gate than most other STC facilities, but transportation is needed to get to the Mess Hall. Bus service and other transportation can be provided when required. The LAUREL Conference Building has already been used by small working groups who have found its relative isolation highly conducive to work and its accommodations comfortable and pleasant. (Unclassified) CONFIDENTIAL 37 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 ADMAG� ADMINISTRATION MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP OMS CONFIDENTIAL The ADMAG was established on 2 July 1973 as a forum for continuing dialogue between senior management and employ- ees. It is composed of nine members, one from each DDA office and one from the Administration Career Service. Members are generally from the age group 30-45 and from grades GS-11 through GS-14. The tour of participation is for one year, with one-half of the membership rotating semi-annually. The group meets at least once each month, most often during non-duty hours. Under the original guidelines, the purpose of the group is to study issues and problems affecting the Directorate and to make rec- ommendations for improvement. While sug- gestions from employees are welcome, the Group is instructed to avoid personal griev- ances since grievance procedures are already available. If you have an Agency, Directorate, or Office level idea or an honest criticism that you would rather not pursue personally, perhaps ADMAG can assist you. ADMAG has no formal production re- sponsibility, nor is it intended to replace existing formal command channels. In its first year, ADMAG approached issues and problems with in-depth research reports to the DDA. However, as a result of advertising its existence, interaction with Directorate management and through presentations at "Trends and Highlights" (an excellent source for feeling the pulse of employee concerns), the Group has become involved with more and broader issues. Conse- quently, new procedures have been devised to handle this increased activity. Issues or problems are now thoroughly screened in an effort to determine appropriate action and then recommendations in the form of brief memoranda are forwarded to the DDA for his consideration, thus permitting the Group to focus its efforts on a greater number of issues having Agency, Director- ate and Office wide impact. CONFIDENTIAL 39 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL Of course, not every item considered by the ADMAG has resulted in a demonstrable change in policies or functioning of the DDA, nor has every item investigated culminated in a suggestion for action to the DDA. In the majority of these cases, investigation showed that efforts were being made else- where to satisfy the particular need. How- ever, no item is ignored, since in many instances the discussion of these issues does stimulate interest and action on the part of the responsible component or indi- vidual. The importance of good communication cannot be over stated and the key to good communication is the ability of people to level with one another. ADMAG offers an excellent forum for opening the informal lines of communication, upward, downward and horizontally, throughout the DDA. Through the ADMAG, employees have an opportunity to directly exchange views or offer honest criticisms to the DDA; anony- mously if so desired. Some items that appear on a review of past ADMAG minutes are: VIP Price Infor- mation; Honor and Merit Awards; Drug and Alcohol Abuse and Prevention Programs; Applicant Processing Procedures; CIA Ex- hibit Displays; Fitness Reports; Parking at Non-Headquarters Sites; Small Car Parking Lanes; After Hours Security Checks; Flex Hours; Non-Profit Transportation Associ- ation; and Employee Concerns Over Va- cancy Notices. The DDA feels that ADMAG's contribution to these items and the other issues it has addressed is a helpful "sound- ing board" and communications link to the employees in the Directorate. In addition to ADMAG, many of the offices within the Directorate have their own Man- agement Advisory Group organized for the purpose of examining issues and problems at the Office level. Similar MAG organiza- tions may be found in the other Directorates; and finally, there also exists a DCl/MAG. 40 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL Following is a list of your current ADMAG representatives, through 1 January 1977: Office MG OC OF ODP OL OMS OP OS OTR (Confidential) Name Ext. POSITION MANAGEMENT OP/PMCD Staff President Ford, in a recent memorandum, called upon Heads of Departments and Agencies to reexamine their position man- agement systems to ensure that they are operating effectively and in full compliance with applicable laws and regulations. He made reference to such things as "excessive organization fragmentation," "duplication of work" and "superfluous layers of supervi- sion." He clearly expressed his concern that deficiencies in Position Management are resulting in an unnecessary increase in the cost of Government. What is Position Management? Quite simply, position management is what a manager does when he decides how his organization should be structured, how many people are needed to accomplish the work, what types of positions are needed, and what duties and responsibilities should be included in the positions. In making these decisions, he should attempt to strike a balance between economy and effective- ness, considering such things as the mis- sion, work simplification, employee utiliza- tion, motivation, career opportunities, and the availability of funds and ceiling. Many of the manager's problems such as bottlenecks, red tape, high employee turn- over, recruiting difficulty, high error rate, grievance cases, employee cliques, and CONFIDENTIAL 41 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL unmanageable backlogs are tied to weak- nesses in organization and job design. As noted by the President, some of these weaknesses are: Fragmentation (the unnecessary splitting of an organization into many small elements)� Some problems created by fragmentation are that small units can become so special- ized that they restrict the employees' poten- tial contribution; communications between units are restricted and action slows down; uncertainty develops as to who is responsi- ble for an activity; and fluctuations in work load are more difficult to manage. Excessive Layering (too many levels in the chain of command)�Problems here are that ideas or products have difficulty moving since they must be reviewed and restated by each supervisor; top management is often unaware of how decisions were made at lower levels; controversy on important issues does not always reach the boss' attention; and lower level supervisors and employees become frustrated because they are too restricted in what they can do. Unnecessary Positions (Special assistant, deputy chiefs, aides, and staff assistant positions that are not really needed)�These often add another level to the chain of command. This creates delays in decision- making, increases the possibility of duplica- tion of effort, and tends to create staff/line conflicts. Narrow Span of Control (supervision over too few people or areas of activity)�A narrow span of control can stifle initiative and discourage individual responsibility for work quality, limit opportunity for career development, and often result in excessive overhead expense. To summarize, when a manager has completed the organization of positions and functions for his office, he should ask himself the following questions: Have I eliminated all unnecessary work? Am I using the most efficient work methods and tech- niques? Does my organizational structure reflect the division of duties and lines of authority under which I plan to operate? Have I avoided unnecessary mixing of high 42 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL and low level duties that require unrelated knowledges and skills? Do all my positions contain sufficient duties to employ gainfully the number of persons I plan to assign to them? Have I eliminated all unnecessary positions such as deputies, special assist- ants, aides and staff assistants? Does my organizational structure and position design provide for career development of employ- ees? Have I organized the work in such a way that it will be challenging to employees? If the manager can answer yes to all these questions, he has achieved the objective of Position Management which is to have an arrangement of work that strikes a balance between economy and effectiveness. (Unclassified) CAFE CORONARY OMS Foreign body obstruction of the upper airway resulting in death occurs more fre- quently than most people realize. It is thought that approximately 4,000 Americans of all ages die annually as a result of choking on a foreign object. In adults the most common cause of choking is the obstruction caused by large chunks of meat not thoroughly chewed. This is accentuated by alcoholic intake, which makes an individ- ual careless when it comes to chewing his food thoroughly. In children, especially in- fants, common objects which cause such obstruction are not usually large pieces of meat but peanuts, hard candy, marbles, etc., which will easily block the small airways found in infants. The symptoms associated with this emer- gency are similar to those noted in a myocardial infarction or heart attack, thus the name "Cafe Coronary." Although there are similarities in these two conditions, there are also important differences, and the OMS Training Officer will gladly explain them to you. A new life-saving technique has been developed by Dr. Henry J. Heimlich, Direc- tor of Surgery of the Jewish Hospital of CONFIDENTIAL 43 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL Cincinnati. This procedure, known as the Heimlich Maneuver, has now been accepted by the Red Cross and is very effective in removing foreign material which has blocked the upper air passages. This easily applied technique is based on the principle of increasing the pressure in the lungs to force out the obstructing material. A short movie which explains the reasons for the success of this procedure and how it should be applied is available in the OMS. If you desire to see the film and have your questions answered personally, please call 25X1 your OMS Training Officer (Unclassified) 25X1 PDP�THE PERSONNEL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM CMO/DDA The Directorate of Administration recently forwarded to OP its Fiscal Year 1977 edition of the Personnel Development Program (PDP). This submission marked the fourth 44 year of participation in this Agency-wide Program. The DDA consolidated report represents a summarization of the efforts of the DDA Sub-Groups and focuses upon certain career management activities planned for the next three fiscal years. The PDP, as the Agency's basic executive management and development plan, is just one of the integral parts of the Directorate's total management program which also in- cludes the Management By Objectives sys- tem and the Annual Personnel Plan. It is designed to identify anticipated executive level vacancies (GS-15 through GS-17 posi- tions) and the officers evaluated by their sub-groups as capable of fulfilling those requirements in the immediate three-year period. Further, the Directorate identifies mid- level officers (GS-13 through GS-15) who are to be groomed, through specifically named training courses and developmental assignments, to assume executive level positions in the more distant future. Thus, the PDP serves as catalyst for increased CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL planning as it prompts communication among the various elements concerned with career management and executive develop- ment, namely, Office Directors and their Deputies, senior line management, career boards and administrative and personnel officers responsible for planning and career development. By way of statistical illustration the Direc- torate this fiscal year reported the following anticipated GS 15-17 position vacancies: FY 1977-84 FY 1978-90 FY 1979-53 227 Positions The vast majority of the 227 projected vacancies are not net vacancies occasioned by the departure of our senior people through retirement or resignation but rather should occur as a result of internal reas- signments. This fiscal year the Directorate identified 423 officers, GS-13 through GS- 15, for development against our less imme- diate staffing needs. During FY 1975 the sub-groups were directed to formulate Developmental Pro- files which would exhibit training exper- iences and developmental assignments considered essential to the career advance- ment and enrichment of its careerists. This phase of the personnel management sys- tem, PDP Part II, is an attempt to (a) focus attention on the various opportunities avail- able to employees, (b) define the require- ments for development within a particular discipline, and (c) improve motivation by providing an understanding of what consti- tutes progress in career development. The Profiles, reviewed and refined during FY 1976, were published a few months ago and are available to DDA employees through their personnel and career management officers. The PDP serves as the Career Service vehicle for management and effective devel- opment of our careerists. The Program is expected to play an increasingly vital role as the Directorate faces a future of anticipated ceiling reductions and diminishing re- sources. (Unclassified) CONFIDENTIAL 45 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL features 46 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL THE POWERS/ABEL EXCHANGE Charles Wauhop, OC Approximately mid-January 1962, when the final negotiations were being completed for the exchange of Colonel Rudolf E. Abel for Francis Gary Powers, President Kennedy became concerned that the Russians might scoop the U.S. on the release of the details of the exchange. In conjunction with the exchange of Abel and Powers, an American student by the name of Prior, held by the East Germans, was to be released simultaneously with Mr. Powers, but at a different geographic loca- tion. Prior was to be released at Checkpoint Charlie and the exchange of Abel and Powers was to take place at the Gleiniger Bridge. The Abel/Powers exchange was not to be concluded until after U.S. Officials had received word that Prior had been released. The President wanted to hold a press conference as soon as the exchange was completed but did not want to announce the press conference in advance. The exchange was scheduled for approximately 0630 in West Berlin which would be 0130 in Wash- ington. The President therefore decided to invite members of the press to a White House party on 11 February and to make an announcement regarding the exchange as soon as he received word that the exchange had been completed. At a meeting at the Department of State, Mr. Pierre Salinger, White House Press Secretary, queried Mr. John McMahon, Operations Officer, Office of Special Activi- ties (OSA), as to the length of time it would take for the President to be notified when the exchange was completed. Mr. McMahon responded, "Five minutes." "Impossible," replied Mr. Salinger. "Five minutes," reiter- ated Mr. McMahon. "Show me," said Mr. Salinger. In conjunction with Chief, Signal Centers and Chief, EUCA, the following communica- tions plan was developed. CONFIDENTIAL 47 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL The existing staff circuitry at that time was a KW-26 protected circuit between Berlin and Frankfurt, a KW-26 protected circuit between Frankfurt and Headquarters, and a KW-26 protected circuit between Frankfurt and London. OSA had a KW-26 protected circuit to the Headquarters Signal Center. Since it was not possible to patch the Berlin circuit directly back to Headquarters or OSA, a manual torn tape relay would be required in Frankfurt and London. It was decided that OSA would establish its call-up circuit with London and that Frankfurt would transmit the release mes- sage two times after receiving it from Berlin: once via the Frankfurt/London circuit with torn tape relay performed in London to OSA, and secondly, via the Frankfurt/Head- quarters circuit with torn tape relay per- formed by Headquarters Signal Center to OSA. On 11 February 1962, the OSA/London circuit was activated 24 hours in advance of the scheduled Powers/Abel exchange. The exchange plan was as follows: 48 An Agency employee was to accompany the West German officials to Checkpoint Charlie where Mr. Prior was to be released. Upon the release of Mr. Prior, a telephone call would be made to the Gleiniger Bridge exchange group confirming that Mr. Prior had been released. Mr. Joseph Murphy, Office of Special Activities, Security Officer, was to provide positive identification of Mr. Powers. After the exchange had been completed, the information was to be communicated by phone to the Berlin Signal Center complex from the bridge area. The time of release would be inserted into a short pre-cut message (exchange completed at Z) and transmitted to Frankfurt, with Frankfurt performing torn tape relay simultaneously both to London and to the Headquarters Signal Center for further torn tape relay to OSA. As soon as the message was received in OSA, it was to be delivered to OSA OPS Center which had an open telephone line at the White House. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 LOA I CONFIDENTIAL The above circuitry and equipment con- figuration was tested hourly for some 18 hours prior to the scheduled exchange. The best test time that could be achieved during the hourly tests was five minutes, meeting the desired goal. On 12 February 1962 at approximately 0200 Washington time, President Kennedy called an emergency press conference and announced the release of Francis Gary Powers in exchange for Colonel Rudolf Abel. The notification message from West Berlin was received by the President in less than three minutes�beating a last minute trans-Atlantic phone call initiated at the same time the message was transmitted from Berlin and, more importantly, beating the best test time by over 2 minutes. This achievement clearly demonstrated that the newly created AXANET (Agency Communi- cations System) and the esprit de corps of its personnel was capable of providing extremely rapid service during periods of national emergency. (Unclassified) U-2 PILOT FREED Russia Swaps Powers for Red Spy One year, nine months, and ten days after his ill-fated U-2 Hight, Powers was dramatically exchanged for Soviet spy Colonel Rudolph Abel, in the first Cold War spy exchange. Following his release from a Russian prison, Powers was held in- communicado for another twenty-four days by the CIA in "safe" houses in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Powers' own story of the U-2 incident was suppressed for eight years, until the publi- cation of this book. � I N I, A.). FEXHI fl5 H.194,2 Exchange Is Made in Dramatic Meeting on German Bridge waxmcr.- I, rt. Pm. 6.7 Pmem. .1,1 ern lay Ur MO yew., �s� Mame.* Imo Ituvuu 14.11 ore, !Powers Returning Secretly; T. S. 'Plays Down' Exchange LEA1,711G Ar7.1111:171\ MEOW! %el 11 a- I-, IIt llll liar' 1111 VIIi/ CONFIDENTIAL 49 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL SWINE FLU VACCINE�A SHOT IN THE DARK? M.D., OMS Just over 250 years ago, Calvinist theolo- gian Cotton Mather learned from his African slave, Onesimus (who was "a pretty Intelli- gent Fellow"), that he once "had undergone an Operation, which had given him some- thing of the Small-Pox, and would forever preserve him from it . . ." The operation involved inoculation with fresh, virulent pus- tular material from an active case of small- pox, and the idea was not a winning one in Boston. The very concept was viewed as dangerous, irreligious, and probably crimi- nal. The Reverend Mather nonetheless thought the idea worth a trial, but managed to convince only a single physician, one Zabdiel Boylston, to try "the New Method." When the next epidemic swept through Boston, in the fall of 1721, Boylston inocu- lated some 242 people. Nearly 50% of the population of Boston (then about 12,000) contracted smallpox that year, and of those nearly 15% died. Among the inoculated group, deaths totalled only 2%. Thus began the practice of immunization in America. In the following three centuries, vaccines have been developed against some of the most devastating diseases known to man�after smallpox (and its more modern derivative, "vaccination" with cow- pox), came vaccines for rabies, typhoid fever, cholera, plague, tuberculosis, diph- theria, tetanus, pneumonia, yellow fever, typhus, whooping cough, poliomyelitis, mumps, measles, rubella ... and now swine flu. Although not all were totally successful, or safe, collectively they represent one of the most important accomplishments in the history of medicine. Despite the early successes of immuniza- tion programs, widespread public�and medical�opposition continued. Heated controversy accompanied the use of inocu- lation throughout the eighteenth century. It was said to cause smallpox in healthy people (it did!), start epidemics (probably 50 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL true), and kill (one of every 50 inoculated died) or disfigure its victims. In short, it was considered by many too dangerous to use regardless of the alternatives. Even the introduction of cowpox vaccination in 1796, a much safer procedure than inoculation, induced only a temporary lull in what shortly became a major anti-vaccination crusade. While the dangers of immunization had decreased, the successes of vaccination had reduced even further the risk of con- tracting the disease. By 1870, apathy and antipathy were so widespread that most Americans were com- pletely unprotected against smallpox. Pre- dictably, it shortly returned in force, and smallpox epidemics periodically swept the United States well into the twentieth century. Only within the past few decades has smallpox truly been banished from America, as well as most of the world. Ironically, for most Americans vaccination today in fact does pose a greater threat than does smallpox itself. The controversy surrounding immuniza- tion programs is based on a delicate balance that weighs the risks to individuals and society from a given illness against the risks inherent in a preventative vaccine. At one time, such decisions were relatively easy. Epidemics of diphtheria killed over 50% of infected children in some areas of colonial America; among the general popu- lation, smallpox routinely took 10-20% to the grave; and the less frequent, but more terrifying yellow fever epidemics occasion- ally had fatality rates approaching 50%. A vaccine didn't have to be very safe to beat these odds, if it could be delivered in a timely manner. A classic example was the early rabies vaccines, used regularly to combat a disease that was 100% fatal, but itself extracting a very high price in death and paralysis. By the mid-twentieth century, all this had changed. When the Salk vaccine against poliomyelitis was rushed into production in CONFIDENTIAL 51 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL 1955, and some 365 children contracted polio from defective vaccine, the public and medical outcry was almost unprece- dented�even though several million addi- tional doses had been successfully adminis- tered without serious complication. Subse- quently, the somewhat more effective Sabin oral vaccine was introduced, with a margin of safety considered acceptable�about one significant complication in 4,000,000 doses. Influenza vaccines have been, in a sense, the black sheep in the history of immunol- ogy. Despite being very safe, flu shots have just never caught on. Americans over- whelmingly (and rightfully) have viewed the flu as more a nuisance than a threat, and routine immunization has not been recom- mended for most healthy adults. Influenza is not without serious risks, however. An estimated 60,000-70,000 Americans died in the pandemic of "Asian flu" in 1957-58, and nearly 30,000 in the more recent "Hong Kong flu" epidemic of 1968-69. Even so, the deaths were almost always due to second- ary complications in elderly or otherwise weak or debilitated individuals. Healthy adults and youth were generally only inca- pacitated for a few days. Consequently, only those in unusually vulnerable conditions, or occupying positions where even a relatively brief illness must be avoided, have routinely received influenza vaccination. But there are influenzas, and then there are influenzas. The infamous influenza pan- demic of 1918 was much less a respector of persons than its modern, relatively toothless grandchildren. With a perverse abandon, this modern plague felled primarily young, healthy adults. Though the overall case fatality rate was only 1 in 200, so widespread was the disease that some 500,000 Ameri- cans died from its complications�ten times the American deaths in World War I. World- wide, there were an estimated 20 million deaths, and in some communities over 10% of the young men succumbed. 52 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL INFLUENZA FREOUENTLY COMPLICATED WITH PNEUMONIA IS PREVALENT AT THIS TIME THROUGHOUT AMERICA. TIM THEATRE IS CO-OPERAWIG RR THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTIL YOU MUST DO THE SAME IF YOU RAVE A COLD AND ARE COUCHING AND SNEEZING. DO NOT ENTER THIS THEATRE GO OE AND GO TO 1 I I UNTIL YOU ARE YELL coughing. Sneezing or Spitting Will Not Be permitted In The Theatre. In case you must cough or Sneeze, do so In Pour own hand- kerchief, and If the Coughing or Sneezing Peraists Leave The Theatre At Once. This Theatre has agreed to co-operate with the Department Of Health in disseminating the truth about Influenza, and thus serve a great educational purpose. HELP US TO KEEP CHICAGO THE HEALTHIEST CITY IN TUE WORLD JOHN DILL ROBERTSON COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH 1918 Poster It was therefore no mere curiosity when investigators studying an outbreak of flu at Fort Dix, New Jersey, this past February found it to be indistinguishable from "swine" flu. For it was into the pig population that the 1918 strain eventually disappeared, appar- ently no longer infecting man. Was it the 1918 strain? Identification techniques fifty years ago were not sophisti- cated enough to allow an absolute confirma- tion, but available indicators suggested it was the same. Would it be just as virulent? Possibly not. There was only one fatality among the 500 cases at Fort Dix, and today we are much better able to treat serious complications. Still, it is too early to know for sure. The swine flu (technically the "A/New Jersey strain") did not spread from Fort Dix this past winter; but the 1918 strain probably also had been around a year or more prior to the pandemic. If a new epidemic was about to begin, it would not be until at least the next flu season�late fall and winter, 1976-77. CONFIDENTIAL 53 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL The decision to undertake a massive, pre- emptive immunization campaign against a potential, but still hypothetical, epidemic of a dangerous new strain of influenza was therefore made within an extensive histori- cal context. Fortunately, a major problem in the past was largely irrelevant to the current decision. Immunology had come a long way since 1721, and the flu vaccines were very safe�no documented fatalities reported in thirty years. The final decision, then, was quickly reduced to weighing the cost in dollars and manpower (and minimal associ- ated malaise) against the likelihood that a serious epidemic would be avoided. A vaccine was available, which at 70% effec- tiveness, should, if effectively utilized, blunt an epidemic. But is there going to be an epidemic? In the final analysis, this seemingly central question has become irrelevant. For, how likely does an epidemic have to be before a safe, but expensive, program would be appropriate? One chance in three? In ten? If there was a reasonable risk, and there definitely is, there was no real alternative. (Unclassified) 54 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL about dcla HELP WANTED OP An Agency retiree, disappointed with his job prospects in California and thinking of moving back to Washington, obtains an executive position within commuting dis- tance of his retirement home. A staff employee, who wisely begins job hunting well before he retires, comes out of a job interview with a position that pays double the salary of the vacancy he applied for. A resignee, who finds the Agency cannot fully utilize her qualifications, wins a position in the Washington area that requires pre- cisely her training and experience. Like many others who look for work after they leave the Agency, those persons ob- tained new employment with the help of the Retirement Counseling and Employee As- sistance Branch (RCEAB). Counselors in RCEAB advise their "clients" on all aspects of job hunting, such as preparing an effec- tive background resume, drawing up a mailing list of potential employers, and handling interviews. Counselors provide specific job leads and sometimes can make direct referrals to employers who welcome former Agency personnel. Job seekers can browse at their leisure through RCEAB's collection of employment reference materi- als, including current vacancy listings. In recent months employers have solicited Agency applicants for a management open- ing with a prominent recruiting firm on the West Coast, an administrative position at a distinguished private school in New Eng- land, a security job (at $30,000) with a publishing company in the South, editorial research vacancies at a university in Wash- ington, D.C., and many other positions, including clerical jobs. Openings have been filled in the federal government also. Inter- esting part time work is often available, too. Finding and landing a job takes time, however, sometimes months, depending on the job market, the job seeker's qualifica- CONFIDENTIAL 55 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL tions, and his (or her) mobility. Normally RCEAB's contacts can do more for the local job hunter than for the retiree who has resettled in a distant state, but promising leads, frequently from ex-employees, come in from widespread locations. Competition is keen for good openings, which are quickly filled. Matching qualifications of available clients with job requirements of rapidly turning over vacancies is another constant problem. A few job seekers have reported cool receptions from potential employers which they attributed to the bad publicity the Agency has received recently. A far greater number of employers take the initiative to apprise RCEAB of job openings because they recognize Agency talent, experience, and dependability. They realize, moreover, that the retiree with an annuity is usually available for less than the current market price for comparable ability. Nearly one out of three job seekers who work energetically and patiently with RCEAB find rewarding employment as a result of 56 their combined efforts. RCEAB provides advice, guidance, and leads; the successful job hunter composes his own resume, gains interviews, and sells himself to a future employer. (Unclassified) FIGHTING INFLATION M&AS/DDA 25X1 The Director of Central Intelligence, in a memo dated November 1974, initiated an Agency-wide program to fight inflation and reduce daily operating expenses. The pro- gram was an outgrowth of the nationwide energy crises and inflationary problems of the early 70's. In spite of the plethora of other cost savings programs in operation at the time (carpooling, paper-savings, reduc- tion in lighting, heating, and air conditioning) the new multi-faceted program, which con- tinues in operation today, has met with resounding success. Based on the premise that . . . "only by management example will all employees CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL come to understand that we are truly committed to this task," the program has netted $8.4 million in savings since its inception. Considering the nature of the DDA mission to manage many Agency resources and provide services of common concern, it was not surprising that DDA was appointed to lead the way in this program. Particularly gratifying to Directorate man- agement, however, was the magnitude of the response�measured in terms of dollar savings and innovation�as a direct result of the efforts of DDA employees and compo- nents alike. At the end of Fiscal Year 1975 annual savings within the DDA were reported at $1.3 million while Fiscal Year 1976 (Transi- tional Quarter excluded) savings ap- proached $2.2 million (33% of total Agency savings). More importantly, new innovations and personal practices were put in motion which promise a conservative estimate of $2.7 million in savings each year by DDA components. Several of the measures in force have become second nature to most of us, e.g., reducing use of copying equipment, turning off lights in unused or naturally lighted areas, using microfilm to reduce storage requirements, reducing POV travel particu- larly where Agency shuttle buses can be used, and using less costly substitutes for commonly used office supplies. But there remains many potential oppor- tunities for cost savings within the DDA�it only takes YOU to do something about them. � Large volume copying�where 24-hour turnaround can be tolerated�is ac- complished most economically in the General Printing Plant in GJ-56 Head- quarters. � Too much paper is still finding its way to destinations where microforms would suffice. CONFIDENTIAL 57 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL � Many desks are crammed with miscel- laneous office supplies which could be put into use if returned to the Building Supply Office. � Many offices are receiving computer generated reports in more quantities than are used. � Many homegrown computer programs run inefficiently in the current comput- ing environment. Also, many user files of limited value or low use rate occupy direct-access storage where lower cost media would suffice. � Forms continue in use which have become obsolete or overly complex in the changing administrative environ- ment. These, of course, are but a few examples of the work which confront us in the continuing struggle to cut costs. As pointed out in a recent memo to the DCI on this subject, ". . . we should not forget or overlook the efforts of the individuals who 58 are the totality of the Agency. It is this increased concern of the employees them- selves in what now have become uncon- scious actions that are netting us significant real savings." (Unclassified) LIFE SAVERS, OP OP 25X1 Few of us have had the opportunity to participate in activities or occupations that are directed toward life saving. Fortunately, there is another answer for those of us who desire to make a contribution. It is an easy procedure�no specialized training is re- quired, and it takes only a few minutes. What is it? The simple and significant solution is to be a regular contributor to the life-saving Blood Donor Program. The Agency has an active Blood Donor Program and although we have received many commendations from the Red Cross for our participation throughout the years, our potential is far greater than our average CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL monthly donation of 180 pints. What more fitting time than during our Bicentennial year to increase our monthly participation to the figure of 200. The opportunity is available to all of us on the first Tuesday of each month in the Tunnel at Headquarters Building. If your office representative does not contact you, consider this your personal invitation to participate. As a direct result of our Blood Donor Program, during the past five years approxi- mately 3,000 pints of blood have been replaced for Agency employees, retirees, and their dependents. This "replacement of blood" brings our efforts very close to home. Fortunately, those who have not or cannot donate may still be recipients because of the overall participation of the Agency in this worthwhile program. In order to insure this benefit for the future, why not become one of the 200 monthly life savers who make it possible for all Agency employees and their families to benefit from your gift of life? (Unclassified) CONFIDENTIAL 59 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 %�%/11111116.4111111;11 Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP86-00114R000100150003-1 .1 ,